John Chrysostom and the Greeks: Hellenism and Greek Philosophy in the Rhetoric of John Chrysostom by Gkortsilas, Paschalis
 JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND THE GREEKS 
 HELLENISM AND GREEK PHILOSOPHY IN THE RHETORIC 
OF JOHN CHRYSOSTOM 
 
BY PASCHALIS GKORTSILAS 
 
December 21, 2017 
 
 
DECLARATION 
Submitted by PASCHALIS GKORTSILAS to the UNIVERSITY OF EXETER as a 
thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Theology and Religion, December 21, 
2017. 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material 
and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement.  
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified 
and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a 
degree by this or any other university. 
 
SIGNATURE:  Paschalis Gkortsilas (signed) 
 
 

  
Dedicated to the Memory of 
Γεώργιος, Εµµανουήλ, Πασχάλης, and Μπουµπού 
ἔνθα τοιοῦτον οὐδέν ἐστιν, ἔνθα ἀπέδρα ὀδύνη, λύπη καὶ στεναγµός 
John Chrysostom, Homilies on 2 Timothy 1.1 (PG 62:601)    
 
v 
Abstract 
John Chrysostom and the Greeks 
Hellenism and Greek Philosophy in the Rhetoric of John Chrysostom 
By Paschalis Gkortsilas 
 
The aim of the present study is to examine how Hellenism and Greek philosophy 
were received and used in arguments in the writings of John Chrysostom. The thesis is 
divided into five chapters of varying lengths, with the fifth chapter being the conclusion 
of the thesis.  
Chapter 1 is divided into two major parts. Part A is the story of certain major 
scholarly works on the topic of Hellenism and Christianity, particularly in late antiquity. 
Part B turns to previous scholarship on John Chrysostom and Hellenism specifically. 
We discuss three particular aspects of John’s reception, rhetoric, philosophy, and 
religious identity while also looking in interpretations from modern scholarship. This 
part and the chapter conclude with a general overview of the argument and an 
identification of research gaps. 
Chapter 2 is divided into five parts. After a discussion of the identity of those called 
Greeks in John’s corpus we proceed to analyse his extensive criticism of several aspects 
of Hellenism: philosophy, religion, public attitudes, and the binding power of tradition. 
The third part goes into the opposite direction and examines instances of John’s positive 
references to Hellenes and Greek history. In part four we see the reception moving on 
from the binary of praise and criticism and we discuss examples of both praise and 
criticism combined, along with indifferent references to Hellenes and John’s practical 
suggestions on how the Christians should treat the Greeks.  
In Chapter 3 we examine John’s embodiments of Hellenism and Christianity 
respectively through his comparisons of individuals. The first three parts consist of 
vi 
major comparisons, which are the most frequent ones in terms of the individuals 
compared, and minor comparisons, which are smaller treatments and usually group 
individuals together instead of treating them separately. The fourth part is a close 
analysis of Chrysostom’s Discourse on Babylas, a treatise that includes a major 
comparison between Babylas and Diogenes but also provides an opportunity for John to 
launch a full-scale attack against Hellenism.  
Finally, in Chapter 4 we will be looking into John’s reception of a specific 
philosophical school: the Cynics. After situating John’s own texts within previous 
Christian tradition and assessing differences and similarities, we complete the chapter 
by a comparison between John and the Cynics and their respective conception of a 
specific philosophical concept, that of autarkeia. 
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1. Christianity, John Chrysostom and Hellenism: The Status 
Quaestionis 
Christianity’s engagement with late antique culture is a perennial issue that has been 
studied from a variety of angles and approaches. One of the aspects of this engagement 
is the relationship, interaction, and confrontation between Christianity and Hellenism. 
In this chapter, our focus will be the reception of the relationship between Christianity 
and Hellenism in modern scholarship, and second, the reception of John Chrysostom’s 
role within this relationship.   John Chrysostom lived in an age when Christianity was 
slowly becoming the dominant religion in the Roman Empire and his attitude towards 
Hellenism has habitually provoked two very different responses: on the one hand, there 
are those who consider him someone “distinguished for furthering that fruitful 
encounter between the Christian message and Hellenic culture which has had an 
enduring impact on the Churches of East and West,”1 and that “with John Chrysostom 
we see Greek culture incorporated into a newly ascendant Christianity.”2 On the other 
hand, he has been recently called a “champion of anti-Hellenism”3 (whatever that may 
mean), a charge which we will attempt to trace as we try to see which, if either, of the 
two pictures described above is an accurate representation or based on an image of 
Chrysostom tailored to fit pre-existing conceptions. It should be obvious from the 
beginning that both positions suffer from certain limitations. The first position is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Letter of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI on the occasion of the 16th centenary of the death of St 
John Chrysostom, 10 August 2007, accessed 16 December 2017, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-
xvi/en/letters/2007/documents/hf_ben-xvi_let_20070810_giovanni-crisostomo.html. 
2 Jacqueline De Romilly, A Short History of Greek Literature, trans. Lillian Doherty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 220. Romilly identifies the following as the assimilated elements of 
Greek culture: rhetorical devices, echoes of classical Greek authors (Plato, Aeschylus, Demosthenes, 
Homer), and images drawn from the ancient Greek poets.   
3 Niketas Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret: The Christian Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy 
and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 52.  For a 
similar view to Siniossoglou see Frank R. Trombley, Hellenic Religion and Christianization, vol. 1, c. 
370-529 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 341: “the most eminent scholar and anti-Hellene of the century to occupy 
the patriarchal throne, John Chrysostom.” We will be discussing other similar views in more detail in the 
second part of this chapter.  
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sweeping judgment, which tends to forget that the encounter between Hellenism and 
Christianity was not always fruitful, or peaceful, for that matter.  
Furthermore, it tends to imply that the two were clear, delimited categories. A 
subsequent outcome of the first position was the invention of the term “Christian 
Hellenism”, commonly used to describe the Cappadocians’ attempted synthesis of the 
two worldviews. While many scholars use the term, few have been able to define 
Christian Hellenism or to explain what it entails. One of the oldest definitions, and an 
excellent example of someone who thought of Christianity and Hellenism as delimited 
categories, comes from James Marshall Campbell: 
If Hellenism is one thing and Christianity is another, the Greek Fathers are of 
the unity of Hellenism nevertheless. When we use the term “Christian 
Hellenism” we are not attempting a paradox. We mean that the old Hellenic 
civilization finds a new lease of life, a circumscribed life, a life minus the 
principle of indiscriminate liberty of the reason, for instance -but yet life and 
growth, as distinguished from decay and final death in its pagan haunts. The 
principal force of Christianity comes from elsewhere, most of its ideas and 
sentiments are non-Hellenic, but Hellenism contributed ideas too, and above all 
it contributed its literary art and its intellectual method… the content of 
Hellenism -its Greek philosophy- furnished the intellectual frames wherein 
orthodoxy placed the faith for aftertimes. Without Hellenism there would have 
been no golden age of Patristic literature, as we conceive it on its literary side-no 
Basil, no Chrysostom, no Gregory of Nazianzus.4 
 
The second view sometimes shows a very limited perception of what Hellenism 
was, and tends to equate Hellenism exclusively with pagan religious practices that had 
already been criticized in certain schools of Greek philosophy centuries before the 
emergence of Christianity.5 It is a view shared by many modern scholars6 and fails to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 James Marshall Campbell, The Greek Fathers (New York: Longmans, Green, 1929), 16-7. 
5 “The Academy, the successors of Plato … had made such offensive comments on the morality of 
the Homeric gods and had even gone so far as to expel the ancient poet from his ideal state.” Henry 
Chadwick, “Introduction,” in Origen: Contra Celsum, ed. and trans. Henry Chadwick (1953; repr., 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), x. Plato himself condemned Homer’s anthropomorphic 
conception of the deity in the Republic, 377d-387b. “The rejection of Hellenic religion did not imply a 
wholesale rejection of Hellenic culture.” Yannis Papadogiannakis, Christianity and Hellenism in the 
Fifth-Century Greek East: Theodoret’s Apologetics against the Greeks in Context (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Hellenic Studies, 2012), 23. “Yet, throughout late antiquity Greekness rarely became a strictly 
religious identity (whether in the eyes of those who identified themselves as Greeks or those who 
attacked it), if a religious identity is understood to be an identity delimited by doctrinal or narrowly cultic 
elements alone… one is hard-pressed to find a clear instance of a “pagan” author of late antiquity who 
sought to limit the signification of Hellen to a religious identity in any sustained way.” Aaron Johnson, 
15 
take into account a basic distinction apparent in most patristic writings: while some of 
the Fathers might be more sympathetic to Greek philosophy (or other aspects of 
classical culture) than others, almost all had an utterly negative attitude towards pagan 
(i.e. non-Christian) religious practices.7 Furthermore, paganism as a religious concept is 
certainly not limited to ancient Greeks, who a) would not even be aware of it since it’s a 
modern scholarly construction, and b) as an umbrella term it includes not just the 
religion of ancient Greeks but encompasses different religions (usually polytheistic) 
from different regions in antiquity.8 Therefore, the concept of anti-Hellenism is not 
necessarily synonymous with anti-paganism. However, it is true that the age of 
Chrysostom can be regarded as a transition point in the development of meaning of the 
terms Hellene (Ἕλλην) and Hellenism (Ἑλληνισµός) and their becoming almost 
synonymous with pagan religious practices in Christian writings.9 Late Antique Greek 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Religion and Identity in Porphyry of Tyre: The Limits of Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 5. 
6 Susanna Elm, “Hellenism and Historiography: Gregory of Nazianzus and Julian in Dialogue,” in 
The Cultural Turn in Late Ancient Studies: Gender, Asceticism, and Historiography, eds. Dale B. Martin 
and Patricia Cox Miller (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 261. 
7 In discussing Clement of Alexandria’s attitude toward Greek philosophy Joseph Trigg notes that 
“this favourable attitude toward Greek philosophy did not extend to pagan religion, toward which 
Clement exhibited the same implacable opposition that characterizes all early Christian authors.” Joseph 
W. Trigg, Origen (London: Routledge, 1998), 9. In certain instances, it is exactly the endorsement of 
pagan religion by certain philosophers (such as the Stoics) and poets that leads to Chrysostom’s rhetorical 
outbursts against the “Greeks.” Cf. R. R. Bolgar, “The Greek Legacy,” in The Legacy of Greece: A New 
Appraisal, ed. M. I. Finley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 434: “Outside the theological field the 
Christians’ attitude to their pagan heritage remained notably ambivalent. All patristic writers, even those 
who are generally in favour of reading ancient literature, display a lively distrust of the pagan tradition 
and habitually enlarge on the dangers of corruption and disbelief.” 
8 Paganus was the common term used for polytheists in the Latin west: “The adoption of paganus by 
Latin Christians as an all-embracing, pejorative term for polytheists represents an unforeseen and 
singularly long-lasting victory, within a religious group, of a word of Latin slang originally devoid of 
religious meaning. The evolution occurred only in the Latin west, and in connection with the Latin 
church. Elsewhere, “Hellene” or “gentile” (ethnikos) remained the word for “pagan”; and paganos 
continued as a purely secular term, with overtones of the inferior and the commonplace.” Peter Brown, 
“Pagan,” in Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World, eds. G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown and 
Oleg Grabar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 625. The word itself was used in this 
sense by the Christians themselves, and appears first in Christian inscriptions of the early fourth century. 
See Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986), 30. For the notion of 
monotheism in late antique debates between pagans and Christians see Monotheism between Pagans and 
Christians in Late Antiquity, eds. Stephen Mitchell and Peter Van Nuffelen (Leuven: Peeters, 2010); One 
God. Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire, eds. Stephen Mitchell and Peter Van Nuffelen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
9 Although N. Siniossoglou recognizes that the new meaning of the terms Hellene and Hellenism was 
not due to the Christians but originates from the Jewish opposition to the Hellenistic kings’ attempt to 
16 
speakers sometimes used the term to describe these, but this is not always related to the 
broader question of Christianity’s relationship to Hellenism. 
At the same time, Greek language and culture, the ideals of paideia and philosophy 
are all major parts of Hellenism that are neglected if we equate Hellenism primarily 
with pagan religious practices or beliefs.10 Any present-day treatment of Hellenism in 
late antiquity should also ideally incorporate discussions of notions such as ethnicity 
and culture, which include Hellenism as a religion but are not limited by this definition. 
Finally, it is important to note that the term Hellenism as used in this study does not 
have a strict geographical limit: Alexander’s conquests and the expansion of 
Christianity enabled Hellenism to spread beyond Greece, making it “the only national 
culture that also became a transnational ideal.”11  
Therefore, this chapter will assess scholarly treatments of John Chrysostom and 
Hellenism, seeking to highlight the weaknesses in the two prevalent approaches. What 
follows is an engagement with major scholarly endeavours on two fronts: a) the 
relationship between Christianity and Hellenism, and b) John Chrysostom and 
Hellenism. The first part will include a brief overview of the debate in the early and 
middle 20th century since these discussions set the stage for many of the subsequent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
convert them, he believes that the fact that the Christians accepted this connotation “illustrates the 
indebtedness of Christian apologetics to the Jewish opposition to Hellenism.” He also claims that a major 
motive for the Christian opposition to Hellenism was Christianity’s desire to abolish national identities 
and traditions and replace them with “a universal and exclusive religious identity” (Plato and Theodoret, 
48, n. 82-83). Siniossoglou’s argument can also be understood as a restatement of Julian’s snarky remark 
that the Christians have discarded the love of ancestral traditions in Contr. Gal. 238D (LCL 157:390). 
“The word Hellenism (Hellenismos) takes on a new meaning in late antiquity, a meaning that proclaims 
in the most eloquent way possible the relation between paganism and Greek culture. For Hellenism 
comes to mean “paganism” itself… in later Greek [Hellenism] sometimes means paganism and 
sometimes Greek culture (or Hellenism as we use the word), and that Hellenes are sometimes “pagans” 
and sometimes simply “Greeks.” G.W. Bowersock, Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Michigan, MI: 
University of Michigan Press, 1990), 10. Cf. Aaron Johnson, “Hellenism and Its Discontents,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Late Antiquity, ed. Scott Fitzgerald Johnson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 437-66. 
10 An identification that has its roots in antiquity, with certain scholars proposing Iamblichus as its 
original proponent while others trace it to Porphyry. See G. W. Bowersock, Julian the Apostate 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 84. But see n. 5 above for Aaron Johnson’s 
objections.  
11 Anthony Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the 
Reception of the Classical Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 390. 
17 
arguments, but at the same time often reflected the confessional background of the 
authors and the ways it influenced their positions. This will be followed by more recent 
discussions on the subject, which, although in many ways offering a revision and 
refinement of previous arguments, also tend to take one-sided positions that are still 
reflective of specific assumptions. In this respect, the figure of Chrysostom is 
emblematic of the two most common positions in scholarship on the subject: there are 
those who still consider Christianity and Hellenism in late antiquity as mortal enemies 
(with Chrysostom offering many texts towards this proposition), and those who see 
them as two movements which, even though they went through some difficult times in 
their relationship, eventually came to an irenic coexistence. Chrysostom and the 
Cappadocians are often used as particularly good examples of this. As we shall show, 
the literature on Chrysostom’s reception of Hellenism tends to conform to one of these 
two positions, and even though one might argue that Hellenism lacks enough coherence 
to be treated as a movement, most of our sources treat it as such and therefore we will 
too.  
It is important to contextualise the discussion in the broader debate about 
Christianity and Hellenism, particularly because this latter has been advanced on many 
fronts lately. This survey of the status quaestionis is a crucial starting point for this 
dissertation, which will argue that John Chrysostom’s position vis-à-vis Hellenism is 
much more complex than either of the two standard accounts allow. Our proposition is 
that to understand Chrysostom’s reception of Hellenism we need to consider the wider 
context of his writings in order to understand them both as responses to specific 
challenges (by, among others, Julian12 and Libanius) and as individual works with 
different audiences in mind. We should not necessarily be looking for consistency on 
the subject of Hellenism in his writings, because he never aimed to be consistent on this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Who was perceived by John as the “emperor who exceeded all who preceded him in impiety.” In 
Iuv. et Max. 1 (PG 50:573). 
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or many other matters. One could also argue here that Chrysostom has often been 
misinterpreted for the exact same reason as Origen (even though in the former’s case 
the state of the texts is infinitely better compared to most of the latter’s): due to the 
sheer amount of his works, he is often not read as carefully as he should be, which often 
leads to some bold, sweeping statements on the matter. A reading of John Chrysostom 
which takes these factors into account will render a more nuanced account of his 
relationship with Hellenism and will allow us to see whether Chrysostom reflects or 
challenges our understanding of Hellenism in Late Antiquity. 
a. Christianity and Hellenism  
The question of the relationship between Christianity and Hellenism has generated 
volumes of scholarship in a variety of scholarly fields such as history, classics and 
archaeology. However, we must not forget that it has also been a divisive issue for 
Christian theology from the days of the early Church and ever since. As already 
mentioned, it has been seen through different lenses, some looking at it as a fruitful 
encounter and others as a conflict between fundamentally incompatible worldviews. 
Even so, a worldview is not just a collection of propositions about the world, but could 
be an attitude or mode of behaviour. Thus, for example, Paul Cartledge argues that “for 
a Christian, religion is essentially an individual personal, and privatized matter, a 
relation between a particular person’s immortal soul and the Almighty. By contrast, the 
Classical Greeks’ religion was typically focused upon relations between men 
collectively and the gods, and was expressed in collective, official, public rituals, above 
all festivals.”13 This is, in fact, an unhelpful generalisation because this particular 
description of ancient Greek religion could be easily used to describe Christian public 
rituals in late antiquity, which were also collective and official, with the Roman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Paul Cartledge, The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 169. 
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Emperors being participants themselves. It might also be more accurate if it were 
intended to be one between modern forms of Christianity compared to ancient Greek 
religious rites. But it still would not be absolutely applicable to Christianity in late 
antiquity. 
Hellenism has been given various definitions throughout history, and almost all of 
them depended on what the relevant author wanted to emphasize as its distinct feature. 
Our aim in this section will be to provide a small sample of different definitions in order 
to become acquainted with the different perspectives and challenges Hellenism 
presented to the Christians of late antiquity. One of the first comprehensive definitions 
of Hellenism comes from Herodotus in the fifth century BC; it is a summative 
description that selects four features as the marks of Hellenic kinship: “then again, there 
is the fact that we are all Greeks—one race speaking one language, with temples to the 
gods and religious rites in common, and with a common way of life.”14 A little later on 
Isocrates would provide a very different definition in his Panegyrikos: “Athens has 
made it so that the name of the Greeks designates not a race (genos) but a mindset, and 
those are called Greeks who share in our culture rather than our common stock 
(physis).”15 This is a classic cultural definition of Hellenism, which seems to be 
exclusive of any racial or ethnic elements and is usually considered as the archetype of 
the idea of universal Hellenism, which would only be truly actualized by Alexander. 
However, as A. Kaldellis has argued, Isocrates’ focus was not on spreading Hellenic 
culture to barbarians. His definition was primarily intended for “other Greeks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Herodotus, Hist. 8.144.2 (Historiae, ed. N. G. Wilson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 
775; Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Robin Waterfield, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 539): 
αὖθις δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐὸν ὅµαιµόν τε καὶ ὁµόγλωσσον καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύµατά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε 
ὁµότροπα. Jonathan Hall has argued that Herodotus’s emphasis on ethnic identity did not last long and 
was replaced by a focus on “broader cultural criteria” that defined Hellenic identity until the Roman 
conquest. Jonathan M. Hall, Hellenicity between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002), 226. The relationship between Hellenic religion and cultural identity and whether the use of 
Greek implied an acceptance of Greek religious beliefs would lead to heated debates in the patristic 
period, such as the one between Gregory Nazianzus and the Emperor Julian.  
15 Isocrates, Pan. 50 (trans. Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 18). 
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recognize the supremacy of Athenian culture and specifically of his own school, which 
he was constantly advertising.”16  
It should also be mentioned that there are periodical distinctions in the history of 
Hellenism, as well as political and cultural17, and what will mainly concern us here is 
the late antique and proto-Byzantine sense of Hellenism. A. Kaldellis has aptly 
summarized five different senses of Hellenism that would be familiar to anyone who 
studies Byzantine writers, and these should be kept in mind throughout this study since 
they are also of fundamental importance for late antique writers. They are as follows: a) 
the term Hellenic had sometimes a geographical connection to mainland Greece as a 
place of origin, and when used in that sense it did not convey anything related to 
nationality; b) the Hellenes were sometimes the ancient Greeks, an ancient nation 
mainly known through history; c) Hellenes was also the term used to denote pagans of 
different nationalities, Greek or otherwise18; d) a Hellene was also someone who spoke 
Greek, and this usage was neutral to other associations, religious or ethnic; e) finally, 
Hellenism was also the acquaintance with classical paideia, which included the 
knowledge of philosophy and an appreciation, if not usage, of rhetorical mannerisms.19 
Kaldellis’ masterful study concludes that Byzantine Hellenism was both paideia and 
paganism and argues that the appeal of the classics led to the prevalence of the former 
over the latter. He argues for the exclusion of damnation of Hellenism from the range of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 18. 
17 Katerina Zacharia, Introduction to Hellenisms: Culture, Identity, and Ethnicity from Antiquity to 
Modernity, ed. Katerina Zacharia (London: Ashgate, 2008), 2. 
18 All five senses appear in Chrysostom’s works. For an example of this particular sense see In 1 Cor. 
hom. 20.8 (PG 61:165; NPNF 1-12:115): “For tell me not of the present establishment, and that you have 
received the true religion from your ancestors. But carry back your thoughts to those times, and consider 
when the Gospel was just set on foot, and impiety was still at its height, and altars burning, and sacrifices 
and libations offering up, and the greater part of men were Gentiles [Hellenes]; think, I say, of those who 
from their ancestors had received impiety, and who were the descendants of fathers and grandfathers and 
great-grandfathers like themselves.” This particular use of the term was popularized in the fourth century 
by authors like Eusebius and Athanasius, and from then on was used “interchangeably with ta ethne to 
designate those who were neither Jews nor Christians and who worshipped the Graeco-Roman Gods in 
some form.” Isabella Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Greeks, Jews and Christians in 
Antioch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 149. 
19 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 184-6. 
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the various options on the debate between Christianity and Hellenism and identifies 
paideia, philosophy and national identity as the components that comprised Byzantine 
Hellenism. He also sees that as part of the ancient tradition of Hellenism and believes 
that despite what he calls the “distorting legacy” of the Fathers, the Byzantines 
essentially opted for the Hellenism of Plato, Isocrates, Libanius and Synesius.20  
Kaldellis’ summary is extremely useful for our study since it provides us with all the 
different senses of Hellenism in Chrysostom’s vast corpus and enables us to see which 
component was most important for him as a Christian writing in late antiquity. 
Before we get into the different scholarly views on Hellenism and Christianity, we 
should mention that any discussion on the Hellenic cultural tradition in Byzantium 
would be incomplete without considering the other two constitutive elements of the 
Byzantine society, its Roman political identity and its relation to Greekness and the 
relation of Romanitas to Christianity. These issues have been the subjects of other 
studies, both in connection to Chrysostom and Byzantium in general, but will not 
concern us here.21 
i. Nineteenth-twentieth century: Harnack and the response to Harnack  
Historians of early Christianity in the early 20th century, especially Protestants such 
as A. Harnack, tended to see primitive Christianity as the pure religion established by 
Jesus and the Apostles, which was later corrupted by Hellenic influences in its doctrine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 397. On the other hand, Sandwell has argued that the power of 
paideia was co-opted by fourth century Christians (i.e. the Church Fathers) in their attempts to convert 
the Graeco-Roman elites and establish themselves as a serious intellectual force in Graeco-Roman 
society. Part of this effort was their interest to separate Greek culture from Greek religion. See further 
analysis in ibid., 152.  
21 For a concise but masterful discussion of these interconnected issues see Claudia Rapp, “Hellenic 
Identity, Romanitas, and Christianity in Byzantium,” in Hellenisms, ed. K. Zacharia, 127-47. For a 
detailed study of Chrysostom’s stance towards the Roman Empire see Constantine Bozinis, Ο Ιωάννης ο 
Χρυσόστοµος για το Imperium Romanum: Μελέτη πάνω στην πολιτική σκέψη της Αρχαίας Εκκλησίας 
[John Chrysostom on the Imperium Romanum: A Study on the Political Thought of the Early Church] 
(Athens: Book Institute - A. Kardamitsas, 2003), passim. 
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and practice.22 This process is frequently described as ‘Hellenization,’ and one of C. 
Markschies’ most interesting findings in his research on the use of the term 
Hellenization in the twentieth century is that the word can be found in about one tenth 
of works by ancient historians, with the other nine tenths included in works by 
theologians. 23 However, the terms Hellenization and Hellenism were rarely defined 
with any precision, both in terms of their content as well as their chronology.24 Scholars 
from Catholic and Orthodox backgrounds responded to Harnack in different ways in 
later decades, and in this chapter, we shall see some of these responses as exemplified 
in the works of Jaroslav Pelikan25 and Georges Florovsky26. We will also look at how 
classicists and ancient historians such as Werner Jaeger27 responded to the same issue. 
In this brief survey, we will try to classify the different positions of this older 
generation of scholars in mostly a chronological manner, but also based on schools of 
thought. Jean Daniélou (and to a similar extent, Georges Florovsky) is representative of 
a school of thought that rejects the Hellenization of Christianity and argues instead that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “This notion [Hellenization of Christianity] famously found its formulation thanks to A. von 
Harnack, according to whom Christian dogmata are the product of Greek philosophy, which was 
superimposed, as a sort of foreign element, upon the “pure” Gospel ground.” Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, “Origen, 
Patristic Philosophy, and Christian Platonism: Rethinking the Christianisation of Hellenism,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 63 (2009), 253 with references to Harnack’s works. Cf. ibid., 258-9 for more criticisms of 
Harnack’s thesis. It might be on this basis that G.W. Bowersock has called Hellenization “a modern idea, 
reflecting modern forms of cultural domination” and “a useless barometer for assessing Greek culture.” 
Hellenism in Late Antiquity, xi, 7. For a summary of Harnack’s arguments on Hellenization see also 
Christoph Markschies, “Does It Make Sense to Speak about a ‘Hellenization of Christianity’ in 
Antiquity?” Church History and Religious Culture 92.1 (2009), 13-5. 
23 For a history of the term Hellenization in the nineteenth century and its use particularly among 
German academics, including Harnack, see Markschies, “Does It Make Sense,” passim.  To Markschies’ 
surprise, it has been used more often lately by Roman Catholic rather than Protestant theologians. 
However, in recent Roman Catholic works Harnack’s perspective and judgment have been adopted and 
accepted, a phenomenon Markschies calls “protestantization of the Roman Catholic perspective”. Ibid., 
22-5. 
24 Ibid., 13-4. 
25 Jaroslav Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in 
the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). For a more 
specific critique of Harnack’s advocacy of Hellenization, particularly on dogma, see Pelikan, The 
Christian Tradition, A History of the Development of Doctrine 1: The Emergence of the Catholic 
Tradition (100-600), (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 45-55. 
26 Georges Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century, trans. Catherine Edmunds (Vaduz: 
Büchervertriebsanstalt, 1987). 
27 Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1961). 
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Christian Platonists transformed Greek philosophy to such an extent that it is more 
appropriate to speak of a Christianization of philosophy.28 Both Daniélou (and 
Florovsky) are espousing a synthetic view, with Christianity having the steering hand. 
On the other hand, Werner Jaeger looks at the process as both a Christianization of the 
Roman world as well as a Hellenization of Christianity. As a classicist, Jaeger views the 
influence as going both ways. For him, the earliest manifestation of Christian Hellenism 
is the use of Greek in the NT writings, which continues with the writings of the 
Apostolic Fathers.29  Before Pelikan, whose arguments we will be reviewing further on, 
Jaeger uses the example of the Cappadocians in his discussion on Hellenism and 
Christianity in the 4th century and refers to their line of demarcation between Greek 
religion and Greek culture. Their synthesis results in a form of Christian neoclassicism, 
which sees Christianity as the “heir to everything in the Greek tradition that seemed 
worthy of survival.”30 The Cappadocians are often considered emblematic in Christian 
reception of Hellenism, particularly in late antiquity, and Jaeger was not the only one to 
see them as such. 
Jaroslav Pelikan’s pioneering 1993 book on Christianity and Hellenism in the works 
of the Cappadocians is particularly important for our discussion for two reasons: a) 
Pelikan, just like Harnack, was a pivotal historian of doctrine and a scholar who, 
through the magnitude of his works, reached far beyond his discipline and was very 
influential, not just to other scholars, but in public life as well; b) despite the shared 
Lutheran background of both authors (but not for the duration of his lifetime in 
Pelikan’s case), they came to completely different conclusions on the subject, but their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ramelli, “Origen, Patristic Philosophy and Christian Platonism,” 254. Cf. Morwenna Ludlow, 
Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (Post)Modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 85-6 with 
discussion of reasons as to the influence of Harnack’s thesis within Protestantism and the utilization of a 
similar binary scheme (the Gospel vs Greek philosophy) by Catholic writers, specifically Daniélou. 
29 Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, 5-6. 
30 Ibid., 74-5. 
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respective positions still influence numerous others to this day.31 The work can also be 
considered a definitive culmination of Pelikan’s views on the issue, after the completion 
of his monumental five volumes on the history of doctrine, and whilst he was still a 
Lutheran. Moving beyond the binary scheme that has been previously employed to 
categorise the Church Fathers as either overly hostile to Hellenism or as the ones 
responsible for the Hellenization of Christianity, Pelikan sees the Cappadocians as 
authors sitting “squarely in the tradition of Classical Greek culture” and as “intensely 
critical of that tradition.”32 They are in a constant interchange as well as controversy 
with both the “monuments of the culture” and with “contemporary expositors of the 
monuments.” The Cappadocians are thus both exponents of “Christian Hellenism” 
(particularly Basil, Pelikan argues), specifically in its literary aspects, and heavily 
involved in the Christian critique of Hellenism.33 Their writings also display an 
awareness of both the “temptations of Classical rhetoric” and its usefulness to the 
Christian cause, as well as the belief that rhetoric was a common property of the 
Christian and the Classical tradition. In terms of their use of Classical literature, 
ambiguity might be the word that most closely resembles their attitude. They often 
ridicule myths and attribute them to demons, and are also often more vitriolic in their 
remarks against writers such as Homer when corresponding with people like Julian than 
when communicating with each other or with other Christians.34 The Cappadocians’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Mark Humphries with David M. Gwynn, “The Sacred and the Secular: The Presence or Absence 
of Christian Religious Thought in Secular Writing in the Late Antique West,” in Religious Diversity in 
Late Antiquity, eds. David M. Gwynn and Susanne Bangert (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 494, included Pelikan 
as one of the scholars (alongside R. MacMullen, H. Chadwick, et. al.) responsible for the customary 
scholarly approach on the topic, “the extent to which the ancient and classical does or does not persist 
into the new Christian dispensation.” The authors also make the pertinent observation that the opposition 
between pagan/classical and Christian/late antique often involves a sense of superiority of the former 
compared to the latter (ibid.). 
32 Although Pelikan was not the only one who avoided falling into this trap. Cf. C. J. De Vogel, 
“Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common Ground?” Vigiliae Christianae 
39:1 (1985), 27: “on the whole, Christian intellectuals did not take an attitude of hostility towards Greek 
philosophy; mostly they were positively interested, though never without critical reserve.” 
33 Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture, 9-10. 
34 Ibid., 16-17. 
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“ambivalent identification” with Classical literature is also applicable to their treatment 
of Classical philosophy. Pelikan uses the example of Gregory of Nyssa to support his 
claim. Gregory could at the same time blame Greek philosophy for Eunomius’ heretical 
views, whilst also accusing Eunomius of neglecting the study of philosophy.35 One of 
their favourite rhetorical devices was the recitation of a catalogue of Greek 
philosophical schools, and the application of one or two epithets to each. This was 
complemented by the singling out of certain philosophers and the application of 
criticism to them. In Pelikan’s opinion, the theology of the Greek Christian tradition 
from the Patristic period and onwards took shape under these encounters with 
Hellenism,36 and frequently the fundamental elements of this encounter were influenced 
by the Cappadocians, even if their attitude was by no means uniform. Their ambiguous 
attitude, ranging from a positive view of the Classical language to a harsh condemnation 
of Greek religion, which could sometimes lead them to “align themselves… with the 
anticlerical, rationalistic exponents of a philosophical natural theology among pagan 
Greek thinkers”37 was by no means unique or peculiar. We will see in chapter 2 how 
Chrysostom was also sympathetic to these very same exponents. 
A similar model has been proposed by Basil Tatakis.38 Tatakis looks at Christianity 
and Hellenism as two sources of philosophical thought, with Hellenism being an 
evolved feature stemming from classical civilization, and which, although preserving 
the “essentials characteristics of Greek thought”, gradually faded away with the 
transition to a new world. This new world, as represented by the rise of Christianity, 
assimilated Greek thought “in form and content” as long as there were no conflicts with 
the faith, and Greek thought acquired a new meaning since “the foundation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 18, with references to Gregory’s works. 
36 Ibid., 19-21. 
37 Ibid., 22-3. 
38 Basil Tatakis, Byzantine Philosophy, trans. Nicholas J. Moutafakis (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
2003). The original French edition is from 1949, even though it was only translated into English in 2003. 
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edifice that it supports is entirely different.” But Tatakis correlates this development 
with the division between Western and Eastern Christianity, which led to the distinction 
between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the latter being what he calls “the Greek 
conception of Christianity.” As we shall see below, other scholars have made similar 
claims, but Tatakis sees this continuation under a different light. For Tatakis the 
barbarian invasions in Western Europe led to the annihilation of Hellenism in the West, 
where the Latin spirit then prevailed, but the embodiment of non-religious elements of 
Hellenism into the lives of Byzantines is one of the two constituent elements that 
created Byzantine civilization (the other being Christianity).39 Finally, Tatakis extends 
this paradigm to Greek philosophy (which is just one part of Greek thought), where 
“Christianity was free to appropriate any and all of the basic elements of waning 
paganism, as long as these elements underwent discussion, study, and cleansing from 
their non-Christian foundations.”40 Tatakis is just one among many scholars who claim 
that Christians retained certain elements from Hellenism whilst excluding others, but 
aside from criterion of religion (i.e. anything that could be contrary to the faith was left 
out) there has not been a systematic work on what other, if any, criteria may have been 
operative in this process of appropriation. 
It is important to note here that Tatakis speaks of an evolution within Greek thought. 
He does not see Hellenism in Byzantium as a continuation of classical Hellenism; his 
argument sees continuity in language rather than in the essence of classical thought. In 
this respect, he is downplaying an oft-repeated paradigm in studies on the history of 
Hellenism: the temptation to see Christian Hellenism as the historical evolution of 
classical Hellenism. This issue is particularly potent and controversial in debates on the 
issue of modern Greek identity, but will not concern us here. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For a critique of Tatakis’ search for an essence (in the sense of a specific, distinguishing feature) of 
the Byzantine philosophical tradition see Michele Trizio, “Byzantine Philosophy as a Contemporary 
Historiographical Project,” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 74:1 (2007), 248-57. 
40 Tatakis, Byzantine Philosophy, xiii. 
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With Tatakis we are approaching an opposite scheme to what has previously been 
called the Hellenization of Christianity, a reversal of the term and its construction as the 
Christianization of Hellenism. Georges Florovsky is a representative of this position and 
writing a little later than Tatakis, in the 1950’s, describes it as a process of 
transfiguration and re-orientation: “Ancient culture proved to be plastic enough to admit 
of an inner “transfiguration.” … Christians proved that it was possible to re-orient the 
cultural process, without lapsing into a pre-cultural state, to reshape the cultural fabric 
in a new spirit. The same process which has been variously described as a 
“Hellenization of Christianity” can be construed rather as a “Christianization of 
Hellenism.”41 Florovsky’s reorientation can be seen specifically as a response to 
Harnack’s advocacy of a Hellenization of Christianity.42 In this he is also followed by 
John Meyendorff, for whom the effort of the Church Fathers to formulate Christianity in 
the categories of Hellenism is a legitimate and necessary enterprise since the Christian 
faith needed to rethink itself in light of changing cultural patterns.43 Florovsky qualifies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Georges Florovsky, “Faith and Culture,” St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly 4:1-2 (1955), 40. “The 
Christian reception of Hellenism was not just a se[r]vile absorption of an undigested heathen heritage. It 
was rather a conversion of the Hellenic mind and heart.” Id. “Christianity and Civilization,” St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly 1:1 (1952), 14. Other advocates of Florovsky’s position include I. 
Ramelli, “Origen, Patristic Philosophy and Christian Platonism,” 260-1, who makes the argument that the 
Fathers were “allowed to take- as they felicitously did, in the most enlightened cases- all that Greek 
philosophy and culture had to offer, insofar as it was compatible with Christianity” and uses the examples 
of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa as Christian philosophers who “sought a continuity and a synthesis 
without renouncing their own Christian identity” since taking over Greek philosophy did not imply a 
rejection of Christianity or a detachment from its Jewish root because essentially Christianity “is neither 
Jewish nor Greek.” It is interesting to note that in Ramelli’s argument the language of appropriation 
(allowed to take, take over) is consistently used as if the Christians writers she refers to were partaking of 
something that was essentially alien to them. 
42 For an analysis of Florovsky’s idea of Christian Hellenism as a reaction to Harnack’s Hellenization 
of early Christianity and their classification as two extremes stemming from the Eastern Orthodox and 
Liberal Protestant traditions respectively see Paul Gavrilyuk, Georges Florovsky and the Russian 
Religious Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 201-19. For other critiques of 
Florovsky’s position see Brandon Gallaher, “‘Waiting for the Barbarians’: Identity and Polemicism in the 
Neo-Patristic Synthesis of Georges Florovsky,” Modern Theology 27:4 (2011), 659–91; Paul Gavrilyuk, 
“Harnack’s Hellenized Christianity or Florovsky’s ‘Sacred Hellenism’: Questioning Two Metanarratives 
of Early Christian Engagement with Late Antique Culture,” St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 54:3–4 
(2010), 323–44. 
43 John Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology: Historical Trends and Doctrinal Themes (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1979), 2. But others choose to emphasize the difference in forms: “The Greek 
Fathers are of the unity of Hellenism, certainly, … but they are no mere echo, even in their forms, of the 
Greek literature that had gone before them.” Campbell, The Greek Fathers, 10. 
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his statement by two admissions: a) his plea for a return to Christian Hellenism is a plea 
for a return to “the tradition of the Eastern Fathers as opposed to Western medieval 
thought”, and b) he also recognizes that on certain issues the Bible and Greek 
philosophy are wholly incompatible, such as on the issues of creation and freedom.44  
Therefore, if we were to briefly summarize 20th century discussions of the 
relationship between Christianity and Hellenism, we would say that most scholars were 
working mostly on a model that required a positive synthesis of the two worldviews, 
which is in itself a reaction against Harnack’s model of Hellenic corruption of Christian 
dogma by its interaction with Greek philosophy. Despite minor variations on this 
model, it seems that the authors more commonly used to exemplify it were either the 
Apologists, Clement, and Origen (or any combination of the above) for the first period 
of the synthesis and the Cappadocians for the later period. But as we saw earlier, within 
this broad consensus there was a range of views as to how exactly Christianity and 
Hellenism came together. 
ii. Twenty-first century: Hellenism and religious and cultural identity 
In the early twenty-first century, there has been a resurgence of interest regarding 
the relationship between Christianity and Hellenism, particularly in Late Antiquity, with 
much of the discussion being initiated by classicists and ancient historians, as opposed 
to historians of Christianity and theologians. The new focus has also shifted the locus of 
the discussion, which is often seen as primarily a broader conflict of worldviews and 
ideas (along with the practices that stem from these), instead of a clash between 
different religions. A prime mover (although not the originator) of this argument is 
Niketas Siniossoglou, representative of a position that perceives the issue as a conflict 
between Hellenism and Judaeo-Christianity,45 a term that stresses Christianity’s Jewish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 24, with references to Florovsky’s works. 
45 This is the term used by Siniossoglou. The term Judaeo-Christian is an early modern neologism, 
and was characteristically used in a negative sense by Friedrich Nietzsche.  
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heritage over and against the Hellenic intellectual paradigm.46 It also claims that despite 
the Fathers’ use of Greek language and acquaintance with classical literature, their 
worldview was so radically different from the Hellenic worldview that no notion of 
compatibility is applicable. Nevertheless, they did seek to find what was useful to them 
and utilized it for their own (usually apologetic) purposes. In Siniossoglou’s narrative, 
this process of ambiguous cultural appropriation reaches its culmination with Theodoret 
of Cyrus, who is mostly following in Eusebius’ footsteps. Siniossoglou uses Theodoret 
as a template for his general thesis on Hellenism and Christianity in late antiquity, 
something that is neither fair to Theodoret himself nor particularly useful in advancing 
the discussion on the subject. Although Siniossoglou is not the first to argue these 
points, we will start with him because his radical position is characteristic of what we 
call the conflict model and his arguments have a forcefulness that is rarely seen in 
previous scholarship on the subject. Furthermore, Siniossoglou’s persistent fervor in 
“favoring one side of late antiquity's culture wars over the other,”47 in the most 
positively explicit way will show how other scholars, who also favor one side over the 
other, do so implicitly whilst they reach similar conclusions. As we have seen both with 
Adolf Harnack and with responses to him, all too often scholars have examined this 
issue from the other side of these very same cultural wars. Precisely because 
Siniossoglou’s point of view is in direct contrast to earlier approaches that considered 
that Greek philosophy and the ideals of paideia were preserved and even cultivated 
within early Christianity, his is an argument worthy of careful consideration.  
One key aspect of Siniossoglou’s argument is that similarities between Christianity 
and certain schools of ancient philosophy such as Platonism or Stoicism can only be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For this view see Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret, xi.  
47 Aaron Johnson, Review of Niketas Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret: The Christian 
Appropriation of Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance. Cambridge Classical 
Studies. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Bryn Mawr Classical Review 
5/5/2009. Accessed on 16 December 2017, http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2009/2009-05-05.html. 
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attributed to a common use of vocabulary, but not meaning. Christians and Hellenes 
might use the same words, but they are describing entirely different things. The 
Christian appropriation of Greek philosophy is therefore limited to external structures 
and words, but not its substance.48 According to Siniossoglou, the shift in meaning of 
the word philosophia is a classic case in point. This antithesis between Christianity and 
philosophy occurs through a strategy devised by Christians against both their Jewish 
and pagan opponents: the appropriation of their own texts in order to undermine their 
ideas, and therefore turning their own weapons against them.49 In this process the 
meaning of the text changed, and different hermeneutical strategies (such as allegory) 
brought forth an entirely different interpretation of the texts. The term philosophia is 
also appropriated by Christians to describe the Christian way of life and it gradually 
loses its original connotations. Another example of the Christians’ strategy, according 
to Siniossoglou, is the way they used Plato and his texts: while the Neoplatonists were 
attempting an exegesis of the whole Platonic corpus by trying to interpret its intended 
meaning, Christians only sought what was useful in Plato’s texts for their own 
religion.50 Furthermore, the fact that sometimes the Church Fathers showed disdain and 
hostility towards the Greek philosophical tradition is introduced by Siniossoglou as 
further proof of the fact that they cannot be considered legitimate heirs of Hellenic 
paideia.51 Finally, another factor that prevents any possible synthesis (or even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret, xi. 
49 Ibid., 13. 
50 Ibid., 23. Siniossoglou calls the Neoplatonic attitude towards the platonic corpus the principal 
question of exegesis and describes the Christian attitude as linked to a rhetorical agenda. However, I am 
not entirely convinced that the Christians were the only ones with an agenda when it came to the 
interpretation of Plato. 
51 Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret, 54, where Siniossoglou also claims that these passages are 
rarely cited. Although I doubt that this is the case, every major criticism of Greek philosophy in John’s 
corpus will be mentioned in this study. Another fact that Siniossoglou does not mention is the fact that 
this display of disdain and hostility, or “rhetoric of abuse” in Wilken, is not peculiar at all in the context 
of polemics in the fourth century. Robert L. Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews: Rhetoric and Reality 
in the Late Fourth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 122-3, provides many 
examples from both Chrysostom’s and Julian’s works and places their comments in their rhetorical 
contexts, while also indicating that the foes in this case were real, not imaginary. 
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symbiosis) between Hellenism and Christianity, at least at the philosophical level, is the 
latter’s exclusivity, especially when it is contrasted to the universal dimensions of 
Hellenism.52 Siniossoglou poses the two as completely separate entities, “neither 
artificial nor socially constructed.”53  
One can offer many criticisms of and counterarguments to Siniossoglou’s case. For 
example, one can easily cite Julian using a Christian idea (the relationship between the 
destruction of the temple in Jerusalem and the legitimacy of Jewish law) and turning it 
against Christianity.54 Allegory was by no means a Christian invention either and many 
non-Christians utilised it in their exegesis of ancient texts and we know of allegorical 
readings of Homer from the 1st cent. B.C.55 The ecumenical dimensions that 
Christianity adopted from a very early stage (by using Greek, for example), which 
contributed to its expansion in the Roman Empire, are a fact that Siniossoglou neither 
mentions nor discusses.56 Others have also mentioned certain problematic readings of 
Theodoret’s text and the lack of analysis in terms of how Neoplatonists used (or did not 
use) the term “Hellene” to describe themselves.57  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Ibid., 106. 
53 Ibid., 238. 
54 Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 143. Chrysostom would not really mind the accusation. In 
fact, he would claim that he is just following in Paul’s footsteps, as this is exactly what the latter did 
when conversing with the Athenians. See Princ. Act. hom. 1.3 (PG 51:72): Εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὁ 
Παῦλος, εὗρε βωµὸν ἐν ᾧ ἐπεγέγραπτο, Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ. Τί ἔδει ποιῆσαι; Ἕλληνες πάντες ἦσαν, ἀσεβεῖς 
πάντες. Τί οὖν ἐχρῆν ποιῆσαι; Ἀπὸ Εὐαγγελίων διαλεχθῆναι; Ἀλλὰ κατεγέλων. Ἀλλ' ἀπὸ προφητικῶν, 
καὶ τοῦ νόµου γραµµάτων; Ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπίστευον. Τί οὖν ἐποίησεν; Ἐπὶ τὸν βωµὸν ἔδραµε, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν 
ὅπλων τῶν πολεµίων αὐτοὺς ἐχειρώσατο. 
55 For allegorical Neoplatonist readings of Homer see Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: 
Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth of the Epic Tradition (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1989). 
56 “Next to the obvious acceptance of elements of Greek philosophy operated another, underground 
tendency to Hellenize the Christian religion. Indeed, sometimes the fiercest opponents of traditional 
Hellenism were those substantially inspired by the ancient Greek spirit in its internal and ecumenical 
dimension.” Dimitris J. Kyrtatas and Spyros I. Rangos, Η Ελληνική Αρχαιότητα: Πόλεµος-Πολιτική-
Πολιτισµός [The Greek Antiquity: War-Politics-Civilization], (Thessaloniki: Institute of Modern Greek 
Studies, 2010), 403, my translation. The lack of these ecumenical structures, as well as other issues with 
the old religion and its inability to compete with Christianity after a certain point are discussed in Garth 
Fowden, “Polytheist Religion and Philosophy,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. XIII: The Late 
Empire, A.D. 337-425, eds. Averil Cameron and Peter Garnsey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 559-60. 
57 Both points mentioned (with examples) in Johnson’s review. See n. 47 above. 
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It is clear that in this debate Siniossoglou has chosen a specific side and his 
arguments are certainly a reflection of that. Siniossoglou’s position can be labelled as 
the conflict model and it certainly does not lack support in scholarship. His view is just 
one of the most recent examples of such an argument. For example, a more radical 
version of this position argues that while no national, racial, social or cultural elements 
could prevent someone from becoming a Christian, no elements of origin or tradition 
could theoretically be combined with this new identity. It is also argued that with 
Christianity humanity was stripped from its [national] traditions, and humans became 
the centre of the universe and God’s main preoccupation. By abandoning the Hellenic 
tradition of searching for God in nature or within ourselves and trying to transcend our 
mortal limitations, God and his representatives are now the ones concerned with human 
salvation, with what the authors of this position call “a characteristic tendency towards 
weakness (mercy, compassion, love).”58  
Siniossoglou’s argument on Christianity’s appropriation of Greek culture has been 
previously presented by Polymnia Athanassiadi, who, despite calling John Chrysostom 
“a man in whom culture, literary talent and rhetorical skill combined to form the ideal 
late antique intellectual,” also talks about an attempt by Christians such as Basil of 
Caesarea “to rob the Hellenes of their culture” in the way they read and interpreted 
Greek texts from antiquity.59Athanassiadi presents Byzantium as a systematic 
persecutor of the spirit of Hellenism. Specifically, she argues that Chrysostom’s advice 
on avoiding the classics to parents regarding the education of children by grammarians60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Kyrtatas and Rangos, Η Ελληνική Αρχαιότητα, 408-9. The identification of Christian virtues as 
signs of weakness and as the exact opposites of the classical virtues is Nietzschean in origin.   
59 Polymnia Athanassiadi-Fowden, Julian and Hellenism: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 1,10.  
60 “What is the use of sending our children to the grammarian, where, before learning their texts, they 
will acquire wickedness and, in their desire to receive a trifle, they will lose the most important thing, all 
the vigour and health of their soul?” Adv. opp. vit. mon. 3.11 (PG 47:367; trans. Athanassiadi, Julian and 
Hellenism, 1). Obviously, Chrysostom’s view is presented completely outside its context. This phrase, in 
its proper context, was not a question on the value of the classics (as it is very clear that Chrysostom is 
discussing education), but an exhortation to parents to pay close attention to the formation of their 
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was not the policy adapted by the Eastern Empire. Instead, the policy chosen was one of 
compromise, in the sense that while the classics remained a part of the curriculum, their 
spirit was lost. This was a policy devised by “cunning men like Basil of Caesarea, 
Socrates Scholasticus and Theodoret of Cyrrhus” and safeguarded a place in the 
Byzantine curriculum “for the ghosts of the classical authors.”61 Similarly to 
Siniossoglou, Athanassiadi constructs a radical dichotomy that sees the main 
protagonists as cultural appropriators, conquerors of a culture that was not theirs for the 
taking, simultaneously persecuting and usurping Hellenism to adapt it to their 
purposes.62 However, as previous criticisms of the conflict model have indicated, this 
approach fails to do justice to the complexity and nuances of ancient sources, whilst it 
has also been judged as inadequate “for any analysis of cultural conflict.”63 Others have 
used similar arguments to Siniossoglou and Athanassiadi. However, we think it is 
worthy to focus on Siniossoglou in particular because we consider him to be the logical 
culmination of these previous arguments, and at the same time an even more extreme 
proponent of the clash between Christianity and Hellenism. In his narrative, Christianity 
is not just appropriating texts; it is represented as being in a constant war against 
Hellenism, and attempts to extinguish it by any means necessary, even by turning its 
own weapons against it.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
children’s virtue and not to rely exclusively on their formal education, which might make them skilled in 
speech but wicked as individuals. However, in Athanassiadi’s interpretation Chrysostom gives a warning 
“that the price of a cultivated mind was for the Christian the loss for his soul” (ibid., 19), which is, among 
other things, a complete misrepresentation of his argument. 
61 Athanassiadi, Julian and Hellenism, 19. Gregory Nazianzus, Or. 4.5 (SC 309.92) famously 
responded to a similar challenge by Julian, when he complained that he “barred us from rhetoric [logoi] 
as though we were stealing someone else’s goods.” In this respect, the appropriation argument is just a 
repetition of Julian’s order in Ep. 36 (LCL 157:120) that the Christians should only teach the classics if 
they show appropriate piety towards the gods. 
62 Cf. Garth Fowden, The Egyptian Hermes: A Historical Approach to the Late Pagan Mind 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 73: “By Late Antiquity most of the leading exponents 
of Hellenism were orientals. Inheriting a tradition which once had professed respect for the wisdom of the 
Orient from a safe distance, they tipped the whole centre of gravity eastwards… Hellenism, then, was 
held captive by those it had conquered.” 
63 Johnson, “Hellenism and Its Discontents,” 438. 
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Finally, other scholars have described the attitudes of Christian writers of the fourth 
and fifth centuries towards Hellenism and classical culture as inherently opportunistic64 
and even schizophrenic, because of their simultaneous “appropriation” and 
condemnation of it.65 Although these arguments can already be found in the conflict 
model, we refer to them separately as they do not form part of a larger narrative, as was 
the case with Siniossoglou and Athanassiadi. However, they do seem to rest on a 
fundamental assumption of a conflict between Christianity and Hellenism or classical 
culture. 
Nonetheless, conflict is not the only model used to describe the relationship between 
Hellenism and Christianity.66 There is another model, which, although realizing the 
varied positions of both pagans and Christians on different issues, does not believe that 
there was a consistent or organized pagan opposition against Christianity, as assumed in 
the narratives of, among others, Siniossoglou and Athanassiadi: it is a model based on 
the assumption of co-existence, and has been supported by Yannis Papadogiannakis.67 It 
mainly sees the pagan reaction in either “covert polemical allusions” or “damnatio by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Pauline Allen, “Some Aspects of Hellenism in the Early Greek Church Historians,” Traditio 43 
(1987), 371: “On the one hand, tacitly recognizing that it [Greek learning] is indispensable for the 
Christian; on the other, impugning it freely in arguments against the pagans.” Another common topos to 
writers of the same period is the view that “Greek learning was not totally harmful, and could in fact be 
serviceable to the Christian” (ibid., 373). 
65 Averil Cameron, Byzantine Matters (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 54: “The 
term [Hellenism] is also commonly used instead of “classical” in discussions of the education and culture 
of Christian patristic writers …. Christian intellectuals and writers had a schizophrenic relation to 
classical culture and aspired to and sought to appropriate and exploit Greek paideia while at the same 
time condemning it.”  
66 In her earlier works Averil Cameron has been critical of the models we have been describing so far 
and proposed alternative ways of looking at the issue: “The questions have changed, and the answers will 
no longer be found in the old places, whether in the traditional formulation of Christianity’s “relation to” 
or “conflict with” classical culture or in the much-studied yet limited field of Christian-pagan polemic; 
we shall instead look to the broader techniques of Christian discourse and its reception in the social 
conditions of the empire.” Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of 
Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 20. 
67 That includes both practical as well as literary opposition. Papadogiannakis is not arguing against 
the existence of opposition per se. However, he does not believe that it was a constant or that it was part 
of a larger scheme. As an example of the inconsistency he mentions, we could refer to the different 
literary attitudes towards Christians by authors like Libanius or Porphyry and their respective styles and 
points of opposition.  
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exclusion from narratives.”68 This model can be tentatively called the symbiotic model, 
because symbiosis primarily denotes interaction, which can at times be either irenic or 
polemical, but can also be both. It does not overemphasize the conflict at the expense of 
points of agreement and has a more inclusive understanding of the multifaceted nature 
of Hellenism. In this model’s narrative, Hellenism included, besides pagan religious 
beliefs and adherence to cults, a thorough acquaintance with ancient Greek literature 
and a good command of the Greek language. According to Yannis Papadogiannakis, it 
is this multivalence of Hellenism that “rendered it inherently ambiguous and therefore 
subject to competing conceptualizations,”69 thus making it difficult to draw the line 
between its religious and non-religious elements. He concludes that this led to a large 
variety of definitions and understandings of the pagan elements of Hellenism among the 
different Christian authors. It also points to the “intimate relations” between Greek 
classicism and Greek Christianity, relations that were forged through the common 
education that both pagan and Christian elites shared in the fourth century and the 
common cultural framework of the eastern parts of the Empire.70  
Papadogiannakis’ work on Theodoret is not the only one that examined the 
relationship through these lenses. Aaron Johnson has described Hellenism in late 
antiquity as a “sort of rhetorical and conceptual toolbox.”71 The educated elite of the 
period, which included Christians and non-Christians alike, could draw from a large 
variety of texts to make an argument relevant to their case, whether that was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Papadogiannakis, Christianity and Hellenism, 15.   
69 Papadogiannakis, Christianity and Hellenism, 23.  
70 Chrysostomus Baur, John Chrysostom and His Time, vol. 1: Antioch, trans. Mary Gonzaga 
(London: Sands, 1959), 9. These intimate relations are clearly mapped by the sober assessment of 
Socrates, when he talks about Julian’s edict on the teaching of Greek literature: ‘the Christians beginning 
afresh to imbue their minds with the philosophy of the heathens, this works out no benefit to Christianity, 
for pagan philosophy teaches Polytheism, and is injurious to the promotion of true religion.’ This 
objection I [Socrates] shall meet with such considerations as at present occur to me. Greek literature 
certainly was never recognized either by Christ or his Apostles as divinely inspired, nor on the other hand 
was it wholly rejected as pernicious. And this they did, I conceive, not inconsiderately. For there were 
many philosophers among the Greeks who were not far from the knowledge of God…” Hist. eccl. 3.16.1 
(GCS NF1:211; NPNF 2-2:87). 
71 Johnson, “Hellenism and Its Discontents,” 439. 
36 
philosophical argument, an oration, writing historiography, novels, apologetic treatises, 
et al. One common feature of all the above is obviously the use of the Greek language. 
But this was not the sole tool: others, Johnson argues, included “the citation of or 
allusion to classical authors; mythological exempla; genealogies; … invocation of 
historical figures or events; personal dress or grooming … and, at the most basic level, 
generic conceptual categories for classifying the world (genos, ethnos, and so on).” 
While none of the tools was essentials for the toolbox, Hellenism itself could combine 
many of these for different purposes, which included the negotiation of identity, making 
and supporting an argument, or just displaying erudition. At the same time, Johnson 
emphasizes the fact that the verb ἑλληνίζειν as well as the term Hellene were markers of 
multiple identities, in both Christian and non-Christian writings (such as Julian’s): it 
denoted religious, ethnic, and cultural identities, along with the standard topographical 
designation and the sense of speaking Greek.72    
To summarize: we have referred to two models that we have been able to identify as 
tendencies among scholars on the subject of Christianity and Hellenism in late 
antiquity. One that considers the relationship through the lenses of conflict and polemic 
and an imbalance of power, and another that emphasizes a more even-handed 
interaction and symbiosis. This is obviously a broad classification, and there are 
numerous subdivisions and further nuances within each position. However, three points 
of note emerge from this discussion. First, as we have already indicated, the issue is 
even more increasingly important in discussions of modern Greek identity, and this is 
one of the reasons that Greek scholars have the lion’s share in this initial survey. The 
reason for this is related to the model one follows and the ways it affects their position 
in terms of the diachronic nature of Hellenism and its existence. For example, Kaldellis’ 
argument that Hellenism was in “limbo” for about six centuries (from 400-1000 AD) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Johnson, “Hellenism and Its Discontents,” 448. 
37 
certainly colours his interpretation of Byzantium and the way it is related to modern 
Greek identity. This is particularly pertinent for the conflict model. While classicists 
(such as Ramsay McMullen and Fergus Millar) have previously laid the groundwork by 
interpreting the relationship as a clash between Christianity and Hellenism, they did not 
always consider the implications their stance would have for interpreting Hellenism in 
Byzantium and modern Greece. By contrast, this question is obviously of great 
importance for Greek scholars, particularly when it comes to debates about ancient, 
medieval and modern Greek identity and their relationship to each other.  
Second, despite and beyond the different models, Hellenism has a very large 
number of definitions. As we have seen, it has been considered (and still is) a national, 
cultural, philosophical and religious identity and its legacy has been contested 
throughout history.73 If we aim to understand these different meanings we must 
primarily consider why Hellenism maintained its status as an ideal for such a long time 
and why it has provoked such strong reactions from people who have been either for or 
against it. Thirdly, however, this binary does not necessarily describe everyone’s stance. 
There have been ancient figures that would not fit the for/against dichotomy because 
they could both appreciate certain aspects of Hellenism and at the same time be critical 
of others. It is very possible to appreciate something while being critical of it, and 
Hellenism’s non-dogmatic and flexible nature left plenty of space for any attitude. 
Individuals from different sides and of varied religious persuasions might all have 
different senses of what exactly was bound up in the concept of ‘Hellenism’, and most 
of them did indeed, as it was a discursive category, not a clear set of things. Finally, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 394. But see Cameron, Byzantine Matters, 56, for a critique of 
a scholarly tendency shared between Kaldellis, Siniossoglou and Athanassiadi, which attempts to 
disassociate Christianity from Byzantium and their construction of Hellenism as either a movement of 
rationalism and dissent (Kaldellis and Siniossoglou) or its connection with a high valuation of late antique 
platonism (Athanassiadi). For all three authors, Christian Hellenism is not just an impossibility, but a 
contradiction in terms, and it becomes more obvious in their efforts to look for Greek continuity either 
through a dubious link between philosophy and identity or by emphasizing the Roman identity of 
Orthodoxy as an oppositional power to Hellenism. 
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many of the scholarly treatments we have already referred to one name is notably 
conspicuous by its absence. John Chrysostom is usually nowhere to be found in 
scholarly master narratives that describe Christianity and Hellenism in late antiquity, 
and, if he is, it is often due to philological studies that focus on his language. We will 
start with this aspect of scholarship then, as it provided the starting point for further 
elaborations on the subject.  
b. John Chrysostom and Hellenism 
i. John Chrysostom and the Greek classical tradition: Rhetoric 
Chrysostom’s interaction with and influence by ancient Greek culture has been 
relatively well documented in studies that range from ancient Greek philology to 
patristics. While there are many studies on Chrysostom’s language, relations to rhetoric 
and philosophy, as well as other aspects of Hellenic culture, there has been no 
systematic attempt to collect all these disparate elements and write a study that will 
provide a fair and analytic framework concerning Chrysostom’s engagement with 
Hellenism.74 The image of Chrysostom as the Christian classicist par excellence is still 
echoed in the assessment of one of the greatest philologists of the late nineteenth to the 
early twentieth century, U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf:  
Chrysostom is an almost pure Atticist … All the Hellenes of his century are 
barbarian bunglers compared to this Syrian Christian, who merits a higher rating 
than Aristides, and in point of style can be compared with Demosthenes. In the 
Homilies … pure Attic Greek dominates everywhere. In the great orations … 
the musical periods roll out, the embellishment grows even richer, but never is 
there any clatter of rhyme or cadence. And this Attic style is not merely an 
artificial style acquired by study: it is the harmonious expression of an Attic 
soul. How anything like that is possible may be explained by him who can make 
the whole man comprehensible through his works. That it is possible, even a 
fleeting acquaintance can testify, and pay homage to the classic writer who is 
here at the same time a classicist.75 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In any similar endeavour, it is also important to remember that, as Raymond Laird, Mindset, Moral 
Choice and Sin in the Anthropology of John Chrysostom (Strathfield: St. Pauls, 2012), 6, argues, “In any 
analytical research of Chrysostom’s corpus, his focus upon pastoral needs should never be overlooked.” 
75 “Die Griechische Literatur des Altertums,” in Die Griechische und Lateinische Literatur und 
Sprache, ed. Paul Hinnenberg (Leipzig: Teubner, 1912), 296 as cited in Baur, John Chrysostom, 1:305. 
Cf. T.D. Barnes’ comment of Chrysostom as “the liveliest and most accomplished orator since 
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Willamowitz’s emphasis in the passage above is on the aesthetic pleasure derived 
from reading Chrysostom’s elegant Greek prose. It can also be considered an indirect 
response to accusations that Chrysostom was hostile to Greek learning and rhetoric.76 
The claim that Chrysostom, one of the finest rhetoricians in the history of Christianity, 
was hostile to rhetoric is patently absurd. Even in texts where Chrysostom seems to 
show hostility, it is with some of the possible outcomes of a rhetorical education and not 
rhetoric itself. A striking example of this subtle difference in attitude comes from 
Against the Opponents of Monastic Life: “When parents urge their children to study 
rhetoric (ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν λόγων σπουδῆς), all they say are words like these: “A certain 
man, of low estate, born of lowly parents, after achieving the power that comes from 
rhetoric, obtained the highest positions, gained great wealth, married a rich woman, 
built a splendid house, and is feared and respected by all.”77 Furthermore, in his Address 
on Vainglory and the Right Way for Parents to Bring Up their Children John provides 
further information about the priorities of some parents of his day- although he does not 
explicitly state whether he is talking about Christians or not: “In our own day every man 
takes the greatest pain to train his boy in the arts and in literature and speech, but to 
exercise this child’s soul in virtue, to that no man any longer pays heed.”78 This view 
might have led to certain members of his audience thinking that John espoused the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Demosthenes”, in The Funerary Speech for John Chrysostom, ed. and trans. Timothy D. Barnes and 
George Bevan (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2013), 2. A similar assessment is also almost 
always a feature of histories of Christian literature: “Chrysostom’s speeches fascinate both by their 
contents and their effective eloquent presentation. His style combines the Christian spirit with Greek 
beauty of form.” Berthold Altaner, Patrology, 5th ed., trans. Hilda C. Graff (Freiburg: Herder, 1960), 
377.  
76 For the first accusations against Chrysostom as hostile to Greek learning and rhetoric, dating back 
to 1891, see Margaret Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline 
Interpretation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 23. 
77 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 3.5 (PG 47:357; John Chrysostom, A Comparison between a King and a 
Monk/Against the Opponents of the Monastic Life: Two Treatises by John Chrysostom, ed. and trans. 
David G. Hunter (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988, 135). 
78 Inan. glor. et ed. lib. 18 (SC 188:100-2; trans. M.L.W. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan Culture in 
the Roman Empire, together with an English translation of John Chrysostom’s “Address on Vainglory 
and the Right Way for Parents to Bring Up Their Children”, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1951, 
95). 
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obliteration of the rhetorical schools, and to that he pre-emptively responds as follows: 
“I do not say this, but let us not destroy the edifice of virtue, nor bury the soul alive. 
When the soul is self-controlled, no harm will come from a lack of knowledge of 
rhetoric (λόγων); but when the soul is corrupted, the greatest damage will result, even if 
the tongue is quite sharp; indeed, the damage will be greater the more skilled in rhetoric 
he becomes. For when wickedness gains experience in speaking, it does far worse deeds 
than ignorance.”79 In other words, while rhetoric is no obstacle to the virtuous life, lack 
of rhetorical skill should be no cause of grief to those who do want to live in virtue 
because it has no effect to that whatsoever. Even if John’s view does not glorify 
eloquence, it does not show a particularly hostile attitude towards it either. Hunter is of 
the opinion that behind this “attack on the pursuit of rhetorical education” is Libanius 
and his devotion to the cult of the logoi along with the place of rhetoric in the 
expression of piety to the gods. Nonetheless, Hunter agrees that Chrysostom does not 
attack “altogether the learning or practice of rhetoric”, a position he believes would be 
found “impractical and, indeed, self-contradictory given his own ample use of sophistic 
devices...” Instead, Hunter argues, Chrysostom devalues rhetoric and “strips λόγοι of 
any moral value.”80 In our chapter on Chrysostom’s reception of philosophy we will see 
how he also appealed to the Greek philosophers themselves in his polemic against 
rhetoric. 
Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis is not the language of Chrysostom, as useful as 
that may be, but on the actual content of this language, especially since there already are 
many studies on Chrysostom’s use of Greek from a rhetorical and philological point of 
view.81 However, these studies mostly focus on individual works and to this day “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 3.11 (PG 47:367; trans. Hunter, A Comparison, 148-9). 
80 Hunter, A Comparison, 34-5. 
81 Besides Ameringer, for whom see n. 84 below, we will mention a small sample here: Frederick 
Walter Augustine Dickinson, The Use of the Optative Mood in the Works of St. John Chrysostom 
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1926); Mary Albania Burns, Saint John 
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comprehensive analysis of the classical elements in Chrysostom’s rhetoric is yet to be 
written.”82 The size of Chrysostom’s corpus is probably the reason that this is not 
something that can be easily achieved by a single person. Previous attempts to study 
Chrysostom and Hellenism have either been very brief (e.g. a chapter in Baur’s and 
Papadopoulos’ biographies or journal articles)83 or served as introductions to different 
translations of his works in various European languages (English, French, etc.), which, 
with few exceptions, obviously tend to emphasize what is presented in the translated 
work.84 There has also been a tendency to categorize him as someone overly hostile to 
classical literature, while others tend to classify him alongside Origen and the 
Cappadocians as those primarily responsible for striking a compromise between 
Christianity and Hellenism.85 Depending on the model each scholar chooses to follow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Chrysostom’s Homilies on the Statues: A Study of their Rhetorical Qualities and Form (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1930); William A. Maat, A Rhetorical Study of St. John 
Chrysostom’s De Sacerdotio (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1944), as well as 
most introductions to the critical edition of his works published in the Sources Chrétiennes series. I think 
that Hubbell’s assessment of Chrysostom’s rhetoric is still true: “in sentence structure and in the use of 
figures and other ornaments of style he was a true child of his age -a Christian orator speaking with all the 
art of the pagan.” Harry M. Hubbell, “Chrysostom and Rhetoric,” Classical Philology 19:3 (1924), 267.  
82 Hagit Amirav, “Exegetical Models and Chrysostomian Homiletics: The Example of Gen. 6.2,” 
Studia Patristica 37 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 311. Similarly, and in regard to classical citations within 
John’s corpus, Samuel Pomeroy, “Reading Plato Through the Eyes of Eusebius: John Chrysostom’s 
Timaeus Quotations in Rhetorical Context,” in (Re)Visioning John Chrysostom: New Theories and 
Approaches, eds. Wendy Mayer and Chris de Wet (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming), argues that what is 
needed is “detailed examination of the citation techniques and rhetorical purposes of individual sets of 
quotations and allusions in their literary settings.” 
83 Stylianos Papadopoulos, Άγιος Ιωάννης ο Χρυσόστοµος, Τόµος Β: Η σκέψη του, η προσφορά του, η 
µεγαλωσύνη του [St. John Chrysostom, vol. 2: A Study on his Thought, Contribution, and Greatness] 
(Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia, 1999), 9-18. There is also a book by Christos Krikonis entitled Σχέση 
Ελληνισµού - Χριστιανισµού κατά τον Ιωάννη Χρυσόστοµο [The Relationship between Hellenism and 
Christianity according to John Chrysostom], (Athens: Apostoliki Diakonia, 2012) but the title is partially 
misleading since the largest and first part of the book is devoted to the relations between Christianity and 
Hellenism before Chrysostom while only the second and far too brief part actually deals with the subject 
matter to which the title of the book refers. For a good example of the influence (or lack thereof) of a 
Greek author, Plutarch in this case, on Chrysostom, see Geert Roskam, “Plutarch’s Influence on John 
Chrysostom,” Byzantion 85 (2015), 314-63. Roskam conclusively proves that despite certain superficial 
similarities (such as common moral preoccupations), there is no evidence of Plutarch’s influence on 
Chrysostom, and the parallels used by scholars in the past just show that John was familiar with the 
intellectual traditions of his time.  
84 Many of the introductions to the critical editions of the Sources Chrétiennes series as well as 
translations of Chrysostom into English include smaller or larger pieces discussing various aspects of 
Chrysostom’s reception of Hellenism.  
85 Numerous expressions of the former position will be cited throughout this review. For a 
representative example of the latter position see Thomas Edward Ameringer, The Stylistic Influence of the 
Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom: A Study in Greek Rhetoric 
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(conflict or symbiosis), Chrysostom’s texts can support both, depending on the 
occasion. However, this creates a very fragmented image of Chrysostom the classicist, 
and a further aim of this study is to collect these fragments of John’s own work in an 
attempt to recreate an intelligible image of his fascinating reconfiguration of Hellenism 
through the prism of the Christian tradition. Before we proceed to the different views of 
scholarship on the subject, we need to mention briefly that Hellenism in the late fourth 
century was something different from Hellenism in Byzantium, even if some scholars 
have taken Chrysostom’s stance towards it as indicative and axiomatic of later attitudes. 
In places like Antioch, its existence is highlighted not only in the writings of Libanius 
and others, but also in education, ethics, art and architecture, as well as everyday values 
and attitudes. In short, “the culture was still informed by traditional pagan values, and 
Christians had no reason to suppose that a Christian emperor was to be a permanent 
feature of the Roman Empire.”86 Wilken provides many examples of Hellenism’s 
enduring pervasiveness on everyday life and also makes the pertinent point that it was 
not perceived as a separate “religion” or faith of a particular community at the time, 
whilst also setting the tone of life in Antioch.87 
As we mentioned already, previous scholarship has been thorough with aspects of 
Chrysostom’s language and studies of individual texts have increased our understanding 
of his reception of Hellenism. Nevertheless, the identification of the need for a 
comprehensive analysis that would take into account (ideally) the whole corpus is not 
recent, even if it has been repeated again lately. More than 40 years ago, Robert Carter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1921), 20. Glanville Downey, A History of 
Antioch in Syria: From Seleucus to the Arab Conquest (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 
42, frames Chrysostom’s writings as a paradigmatic illustration of the absorption of the best elements of 
Greek literature and philosophy in the Christian culture of the fourth century. 
86 Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, xvii. Cf. ibid., 18: “Antioch, in spite of its large Christian 
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points see pages 21 and 30 respectively.  
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suggested different types of studies on Chrysostom’s theology that he thought were 
needed for the future.88 What interests us here is what he calls the “third term to which 
Chrysostom’s thinking can be related”: his cultural milieu. The reasoning behind a 
study which examines John’s cultural environment is that it will enable scholars to see 
what is Christian and non-Christian or culturally conditioned in Chrysostom’s 
thought.89 To identify the non-Christian sources behind a Christian’s thought is 
“important theologically, since not every thought of a Christian is necessarily a 
Christian thought.”90 Carter believed that future studies of Chrysostom’s relation to 
Greek culture would enable us to find out whether “alien plantings found congenial soil 
in Christianity” but also to identify the fundamental differences (and accidental, as he 
calls them, similarities) between Scripture and Greek philosophy. As far as Chrysostom 
is concerned, he thought that by identifying the sources behind his thought we might 
accurately find which influence, philosophical or biblical, “is preponderant in 
Chrysostom’s own thinking.”91 While Carter’s terminology might seem to imply a third 
model regarding the relationship between Hellenism and Christianity, beyond conflict 
and symbiosis, it did not evolve into a fully-fledged thesis since this was not the 
purpose of his article. Still, we cannot help but point out that Carter’s thought here is a 
logical fallacy. Even if we were able to identify everything that Chrysostom read, it still 
wouldn’t mean that we have found the hierarchy, according to which his sources were 
arranged in his mind. By the same token, the fact that Plato is the most cited author in 
Chrysostom’s corpus does not necessarily imply that he was more engaged with 
Platonism than with other philosophical schools. Nonetheless, the importance of 
Carter’s proposition lies with the fact that he thought of Chrysostom as someone worth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Robert Carter, “The future of Chrysostom studies: Theology and Nachleben,” in Συµπόσιον: 
Studies on St. John Chrysostom, ed. Panayotis C. Christou (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic 
Studies, 1973), 129-136. 
89 Ibid., 132. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 133. 
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studying in the larger context of the relationship between Christianity and Hellenism in 
late antiquity, something that the grand narratives published before his article did not 
consider. 
ii. John Chrysostom and the Greek Classical Tradition: John’s Reception of Greek 
Philosophy and Classical Culture 
While we will try to summarize the general state of research, our focus will be his 
relationship with ancient Greek philosophy. This is because Hellenism is often 
identified with philosophy, as we have seen with both Siniossoglou and Athanassiadi, 
and Chrysostom’s stance towards it is assessed based on his various remarks on 
different philosophers and some of their ideas. In our case, this is not what Markschies 
calls “an almost randomly chosen specific phenomenon of cultural contact.”92 In 
Chrysostom’s corpus philosophy (both as a concept and as a word) plays an important 
role as a major force of Hellenism and philosophers and their ideas are often referred to 
as paradigmatic and/or emblematic of specific cultural positions and connotations. I do 
not agree with Markschies that the field which examines the reception of Greek 
philosophy in Christian theology is always an example of a “problematical application 
of the term [Hellenism]”, particularly since he uses it as something that often points to 
“theological premises and even prejudices” but as we have seen these premises and 
prejudices are certainly not limited to theologians.93 When we initially deal with 
Chrysostom’s interaction with Greek philosophy, we might reach the same conclusion 
that Goulven Madec did in his study on St. Ambrose and philosophy, namely that “he 
seems to use the language and ideas of the philosophers more as literary ornamentation 
than as substantial arguments.”94 One thing to be said from the outset is that it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Markschies, “Does It Make Sense,” 26. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Goulven Madec, Saint Ambroise et la Philosophie (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1974), 175, cited 
in Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 12. “It is true that the classical philosophy left no deep traces in Chrysostom.” Baur, John 
Chrysostom, 1:310. The reasons for this, per Baur, are three: a) Chrysostom had “no special gift for real 
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generally agreed Chrysostom was never as comfortable with Greek philosophy as were 
Clement, Origen, or the Cappadocians.95 For example, he certainly does not seem to 
have the comfort of a Clement, who could be “combining biblical and classical 
terminology or moving seamlessly from a citation of a pagan author to a similar idea in 
the Bible and vice versa.”96 It is certainly difficult to see Chrysostom as an heir of the 
patristic tradition of attempting to harmonize the Bible with the philosophy and 
literature of Hellenism or as a Christian Hellenist in his use of philosophy in the way 
that Pelikan and Jaeger present the Cappadocians.97 But to exclude him and the whole 
of the Patristic tradition from the history of Hellenism is an entirely different matter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
philosophy” (it is not exactly clear what Baur means by “real” philosophy), b) he gave up his education 
with the sophists prematurely, and c) there were no first-rate philosophers alive in Antioch or even the 
whole Roman Empire (ibid.). Generalisations about Chrysostom’s attitude towards philosophy and 
rhetoric can be traced back to Edward Gibbon, who accused him of “conceal[ing] the advantages which 
he derived from the knowledge of rhetoric and philosophy.” Ch. 32, History of the Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire vol. 3, (London: 1781), 468. Gibbon was willing to admit that he was a stranger to 
Chrysostom’s voluminous production and his opinion was based on what he read from the two “most 
judicious and moderate of the ecclesiastical critics,” Erasmus and Dupin. A variation of this thesis are the 
accusations of opportunism and schizophrenia we saw in the first part of this chapter. Marius Soffray, 
“Saint-Jean Chrysostome et la Littérature Païenne,” Phoenix 2:3 (1948), 82, points out that the first 
successful overturning of the traditional opinion (that Chrysostom was overly hostile against Hellenism 
and philosophy) was by Anton Nägele in his article  “Johannes Chrysostomos und sein Verhältnis zum 
Hellenismus,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 12 (1904), 73-113, who argued that Chrysostom deserves a place 
next to Origen, Basil, and Augustine for striking a compromise between Hellenism and Christianity. 
95 “Of their sentiments [the Greek philosophers] he retained little admiration when he entered the 
Christian life and to their writings he probably seldom recurred for recreation, but his retentive memory 
enabled him to point and adorn his arguments with illustrations and quotations from them.” P. R. 
Coleman-Norton, “St. Chrysostom and the Greek Philosophers,” Classical Philology 25:4 (1930), 305. 
Coleman-Norton’s opinion obviously completely overlooks Chrysostom’s actual engagement with 
philosophical ideas and emphasizes their rhetorical usefulness instead. Chrysostom was definitely more 
outspoken and clear about the proper order that philosophy should have in someone’s life, but did not 
explicitly argue against its existence. For a similar argument see D. Hunter, “Libanius and John 
Chrysostom: New Thoughts on an Old Problem,” Studia Patristica 22 (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1989), 
133, where Hunter claims that “Greek philosophers rarely receive a positive evaluation in his works” and 
that Chrysostom “almost always refers to the philosophers with disdain, except in the Adversus 
Oppugnatores.” 
96 Trigg, Origen, 9. Clement was even a proponent of the idea that philosophy was a pedagogue to 
the Greeks just as the Torah was for the Jews in preparation for the coming of Christ (ibid.). Josef Lössl 
comments that Clement’s technique “creates the impression that these two are treated as equally valid 
sources of divine revelation” and thinks that once early Christians from a Greco-Roman cultural 
background distanced themselves from Judaism then the only alternative as point of reference for their 
past was their pagan past. Josef Lössl, “An Inextinguishable Memory: ‘Pagan’ Past and Presence in Early 
Christian Writing,” in Being Christian in Late Antiquity: A Festschrift for Gillian Clark, eds. Carol 
Harrison, Caroline Humfress, and Isabella Sandwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 81. 
97 For this tradition as well as other challenges the Christians had to face at the time see 
Papadogiannakis, Christianity and Hellenism, 24.  
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and one that would need serious justification in order to do so.98 The fact that he 
despised certain aspects of the classical heritage does not obviously turn him into a 
champion of anti-Hellenism. His attachment to the classical tradition, as was the case 
with other contemporary authors such as Gregory of Nazianzus, was at least 
ambivalent.99 But being ambivalent is far from being an anti-Hellene by nature, as some 
scholars have tried to present him.  
Thus, Baur was of the opinion that John was led astray in his attacks against the 
“Greeks” and the “philosophers”, because what he wished was to attack “polytheism, 
pagan superstition and pagan immorality” but as is often the case these later 
characteristics were so intertwined with the ancient Greek heritage that it becomes 
difficult to distinguish what is really attacked.100 I. Sandwell believes that Chrysostom 
“had very little time for the literature and learning of classical literature” and compares 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 It may or may not be significant, but two of  the references to John in the Synaxarium Ecclesiae 
Constantinopolitae mention his classical education with no hint of conflict between this and his education 
in Christian literature: “from the beginning of his life he acquired a great love of letters and quickly read 
through all pagan and Christian literature” and “he investigated all the wisdom of the Greeks and became 
a pupil of the sophists Libanius and Andragathius in Antioch and then of those in Athens.” Entries for 13 
November, transl. Barnes and Bevan, Funerary Speech, 164-5. The reference to John studying in Athens 
is obviously inaccurate. For an alternative view on the historicity of John’s studies in Athens see 
Trombley, Hellenic Religion and Christianization, 333-41. One of the accusations the monk Isaac 
brought against Chrysostom at the Council of the Oak was that he was being too welcoming to the 
Greeks: “that he received pagans [Hellenes] who had done a great deal of harm to the Christians,” 
Photius, Bibl. 59 (Photius, Bibliothèque vol. 1, ed. René Henry, Paris: Belles Lettres, 1959, 56; trans. 
Barnes and Bevan, Funerary Speech, 157). Barnes (ibid., n. 30) has suggested that this is “probably a 
reference to John’s granting of temporary asylum to the eunuch Eutropius in 399.” Eutropius (and the 
handing over of a priest to him by Chrysostom, after which he was exiled) is mentioned by name in the 
first list of accusations against Chrysostom brought by his deacon, also named John (ibid., 155). I think 
the accusation can be taken at face value: Chrysostom was responsible for the conversion of Greeks to 
Christianity despite the fact that they might have been hostile to Christians in the past. 
99 Anthony Meredith described this attitude as “coolness” towards the classical tradition, and 
contrasted it with Basil of Caesarea’s defensive and cautious attitude towards Hellenism, which rejected 
an uncritical absorption of Hellenism but also showed an evident affection for it. According to Meredith, 
it was this latter attitude that enabled the culture and philosophy of Hellenism to find “its most enduring 
home within the austere if discriminating embrace of the Church” after the demise of the remaining pagan 
faculties during the fifth and sixth centuries: Anthony Meredith, Gregory of Nyssa (London: Routledge, 
1999), 10. Gregory of Nazianzus’ principle for appropriating Greek paideia has been described as a 
method of avoiding the thorns while plucking the roses, with revelation being the criterion for both the 
roses and the thorns: Faith gives Fullness to Reasoning: The Five Theological Orations of Gregory 
Nazianzen, ed. Frederick W. Norris, trans. Lionel Wickham and Frederick Williams (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 
45. Frances Young believes that Chrysostom “had a strongly ambivalent locus in relation to ‘Greek’ 
(pagan) culture, and his works suggest implicit criticism of Libanius.” Frances Young with Andrew Teal, 
From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and its Background, 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press, 
2010), 207. 
100 Baur, John Chrysostom, 1:310. 
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his attitude with Basil of Caesarea’s careful allowance of Greek learning as a “shadow 
outline of Christian virtue.” One of the arguments that Sandwell uses to support her 
thesis is Chrysostom’s alleged total rejection of Greek learning.101 Finally, Soffray is 
more specific about what exactly Chrysostom rejected from classical culture and argues 
that the one branch of Greek culture that Chrysostom rejected overwhelmingly was 
sophistic rhetoric, specifically its artificial and verbose elements. Nevertheless, he 
refuses to call him an enemy of Hellenism and claims that John was sensitive to the 
artistic beauty of pagan literature and favourable to the use of profane rhetoric, but 
without going beyond the limits of utility and necessity and by refusing to see rhetoric 
as an end, like the Sophists did, but as a means.102 John was a powerful preacher, and in 
his homilies we find not only echoes of the Scripture but also of many Greek authors: 
Homer, Aeschylus, Demosthenes, and Plato.103 In this respect, John assimilated the 
heritage of pagan culture and “in the spirit of that culture, he tried to speak directly to 
men in order to improve their lives.”104 Nevertheless, this tension has not been directly 
addressed in scholarship, since Chrysostom’s thought is usually made to fit pre-existing 
conceptions rather than analysed in its own terms. 
As with almost every church father, different scholars have provided a variety of 
interpretations on the question of Chrysostom and Hellenism. According to C. Krikonis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 152. Cf. Duane Garrett, An Analysis of the 
Hermeneutics of John Chrysostom’s Commentary on Isaiah 1 - 8 with an English Translation (London: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 240: “Chrysostom was well read in the classics, but his attitude towards them 
ranged from indifference to complete disdain. His antagonism is in part due to the artificiality of his 
contemporaries’ imitation of the classical style, which he found irksome.” 
102 Soffray, “Saint-Jean Chrysostome et la Littérature Païenne,” 83-5. 
103 For complete lists of Greek authors known and cited by Chrysostom see Baur, John Chrysostom, 
1:306 and Coleman-Norton, “St. Chrysostom and the Greek Philosophers,” passim. Plato is obviously the 
one cited more than the rest, in at least thirty citations according to Baur, ibid. Baur also includes several 
useful assessments of Chrysostom the classicist from scholars working in the early 20th century and 
devotes a small but substantial chapter to this topic. They are mostly interesting because through these we 
can discern which aspects of Chrysostom and Hellenism interested them most and identify gaps in 
knowledge that need to be filled by contemporary studies. Sometimes Chrysostom’s quotations of 
classical sources, as e.g. Plato’s Timaeus, come through a second-hand source, in this example, Eusebius 
of Caesarea. For a detailed argumentation in support of this see Pomeroy, “Reading Plato,” passim. For 
the influence of authors such as Aristotle and Demosthenes on John’s understanding of the concept of 
γνώµη see Laird, Mindset, Moral Choice and Sin, 157-91. 
104 De Romilly, A Short History of Greek literature, 219. 
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who is the only scholar who had addressed the issue of Chrysostom and Hellenism 
explicitly (although in a limited way), John criticized the “pernicious fruits” of 
Hellenism, the neglect of ethical education and its materialist mentality.105 He is not 
hostile to ancient culture, but he is not an ardent supporter either.106 For this scholar, 
Chrysostom is “mercilessly whipping” the sayings of Greek philosophers due to their 
“wrong-headed” beliefs and their immoral lives.107 His polemics against Greek paideia 
may also be attributed to the fact that in his time, there was a real danger of a one-sided 
cultivation of the mind instead of the ethos and of a secularization of Christianity 
instead of the evangelical fervor that characterised the movement in its infancy.108 To 
summarize, for Krikonis Chrysostom did not accept the incompatibility between 
Christianity and Hellenism but received whatever was useful to him, such as the 
language, the art of rhetoric, and some moral values such as virtue, prudence, and 
ontological thinking.109  
This utilitarian type of reception of Hellenism into Christianity inevitably leads to a 
version of Christianized Hellenism. Krikonis further argues that through logical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Krikonis, Σχέση Ελληνισµού - Χριστιανισµού, 13. 
106 A similar proposition also found in Ameringer, The Stylistic Influence, 21: “In the heat of battle he 
sometimes allows his zeal to carry him too far, to censure not only the errors and vices of paganism, but 
profane writers and literature in general… A deeper and more sympathetic study of his sermons would 
have revealed the fact that, though he is unsparing in his condemnation of pagan error and immorality, he 
is at heart not hostile to the refining and cultural influences of antiquity.” In other words, a study of the 
context of Chrysostom’s criticisms is a pre-supposition to any attempt to pronounce him the archenemy 
of Hellenism. 
107 Krikonis, Σχέση Ελληνισµού - Χριστιανισµού, 13. 
108 Ibid., 114. For a comparison of Origen’s and Chrysostom’s respective uses of paideia and their 
development of Christian equivalents see Jutta Tloka, Griechische Christen, Christliche Griechen: 
Plausibilisierungsstrategien des antiken Christentums bei Origenes und Johannes Chrysostomos 
(Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). 
109 Krikonis, Σχέση Ελληνισµού - Χριστιανισµού, 117. Wendy Mayer has shown Chrysostom’s 
philosophical eclecticism on issues of social teaching that would be of concern to both pagans and 
Christians: “On the topic of slavery, for instance, John will on one occasion use a Stoic model to argue 
that slavery is an adiaphoron, which has no bearing on the inner virtue of the Christian. On another 
occasion, he construes slavery within a Platonic framework to argue that the slave is a model of a 
properly philosophical life that every Christian should emulate. On yet another occasion he invokes an 
Aristotelean view of slaves, when he argues that they are passionate, not open to impression, intractable, 
and not very apt to receive instruction in virtue.” Wendy Mayer, “The Audience(s) for Patristic Social 
Teaching,” in Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and Challenges for Twenty-First-Century 
Christian Social Thought, eds. Johan Leemans, Brian Matz, and Johan Verstraeten (Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 87, with appropriate references to Chrysostom’s texts.   
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progression this concludes with a Hellenic Orthodoxy.110 He also maintains that because 
the problems of classical Greek philosophy were the problems faced by any spiritual 
man, it is therefore impossible to think of Hellenism separately from Orthodox 
Christianity and vice versa. In a way, Krikonis seems to be thinking that the Greek spirit 
was absolutely indispensable for Christianity. Essentially Krikonis constructs a scheme 
of historical progression that begins with Classical Hellenism, is then followed by 
Christian Hellenism and finally concludes with Hellenic Orthodoxy (which obviously 
happens after the Schism of 1054), which exists to this day. Interesting as this last thesis 
may be, it will not concern us here, although it should be pointed out that the essential 
component in Krikonis’ case always seems to be Hellenism. As we mentioned 
previously, these statements have more to do with issues in modern Greek identity than 
Hellenism in late antiquity. However, we see in this as well as in other works a 
discussion of the compatibility or incompatibility between Christianity and Hellenism, 
and as far as we are aware there has been no systematic attempt to answer the following 
questions: why exactly must these two systems of thought be compatible or 
incompatible? Are synthesis or antithesis the only alternatives?111 It is hoped that this 
thesis will provide an initial framework that will partially give a response to these 
questions.  
Chrysostom’s engagement with Hellenism and classical culture takes place in many 
of his works, even in some that initially would not appear to be fit for such a purpose.112 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Krikonis, Σχέση Ελληνισµού - Χριστιανισµού,118-9.   
111 Or, in B. Leyerle’s words, “whether Chrysostom was “for” or “against” classical culture.” 
Theatrical Shows and Ascetic Lives: John Chrysostom’s Attack on Spiritual Marriage (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 207. 
112 Such as A Comparison between a King and a Monk and Against the Opponents of the Monastic 
Life. See Hunter, A Comparison, 2. These works alongside other similar treatises substantiates the claim 
of J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John Chrysostom: Clerics between Desert and Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 133, that “as a rule, the treatises contain more references and 
stylistic allusions to classical authors than the sermons.” A simple skimming through the Sources 
Chrétiennes editions of some of John’s works should be enough to show this. However, this distinction 
(between orally delivered sermons and literary treatises written for a smaller audience) has not been 
considered in discussions of John’s reception of classical culture.  
50 
Overall, this engagement is usually with the personalities of the philosophers, and with 
some of their ideas, particularly those concerned with ethics. Chrysostom does not 
appeal to the philosophers too often (with the exception of the Against the Opponents of 
Monastic Life) and spends much of his time criticizing them, either for their moral 
failings, or, when that does not work as easily, as in the case of Diogenes, by claiming 
that their ‘virtue’ was a result of their vainglory.113 Sometimes he would also invoke 
them as positive examples, particularly when he wanted to make a point about 
exemplary behavior and wished to show that this was not an exclusively Christian 
phenomenon but could also be found among the pagans.114 His criticism also involved 
some of his contemporaries, such as his teacher Libanius and Julian the Emperor, and 
could be either implicit or explicit.115 We should not overlook that Chrysostom's 
criticism against the pagans was often of a rhetorical and hyperbolic nature, nor should 
we ignore the historical context of many of his critiques.  In the words of David Hunter, 
pagans such as Julian and Libanius were no less critical of immoral behavior 
than the Christian preacher. They, too, condemned the pursuit of unjust wealth. 
They also abstained from the sexual promiscuity associated with the theatre, 
dancers, and mimes. They, too, criticized the widespread practice of pederasty. 
Julian, in particular, was almost prudish in his observance of sexual continence, 
as Libanius pointed out.116  
If that was the case, one may ask, why was there so much polemic between them? In 
Hunter’s view, who pays particular attendance to the historical and literary context of 
the period, the main difference is to be found in their respective attribution of what they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Hunter, A Comparison, 31. 
114 Derek Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” Vigiliae Christianae 
47:1 (1993), 37. 
115 The Demonstration against the Pagans that Christ is God being a case of the former and the 
Discourse on Blessed Babylas of the latter. According to Hunter, what both works have in common is 
“Chrysostom's apologetic arguments against the Hellenic tradition [which] involved a rejection of the 
moral value of Greek literature and an assertion of the moral benefits of Christianity.” Hunter, A 
Comparison, 47. The lack of correspondence between Libanius and Chrysostom, despite their previous 
relationship, has been attributed to “Chrysostom’s relative apathy for the Classics.” Jaclyn L. Maxwell, 
Christianization and Communication in Late Antiquity: John Chrysostom and his Congregation in 
Antioch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 39. One could of course argue that the 
surviving correspondence of both Libanius and Chrysostom is not always about the classics and this 
cannot possibly be the reason they did not correspond.  
116 Hunter, A Comparison, 55-6. 
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saw as the reasons for society’s moral decadence: for Chrysostom, pagan culture was to 
be blamed for many societal evils, while for Julian and Libanius, the Christians were 
fundamentally responsible.117 We also need to consider the particularities of Hellenism 
at the time of John Chrysostom. John’s writings all come in the period after the pagan 
revival of Julian, who was supported by Libanius as they both claimed “the literary and 
cultural tradition of Greece as their own unique possession,”118 although even Libanius 
was not enthusiastic about Julian’s School Edict. In the works of Libanius, Julian 
becomes a moral paradigm that pinpoints the benefits of Hellenic culture and its pagan 
origins. Considering Chrysostom’s extremely negative opinion of Julian, it is not 
surprising that his polemic would often include Libanius as well. 
Other scholars have identified the influences of Greek philosophy on Chrysostom 
more precisely. For example, Elizabeth Clark sees Chrysostom’s views on marriage and 
virginity as part of a discussion that borrows extensively from the traditions of Greek 
philosophy.119 Clark also argues that Chrysostom sees Christian teaching “not so much 
as divine revelation as “philosophy,”120 which implies that Christianity was comprised 
of both theoria and praxis, as were all philosophical systems. She also mentions a 
specific example, where John borrows Plato’s image of reason as the charioteer that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid. But as D. Hunter remarks, “both pagans and Christians accepted the notion that moral 
conduct had apologetic value, and both sides claimed that the paideia on their own side produced the 
better results.” Ibid., 58. In Chrysostom’s case, his criticism against the Greeks did not prevent him from 
arguing against Christians in his own community, both in regard to their conduct to God and as to how 
their behavior affects Christianity in the eyes of outsiders. An example of this comes from Adv. opp. vit. 
mon. 1.2 (PG 47:321-2; trans. Hunter, A Comparison, 80-1): “For I am now forced to display our sins to 
all the pagans (Ἕλληνας), both those who live today and those who shall come, the very ones I am 
always ridiculing for their teachings no less than for the laxness of their way of life (τῶν δογµάτων οὐχ 
ἧττον ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου διασύρων ῥᾳθυµίᾳ). If any of them should realize that among the Christians there 
are some people so hostile to virtue and philosophy … I am afraid that they will think that we Christians 
are not human, but beasts and wild animals in human for, some wretched demons, and enemies of the 
common nature, and they will make this judgement not only about those who are responsible, but about 
our entire people (ἔθνος).” The Christians in that case were the ones who opposed monasticism. This is a 
good example of the word philosophia used with a completely different way of life in mind.  
118 Hunter, A Comparison, 62. We should always keep in mind that Julian did not consider himself a 
Hellene, but a Roman, and called the Hellenes “our relatives,” Contr. Gal. 200A (LCL 157:375).  
119 Elizabeth Clark, Introduction to John Chrysostom, On Virginity; Against Remarriage, trans. Sally 
Rieger Shore (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1983), xviii-xix. 
120 Ibid., xviii. 
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reins in the passions (Phaedrus 246A-248E) and applies it to the virgin who as a 
charioteer herself rules over the tongue, ears, feet, etc.121 Clark uses this example to 
argue that “an appeal to revelation has here been supplanted by an appeal to Greek 
ethical writings.”122 The distinction between revelation and philosophy is an interesting 
one, although Clark does not seem to take into account the fact that the New Testament 
(or even the Old Testament) did not have the answer to every single problem that might 
arise in the Christian communities of later ages and therefore, an appeal to revelation 
was not always possible, unless one claimed access to extra-biblical revelation, which 
could often leads to charges of heresy, as for example with Montanism. Even within the 
context of exegesis and the fact that Chrysostom’s most common exegetical device was 
to interpret the Bible through the Bible, there were still issues that did not necessarily 
have to be discussed in the context of revelation. 
We can use the same argument for another of Clark’s points, when she claims that 
“Chrysostom’s treatment of riches is in strict accord with the classical praises of simple 
living that are more reminiscent of Stoic and Cynic diatribe than of the New 
Testament.”123 Our chapter on the affinities and the differences between John and the 
Cynics will offer a more nuanced picture to this claim, and it is our firm belief that in 
matters of ethics certain schools of thought within the tradition of Hellenism were riper 
for appropriation than others. It is not accidental that the image of Jesus as a “wandering 
Cynic” has been very popular among certain circles of scholars of the historical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Clark, Introduction, xix. For the assimilation of the two platonic images of the “Wings of Love” 
and the “Charioteer of the Soul” in John’s rhetoric see Constantine Bosinis, “Two Platonic Images in the 
Rhetoric of John Chrysostom: ‘The Wings of Love’ and ‘the Charioteer of the Soul,’” Studia Patristica 
41 (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 433-8. 
122 Clark, Introduction, xix. Then again, if Chrysostom needed to enrich his repertoire, why would he 
not use examples from other popular works and stories as he does here with Plato, and why should this be 
thought of as supplantation? Cf. David Rylaarsdam, John Chrysostom on Divine Pedagogy: The 
Coherence of his Theology and Preaching (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 194: 
“[Chrysostom’s] theological vision of formation was a synthesis of Scripture and classical paideia, a 
reading of the biblical text which was formed by and transformed Greco-Roman philosophical and 
rhetorical concepts.” 
123 Clark, Introduction, xix.  
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Jesus.124 Others have also been able to specifically identify Stoic influences in 
Chrysostom’s critique of games and the way they could affect both bodily senses and 
the soul itself.125 Clark’s reading of Chrysostom, even if not always specific as to the 
precise philosophical influences, served as a good starting point for others to follow 
when discussing the influence of philosophy in Chrysostom’s works. 
Thus, in Wendy Mayer’s most recent works Chrysostom is treated as a Christian 
philosopher within traditions of Greek medico-philosophical therapies, and even if he is 
working with a Christian framework in mind, the parameters are those of a “long-
standing Hellenistic intellectual tradition.”126 For example, by comparing John and 
Libanius’ understanding of gnome she concludes that what we see are two approaches 
“within Greek paideia”, one Christian and one Greek, and with significant crossover in 
their approach to rhetoric as well. In treatises like John’s That No One Can Harm the 
Man Who Does Not Harm Himself, Mayer sees an “understanding of the soul drawn 
almost entirely from a Greek paideia”, which, even if he vehemently rejects it, 
implicitly influences the way he frames the Christian way of life.127 On the other hand, 
Mayer does not deny the distinctiveness of John’s philosophy, and identifies the 
following as some of its identifying marks: his appeal to the Scriptures and the biblical 
virtue exemplars rather than the Greek gods, philosophers, or heroes; his emphasis that 
philosophy is more appropriately aimed towards the heavenly rather than the earthly 
citizen; and his promotion of euergetism as something that needs to be directed towards 
the poor alone. What she claims instead is that John’s “anti-intellectual stance”, as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 For a description and critique of this movement see Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest: The 
Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 58-92. 
125 Richard Lim, “Christianization, Secularization, and the Transformation of Public Life,” in A 
Companion to Late Antiquity, ed. Philip Rousseau (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 501. 
126 Wendy Mayer, “A Son of Hellenism: Viewing John Chrysostom’s anti-intellectualism through the 
lens of Antiochene paideia,” in Intellektueller Austausch und religiöse Diversität in Antiochien 350-
450/Intellectual Exchange and Religious Diversity in Antioch (CE 350-450), eds. Silke-Petra Bergjan and 
Susanna Elm (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, forthcoming). 
127 Wendy Mayer, “The Persistence in Late Antiquity of Medico-Philosophical Psychic Therapy,” 
Journal of Late Antiquity 8:2 (2015), 338.  
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drawn by himself, is false, since his understanding of the role of the preacher as a 
medico-philosophical therapist was part of an existing intellectual tradition and not 
something outside of it or against it.128  
While Clark and Mayer have placed Chrysostom firmly among traditions of Greek 
philosophy, Florovsky sees him as “an orator and a rhetorician” in the classical sense, 
while also claiming that he was not “a thinker or a philosopher.”129 Chrysostom is thus a 
true Hellenist who did not denounce his cultural heritage, and similarly to classical 
rhetoricians he was a teacher as well as a moralist and a preacher. His Hellenism is most 
obvious in his language and style and his writings exhibit some of the brilliance of 
classical Athenians like Demosthenes and Plato. At the same time, Florovsky claims, 
his Hellenism is not just external or superficial, even if he was never “stirred by the 
philosophical problems of Hellenism” or “forced to reconcile the Hellenist in himself 
with his Christianity.” Thus, his Hellenism is also evident in his moralism, which 
Florovsky uses to explain the “acceptance and transformation of Stoicism by Christian 
ethics” and more particularly Chrysostom’s contribution to this transformation in his 
constant efforts to teach “moral wisdom and nobility” and even his mysticism is 
described as “a mysticism of goodness, of good works and virtue.”130 Similarly to 
others, then, Florovsky emphasizes his engagement with Greek philosophical ethics and 
his mastery of the Greek language. However, he also explicitly calls him a rhetorician 
rather than a philosopher and claims that he was not particularly engaged with the 
philosophical problems in Hellenism.  
This is an argument that has not gone unnoticed by those who follow the conflict 
model. There are references in Chrysostom’s writings where he claims that the ἔξωθεν 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Mayer, “A Son of Hellenism.” 
129 Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century, 241. Cf. Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John 
Chrysostom, 251: “Chrysostom was not really interested in theology. He was basically a pastor and 
minister…” 
130 Florovsky, The Eastern Fathers of the Fourth Century, 240-1. 
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σοφία131 does not even really benefit those who follow it, leaving them empty handed 
and without any profit.132 The ἔξωθεν philosophers might say much, but none of it is 
sound.133 N. Siniossoglou uses this reference (from his Homilies on 1 Corinthians) to 
argue that Chrysostom does not see much use in pagan philosophy.134 However, if we 
look at the passage in its context we shall see that Chrysostom’s argument is that the 
real wisdom is synonymous with the Gospel and the salvation offered by the cross, and 
that in comparison with that every other wisdom seems irrelevant or one might even say 
useless. It is relatively easy to take some of Chrysostom’s statements out of their 
literary context and provide an inaccurate picture of his views on a range of issues, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The term ἔξωθεν, usually misleadingly translated as “pagan”, is a reference to any kind of non-
Christian wisdom, not necessarily Hellenic. Cf. a case where the term does seem to imply Hellenes: “Or 
haven’t you heard the maxim the pagans tell: “from force of habit free will becomes second nature”,” De 
laud. Paul. hom. 6.6 (SC 300:272; trans. Mitchell, Heavenly trumpet, 477). Cf. John referring to Moses as 
well versed in ἔξωθεν φιλοσοφία (of the Egyptians in this case) in Mut. nom. hom. 2.2 (PG 51:134). Even 
when used for pagans, ἔξωθεν does not carry the negative connotations that Christians would associate 
with paganism. It is simply a reference to those outside the Christian faith. For an example of the 
application of the term in the praise of widowhood among non-Christians, see Ad. vid. iun. 2 (SC 
138:122). We should also note that the word pagan often appears in quotation marks in this thesis. This is 
because we usually consider it as either a wrong translation of a term that did not always necessarily 
mean pagan (such as Hellene or outsider) or because there are better ways to express what we mean: thus, 
ancient Greek philosophy is called exactly that, and not pagan philosophy, with the exception of explicit 
religious references in ancient philosophical writings, where one can use the term to describe pagan 
beliefs. Other works on Chrysostom have also indicated how problematic the term is, but for different 
reasons. Thus, Isabella Sandwell expresses her dissatisfaction for the use of the term pagan by referring to 
historians who consider it as a “Christian category that flattens out the diversity of religious experience of 
those in the Graeco-Roman world.” She rejects other alternatives such as polytheists and her own refusal 
to use the term pagans comes down to the fact that it “suggests a Christian view that the world is 
permanently drawn into distinct, all-defining religious identities.” Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 10. 
A similar argument is also used by A. Cameron: “One gets into problematic areas with the application of 
the very terms “Christian” and “pagan,” as though there always firm and easily detectable boundaries 
between them instead of a murky overlapping area.” Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 122. While 
I agree with both these statements, Cameron’s argument can be more qualified by the observation that 
while “Christian” was a term used by various groups in antiquity as a way to describe themselves, we 
have no evidence of any group identifying as “pagan”, which is purely a scholarly construct that can 
describe many different things. Similarly, the use of the term “Greek” does not always indicate that John 
is talking about ethnic Greeks. Sometimes it just refers to “those who observe the Graeco-Roman 
religions in the first instance, but more generally to those who don’t fall within the categories ‘Jew’ or 
‘Christian.’” Johan Leemans et al., ‘Let us Die That We May Live’: Greek Homilies on Christian Martyrs 
from Asia Minor, Palestine and Syria (c. AD 350-AD 450), (London: Routledge, 2003), 160. 
132 In 1 Cor. hom. 7.1 (PG 61:55); De stat. 1.1 (PG 49:18).  
133 De stat. 19.1 (PG 49:189; NPNF 1-9:465): “the pagan philosophers have discoursed an infinite 
deal, and have expended a multitude of words, without being able to say anything sound.” 
134 Siniossoglou, Theodoret and Plato, 52. Nevertheless, he is not the first to make this argument. 
Baur mentions several German philologists of the early twentieth century that repeatedly charged 
Chrysostom with “disrespect or contempt for classical education” and argued their position with reference 
to the fact that Chrysostom “indulges in controversy against the classic mythologies and against the moral 
aberrations of many philosophers.” Baur, John Chrysostom 1:307. 
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therefore turn him into a champion of anti-Hellenism. It is equally easy to take other 
statements that favor the study of the classics and turn him into a champion of their 
study, such as the following:  
Every day you may find examples of these things- the succession of rulers, - the 
confiscation of rich men’s goods… Do not our affairs resemble a kind of wheel? 
Read, if you will, both our own (books), and those without: for they also abound 
in such examples. If you despise ours, and this from pride; if you admire the 
works of philosophers, go even to them. They will instruct you, relating ancient 
calamities, as will poets, and orators, and sophists, and all historians. From 
every side, if you will, you may find examples.135  
 
Examples of Chrysostom recommending or denigrating the classics or examples 
from the classical world are plentiful, but they do not mean much by themselves, unless 
one looks at them in their specific context: the work they appear in, its genre, potential 
audiences, and its place within the work itself. On the contrary, they are often used to 
make grand generalisations. Finally, one should also pay attention to the whole body of 
John’s works. Only then will s/he realize that Chrysostom “was far more concerned to 
teach his Christians, than to polemicize against Jews and pagans,”136 and to that we 
would only add that the polemic was also frequently utilized as a way of making a point 
to these very same Christians about what the other groups were and were not doing 
properly. 
iii. The Question of Religious Identity 
Taking John’s or any other ancient author’s views on any given subject out of 
context is often the reasoning behind grand sweeping judgments of their thought, a fault 
that is usually associated with older scholarship but can be found even today, although 
to a lesser degree. An example of this is I. Sandwell’s work on Chrysostom and 
religious identity in Late Antiquity. Sandwell’s profile of Chrysostom is one of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 In 2 Thess. hom. 1.2 (PG 62:472; NPNF 1-13:379). Baur’s commentary on this passage is 
interesting, primarily because it perfectly captures John’s spirit: “Chrysostom then was not ungrateful to 
the schools, through which he has passed; he was no fanatic, no renegade, no “embittered adversary” of 
classical culture.” Baur, John Chrysostom 1:308.  
136 Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 187. 
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someone who is not just hostile to Greek religion, but pretty much everything Greek: 
culture, history, moral and social values, and everything that could have been perceived 
as part of Greek identity. The reason Chrysostom does that, according to Sandwell, is 
due to his uncompromising stance in his understanding of religious and ethno-racial 
identity: you were either Christian or Greek in Chrysostom’s time and your choice also 
determined your way of life. In Sandwell’s argument Chrysostom was constructing a 
Christian identity in his attempt to define what it meant to be a Christian.137 However, 
in his criticism of Sandwell’s thesis, W. Liebeschuetz does not find this description 
helpful since it overlooks the fact that not only did Chrysostom not think that he was 
creating something new, but that his purpose was something much grander than the 
mere creation of a new identity. What Chrysostom asked from his congregation was a 
practical application of all Christian teaching as found in the Bible and the traditions of 
the Church.138 But in Sandwell’s view Chrysostom’s ultimate aim was to make religion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 277.  
138 Wolf Liebeschuetz, “The view from Antioch: from Libanius via John Chrysostom to John Malalas 
and beyond,” in Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire: The Breaking of a Dialogue (IVth – VIth 
Century A.D.), eds. Peter Brown and Rita Lizzi Testa (Zurich: Lit Verlag, 2011), 321-2. Liebeschuetz 
makes other pertinent points in his critique of Sandwell, which we will only summarize here: Chrysostom 
was adamant that there was only one correct belief and one correct way of life because this was the belief 
shared by other Christian leaders from the beginning. He also makes the case that a lot of Christian 
practices (such as giving alms to the poor, not going to the theatre and circus, giving up swearing, etc.) 
were not intended as markers of the Christians’ differences from their fellow citizens, but rather as the 
behaviour they were taught and was considered proper; essentially, they were not different for the sake of 
being different, but because it is better to do what is right than what is wrong (ibid., 322). Liebeschuetz 
furthered his critique (Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 190-1) with the argument that the creation of an 
identity was not the purpose of preaching but its result. Thus, Sandwell’s construction thesis “does not 
fairly describe what was going on in the minds of these men [preachers], it is not what the preachers 
thought they were doing, and it does not explain why congregations found their preachers’ demands 
persuasive.” We should note here that there are disagreements even among scholars who work on the 
basis of the conflict model, such as the debate between “essentialists” and “constructionists.” For 
example, in a similar take on the same matter (the alleged “construction” of identities), Siniossoglou has 
labelled Sandwell’s point of view as relativist and non-essentialist: “Christian theologians, philosophers 
and intellectuals in late antiquity and Byzantium certainly thought about Christianity and Hellenism in 
realist terms: as possessing an essential core or inalienable meaning. To study these essentialist world-
views and the texts in which they are contained by adopting a relativist non-essentialist standpoint, as is 
commonly done in recent scholarship, means never to take Christian intellectuals, philosophical pagans 
and other intellectuals at their word, to assume, in effect, that they were not the persons they thought 
themselves to be. The intellectual and religious identities which Christians … or pagans … gave 
themselves should not be thought as unreal and should not be dissolved into constantly shifting, 
impersonal collective discourses.” N. Siniossoglou, Radical Platonism in Byzantium: Illumination and 
Utopia in Gemistos Plethon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xi-xii. Cameron, Byzantine 
Matters, 64, calls Siniossoglou’s hypothesis in this work (the existence of a continuous Platonic 
movement within Byzantium and its role as a carrier of Hellenic identity) as part of a “clear Greek and 
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the defining feature of one’s identity, and there could be no overlap or indeterminacy 
between being Christian or Greek.139 Sandwell’s idea that Chrysostom constructs a 
Christian identity in order to define it and in order to refute other kinds of identity is an 
important version of the conflict model we discussed in the first part of the chapter. But 
here the conflict is seen by the scholar not as something ‘natural’ or inherent to 
Christianity and Hellenism (as Harnack clearly thought); rather, the conflict is seen as a 
product of the way Christianity was constructed by Chrysostom. 
We previously indicated that sometimes Chrysostom’s attitude is also taken as 
paradigmatic for the literary reception of classical texts throughout Byzantium. One 
example of this is Ramsay Macmullen, who characterized Chrysostom as the archetypal 
thinker who determined the attitude of the Byzantines towards the classics for centuries 
following his death.140  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
anti-Orthodox agenda” that “depends … on a strongly essentialist way of looking at identity.” Cameron 
herself supports a model of “sustained challenge and redefinition” to move things forward from the 
positions of appropriation or existential opposition, whilst admitting that Hellenism is not enough to 
explain the problem of identity in Byzantium (ibid., 68). While this could potentially lead to the adoption 
of a third and more nuanced model to accurately describe the relationship between Hellenism and 
Christianity, it remains to be seen whether this could be sustainable within the context of the study of late 
antiquity. 
139 Sandwell’s interpretation of Chrysostom’s binary scheme of Christian/Greek further leads her to 
claim that Chrysostom allowed “no room for a non-Christian civic identity” and little room “for a non-
Christian form of ethnic identification.” The main reason Chrysostom even used terms such as Hellenes 
was to show the incompatibility between Christianity and Greek culture. Sandwell refers to Chrysostom’s 
use of techniques from the classical Greek education as one of the only positive associations she finds 
between Chrysostom and Hellenism. All these claims finally lead to one point: that Chrysostom wanted 
to make Christianity the sole political, civic, ethnic and religious identity of the Christians, and that in 
order to do that there was not much space for religious toleration or the idea that religion is a private 
matter in his thought. For all these references see Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 152-3. 
Cf. Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 147: “Chrysostom hoped to eclipse distinctions of 
class or culture, by making religious identity the primary marker of difference in society.” These views 
inevitably lead one to the conclusion that Chrysostom (and others, like Julian) were playing a game of 
identity politics.  
140 Ramsay Macmullen, Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 89, where we also find yet another overly negative description 
regarding Chrysostom’s attitude towards philosophy and learning: “Chrysostom, just like earlier bishops, 
vaunts the wisdom of the believing unlearned over the unbelieving learned [the reason behind why 
Chrysostom would ever prefer the unbelieving, whether learned or unlearned, is not explained]; ridicules 
and rejects Plato and the other great names of the philosophic pantheon, just as Constantine had done; 
dismisses their teachings as mere cobwebs; and in the end approves only “rustics and ordinary folk.” His 
is the cast of mind prevailing in the Byzantine world to come.” None of the above is wrong per se. 
Chrysostom does all these things, even though his ridicule of Plato and other philosophers is not 
necessarily related to Constantine, as there were many other Christian writings before and after 
Constantine doing the exact same thing. The problem with this style of argument is that it takes one 
element from Chrysostom’s writing, that of ridicule, and presents it as the absolute depiction of his 
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iv. Overview of the Argument: Research Questions and Future Directions 
These extreme positions serve to highlight that what has been lacking in research so 
far is a coherent rhetorical and historical analysis of Chrysostom’s views on Hellenism 
in an effort to provide a systematic study of a very un-systematic thinker such as 
Chrysostom.141 For example: in what context is he ranting against the philosophers? Is 
he only criticizing them, or can we find examples of praise as well? Are the Hellenes of 
his time constantly disparaged? Is he really a cultural appropriator? The context in 
which these questions are answered is of fundamental importance, and only a 
contextualization of his various statements will be sufficient if we want to move beyond 
the dichotomies that plague the field. If we want to see how Chrysostom is relevant to 
modern debates on Hellenism and Christianity in late antiquity, another extended array 
of questions also need to be answered: how did he interpret and use Hellenism? How 
did he treat “external” wisdom and did he ever consider that Christianity had to 
“borrow” the Greek language and philosophical terminology in order to make its 
message more accessible to the large masses of the Roman Empire?142 What were his 
views on the different schools of ancient philosophy, such as Platonism, Stoicism, 
Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism, if any, and what does he approve of and reject from 
the Hellenic tradition?143 How does he define his Christian identity in relation to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
attitude towards philosophy and the philosophers themselves. But Chrysostom, thankfully, is a much 
more interesting thinker than is presented in views like the one above, and his attitude, as we will be 
seeing, was much more varied and nuanced than Macmullen’s view of him.  
141 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 19, rightly emphasizes the futility of any attempts at 
systematization that would exclude the different literary, historical, and rhetorical contexts of his thought. 
In a sense, the aim is similar to Pelikan’s work on the Cappadocians: “to treat their thought systematically 
without imposing a system upon it.” Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture, 6. 
142 The reason the word borrow is in quotation marks is because the claim that Christianity borrowed 
the Greek language implies that it did not belong to the Christians in the first place. Even within the first 
generation of Christians there were believers whose native (and often only) language and culture was 
Greek.  
143 Beside the references from his own writings, John’s antithesis to pagan religious practices is 
briefly mentioned in a text that is now considered the earliest of his biographies, The Funerary Speech for 
John Chrysostom: “He was unwilling to neglect the salvation even of the barbarians; he was fighting with 
all his might against the enemy of our salvation, now driving out impiety by the destruction of temples 
and idols, now introducing piety by the planting of churches,” The Funerary Speech 60 (trans. Barnes and 
Bevan, The Funerary Speech, 74).   
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Hellenic and Roman cultural milieu of both Antioch and Constantinople?144 Are his 
polemics against paganism a sign of cultural and/or ethnic denunciation of 
Hellenism?145 Some of these questions have been asked before, and the responses have 
been varied.  
Before proceeding to identify the exact gaps in the research, we will need to look 
into some of these responses because they provide both the framework and the impetus 
for this study. Thus, Garrett attributes Chrysostom’s antagonism to the classics “in part 
to the grip paganism still held on people’s minds.”146 Averil Cameron looks at the fight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Whilst we can assert Chrysostom’s Christian identity without any issue, things become more 
complicated when it comes to any assertions of his ethnicity. For example, he is sometimes referred to as 
a Greek-writing Syrian: Christine Shepardson, “Syria, Syriac, Syrian: Negotiating East and West,” in A 
Companion to Late Antiquity, ed. Rousseau, 455. Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 127, 
asserts that he derived “from a family of … Western origin” due to his father’s (Secundos) and sister’s 
(Sabiniana) names. The question must be asked at this point, primarily in relation to Shepardson’s claim: 
what makes Chrysostom a Syrian and Libanius a Hellene, considering that they were both natives of 
Antioch, and used Greek in both their speeches and writing? Is it just self-designation? If that is the case, 
Chrysostom never applied the term Syrian to himself. Even though Shepardson does not offer a response 
to this question, she nonetheless argues against generalizations such as calling Antioch “Greek” and 
Edessa “Syriac” and rightly emphasizes the place of Antioch within its Syrian environment. For another 
characterization of Chrysostom as a Syrian, which in this example is used as an explanation for his ample 
use of comparison as a literary device, see Ameringer, The Stylistic Influence, 68. This seems to be an 
issue of modern scholarship unnecessarily complicating things. In Byzantine biographies of Chrysostom, 
he is almost always described as a Greek from Greek parentage. See Theodore of Tremithus (c. 680), v. 
Chrys. 1.1 (Douze Récits Byzantins sur Saint Jean Chrysostome, ed. François Halkin, Bruxelles: Société 
des Bollandistes, 1977, 8): Ἤν δὲ γονέων Έλλήνων καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ Ἓλλην; cf. George of Alexandria (c. 
680-725), v. Chrys. 3.2 (Douze Récits, 73): Πάντες δὲ ᾖσαν Ἕλληνες [i.e. both John and his parents]. In 
the same work, we can also find an early Byzantine version of the utilitarian reception of the classics 
(ibid., 3.3, 78): “And he reaped what was useful among these [the ancient books, i.e. the classics], but the 
others he refused to touch as thorny” as well as a statement that John “mastered all of Greek education” 
before his return to Antioch [3.5, 88, my translation]. When describing the flames in the Cathedral that 
followed after John’s exile, George mentions the persecutions that Johannites had to suffer from Optatus, 
Prefect of Constantinople at the time, who is called Ἕλλην ὤν τὴν θρησκείαν (ibid., 3.57, 236). This is 
particularly important due to the fact that John was also previously called a Hellene in the very same 
work, and indicates that the word could be used either as a description of ethnic origin or a religious 
persuasion and was not used to exclusively designate pagans, as is often claimed. For another reference to 
a Lucian who was “a Greek according to religion” and a leader of a group that violently persecuted the 
Johannites see Vie anonym. du Vatic. 1669 26.30 (Halkin, Douze Récits, 418). With the exception of an 
incident in George’s Vita where John, whilst in Athens, strongly criticizes Hellenic religion, there is no 
sense of conflict or any emphasis on John’s supposed anti-Hellenism in any of the Byzantine biographies. 
On the other hand, it is a staple feature in many works of modern scholarship on Chrysostom. For a 
similar false attribution of Roman identity to Chrysostom see Bozinis, Ο Ιωάννης ο Χρυσόστοµος για το 
Imperium Romanum, 26-7. 
145 Other related questions could include Chrysostom’s citation techniques “and rhetorical purposes 
of individual quotations and allusions in their literary settings,” and a good starting point for 
Chrysostom’s Timaeus quotations is Samuel Pomeroy, “Reading Plato Through the Eyes of Eusebius,” 
where the question appears as well. For an extensive treatment of Chrysostom’s critique of classical 
paideia along with comparisons with other Church fathers, see Nägele, “Johannes Chrysostomos,” 
passim. 
146 Garrett, An Analysis, 240. 
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between pagans and Christians as a conflict over who has “the right to interpret the 
past” and “each side approached the task through hermeneutics.”147 Margaret Schatkin 
sees Chrysostom’s refutation of Libanius in his Discourse on Blessed Babylas as a 
strong expression of John’s anti-Hellenism. She also argues that when Chrysostom uses 
the word Greeks (Hellenes) as a derogatory term, as in chapter 40 of the Discourse, 
what is implied is the “linguistic and cultural legacy of pagan Greece”.148 Others have 
argued, that Chrysostom’s polemic was not against Hellenism per se, but against 
Libanius’ specific version of Hellenism and its representation of the old status quo.149 
The difference between Schatkin and Hunter’s arguments is that the former sees the 
attacks on Libanius as part of a consistent anti-Hellenic feeling on John’s part, while the 
latter sees it more as a personal attack that includes Hellenism because Libanius 
advocated for it.  
Our main argument in this thesis is that Chrysostom’s alleged “appropriation” of 
Hellenism is nothing different from what most thinkers of his era (whether they were 
Christians or pagans) did when it came to the reception of ancient Greek culture: they 
used it, interpreted it, rejected or accepted certain of its aspects and related it to their 
Christian beliefs in a variety of ways.150 As Carol Harrison argued in relation to 
Augustine’s Platonism, “to speak of Christian Platonism or Christian Neoplatonism, or 
indeed, Neoplatonism in Augustine’s time is in reality to speak of something which did 
not exist. Different people interpreted, used, appropriated or rejected ideas from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 138. 
148 Margaret A. Schatkin, Introduction to Saint John Chrysostom: Apologist, ed. and trans. Margaret 
Schatkin and Paul W. Harkins (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1985), 33, 41. 
149 See, e.g., Hunter’s discussion of Libanius’ connection between rhetoric (λόγοι) and religion (ἱερά) 
and their identification with the life of the polis: “his [Libanius’] religion was both a cultural and social 
conservatism; the city, its gods, and its culture were one indissoluble unity.” Libanius’ enduring influence 
on Chrysostom is also shown in the latter’s virulent attacks on “that amalgam of rhetoric, religion, and 
civic life espoused by Libanius.” See Hunter, A Comparison, 7-8. 
150 For example, we shall see that Chrysostom’s engagement with ancient Greek philosophy goes far 
beyond Platonism, and includes Stoicism and Cynicism, among other schools. Furthermore, one’s 
Christian faith did not necessarily imply a wholesale rejection of Platonism or other philosophical schools 
and theories. For this argument in relation to Origen see Ramelli, “Origen, Patristic Philosophy, and 
Christian Platonism,” n. 121 at 251. 
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Platonists and their ‘recent interpreters’ in different ways, in relation to the Christian 
faith. And the Platonists, in their turn, criticized and evaluated Christianity.”151 And 
while the process of simply identifying certain philosophical influences in Christian 
writers by indicating the borrowing or appropriating of terms and concepts is of 
fundamental importance, it is also of limited value if not followed by an analysis of the 
re-contextualization of these same terms and concepts. In other words, we agree with 
Tatakis that what scholarship needs to do is “to find out whether such elements retain 
the same meaning, or whether they imply the same thesis within the thought of the 
Christian philosopher, and whether, indeed, they are presented in a new spirit, a new 
arrangement, or whether they serve other final aims.”152  
As we will see, some of Chrysostom’s works, such as the Discourse on Blessed 
Babylas and against the Greeks, might be almost direct responses to specific works of 
pagan authors, such as Porphyry or Julian. Not only some of his works but also certain 
arguments within his corpus attest to pagan accusations against Christians that have 
been around for a very long time and were already counterattacked by the Apologists of 
the second century.153 Julian was an avid supporter of the principle that paganism and 
the classical tradition formed a unified whole, and was probably not very happy that 
“the Christians rejected the pagan religion while seeking the classical culture with 
enthusiasm.”154  However, Chrysostom’s polemic against the Greeks is not limited to a 
philosophical level or to the value of paideia, as was the case with some previous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Harrison, Augustine, 13. 
152 Basil Tatakis, Christian Philosophy in the Patristic and Byzantine Tradition, ed. and trans. 
George D. Dragas (Rollinsford, NH: Orthodox Research Institute, 2007), 35. 
153 See Timothy Barnes, “Pagan Perceptions of Christianity,” in Early Christianity: Origins and 
Evolution to AD 600 In Honour of W. H. C. Frend, ed. Ian Hazlett (London: SPCK, 1991), 233-4 for a 
discussion of Fronto’s charges of Thyestean feasts (cannibalism) and Oedipodean intercourse (incest) 
against the Christians. Porphyry’s sharp attack on Christianity was the dominant focus of the 
philosophical debate between pagans and Christians up until the early fifth century, when the reasons 
behind the fall of Rome became the central issue: see ibid., 238-40 for more information on Porphyry’s 
anti-Christian polemic, which he considers as “the largest, most learned and most dangerous of all the 
ancient literary attacks on Christianity” (238). John also seems to be responding to Julian’s accusations 
that the Christians venerate corpses by providing a detailed defence of the cult of the martyrs.  
154 Baur, John Chrysostom, 1:64. 
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apologists, but also includes a consistent and forceful attack on matters of ritual and 
cultic observances and, in some cases, a reference to actual conflicts.155 The presence of 
a large number of sophists in Antioch, even if they were not necessarily pagan like 
Libanius, might have also provoked his polemics against paganism. When dealing with 
Chrysostom’s attitude towards classical paganism and pagan philosophy during his 
lifetime, one should always remember the attitude their representatives had towards 
Christianity, which was unfriendly more often than not. As philosophers, sophists and 
rhetoricians were the most ardent supporters of “paganism” at the time (Libanius being 
an obvious example), it is not surprising to see them receiving some vitriolic remarks by 
Chrysostom. Considering the polemical literary environment of the time, this was a 
consistent attitude.156 
Moreover, Chrysostom’s challenge to Hellenism was very different from, say, 
Gregory of Nazianzus’. While he would surely reject (as Gregory did) Julian’s 
identification of Greek language and literary tradition with paganism, he would disagree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Such as John’s Letter 126 To the presbyter Rufinus, which begins with an agonizing description of 
news that reached him from Phoenicia: Ἦλθεν εἰς ἡµᾶς, ὅτι πάλιν ἀνήφθη τὰ ἐν Φοινίκῃ κακά, καὶ ἡ τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων ηὐξήθη µανία, καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν µοναχῶν οἱ µὲν ἐπλήγησαν, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀπέθανον (PG 52:685). 
Rufinus is then urged to attend to the matter as soon as possible. One of the things we can infer from the 
letter is that in certain areas of the empire the violence between different religions was still going strong 
in the early fifth century. See also Ep. 123 addressed to Phoenician presbyters and monks (PG 52:676-8). 
In Ep. 221 (PG 52:732-3) to the presbyter Constantius, who was also participating in the missionary work 
in Phoenicia and Arabia, John lists some of his duties, one of which is Ἑλληνισµοῦ τὴν καθαίρεσιν. For 
more information on this mission see Wendy Mayer and Pauline Allen, John Chrysostom (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 45. Other references to the same mission to the Greeks in Phoenicia occur in Ep. 51 To 
Diogenes, 21 To Alphius, 53 and 69 To Presbyter Nicolaus, 54 To Presbyter Gerontius, and 55 To the 
Presbyters Symeon and Maris, Priests, and Monks of Apamea. This is how Theodoret, Hist. Eccl. 5.29 
(GCS NF 5:329-30; NPNF 2-3:152) describes the incident: “On receiving information that Phœnicia was 
still suffering from the madness of the demons’ rites, John got together certain monks who were fired 
with divine zeal, armed them with imperial edicts and despatched them against the idols’ shrines. The 
money which was required to pay the craftsmen and their assistants who were engaged in the work of 
destruction was not taken by John from imperial resources, but he persuaded certain wealthy and faithful 
women to make liberal contributions, pointing out to them how great would be the blessing their 
generosity would win. Thus the remaining shrines of the demons were utterly destroyed.” This could 
potentially explain some of the characterizations of him as an enemy of Hellenism, but does not escape 
the danger we mentioned previously, that is, identifying Hellenism exclusively with pagan religious 
practices. In Ep. 28 (PG 52:627) Chrysostom praises a presbyter named Basil for his zeal against the 
Greeks, whose error he demolishes and leads them to the truth (καταλύων αὐτῶν τὴν πλάνην, καὶ πρὸς 
ἀλήθειαν χειραγωγῶν). We cannot infer what exactly Basil did from the information provided in the 
letter. 
156 Baur, John Chrysostom, 1:12, 309-10. It is also possible that Julian’s virulent attack against 
Diodore of Tarsus (in one of his letters Julian calls him “sharp-witted sophist of that creed of the country-
folk,” Letter 55 To Photinus, LCL 157:189) influenced John’s criticism of paganism. 
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with Gregory that Hellenism simply denoted the Greek language, even if we take that 
statement as a rhetorical provocation.157 His understanding of Hellenism, which was by 
no means uniform across his works, included a variety of aspects from classical culture, 
including religion, philosophy, ethics, and the significance of events from the classical 
past. His challenge to classical culture was not based on whether a Christian has the 
right to take part in paideia or whether Greek is the sole property of paganism.158 It was 
a challenge to a certain set of values and attitudes, many of which were carried over to 
the Christian tradition by Greek converts.159 Even so, we should pre-emptively warn 
that an image of Chrysostom constantly battling against Greek learning or as part of a 
general conflict between supposedly Christian and classical values is neither truthful to 
Chrysostom nor to the way the classics were received in the Christian East.160  Thus, for 
John Hellenism implied a way of life with certain components that seemed to be 
indispensable in its long history, including paideia, the polis and the civic virtues that 
made one a good citizen. John Chrysostom’s critique of Julian and Libanius’ version of 
Hellenism, and one of the main arguments of this thesis is that the Hellenism of Julian 
and Libanius is just one chapter in the history of the Hellenic tradition, and certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Hunter, A Comparison, 59. A. Cameron sees “language, and the control of language, [as] the heart 
of the “struggle” between pagan and Christian culture in the fourth century.” Cameron, Christianity and 
the Rhetoric of Empire, 123. 
158 For an introduction to the different aspects of paganism in Chrysostom’s thought see Constantine 
Bosinis, “What does Paganism Mean for a Church Father? An Inquiry into the Use of the Term 
εἰδωλολατρεία in the Rhetoric of John Chrysostom,” Studia Patristica 47 (Leuven: Peeters, 2010): 243-8. 
159 See Robert Browning, The Emperor Julian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 173: 
“Classical culture was not just a matter of grammatical forms and literary genres. It comprised both 
factual knowledge- such as mythology and history- and a whole structure of values and attitudes.”  
160 Mark Vessey makes the excellent point that much of this underlying tension is due to the writings 
of primarily Augustine and Jerome, and that in the East Basil of Caesarea’s To the Young reflected “a 
comfortable consensus. Almost the only signs of friction, in the Greek sphere, between the disciplinary 
norms of late antique Hellenism and the profession of Christianity relate to the emperor Julian’s bizarre 
endeavour, in 362, to ban Christians from the teaching of grammar and rhetoric … The modern scholarly 
notion of a generalized conflict between Christian and classical literary values in late antiquity has no 
support in the Byzantine tradition.” Mark Vessey, “Literature, Patristics, Early Christian Writing,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, eds. Susan Ashbrook Harvey and David G. Hunter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 46. 
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does not constitute a definitive version of its manifold ideals,161 was more direct than 
what most Christian writers attempted before him: besides his criticism of certain 
aspects of the Hellenic way of life, his most important contribution was his sustained 
“rejection of the pagan claim to form virtue.”162 In this process, he even counteroffered 
an alternative to the Hellenic way: monasticism, seen through the prism of the 
philosophical life. As we already mentioned, John also had to fight against the claims of 
Julian and Libanius, who perceived Christianity as “a return to barbarism and a 
rejection of culture.” In this respect, they also attacked the monks, whom they 
considered the epitome of what was wrong with Christianity and the representatives of a 
spirit totally foreign to Hellenism because of their “rejection of city life and the benefits 
of Greek culture.”163 As D. Hunter has argued, the criticism was two-fold:  
first, they claimed that the monks embodied vices inherent in Christianity itself: 
a rejection of the gods, a search for virtue outside of the inherited culture, 
allegiance to the heavenly over the earthly city. The contempt for the monks 
expressed by Julian and Libanius, then, is but an extension of their hatred for the 
religion which was threatening the culture, religion, and way of life of the 
Hellenes. But by naming “misanthropy” as the monks' cardinal sin, Julian 
reveals that the point at issue between the pagans and the Christians is not 
simply whether Christianity or Hellenism produced better people. At the heart of 
the rival claims and criticisms is a more fundamental argument about what 
constitutes virtue. For the pagans, devotion to the traditional gods and to the 
social institutions of the Greek city was paramount in their definition of virtue. 
For the Christians, at least for John Chrysostom, the monks could be taken as 
ideals of virtue precisely because they demonstrated in their lives the secondary 
value of the earthly city.164 
 
While D. Hunter’s analysis of Julian’s and Libanius’ attack on monasticism and its 
implications about what constitutes virtue is precise for the most part, the claim about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 For its main elements see Hunter, A Comparison, 60: “Libanius believed that rhetoric, city life 
and traditional piety towards the gods were intimately connected in a single fabric of life which was 
Hellenism… from the earliest days of Julian's reign, and for more than twenty years afterwards, Libanius 
extolled the emperor Julian as the model of the social, religious, and moral benefits of Hellenism. He did 
this in two ways. In his orations on behalf of Julian, Libanius attributed to Hellenic paideia the formation 
of Julian's ascetic character as well as his pagan convictions. In Libanius' works, therefore, the emperor 
Julian lived on as a symbol of the Hellenic ideal.” 
162 Hunter, A Comparison, 59. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., 65. 
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what virtue meant for the “pagans” fails to mention a large spectrum in the Hellenic 
tradition (such as the Cynics) that did not think of the gods or the social institutions of 
the polis as paramount to their definition of virtue. In terms of Chrysostom’s defence of 
monasticism, Hunter further argues that besides it being largely a response to pagan 
critique, it also had other Christians in mind, especially the ones at Antioch “who still 
lead lives inextricably connected to the culture and institutions of Hellenism [and by 
extension the traditions of paganism].” Chrysostom’s choice of the monks as the best 
ethical models representative of the Christian “culture”, was both an answer to Hellenic 
critiques and an underlying message to his Christian audience. More than that, 
Chrysostom’s presentation of the monk as the successor of the philosopher, even if 
“portrayed in the garb of Hellenic virtue”, is an attempt at redefining what constitutes 
virtue: “in place of the Hellenic commitment to the city and its life, Chrysostom 
presented a rival, “heavenly” πολιτεία.”165 
The word philosophy will be frequently used throughout this thesis. However, a 
clarification should be made about how we understand and utilize the term to avoid any 
potential misunderstandings. Many modern accounts and histories of ancient philosophy 
show a tendency to look at ancient philosophy as a purely intellectual enterprise, devoid 
of its context as a way of life.166 This might be an image suited to the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, but it distorts ancient Greek philosophy. It is a view that sees 
philosophy as something antagonistic to piety (in the sense of εὐσέβεια), and while we 
should remember that ancient philosophers were critical of many aspects of popular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 This discussion and the references in it are based on and indebted to D. Hunter’s excellent 
discussion of the issues at stake in his A Comparison, 62-6. 
166 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. 
Arnold I. Davidson; trans. Michael Chase (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 107: “Contemporary historians of 
philosophy are today scarcely inclined to pay attention to this subject, although it is an essential one… 
they consider philosophy to be a purely abstract-theoretical activity.” According to Hadot the origins of 
this phenomenon go back to the absorption of philosophy by Christianity and the distinction between 
theology and philosophy. 
67 
piety, they rarely questioned God’s (or the gods’) existence.167 That is true even for 
Plato,168 who is usually considered the archetypal Greek philosopher in the discussion 
on the relationship between Christianity and philosophy. Keeping in mind Pierre 
Hadot’s famous work on philosophy as a way of life, we shall consider how Christianity 
presented itself as a philosophy that fulfilled exactly that role: a new way of life, 
accompanied by a distinct set of beliefs.169 It will then become evident that 
Chrysostom’s rhetorical attacks against the “Greeks” can only be discussed in the 
context of competing alliances between different social groups (pagans, Jews, 
Christians, heretics) and his effort to maintain the Christian faith amidst a variety of 
conflicting worldviews.170 This is an important point: we have seen that even within the 
conflict model there are those who take a non-essentialist point of view in regards to 
these groups (i.e. that much of what Chrysostom describes is his own construction), and 
those who take a different approach and read the texts as descriptions of real identities 
that reflected the world of the time as it really was. Our own approach, whilst 
recognizing that, as with any rhetorical piece we should be careful in the way 
Chrysostom presents Christians and other groups (as we should with others, like 
Libanius), will also take his depictions seriously. This is a position that we will argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Trigg, Origen, 13. 
168 But see the qualifying statement that there is an inherent danger in trying to count Plato as a 
monotheist or even as a theist in the Biblical sense in Mark J. Edwards, Origen against Plato (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002), 48, and 47-53 for Plato’s belief in the gods. 
169 In Chrysostom’s case, a new Christian way of life. It has been argued that he was “the earliest 
Christian author to employ philosophia with a purely Christian connotation,” Laistner, Christianity and 
Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire, 53. Laistner succinctly summarizes the attributes of 
philosophia in Chrysostom’s thought: disregard of worldly things, love of mankind, and almsgiving, 
ibid., 54. Garrett agrees with Laistner’s point of view: most of Chrysostom’s references to philosophia do 
not “designate contemplation about man and the universe but a term for the Christian way of life.” He 
also expands the attributes that Laistner indicated: “φιλοσοφία can refer to the Christian’s avoidance of 
materialism and greed, or to placing one’s confidence not in a nation’s military might but in its Christian 
virtue.” Garrett, An analysis, 231. 
170 “That faith, indeed, presented itself to the ancient world not just as the cultus of a Jewish man-
God, but as a philosophy.” Trigg, Origen, 13. In Sozomen’s account of John as bishop of Constantinople, 
Hellenes and heretics are persuaded by his rhetoric and unite themselves with him: Ἰωάννης δὲ ἄριστα 
τὴν Κωνσταντινουπόλεως ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιτροπεύων πολλοὺς µὲν ἐκ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν 
αἱρέσεων ἐπήγετο. Sozomen, Hist. eccl. 8.5.1 (GCS NF 4:357). However, there is no mention of his 
alleged desire to abolish their national identity or, for that matter, of their identity as antagonistic to the 
Christian faith.  
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from the texts themselves, and we believe that a careful reading of the texts will prove 
this point.  
Here we find the single most important common element between Chrysostom (and 
almost all Greek Patristic thinkers) and Greek philosophy: what both his homilies and 
the works of the philosophers describe is not a simple theoretical vision, but primarily a 
way of living, a practical guide to virtue. Christianity inherited from ancient philosophy 
not just ideas, but also a distinct set of practices and attitudes that allowed it to 
appropriate the word philosophia to describe its way of life.171 This is not to say that 
these propositions agreed or they even had much in common, only that their 
preoccupations were largely the same. As an initial framework for that matter, I 
strongly agree with Meyendorff that “Greek Patristic thought remained open to Greek 
philosophical problematics, but avoided being imprisoned in Hellenic philosophical 
systems.”172 
In this respect, we shall attempt to compare his understanding of certain 
philosophical concepts, such as autarkeia, with relevant arguments drawn from ancient 
philosophy.173 This will allow us to have a fuller understanding of his reception of 
Hellenism, beyond the usual binaries of synthesis/opposition, and to see whether his 
arguments were part of a grander scheme against the Hellenes or simply an attitude 
consistent with many others from his time. A similar argument regarding Theodoret of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171For Chrysostom, the transformation of the world by Christianity is a proof of its divine origins, 
because earlier attempts to form a way of life out of philosophical writings have by and large been 
unsuccessful: “To help you see the truth of this, consider how many men wished to introduce their 
teachings among the Greeks and to establish a new commonwalth (politeia) and way of life. Think of 
such men as Zeno, Plato, Socrates, Diagoras, Pythagoras, and countless others. Yet they fell so far short 
of success that many people do not even know them by name. But Christ not only wrote a constitution 
(politeia) but even brought a new way of life to the whole world.” Adv. Iud. or. 5.3 (PG 48:886; trans. 
Paul W. Harkins, Saint John Chrysostom: Discourses Against Judaizing Christians, Washington, DC: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1979, 104). 
172 Meyendorff, Byzantine Theology, 25; emphasis in the original.  
173 Chadwick argues that what enabled the Church to come to terms with philosophy under the 
Roman Empire was their common concern with ethical problems and applications: “The philosopher of 
the period was not expected to concern himself with an abstract and detached search for metaphysical 
truth, but rather with practical ethical questions.” Chadwick, Contra Celsum, xi. While Chadwick is here 
referring to Origen’s time, the argument is also valid for the late fourth century.  
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Cyrus concluded that his polemics against Hellenic arrogance were not in order to resist 
it but in order to radically change their worldview, in an attempt to persuade them to 
stop being Hellenes.174 Chrysostom had a very pragmatic attitude towards the triumph 
of Christianity and the decline of paganism, especially in certain apologetic writings 
directed against Greeks and/or Jews: he deduced its truthfulness “from its observable 
worldly success,” an approach that has already been used by Origen and Eusebius.175 
What remains to be determined is whether the triumph of Christianity was only due to 
its social and political prevalence or if it also successfully engaged with Hellenism at 
the intellectual level.176 What is fundamentally at stake is the question of continuity or 
extinction of Hellenism, or at least some of its fundamental elements.177 Chrysostom 
would probably never think of himself as someone whose writings would go on to 
determine the attitude of a whole civilization towards the Classics; others put him on 
this pedestal, but because of this his thought is usually stretched to fit the Procrustean 
bed of pre-existing master narratives of any given scholars’ position on Christianity and 
Hellenism in late antiquity rather than examined in its own terms. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret, 29. Others have argued that acceptance of Christianity did not 
involve any rejection of one’s cultural heritage, since a culture could be flexible enough to accommodate 
a transition from one belief to another, regardless of the reasons behind the conversion. For this argument 
see Demetrios J. Constantelos, “The Hellenic Background and Nature of Patristic Philanthropy in the 
Early Byzantine Era,” in Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society, ed. Susan R. Holman (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 190. 
175 Barnes, “Pagan Perceptions,” 237-8. 
176 See Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret, 234, who believes that the prevalence of Christianity in 
political terms does not imply that it also refuted the Hellenic philosophical arguments, and that such a 
conclusion is rash and precipitous.   
177 It remains to be seen which elements were maintained and which did not survive the transition 
from the ancient to the medieval world. Helene Ahrweiler believes that “the policing of private life by 
both State and Church marks the disruption of organic intellectual continuity with the ancient world 
despite the sporadic survival of pastoral, but mainly agrarian customs and reactions, (though these lacked 
any cultural impact), which provided an example of what was virtually a reflex respect for tradition, for 
the remote past, and which, of course, during the broad sweep of history forges certain attitudes of mind.” 
She also mentions Hypatia’s murder and Justinian’s closure of the Platonic academy in Athens as 
examples of this disruption.  For Ahrweiler the continuity of Hellenism within Christianity lies elsewhere: 
she sees the Christian’s desire for redemption and salvation as a survival of the ancient man’s struggle 
towards self-knowledge. In other words, a consistent dedication to and defence of freedom is the mark of 
Greek continuity and not the vain search for models of ancient life and customs, “the organic survival of 
the ancient humanistic virtue transformed into the Christian precept of universal redemption.” Problems 
of Greek Continuity, trans. John Leatham (Athens: National Bank of Greece Cultural Foundation, 1998), 
31.  
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In what follows we will be looking into three separate but interconnected threads in 
John’s multiple receptions of Hellenism. In Chapter 2 we will look into three different 
discursive modes: we will start with John’s negative characterizations of Greeks and 
their philosophy because these are not only the most prevalent but also the ones that 
usually set the tone in relevant scholarship. This will be followed by positive references 
to Greeks through praise of both famous and anonymous individuals. The chapter will 
end with a more complicated stance, one that combines both criticism and praise in the 
same place. Then in Chapter 3 we will be looking into John’s embodiments of 
Hellenism and Christianity respectively through his comparisons of individuals from 
both sides. We distinguish between major comparisons, which are the most frequent 
ones in terms of the individuals compared (although distributed between different texts), 
and minor comparisons, which consist of smaller treatments and usually group 
individuals together instead of treating them separately. We conclude the chapter with a 
close analysis of Chrysostom’s Discourse on Babylas, a treatise that includes a major 
comparison between Babylas and Diogenes but also provides an opportunity for John to 
launch a full-scale attack against the Emperor Julian and the Greeks in general. We also 
look into the debates surrounding the nature of the text and the way it has been 
considered paradigmatic in John’s engagement with Hellenism. Finally, in Chapter 4 we 
will be looking into John’s reception of a specific philosophical school: the Cynics. We 
start by using the same discursive categories used in chapter one and divide Christian 
reception of the Cynics into positive, negative, and neutral. We then situate John’s own 
texts within previous Christian tradition and assess differences and similarities. We 
complete this chapter by a comparison between John and the Cynics and their 
respective conception of a specific philosophical concept, that of autarkeia. 
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2. Chrysostom and the Greeks: The Critique of the Past 
Chrysostom’s reception of Hellenism, as we argued in the previous chapter, has 
often been subject to overt generalisations that are often used to validate opinions on the 
subject of Christianity and Hellenism in general. A simplified and broad classification 
would be that scholarship has tended to see him as either extremely hostile against 
anything Hellenic, a position which also argues that this attitude was to become 
canonical among Byzantine writers of later times, or as someone who can be 
categorized together with Origen and the Cappadocians for their successful integration 
of Hellenism into Christian thought. Very rarely one can find a more balanced 
approach, although as we saw in some recent examples (e.g. some of Wendy Mayer’s 
more recent articles) certain approaches tend to be more nuanced and even more 
specific as to what exactly one is talking about when discussing Chrysostom and 
Hellenism. Building on these approaches and inspired by the fact that previous opinions 
were frequently pronounced due to the focus on a single or just a few of his works, this 
chapter will approach the subject from a variety of angles that showcase exactly how 
varied and unique John’s approach to Hellenism was.  
After establishing some working definitions as to who Chrysostom is talking about 
when referring to Greeks, we will look into two main approaches in his work: instances 
of critiques of Hellenism (be it philosophers, customs, religious rituals, and the power 
of tradition) and instances of praise of Hellenism (including but not limited to historical 
figures, mourning rituals, philosophical ideas, etc). This will then be followed by more 
complex positions: examples of critique and praise within the same passage, indifferent 
references, and the actual treatment of Greeks by Christians in everyday life. The aim of 
this chapter then is twofold: on the one hand, we want to show that Chrysostom’s 
reception of Hellenism in its different forms was far from monolithic and could be 
different even within the same work. If this is successfully argued, then the 
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generalizations of the past should be put to rest and replaced by more pragmatic and 
textually sensitive approaches. On the other hand, it is also an initial attempt to set the 
stage for the next two chapters, which go into even more specific examples of this 
reception and contextualize the general outlines of this chapter through his paradigmatic 
comparisons between Christians and Greeks and his reconfiguration of a philosophical 
concept strongly associated with Cynicism. 
a. Who are the Greeks? 
Before we delve into the specific aspects of Chrysostom’s varied reception of 
Hellenism, it would be useful to briefly clarify our persons of interest, i.e. the Greeks. If 
we were to distinguish the variety of meanings of the term “Hellene” (Ἕλλην) within 
John’s corpus, we could broadly classify them in three categories: Greeks of the 
classical past, Greeks during Paul’s time and usually in the context of John’s exegesis 
of the Pauline corpus, and Greeks contemporary with Chrysostom himself. This chapter 
will mostly deal with the first and third categories, so we will briefly discuss the second 
as a way of introducing some of the concepts that will re-appear later. Some of the 
themes discussed here recur in all three categories. For example, John will usually tend 
to uphold Paul’s loose definition of Greeks whilst also expanding it with his own 
understanding, such as the argument that the Greeks who persecuted Paul (or, rather, 
their descendants) continued to persecute Christians in later times.   
When discussing Paul’s various references to “Jews and Greeks” in the Pauline 
Epistles (it is worth remembering that for Chrysostom all 14 epistles transmitted under 
Paul’s name were indeed written by Paul), John sometimes refers to Hellenes as certain 
pious individuals who did not follow Jewish customs. Thus, in his interpretation of 
Romans 2:8-10 (“there will be wrath and fury, there will be anguish and distress for 
everyone who does evil, the Jew first and also the Greek, but glory and honor and peace 
for everyone who does good, the Jew first and also the Greek”) John thinks that Paul 
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was talking about the times before the coming of Christ, and the one he calls Greek 
means not an idolater but someone who worshipped God without the Jewish 
observances (circumcision, Sabbaths, purifications) and who will be judged based on 
their conscience, which John identifies as the alternative to instruction and admonition 
that the Jews possessed with the Law.1 When discussing Paul’s trial before Festus (Acts 
25:1-22), Chrysostom calls the latter Ἕλληνα … καὶ ἄπιστον.2 Festus is not an 
unbeliever because he is an atheist, but because he did not believe in Christ. Thus, the 
category of Greek, which included idolaters but also people who believed in God 
without observing Jewish customs, also includes unbelievers, due to their lack of faith 
in Christ. The Greeks are also included in a list of “servants of the devil,” amongst 
unbelievers and tyrants who molested Paul in his ministry.3 In essence, and according to 
Chrysostom, the application of the term Greeks in apostolic times meant everyone who 
was not Jewish, and that is why Paul was primarily sent to them whereas Peter was sent 
to the Jews.4 Chrysostom, as we shall see, was also willing to recognize that some 
Greeks were pious while others were not. The condition of the latter would be 
especially problematic in the context of the final judgment, where a Christian might 
wonder how a Greek, who was impious (ἀσεβήσας), worshipped idols, and ignored 
Christ, will be resurrected as well.5 But Chrysostom’s extended definition of whom he 
considered a “Greek” might explain this apparent contradiction, which simply means 
that the Greeks (as well as all humans) will be resurrected before the final judgment but 
will not necessarily be saved. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 De stat. 12.4 (PG 49:133). 
2 De stat. 16.4 (PG 49:166). 
3 De stat. 1.6 (PG 49:24). 
4 In fac. ei rest. 8 (PG 51:379): Τότε τοίνυν, ἡνίκα ἐκήρυττον οὗτοι κατὰ τὴν οἰκουµένην ἅπασαν, 
αἵρεσις οὐδεµία ἦν· πᾶσα δὲ ἡ φύσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων δύο ταῦτα δόγµατα εἶχε, τὸ µὲν ὑγιές, τὸ δὲ 
διεφθαρµένον. Ἢ γὰρ Ἕλληνες, ἢ Ἰουδαῖοι, οἱ τὴν γῆν οἰκοῦντες ἅπαντες ἦσαν·… Τοὺς µὲν οὖν 
Ἰουδαίους ἐπέτρεψε τῷ Πέτρῳ, τοῖς δὲ Ἕλλησι τὸν Παῦλον ἐπέστησεν ὁ Χριστός. 
5 De res. mort. 8 (SC 561:168).  
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This brief discussion is just a highlight of how Chrysostom could be both flexible 
and loose with his definition of who the Greeks were but also signifies the basis for 
some of his hostility. Paul was by far his favourite apostle and by considering the 
Greeks (since this is what he calls the Romans many times, as we shall see) responsible 
for his hardships and eventual death, even if they were long dead, he is already 
exhibiting some of the attitudes that have led some to crown him an enemy of 
Hellenism. It is also significant that John takes the Pauline distinction between Jew and 
Greek and utilises it in a way that creates an image of the world divided into these two 
categories exclusively and is only expanded with the rise of Christianity. The rise of 
Christianity also functions as a replacement category in what John calls healthy and 
corrupt doctrine. Previously, Judaism represented the former and Hellenism the latter. 
But the rise of Christianity represents an expansion of the corrupt category, which now 
includes Judaism, and its replacement by Christianity in what he understands as healthy 
doctrine. If we refer back to the three different categories and the discussion that will 
follow, we will then see that the Greeks of the classical past (such as Plato, Pythagoras, 
and other philosophers) comprised the proto-Greeks, but they were not the only ones. 
The same thing applies to Greeks contemporary with Chrysostom: these are not just 
Greeks by ethnicity or religious convictions. In a sense, even the heretics (such as the 
Arians) can be called Greeks since they exhibit what he understands as a Greek way of 
thinking about the world. In a way, Chrysostom both continues using Hellenes in the 
sense other Christians used it before him (i.e. a group separate to Christians and Jews	  or 
as a group, along with Jews, within which there are Christians, as Paul used it), but also 
expands on who can be classified under the category, while the antagonistic overtones 
in Hellenism’s definition under Julian provided him with a formidable contemporary 
opponent.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Raffaella Cribiore, Libanius the Sophist: Rhetoric, Reality and Religion in the Fourth Century 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 8. 
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b. Criticism of the Greeks 
After this brief introduction, we can now proceed into the more specific aspects of 
John’s critique. We will analyse this according to philosophical and religious criticism. 
Our division into philosophical and religious criticism is obviously artificial, and often 
the two categories overlap, but there is always a certain emphasis that enables us to 
classify each view accordingly, despite John’s frequent blurring of the boundaries. 
Broadly speaking, by philosophical criticism we mean John’s critiques against 
philosophers and philosophical ideas and by religious criticism we refer to his criticism 
of ancient Greek religion and pagan practices, even if sometimes the philosophers are 
treated as the enablers of these.  
i. Philosophical criticism 
We have already claimed that a very incomplete picture emerges when scholars 
argue certain things on the basis of a single or a few texts only, something that has 
unfortunately been the case in the past. In this dissertation, the analysis will be thematic, 
concentrating on the reception of different aspects of Hellenism in a much wider range 
of John’s writings. We will begin with John’s criticism of philosophical ideas, 
particularly metempsychosis, since metempsychosis is a prime example of a religious 
idea explicitly connected with philosophy.  
In a curious but suggestive passage, John begins by criticizing the idea of 
reincarnations thus:  
For whereas their leading men [of the Greeks] affirmed that our soul passes into 
flies, and dogs, and brute creatures; those who came after them, being ashamed 
of this, fell into another kind of turpitude, and invested the brute creatures with 
all rational science, and made out that the creatures—which were called into 
existence on our account—are in all respects more honorable than we! They 
even attribute to them foreknowledge and piety. The crow, they say, knows God, 
and the raven likewise, and they possess gifts of prophecy, and foretell the 
future; there is justice among them, and polity, and laws. … But when we tell 
them that these things are fables, and are full of absurdity, ‘You do not enter 
(ἐνοήσατε) into the higher meaning,’ say they. No, we do not enter into this your 
surpassing nonsense, and may we never do so: for it requires (of course!) an 
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excessively profound mind, to inform me, what all this impiety and confusion 
would be at.7 
 
John offers an intergenerational criticism of Greek philosophy, mixed with criticism 
of certain religious practices that he attributes to the philosophers. It begins with the 
Platonic idea that human souls might pass onto the souls of animals after death, which is 
a very standard Christian criticism of metempsychosis. But, and here is a very peculiar 
phenomenon, this idea did not hold with the successors of Plato, who were ashamed by 
it, and John would probably have been aware of that.8 Yet he decides to argue against it 
not because he thought of the issue as redundant but precisely because Neo-Platonists 
allegorized the original idea. The arguments against the successors was that what they 
did in place of taking things literally was an attempt to invest animals with reason and 
honour them more than humans. Now this might be a far-fetched criticism, but what 
follows that seems to be the rationalization for it, i.e. the fact that the Greeks thought 
that the future could be predicted by certain animals (although John mentions only 
birds, possibly implying the practice of ornithomancy or augury).9 Chrysostom 
considers both the older and the most recent views as absurd fables, and dismisses the 
accusation that Christians did not really understand the higher meaning of these 
practices, calling them confusing and impious instead. It is quite interesting to note that 
when philosophy is criticized, it is almost never for its own sake, but rather because it 
leads to pagan religious practices10 or because its ideas have a bad influence on public 
order and morals. This may be why Chrysostom does not seem to be as critical of Greek 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:48-9; NPNF 1-11:30-1). 
8 For Iamblichus’ opposition to the idea of metempsychosis see Iamblichi Chalcidencis: In Platonis 
dialogos commentariorum fragmenta, ed. and trans. John M. Dillon (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 46, with 
references to relevant texts. 
9 In his homily In Kalendas 3 (PG 48:956) he calls the practice of observing days οὐ Χριστιανικῆς 
φιλοσοφίας, ἀλλ’ Ἑλληνικῆς πλάνης. What John considers appropriate for a Christian is not holding 
feasts for things like months or new moons or even Lord’s days but for his whole life to be a feast. He 
goes on to explain that a constant feast is possible when one has a clean conscience, is nourished with 
good hopes, and revels in the delight of the good things to come (PG 49:955-6). 
10 In 1 Cor. hom.  4.4 (PG 61:36; NPNF 1-12:21). 
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philosophers that allegedly proclaimed atheistic ideas. In this respect, he mentions four 
examples: Protagoras, Diagoras the Milesian, Theodorus the Atheist, and Socrates. 
What these men had in common was a certain amount of influence “which comes from 
eloquence”11 (δύναµιν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων—an interesting phrase, considering the 
beginning of Socrates’ speech in the Apology), were widely admired for their 
philosophy, and were considered to be innovators on religious matters, which brought 
danger to their lives, resulting in exile and even death. The reason Chrysostom mentions 
their example is primarily in order to exalt the accomplishment of the Apostles, who 
managed to overcome all these dangers, whilst also proclaiming Christ and removing 
the old gods from mainstream belief.	   However, Chrysostom’s treatment of these 
‘atheists’ also reveals the reasons behind his lack of criticism: these philosophers should 
not be harshly judged for refusing to believe in false gods, unlike those who actively 
promoted pagan religious practices (even though elsewhere Socrates is critiqued for 
belonging to the second category).12	   It is also important to note that Chrysostom does 
not critique philosophy as such: in another instance, Chrysostom admits that philosophy 
is a great thing, but what he means in this case is philosophy τὴν παρ' ἡµῖν. In contrast, 
the philosophy of τῶν ἔξωθεν is just words and myths, which do not possess true 
wisdom either. Ultimately, non-Christian philosophy loses its value because of its main 
aim: δόξα.13 
Chrysostom’s critique	  of the practices to which Greek philosophy led often employs 
the method of shaming but not naming those he criticizes. In some cases, as in the 
passage above, the critique is too general to be limited to one person. In other cases, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In 1 Cor. hom.  4.4 (PG 61:36-7; NPNF 1-12:21). 
12 This could possibly be a reaction to Julian’s advice in his Letter to a Priest 301a (LCL 29:327): 
“For we ought not to give heed to all philosophers, not the doctrines of all, but only to those philosophers 
and those of their doctrines that make men god fearing, and teach concerning the gods, first that they 
exist, …” 
13 In Ioh. hom. 63.1 (PG 59:349; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 179). 
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criticism of specific philosophers would be particularly easy to decode but even so, he 
refused to do so. The following is just one instance of this phenomenon: 
One of their lawgivers ordered that virgins should wrestle naked in the presence 
of men. I congratulate you that you are not able to bear mention of it; but their 
philosophers were not ashamed of the actual practice. Another, the chief of their 
philosophers, approves of their going out to war, and of their being held as 
common property, as if he were a pimp and they were something to indulge his 
lusts… For if those who professed philosophy among them made such laws, 
what will we say about those who were not philosophers? If such were the 
decrees of those who wore a long beard, and a serious cloak, what can be said of 
others?14 
 
The laws of Lycurgus and the teaching of Plato are casually dismissed, without even 
mentioning their names. The philosophers’ traditional style of dress receives an ironic 
mention as well, while criticism of Plato’s programme for women in his ideal republic 
is one of the most repeated arguments against him. Gender transgressions was a very 
important issue for Chrysostom, and the criticism of Plato were not his only words on 
the subject. His critique of the practice of syneisaktism among Christians was equally 
devastating.15 
As we have just indicated, John would often ascribe certain philosophical views to 
the Greeks and other groups without going into much detail as to who pronounced them 
or in what context. In most cases, he cites the view very briefly in order to immediately 
refute it afterwards. For example, when he ascribes the view that the body was not 
created by God to Greeks and heretics, he does it in a way that sets the stage for his 
counter-argument, which goes all the way back to the creation of Adam and Eve.16 
When criticizing “the insatiable desire for possessions” he mentions those who succumb 
to Greek deception and follow a lifestyle where they let “all their possessions go, 
keeping for themselves only a bit of a cloak and a staff, passing their whole life in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In Tit. hom. 5.4 (PG 62:694; trans. Aideen Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of 
the City, London: Duckworth, 2004, 188). 
15 Particularly in his Contra eos qui subintroductae habent virgines and Quod regulares feminae viris 
cohabitare non debeant. 
16 De stat. 4.2 (PG 49:121). 
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fashion and choosing to endure all this trouble and distress for the sake of people’s good 
opinion.”17 If we were to guess the recipients of this criticism, the Cynics would be the 
primary candidates. This will become more obvious in the fourth chapter, where we will 
theorize about the possible identity of the people John is referring to here. 
Sometimes he is more specific. For example, his interpretation of Acts 17:24 (“The 
God who made the world and everything in it, he who is Lord of heaven and earth, does 
not live in shrines made by human hands”) is that this sentence utterly destroys and 
annihilates everything the philosophers say. In this case, he mentions two examples, the 
Stoics and the Epicureans, probably because they have previously been mentioned in 
Acts 17:18, and criticizes their views on the origins of the world: the Epicureans “affirm 
all to be fortuitously formed and (by concourse) of atoms, the Stoics held it to be body 
and conflagration.”18 But John argues against these cosmological ideas by claiming that 
there are two sufficient proofs (τεκµήρια) for the divine: that it needs nothing, and that 
it provides everything to everyone. In this respect, and compared to this, anything Plato 
and Epicurus have philosophized about God is nonsense!19 In this case his critique is 
based on fundamental cosmology, not on the immoral implications of the philosophy, as 
we have previously seen. 
Generally speaking, Chrysostom considers the past to be important in scoring 
victories against both Greeks and Jews. This is not always necessarily related to the 
Christian past either, as he claims that Old Testament prophecies prove “our things to 
be older than theirs [the Greeks].”20 Sometimes he will also interpret contemporary 
events with reference to the past as a way of showing the short-sightedness of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 In Gen. hom. 20.5 (PG 53:173; Saint John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 18-45, trans. Robert 
C. Hill, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1990, 47-8). 
18 In Act. apost. hom. 38.2 (PG 60:270; NPNF 1-10:235). We replaced the word fire with 
conflagration since the word Chrysostom specifically uses here is ekpírōsis, a Stoic cosmological 
concept. 
19 In Act. apost. hom. 38.2 (PG 60:270). 
20 Vid. dom. hom. 2.3 (SC 277:98; St. John Chrysostom, Old Testament Homilies vol. 2: Homilies on 
Isaiah and Jeremiah, trans. Robert Charles Hill, Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2003, 66). 
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interlocutors he often presents in his homilies. For example, when he discusses the 
conversion of the Philippian jailer in Acts 16:25-40, Chrysostom wants to shift the 
attention from the miracle to the actual conversion itself.21 In order to do so, he presents 
the Greeks as saying that the jailer was “a vile, wretched creature, of no understanding, 
full of all that is bad and nothing else, and easily brought over to anything.” They then 
proceed to categorize him alongside tanners, eunuchs, slaves, and women, as the kind of 
people that believe in these things (i.e. the things the Christians believe). Chrysostom’s 
response to this is to point out that even then the Christians could count people such as 
centurions and proconsuls among their own, but, even more importantly, in the present, 
they count the emperors themselves. But this is not the main point he wants to make, 
since it is something greater he wants to talk about. His real target is “persons of no 
consideration (εὐτελεῖς).” Convincing people such as these about things like the 
resurrection, the kingdom of heaven, and the philosophical life is something 
exponentially more wonderful than persuading those considered wise. Chrysostom’s 
thought can be summarized as such: “if what the philosophers would never have chosen 
to learn, this the slave does learn, then the wonder is greater.”22  
Chrysostom’s ultimate aim is to talk about persuasion. His constant references to 
amazement regarding the fact that women and slaves were persuaded of these truths (as 
evidenced by their actions) also serves as a lesson to the Greek philosophers who were 
unable to persuade even their fellow philosophers. The first example is Plato, who not 
only was unable to persuade anyone, but also showed to his disciples the importance of 
not despising money by getting “an abundance of property, and golden rings, and 
goblets.” Next up is Socrates. His legacy to his disciples was that glory should not be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In Act. apost. hom. 36.2 (PG 60:260-1; NPNF 1-10:226). 
22 Cf. In 1 Cor. hom. 7.8 (PG 61:66; NPNF 1-12:42): “this is what especially makes the Gospel 
worthy of admiration; that such doctrines as Plato and his followers could not apprehend, the fishermen 
had power on a sudden to persuade the most ignorant sort of all to receive. For if they had persuaded wise 
men only, the result would not have been so wonderful; but in advancing slaves, and nurses, and eunuchs 
unto such great severity of life as to make them rivals to angels, they offered the greatest proof of their 
divine inspiration.” 
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despised. Despite his constant philosophizing, Socrates always had an eye to fame. 
According to Chrysostom, one can easily see that by looking into Socrates’ discourses 
as narrated in Plato’s dialogues, with the qualifier that we believe what Plato has to say 
about his teacher. One can also see that these vainglorious discourses are full of irony. 
After this point, Chrysostom decides to leave it at that and directs his speech to the 
Christians again. In summary, the philosophers were not just unable to persuade people 
but also unable to practice what they preached. This is yet another sign of Christianity’s 
strength versus Greek philosophy, which is also often accused of being the main enabler 
of paganism.  
John makes a connection between philosophy and religion in many places23 and 
wants to show a link between them that will enable him to charge the philosophers as 
fundamentally responsible for idolatry. For example, in his Homilies on Romans he 
writes that the original inventors of idolatry are the Egyptians, and Plato, “who is 
thought more reverend than the rest of them, glories in these masters.”24 Equally 
responsible is Plato’s master himself, Socrates, who bids his disciples to sacrifice a cock 
to Asclepius. Therefore, alongside the worship of deities like Apollo and Bacchus, there 
is a darker side which worships creeping beasts and reptiles. Chrysostom then mentions 
some philosophers who lifted bulls, scorpions and dragons up in the sky, which is in 
itself the work of the devil who wishes to bring humans down to the worship of 
creeping things. The passage concludes with an attack against Plato’s claim (uttered by 
Socrates) in Ion 533e-534b: “the Muse inspires men herself … For all the good epic 
poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed… And what 
they tell is true. For a poet is a light and winged and sacred thing, and is unable ever to 
compose until he has been inspired and put out of his senses, and his mind is no longer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Cf. In Col. hom. 6.1 (PG 62:339; NPNF 1-13:285): “Having first shaken [Paul] to pieces the 
Grecian observances, he next overthrows the Jewish ones also. For both Greeks and Jews practiced many 
observances, but the former from philosophy, the latter from the Law.” 
24 In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:414; NPNF 1-11:353). 
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in him…” Chrysostom is not eager to debate the truthfulness of this claim and 
immediately dismisses it as absurd and ludicrous.25 Plato might have wanted to hide his 
support for idolatry behind the poets and their supposed inspiration by the Muses, but 
Chrysostom believes he sees right through that and refuses to even engage with the 
argument. Even if he did, he would attribute the inspiration to demons as he does 
elsewhere, but this time using Plato as a supporter of his argument! 
His critique of philosophy mixed with disparaging comments about the polytheistic 
religion was often specifically directed against its outcomes. Thus, in his Homilies on 
John, while recognizing that some of those outside the faith (ἐξ ἐθνῶν) did believe 
before the coming of Christ, they enjoyed none of the advantages that the Jews did. 
Chrysostom claims that the Greeks “never heard divine oracles- not even as much as 
might be spoken in a dream,”26 which certainly sounds like an insinuation against the 
oracles and their inspiration. At the same time, these “pagans” were “always entangled 
in the myths of madmen (for that is what the philosophy of the pagans is [τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ 
τῶν ἔξωθεν φιλοσοφία]).”27 John would not even hesitate to use Plato to support his 
argument against the idea that the prophets had anything in common with soothsayers:  
We learn something else from this as well, that the inspired authors were not 
like the seers. In their case, after all, when the demon takes possession of their 
soul, it cripples their mind and clouds their reasoning, and so they utter 
everything without their mind understanding anything of what is said: rather, it 
is like a flute sounding without a musician to play a tune. This was said also by a 
philosopher of theirs in these words, “Just like the soothsayers and seers saying 
many things without knowing anything of what they say [Apology 22C, Meno 
99D].28  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:414; LCL 164:421-3). 
26 In Ioh. hom. 9.1 (PG 59:70; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 90). All the references in 
this paragraph are from this passage. Interestingly, even though John does not use the word Hellenes, 
Goggin translates the word for those outside the faith as “Gentiles” and again when the philosophy of 
those outside (the faith) is mentioned she translates it as pagans. While these translations are not wrong in 
this particular context, since it is very clear that John is indeed referring to the classical tradition, there are 
other instances where we cannot be sure that those outside the faith are always the “Greeks”.  
27 In Ioh. hom. 9.1 (PG 59:70; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 90). 
28 Exp. in ps. 45.1 (PG 55:184; St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms vol. 1, trans. Robert 
Charles Hill, Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998, 258-9). 
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The exact same passage is used again in his twenty-ninth Homily on 1 Corinthians, 
but this time John has enriched his repertoire.29 After citing Plato again, he mentions the 
story of a man who was divining and found himself torn by a demon. To the persons 
practicing these things that man says “Finally, loosen the lord [probably Apollo]. The 
mortal no longer makes room for the god.”30 This is a doubtful fragment from the 
Chaldean Oracles (no 225), and John has probably read it in Eusebius’ Praeparatio 
Evangelica 5.9.1. This is then followed by a citation from Porphyry’s Philosophy from 
Oracles (“Unbind my wreaths, and bathe my feet in drops from the pure stream; erase 
these mystic lines and let me go”), which is also cited by Eusebius in Praep. Ev. 5.9.8, 
in order to show the gods’ willingness to withdraw upon their invocation and the oracles 
Eusebius cites are to that effect, as Aaron Johnson points out.31 Chrysostom uses these 
examples as a starting point for his real target, the Pythia. After a very graphic 
description of the frenzied process by which the oracle uttered her prophecies, 
Chrysostom goes on to explain the differences between prophecy in Christianity and in 
ancient Greek religion. 
Returning again to the Homilies on John: Chrysostom’s attack on religion and 
philosophy is followed by an attack on the poets, whose works are called “nonsense” 
(λήρους) and he ascertains that they were enslaved to wood and stone. In summary: 
“they knew nothing useful or sound, either for doctrine or living, since their life was 
more impure and corrupt than their doctrine.”32 But, one may ask, how did it come to 
this? It was, John argues, all because of their gods, who took pleasure in every vice and 
enjoyed being worshipped by shameful words and deeds. This descent “to the very 
depths of evil” is made so that John can finally argue his point: despite all this, as if by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In 1 Cor. hom. 29.1 (PG 61:241-2; NPNF 1-12:169). 
30 Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 
137. 
31 Johnson, Religion and Identity in Porphyry, 320. 
32 In Ioh. hom. 9.1 (PG 59:70; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 90). 
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mechanism from heaven, they appeared shining forth (and became Christians, as one 
might expect).  
It should be clear by now that for Chrysostom Hellenism was, primarily, a 
philosophical and religious system that entailed a different way of life and originated 
from a variety of sources, including the poets, philosophers, and the oracles: as such, it 
either led to immoral deeds, or it led to the mind being misled by deceptive oracles or 
by being possessed by a god (or, as John argued, a demon). However, even if that way 
of life was different, Chrysostom argues in his Homilies on John, no one has the right to 
condemn a man living ἐν Ἑλληνισµῷ33: this is because his lifestyle is merely in accord 
with the shameful and ridiculous gods and practices he believes in. John is also 
reluctantly willing to admit that there are Χριστιανοὶ τὰ φαῦλα πράσσοντες, καὶ 
Ἕλληνες ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ζῶντες, ‘philosophia’ here being what he considered true 
philosophy, i.e. a Christian lifestyle.34 But he does not consider good behavior and 
seemliness to be part of virtue, so he would rather be told “of the man who endures the 
fierce onslaught of his passions, yet lives in an exemplary manner.” If promises of the 
Kingdom and threat of hell cannot inspire the pursuit of virtue in the Christians 
themselves, John argues, he finds it extremely difficult to believe that those who do not 
believe in any of those things would seek to be virtuous, and if they pretend to be so, 
that they do it for the sake of glory. Even if some of the pagans do live virtuous lives, 
this would not make what John said a lie, because he is talking about the rule and not 
the exceptions. Again, the fact that someone is prudent and refrains from stealing does 
not constitute virtue because he might still be enslaved by vainglory. Indeed, no one can 
point to someone who, while being a pagan, “is rid of all passions and free from all 
evil.” This is because, even those among them who were able to rise above wealth and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In Ioh. hom. 28.2-3 (PG 59:164-5; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 273-5). All 
references in this paragraph come from this homily. 
34 Chrysostom is adamant that true knowledge is only the wisdom provided by God, and that those 
who boast about their acquaintance with external wisdom are deficient when it comes to it. See In 2 Cor. 
hom. 12.2 (PG 61:483). 
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gluttony, “have most of all been enslaved by love of praise; and this is the root of all 
evils.” We return to the same vice Chrysostom previously applied to the philosophers, 
only this time applied to common anonymous pagans: vainglory. 
To be fair to him, Chrysostom does not consider vainglory to be an exclusively 
“pagan” characteristic. It can be found in equal amounts within the Christian 
communities, even the ones we would presume to be the farthest from it. Πάντων αἴτιον 
τῶν κακῶν ἡ κενοδοξία: it has turned churches upside down, spoiled political affairs, 
and “upsets entire homes, and cities, and peoples, and nations.” It even holds power in 
the desert, where those who have abandoned wealth and everything worldly and 
subdued their bodily passions have lost everything to vainglory.35 Vainglory is a 
temptation that makes no distinctions: all humans can fall victims to it.  
ii. Reconstructing the beliefs of the Greeks: Religious criticism 
Chrysostom’s criticism of ancient Greek religious beliefs and rituals is quite varied 
across his works and it is not always clear whether the views he considers as “pagan” 
are legitimate or straw men that he uses for the purposes of his argument. In this 
section, we will attempt both to reconstruct the different views he expresses in many of 
his homilies and to see whether a coherent image of the religion of the Hellenes is 
possible. It is sometimes the case that the Greeks’ theological opinion will be thrown 
into a mix that includes people like Mani, Marcion, and Valentinus, as when 
Chrysostom ascribes to all of them the view that matter pre-existed.36 These same 
groups are also included under the collective term οἱ ἔξωθεν and their similarity this 
time is their utter trust in their own reasonings; contrary to this, a Christian who is 
vigilant will have no need of Greek logoi.37 However, Chrysostom also seems to grasp 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 In Ioh. hom. 29.3 (PG 59:170-1; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 286). 
36 In Gen. hom. 2.3 (PG 53:30). For a similar conflation but only between Manicheans and Greeks 
this time, see In Gen. serm. 1.1 (SC 433:144). 
37 In Eph. hom. 23.1 (PG 62:164). In In Col. hom. 5.3 (PG 62:335; NPNF 1-13:282) Chrysostom 
contrasts faith with reasonings and their respective outcomes: “For as reasonings divide, and shake loose, 
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the developmental nature of Greek religion, as when he argues that the Athenians 
slowly incorporated other divinities, such as the ones from the Hyperboreans, Pan, and 
the greater and lesser mysteries (as was the case e.g. with the Eleusinian mysteries).38  
Chrysostom repeatedly states that hyperbolic reliance on reasonings (logismoi) is a 
distinctive mark of Hellenic thought and a feature that separates it from Christianity.39 
For him, all knowledge of God presupposes faith, which in itself stands in stark contrast 
to questioning and doubt. At the same time, he makes clear that this is concerning the 
divine: “if the things asserted were human, we ought to examine them; but since they 
are of God, they are only to be revered and believed.”40 The lack of belief, he argues, 
inevitably leads to an agnostic position regarding the existence of God. To counter that, 
he claims that knowledge of God is only possible without any proofs or evidence 
(Τοῦτο πρῶτον τεκµήριον τοῦ τὸν Θεὸν εἰδέναι, τὸ πιστεύειν οἷς ἂν λέγῃ χωρὶς 
τεκµηρίων καὶ ἀποδείξεων).41 Somewhat surprisingly, John brings forward the Greeks 
to support this last claim: he says that even they believe this, since they believed their 
gods and simultaneously thought of themselves as the offspring of the gods (which was 
their way of saying they were their descendants but did not have actual proof of that). 
But the gods are not the only example he brings forward. Up next is the one he calls 
“deceiver and sorcerer,” Pythagoras, who was so revered that a simple Αὐτὸς ἔφη in 
relation to his sayings rendered immeasurable credence and weight to it.42 He also 
mentions images of the goddess Silence (ἡ σιγὴ, but presumably he means Hesychia) in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
so faith causes solidity and compactness.” However, both reasoning and rationality are characteristics of 
human nature that distinguish it from the irrational creatures. See Quod. nem. laed. 7 (SC 103:94). 
38 In Tit. hom. 3.1 (PG 62:677). 
39 The heretics are also responsible for inserting their own logismoi into the doctrines of the Church 
and they are worse than poison, since poisons might harm the body but the heretics put in danger the 
salvation of one’s soul: Cat. 1.24 (SC 50bis:120). 
40 In 1 Tim. hom. 1.3 (PG 62:507; NPNF 1-13:410). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Gregory Nazianzus has previously used this phrase against Julian and his ignorance of the Logoi, 
since the followers of Pythagoras considered it the primary and most important of their doctrines. See 
Susanna Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the 
Vision of Rome (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 391. 
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pagan temples, whose finger on her mouth exhorted the visitors to be silent. But the real 
point Chrysostom is trying to make is that Greek beliefs were rightly questioned, since 
by nature they were conflicted reasonings, doubts, and disputations (µάχαι τῶν 
λογισµῶν καὶ ἀµφισβητήσεις καὶ συµπεράσµατα).43 On the other hand, the Christian 
beliefs were no such thing. What is it, however, that makes them different? Their origin, 
according to Chrysostom. Greek beliefs derive from human wisdom, but Christian ones 
were taught by spiritual grace. In the end, Christian doctrines are the true wisdom (τῆς 
ὄντως σοφίας δόγµατα). Chrysostom also critiques Greek pedagogy in connection to the 
theme of Greek and Christian beliefs: the Greeks have no teachers or students, because 
in their case everyone is in conversation with one another. In contrast to that, the 
Christian should know from whom s/he needs to learn; s/he should not doubt, but be 
persuaded; s/he should not dispute, but believe.44 
In John’s Homilies on Genesis, the Greeks are purported to be those who were not 
able to move from the beauty of the sun and realize that it was God’s creation, thus 
ending up singing its praises and treating it as a deity in its own right.45 This could be a 
reference to any number of things: the status of Helios as a Titan, his identification 
sometimes as Apollo and other times as Zeus, or even the presence of a strong cult in 
Rhodes.46 John does not make it easy for us to know exactly what he means except the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In 1 Tim. hom. 1.3 (PG 62:507; NPNF 1-13:410). 
44 In 1 Tim. hom. 1.3 (PG 62:507; NPNF 1-13:410). But elsewhere (In 1 Tim. hom. 10.3, PG 62:551; 
NPNF 1-13:439) Chrysostom explains the necessity of teachers among Christians due to the fact that they 
were not who they were meant to be: “There would be no need of words [presumably Biblical exegesis] if 
we shone forth in our lives, there would be no need of teachers [i.e. priests] if we exhibited works. There 
would be no Greek if we were such Christians as we ought to be.” The Christians only needed to be 
instructed because they did not follow the way of life derived from their beliefs. If they did, there would 
be no need for instructors. The sense of this is better explained by a passage in Ad eos qui scand. 13.1 
(SC 79:188, my translation): “Tell me, what priests did Abraham have at his disposal? What teachers? 
What catechism? What exhortation? What advice? Then there were no written documents, no law, no 
prophets, none of these sorts of things.” Yet Abraham needed none of these things since he showed his 
faith through works, possessed genuine and warm love, disregarded money and lived a life that pre-
shadowed the life of the monks in Chrysostom’s day. Later in the same text John uses the same argument 
in relation to Noah and Job. 
45 In Gen. hom. 6.4 (PG 53:58). 
46 For the cult of Helios see Jennifer Larson, Ancient Greek Cults: A Guide (London: Routledge, 
2007), 158-9. 
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fact that he considers the Sun to have acquired a divine status among the Greeks. In any 
case the aim of the polemic is apologetic. John wants to reinforce the point that the Sun 
is just another of God’s creations, and that “from contemplation of created things one 
should move on to the Creator.”47 But this is just one of many in a formidable catalogue 
of what he calls Greek impieties, which are sometimes contrasted to Christian beliefs 
and sometimes are not. Thus, the Christian belief in a “simple, free of parts and shape” 
deity is contrasted to the Greek irreverence of ascribing “an arrangement of limbs to 
God.”48 In fact, the Greeks’ excessive trust in their own reasonings (λογισµοῖς) led them 
to search in bodies for the one who is incorporeal and in shapes for the one who is 
shapeless.49 They also divinized their passions: thus, desire was called Venus, anger 
was called Mars, and drunkenness was called Bacchus.50 
This is not the only instance where Chrysostom makes a similar accusation. He 
often sees the origins of idolatry in the practice of divinizing mortals (which is different 
from divinizing passions), and more specifically the admiration of people beyond their 
worth. He mentions a decision by the Roman Senate decreeing Alexander as the 
thirteenth God, and he contrasts that to the Divinity of Christ, who “was not proclaimed 
by man’s decree, nor was He counted one of the many that were by them elected.”51 He 
also mentions the deification of Antinous, the Roman Emperor Hadrian’s lover, and the 
naming of a city after him, as well as the fact that he was just a child when he became 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In Gen. hom. 6.4 (PG 53:58; Saint John Chrysostom, Homilies on Genesis 1-17, trans. Robert C. 
Hill, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1986, 85). 
48 In Gen. hom. 13.2 (PG 53:107; trans. Hill, Homilies on Genesis 1-17, 173). John’s formulation of 
the divine as ἁπλοῦν γὰρ καὶ ἀσύνθετον καὶ ἀσχηµάτιστον is a direct quotation of Gregory of Nyssa, De 
Beat. 7.160 (GNO VII/2). Claudio Moreschini, “Gregorio di Nissa, De beatitudinibus, Oratio VII,” in 
Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes. An English Version with Commentary and Supporting 
Studies, Proceedings of the Eighth International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (Paderborn, 14-18 
September 1998), ed. Hubertus R. Drobner and Albert Viviano (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 240-1, calls this the 
usual characterization of God’s nature among the Cappadocians and of Origen before them, with the 
qualities themselves being derived from Platonic philosophy, particularly Phaedr. 247a. He also provides 
more references in the works of the Cappadocians in n. 24, 241. Unfortunately, we cannot possibly know 
whether John’s source was Origen or the Cappadocians.  
49 In Rom. hom. 3.2 (PG 60:413). 
50 In Rom. hom. 6.6 (PG 60:440). 
51 In 2 Cor. hom. 26.4 (PG 61:580-2; NPNF 1-12:402-4). 
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Hadrian’s favourite. Chrysostom already anticipates that someone might object to these 
deifications and say that these were mere mortals, and their death testifies to this. But he 
already has an answer at hand. The devil has invented another way to deceive people: 
the soul’s immortality (which makes the death of their physical body irrelevant), mixed 
with excessive flattery towards people like Alexander and Antinous. He then mentions 
that when Christians say that “the Crucified lives,” they are faced with laughter, 
although it has been proclaimed by the entire world, “in old time by miracles, now by 
converts,” and these could not possibly be the successes of a dead man. Yet when 
someone says, “Alexander lives,” he is believed, even if there are no miracles to testify 
to this effect. John concedes the point that during his lifetime, Alexander achieved 
many remarkable things,52 subdued nations and cities, won many wars and was 
victorious in battle. However, there is nothing special or new about a king winning 
battles with armies at his disposal, Chrysostom says, whereas the power of the Cross 
and its achievements throughout proclaim Christ’s power everywhere. Ultimately 
Alexander’s kingdom was torn to pieces after his death and was never restored, and the 
location of his tomb is still unknown along with the day he died. On the contrary, the 
tombs of the Apostles are in the most royal city, “more splendid than the palaces of 
kings” and honoured even by the Emperors themselves. He who wears the diadem 
implores not Alexander but the tentmaker and the fisherman to be “his advocates with 
God,” and Constantine’s burial alongside the Apostles in Constantinople shows that 
“what porters are to kings in their palaces, that kings are at the tomb to fishermen.”53   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Besides these and the references to Alexander in connection to his meeting with Diogenes, 
Chrysostom also refers to him in the context of his discussion on the Macedonians and their fame, which, 
before the coming of Christ, was greater than the Romans’ and in fact the latter were admired for their 
achievement to conquer them. Alexander may have started from a small town, but was soon able to 
conquer the oikoumene and his achievements were mentioned by Daniel and his high-mindedness and 
greatness of his soul was celebrated across the world. John’s praise of Alexander in this instance is in In 1 
Thess. hom. 2.1 (PG 62:399) and serves mostly as an introduction as to how the Macedonians were 
known everywhere, Thessaloniki being a part of Macedonia. 
53 In 2 Cor. hom. 26.4 (PG 61:580-2; NPNF 1-12:402-4). 
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The practice of divinizing mortals, besides being ridiculous compared with the 
(truly divine) Christ and his (human but revered) followers, also leads to unbelief 
towards Christ and had specific implications related to the rejection of fundamental 
Christian doctrines, which were often orchestrated by the philosophers. For example, in 
his Homilies on Acts Chrysostom alleges that a denial of the resurrection is combined 
with a further denial that God can create anything out of nothing.54 The denial of the 
resurrection is also connected elsewhere with a Greek rejection of the last judgment, 
since Chrysostom thinks that there is no other way the world can be judged.55 In fact, 
Chrysostom criticizes the fact that the Greeks reject both the resurrection and Hades as 
myths, whereas stories of gods fornicating are not considered myths but are believed.  
When one talks to them of hell, they reply back that these are myths constructed by the 
poets who wanted to overturn the good life (εὐζωΐα).56 These popular beliefs are also 
contrasted by some with the philosophers, who “discovered something truly grand, and 
far better than these.” 
But Chrysostom will not hear it. These same philosophers are responsible for the 
belief in heimarmene as well as the rejection of providence, and that everything consists 
of atoms. The targets here seem to be the Stoics, Democritus and Leucippus, but John is 
not quite done yet. Others assign a body to God, turn the souls of humans into dogs and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 In Act. apost. hom. 2.4 (PG 60:31). 
55 In Act. apost. hom. 38.4 (PG 60:273). At this point he calls Greek ideas about creation and 
judgment “children’s inventions, ravings of drunkards.” John believed that the Greeks would only believe 
in the resurrection after they witness a philosophical attitude towards afflictions: “But to these things the 
Greeks give no heed. For (one will say) do not tell me of him who is philosophical when out of the 
affliction, for this is nothing great or surprising —show me a man who in the very affliction itself is 
philosophical, and then I will believe the resurrection,” In Heb. hom. 4.5 (PG 63:43; NPNF 1-14:386). 
Elsewhere, Chrysostom explicitly states that belief in the resurrection and the last judgment is 
incompatible with belief in fate (εἱµαρµένη) and admits his embarrassment with having to teach 
Christians about the resurrection since “he who needs to learn that there is a resurrection, and has not 
convinced himself thoroughly that things do not happen by blind force or at random or by chance, could 
not be a Christian.” In Ioh. hom. 45.4 (PG 59:256; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 459). His 
observation about Christians holding such conflicting beliefs is interesting, considering that by that time 
many in his audience must have been cradle Christians. For the belief in the resurrection of Christ as a 
distinguishing feature between Christians and Greeks in Chrysostom’s writings see Sandwell, Religious 
Identity in Late Antiquity, 69. As we will see later on in this chapter, in different places Chrysostom 
assumed that the last judgment and retribution was also a belief held by the pagans! 
56 In Eph. hom. 12.3 (PG 62:91-2; NPNF 1-13:111). 
91 
try to persuade us that we were “once a dog, and a lion, and a fish”- another reference to 
metempsychosis. Furthermore, even Greek philosophers in Paul’s time believed that 
God is a body and that only pleasure is true happiness.57 For all these reasons the Greek 
philosophers look like a man whose mind has been so darkened that he sees a rope and 
thinks of it as a serpent, an image Chrysostom probably borrows from Sextus 
Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism.58 In sum, then, for Chrysostom, these beliefs of the 
philosophers are proofs of their darkened understanding both in respect of their lives 
and their doctrines. 
The idea of heimarmene was consistently attacked by John in different writings and, 
depending on the context, for a variety of reasons. For example, in his Homilies on 
Colossians it is contrasted to the doctrine of the Resurrection and is called unjust, 
irrational, cruel and inhumane, whereas the latter is considered righteous since it awards 
everyone according to their worth.59 Peculiarly, the ones Chrysostom accuses as 
accepting of heimarmene are those who defined pleasure as the ultimate end, i.e. the 
Epicureans (and John uses indolence and their lack of nous as the reason of this 
acceptance), whilst the lovers of virtue among them threw it out as irrational. 
Ultimately, necessity (a synonym for fate in John’s corpus) was a diabolic construct so 
that humans would forego virtue. 
John’s criticism of religious Hellenism sometimes includes a direct attack on the 
gods of Olympus or on pagan cultic observances. When that is the case, we classify it 
under religious criticism since that aspect seems to be the prevailing one, even if others 
are included as well. As we will see in the following chapter, John often compares the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In Act. apost. hom. 38.1 (PG 60:267). 
58 In Eph. hom. 12.3 (PG 62:91-2; NPNF 1-13:111). Sextus Empiricus, PH 1.33 (LCL 273:140-1). 
The origin of Chrysostom’s image was first pointed out by William John Copeland, the translator of the 
Homilies in the Library of the Fathers series. 
59 In Col. hom. 2.5 (PG 62:318) 
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apostles and the martyrs with other humans. Nevertheless, sometimes he also compares 
the apostles to the Greek gods, as in the passage below: 
And what, pray you, is that Minerva of theirs, and Apollo, and Juno? They are 
different kinds of demons among them. And there is a king of theirs, who thinks 
fit to die for the mere purpose of being accounted equal with the gods. But not 
so the men here: no, just the contrary. Hear how they speak on the occasion of 
the lame man’s cure. “Ye men of Israel, why look ye so earnestly on us, as 
though by our own power or holiness we had made him to walk? (Acts 3:12) We 
also are men of like passions with you. (Acts 14:14) But with those, great is the 
self-elation, great the bragging; all for the sake of men’s honors, nothing for the 
pure love of truth and virtue (Ἐκεῖ δὲ πολὺς ὁ τῦφος, πολλὴ ἡ ἀλαζονεία· πάντα 
διὰ τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιµάς, οὐδὲν φιλοσοφίας ἕνεκεν) …60 
 
A great number of themes emerges from Chrysostom’s polemic against the Greek 
gods. What is primarily emphasized is their demonic nature, which is contrasted to the 
apostolic humility. They are also accused of suffering from tuphos and extreme 
boastfulness, which is the root cause for their seeking glory among men, instead of 
performing their actions for the sake of philosophy, which in this case is the literal 
meaning of John’s Greek. The word tuphos61 has a diverse range of meanings that 
includes vanity, pride, delusion or craziness and is a very interesting concept. The 
Cynics used the concept to describe a vice, of which they often accused Plato and which 
they saw as characteristic of the masses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:49-50; NPNF 1-11:31). Elsewhere, Chrysostom argues against the 
sacrificial system and cites Homer (Iliad 4.49), whom he simply calls “a poet of the Greeks,” in support 
of his view that the gods of the ἔξωθεν demanded bloody sacrifices whereas the God of Christians should 
be worshipped through an impeccable lifestyle and with the nous only, for which see Exp. in ps. 50.4 (PG 
55:247). He also repeats the accusation that the Greeks revel in self-references and that their gods used to 
be humans (διὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων ποιοῦσι θεούς): In 1 Cor. hom. 5.1 (PG 61:42). More specifically, the 
“principle and root of idolatry” is because “many after having had success in wars, and set up trophies, 
and built cities, and done diverse other benefits of this kind to the people of those times, came to be 
esteemed gods by the multitude, and were honoured with temples, and altars; and the whole catalogue of 
the Grecian gods is made up of such men.” De stat. 1.7 (PG 49:25; NPNF 1-9:338). Finally, in Post. 
presb. Goth. 4 (PG 63:506), Chrysostom is yet again being consistent in his inconsistency, and declares 
that the Greeks made up their gods and idolatry is an outcome of their attempt to count themselves as 
equals to God: εἰδωλολατρεία ἐντεῦθεν γέγονεν, ὁ κολοφὼν τῶν κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τῶν πολλῶν εἰς 
ἀπόνοιαν αἰροµένων καὶ ἰσοθεΐας ἐπιθυµούντων. Ἅπαντες γοῦν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησι θεοὶ ὑπὸ τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων ἀνεπλάσθησαν. 
61 For the different meanings of the word and an interesting analysis of its use among the Cynics and 
the Stoics see Rene Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 152-158. 
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Chrysostom’s criticism of ancient religion is not limited to his remarks against the 
gods. He often refers to remnants of pagan religious practices among the Christian 
population and urges them to abandon them, as they go against their beliefs. In some 
cases, these practices seem to have nothing particularly anti-Christian about them. For 
example, John argued against the custom of naming children after their forebears and 
promoted the practice of giving them names of martyrs, bishops and apostles instead.62 
He understands that in earlier times these customs were reasonable and served as 
consolation for death since the departed appeared to live through the name, but this 
should not be the case anymore. To reinforce his argument, he brings up the examples 
of the righteous of the OT (Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Moses) who did not follow this 
custom either.63 John’s argument for Christian names is that by naming children after 
Peter or John, they will strive to imitate their zeal. While the practice by itself might 
initially have been harmless, the method used was characterized by Chrysostom as of 
questionable orthodoxy. He writes: “And do not, I pray, follow Greek customs. It is a 
great disgrace and laughable when in a Christian household some Greek pagan customs 
(ἔθη τινὰ ἑλληνικὰ) are observed; and they kindle lamps and sit watching to see which 
is the first to be extinguished and consumed, and other such customs which bring 
certain destruction to those who practice them. Do not regard such doings as paltry and 
trivial.”64 The purpose of the custom John is referring to is not immediately obvious, but 
he refers to these practices again in a homily on 1 Corinthians 4 and helps us understand 
the logic behind the reference: “When a name has to be given to the boy, they fail to 
call him after the saints. As men in older times used first to do, they light lamps and 
give them names. Then they assign the same name to the child as that of the lamp which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Inan. glor. et ed. lib. 47 (SC 188:146). 
63 Inan. glor. et ed. lib. 49 (SC 188:147). 
64 Inan. glor. et ed. lib. 48 (SC 188:146-7; trans. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan culture, 108). 
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burns longest, inferring that he will live a long life.”65 This practice was called name 
divination by lamps, and even though in many cases the names given belonged to 
Christian saints, it was considered superstitious and common enough for Chrysostom to 
inveigh against it.66 
Another example is the use of charms and amulets in Antioch, where the practice of 
wearing talismans with the image of Alexander the Great seems to have been popular in 
Chrysostom’s time.67 Isabella Sandwell argues that presenting the use of amulets as a 
strictly “Greek” feature helps Chrysostom in his attempt to “clarify an aspect of 
Christian identity”, by “making a contrast with Greekness in his definition of the use of 
amulets as Greek.”68 This attempt to define what it means to be a Christian was a result 
of the Christians losing their minority status as a group excluded from mainstream 
society. In this respect, Chrysostom was trying to construct identities – identities that 
Sandwell believes did not objectively exist, but which he saw as fixed and clear-cut. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 In 1 Cor. hom. 12.13 (PG 61:105; trans. Laistner, Christianity and Pagan culture, 137-8). 
66 For more information on the practice and its survival into late Byzantium see Jane Baun, “Coming 
of Age in Byzantium: Agency and Authority in Rites of Passage from Infancy to Adulthood,” in 
Authority in Byzantium, ed. Pamela Armstrong (London: Ashgate, 2013), 113-36, especially 120-6. 
67 Illum. Cat. 2.5 (PG 49:240; St. John Chrysostom: Baptismal Instructions, trans. Paul W. Harkins, 
New York: Newman Press, 190-1): “What would you say of those who use incantations and amulets and 
of those who tie bronze coins of Alexander of Macedon around their heads and feet? Tell me, are these 
the things in which we place our hopes? After our Master died for us on the cross, will we put our hope 
for salvation in the image of a Greek king? Do you not know how many wrongs the cross has set right? 
Did it not destroy death, did it not blot out sin, did it not end the power of the devil, does it not suffice for 
the well-being of our body? Did it restore the whole world, and yet you have no trust in it? What 
punishment would you not deserve? You carry around on your person not only amulets but even 
incantations; you bring into your house drunken and witless old hags. Are you not ashamed and do you 
not blush, after you have been trained in true doctrine, you have been terrified by these things?” 
68 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 5. Chrysostom saw his polemic against certain 
pagan religious practices of his day, which were also shared by some Christians, as a continuation of the 
apostolic project: “This is what we have to dispel and dissolve. It is night not among heretics and among 
Greeks only, but also in the multitude on our side, in respect of doctrines and of life. For many entirely 
disbelieve the resurrection; many fortify themselves with their horoscope; (γένεσιν ἑαυτοῖς ἐπιτειχίζουσι) 
many adhere to superstitious observances, and to omens, and auguries, and presages. And some likewise 
employ amulets and charms.” In 1 Cor. hom. 4.11 (PG 61:40; NPNF 1-12:21). There is no reason to 
doubt Chrysostom’s depiction of certain Christians in this passage. If anything, the description of 
believers participating in these practices would be embarrassing for any Christian preacher, and it would 
be more beneficial if he tried to hide the fact rather than present it in such a frank manner. We should also 
be reminded of B. Leyerle’s pertinent remark that “despite the highly rhetorical nature of Chrysostom’s 
treatises, we may still hope to extract from them some social data, since polemic, in order to be effective, 
must bear at least a stylized resemblance to observable reality.” Leyerle, Theatrical Shows and Ascetic 
Lives, 11.  
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“For Chrysostom, people had to choose whether they were a Christian or a Greek and 
there was to be no space for ambiguity between the two because religious identity had 
to be displayed visibly in every action at all times.”69  
While Sandwell is correct that identity construction usually involves marking out 
differences from other groups, some of her other claims are more contentious. I agree 
that for Chrysostom there was “no space for ambiguity” between being Christian or not. 
Nevertheless, Chrysostom clearly refers to actions of the Greeks of the past, which his 
Christian audience could follow without problems, such as voluntary poverty. While it 
is true that in many of these examples Chrysostom does say that the Greeks did not have 
the right intention even when doing the right things, it is clear that he approves of the 
action itself. Hence it does not seem to be the case that, in Sandwell’s words, “religious 
identity had to be displayed visibly in every action at all times.”   
This is not to deny the fact that religious identity was what primarily distinguished 
the different groups in Chrysostom’s thought, which is well established across studies 
of Chrysostom: “Chrysostom hoped to eclipse the distinctions of class or culture, by 
making religious identity the primary marker of difference in society.”70  But Sandwell 
also overlooks the dimension of conversion from one belief to another and the practices 
that accompanied it.  
As Michael Whitby argues:  
For the majority of people, conversion to Christianity could not have meant the 
total abandonment of all aspects of pagan practice; instead, conversion 
represented a coalescence of practices rather than a complete change, so that the 
survival of some pagan practices does not necessarily prove survival of a much 
more complex set of beliefs. However, a zealous Christian bishop who 
encountered such practices might choose to place the worse interpretation on 
this behaviour, either because he believed that any sign of non-Christian activity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 6. 
70 Maxwell, Christianization, 147. 
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might provide the occasion for a serious lapse or because his reputation could be 
enhanced by the conquest of “real” pagans.71  
 
As we saw above, sometimes Chrysostom would witness Christians who actually 
did hold on to beliefs that were entirely in opposition to major Christian doctrines, such 
as the resurrection. Sandwell can also be challenged on her statement that “neither 
Christian nor Greek nor Jewish identity existed essentially or objectively in 
Chrysostom’s world”, therefore he had to “continually construct them out of a situation 
where many practices were shared by people whatever their religious allegiance.”72  
First, despite the fact that people did indeed share a number of practices, there were also 
practices that were unique to each group and practices that, despite their similarity on 
the surface, took a different meaning. Furthermore, to say that these identities were not 
fixed is one thing; to claim that they did not essentially exist is another. If we follow 
that line of thought it would appear that authors like Chrysostom were arguing against 
smoke-screens and not real ideas. Sandwell’s assertion is a result of her emphasis on 
religious identity, which she believes does not have an objective existence and results 
from boundaries constructed by human actors. But neither Greek nor Jewish identity 
limited themselves to their religious aspects (this is the case for centuries before but also 
during Chrysostom’s time). Instead, I would argue that Laura Nasrallah’s comment that 
early Christian apologists did not define Christianity “against paganism or Judaism as 
much as they define Christianity against certain kinds of other ethnic and religious 
practices, practices they usually attribute to the ‘many’ or the crowd” is much more 
applicable to the way Chrysostom defines Christianity.73 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Michael Whitby, “John of Ephesus and the Pagans: Pagan Survivals in the Sixth Century,” in 
Paganism in the Later Roman Empire and in Byzantium, ed. Maciej Salamon (Cracow: Universitas, 
1991), 114.  
72 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 5. 
73 Laura Salah Nasrallah, Christian Responses to Roman Art and Architecture: The Second-Century 
Church amid the Spaces of Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 6-7. 
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Finally, Sandwell appears to vary her estimation of the significance of amulets: she 
refers to Chrysostom’s characterization of amulets as Greek, idolatrous or Jewish, but 
also claims (in the same paragraph) that he saw the use of amulets as exclusively Greek, 
while at the same time referring to Chrysostom’s accusation against Christians who 
wore phylacteries as a Jewish practice!74 
This construction of identity in the case of Greek religion also involved a focus on 
belief as well as practice. One tactic used by Chrysostom was to single out a set of 
elements and identify them with the core of Greek religion. These elements included, 
among others, worship of the sun, water and animals, divinized humans and an 
association of Greek religion with philosophy.75 John also argued that purity of life is of 
no benefit if one’s doctrines are corrupt, while sound doctrine is not enough if one’s life 
is immoral.76 He also attributes many heretical teachings, particularly those of Marcion 
and Valentinus, to the Greeks, and considers that many of their beliefs (such as the 
belief that matter is uncreated) were really borrowed from non-Christian (ἔξωθεν) 
philosophers.77 For example, he argues that the denial of the resurrection is a direct 
outcome of the belief that matter was uncreated and, if those who support that view cite 
“pagan” wisdom (ἔξωθεν κέχρηνται σοφίᾳ) to back up their arguments, the Christians 
should not be in awe but laugh at them because they are using stupid teachers.  The 
reason John calls the philosophers stupid is because they did not deliver any “sound 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 269. 
75 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 74. The association of religion with philosophy was 
also a connection Libanius made in his own works, such as in Or. 18.18 (LCL 451:291). Sandwell also 
makes the interesting observation that Chrysostom tended to ignore Neoplatonic ideas when discussing 
Greek religion and philosophy (ibid. 75). 
76 Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄφελος βίου καθαροῦ, δογµάτων διεφθαρµένων· ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τοὐναντίον, 
δογµάτων ὑγιῶν, ἐὰν βίος ᾗ διεφθαρµένος. In Ioh. hom. 66.3 (PG 59:369). The discussion that follows is 
part of this same passage.  
77 Hagit Amirav has argued that John’s opposition to Alexandrian exegesis is an illustration of how 
familiar he and his Antiochene colleagues were with pagan culture, since “their ideological insistence on 
a plain exposition of the biblical text was … a deliberate rejection of pagan allegorical methods employed 
in the exposition and study of Homer.” H. Amirav, Rhetoric and Tradition: John Chrysostom on Noah 
and the Flood (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), 6. This is another example of John considering the Greeks as 
predecessors of ideas he disapproved from other Christians.  
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teaching about God or about creation, but Pythagoras did not yet know things which 
even the widow among us understood.”78 The attack on Pythagoras is just the 
beginning; it is followed by an attack on Empedocles and his view on reincarnation (Fr. 
117D) and an ironic statement about how these philosophers “are great men in their 
village, they wear their tresses long, they cast their cloaks about them. Their philosophy 
goes thus far. But if you look within, you see ashes and dust and nothing sound.”79  
This and similar passages from Chrysostom’s corpus are often used to support 
arguments about his alleged hatred of Hellenism and as a prime example of his 
viciousness against Greek philosophy and thought. However, this point of view easily 
overlooks five things. First, mocking of the parochial character and dressing of the 
philosophers is not unheard of in the Hellenic tradition itself; in fact, mocking between 
philosophers in literature is abundant, as a simple skim through Diogenes’ Laertius 
description of the shenanigans between Diogenes the Cynic and Plato would show;80 
secondly, John’s focus here are the Presocratics, not each and every Greek (or even 
non-Christian) philosopher that has ever lived; thirdly, the argument did not begin as a 
diatribe against Greek philosophy but about the way Christian heretics use it against 
their orthodox counterparts; fourthly, criticism of people who dress as philosophers but 
do not really live as philosophers exists even among non-Christian authors81 and finally, 
Chrysostom did not use the argument only against philosophers: elsewhere, he made the 
point that just as we cannot judge a philosopher based on his hairstyle or other external 
characteristics but on the basis of his manners and soul, or a soldier based on his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 In Ioh. hom. 66.3 (PG 59.369; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John vol. 2, 224). 
79 Ibid. (trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John vol. 2, 225). 
80 See for example Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.24-26, 40-41, 53, 58 (LCL 185:27ff.). 
81 See for example Julian, Or. 6.201a (LCL 29:57): “Therefore let him who wishes to be a Cynic 
philosopher not adopt merely their long cloak or wallet or staff or their way of wearing the hair, as though 
he were like a man walking unshaved and illiterate in a village that lacked barbers’ shops and schools, but 
let him consider that reason rather than a staff and a certain plan of life rather than a wallet are the 
mintmarks of the Cynic philosophy.” 
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uniform but on the basis of his bravery, so we cannot judge Christian virginity based on 
the clothing but on the way it exists in the virgin’s body and soul.82  
Later on, in his Homilies on John Chrysostom attacks the views of Thales, 
Empedocles and Anaximenes again, this time regarding the nature of the divine and the 
fact that they could not understand the idea of an incorporeal God; and even when they 
did, it was because of their contact with those he calls “our co-religionists in Egypt.”83 
In essence, and in an instance of Chrysostom agreeing with previous apologists, some 
of the good things in Greek philosophy had their actual origins with the Hebrews.  
The demonic nature of the gods that we mentioned previously is not the only 
instance where Chrysostom correlates the Greco-Roman religion with demons and even 
with Satan himself. He describes the worship of the idols as worship of “not Gods, but 
stones and demons,”84 a characterization he also reserves for the Greeks themselves, 
while religious practices such as Greco-Roman prophecy and divination are considered 
signs of demonic possession.85 The characterization of Greek religion as magical and 
demonic has received varied explanations from scholars. Isabella Sandwell considers it 
part of Chrysostom’s effort to distance it from being a legitimate religious choice and 
also as a further proof that being Greek was something entirely incompatible with being 
Christian.86 This is definitely the case with religious affiliation, a fact that Chrysostom 
often repeats in various instances when he mentions Jews, Greeks and heretics as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 De virg. 8.1 (SC 125:112). 
83 In Ioh. hom. 66.3 (PG 59.369; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John vol. 2, 225).  
84 In 1 Cor. hom. 20.4 (PG 61:163). 
85 For the numerous references to Chrysostom’s works, along with further discussion of associations 
of Greek religion with magic, witchcraft, and superstition see Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late 
Antiquity, 89.  
86 Ibid., 89-90. Sandwell also refers to examples where Chrysostom makes the same association with 
Jews and other Christian heretics and presents it as a choice of different ways of life-Greek, Jewish, or 
Christian. This choice in Sandwell’s view was absolute and involved a number of different 
characteristics: social, moral, cultural and religious.  
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groups that the Christians have to battle against.87 But the inspiration to do that does not 
originate with Chrysostom but with Paul, or at least that is what Chrysostom claims. In 
another attack on the idols as demons and stones that do not have any power, he 
considers 1 Corinthians 8:4-5 to be an attack both against philosophers as well as the 
simpletons among the Greeks, and the philosophers are particularly attacked for 
thinking that the idols have certain power in them. It is at this point that Chrysostom 
lays down his method: he observes that Paul is not just writing doctrine, but he does so 
in contradistinction to the ἔξωθεν. Therefore, when one reads the Pauline corpus, s/he 
should observe whether Paul is speaking abstractly or in opposition to others. The 
outcome of this will be twofold: “this contributes in no ordinary way to the accuracy of 
our doctrinal views, and to the exact understanding of his expressions.”88 
Besides his persistent condemnation of the philosophers as the intellectual enablers 
of Greek religion, Chrysostom often attacks certain superstitions of his day and explains 
them as indicative of a mentality that Christians should not subscribe to. In this respect, 
he criticizes the Greeks for fearing things that do not count as sins, such as filthiness of 
the body, care for the dead (through a fear of pollution by touching the dead body), and 
observation of days. At the same time, they take no account of things that are indeed 
sins, such as pederasty, adultery, and fornication. This contrast is followed by a 
caricature of superstitious characters, who resemble many of the types described by 
Theophrastus in Bk 16 of his Characters. A man might wash himself from the pollution 
of a dead body but would not do the same for dead works, whereas he might pursue 
riches with all his might and at the same time think that all this can be simply undone by 
the crow of a cock. Another one leaves his house and because he thinks the first person 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See e.g. Adv. Iud. or. 7.3 (PG 48:920). This does not apply to family life. As he argues in Adv. Iud. 
or. 2.3 (PG 48:860; trans. Harkins, Discourses against Judaizing Christians, 43), even if one’s wife is a 
Hellene (pagan, or unbeliever in this text), this does not offer a sufficient excuse for a divorce: “If a man 
has an infidel wife, that is, a gentile, he is not forced to put her away.” 
88 In 1 Cor. hom. 20.3 (PG 61:163; NPNF 1-12:113). 
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he meets is a bringer of bad luck a myriad of evils will befall him. The same one also 
complains when his servant puts on the left shoe first when he helps him dress up, 
which is considered a terrible mishap and misfortune, and the same applies when 
exiting the house with the left foot. Chrysostom calls these household evils. They are 
followed by even more examples of superstitions that happen outside the house and this 
time include women as well, along with the fear of certain natural animal behaviours, 
like the aforementioned crow of the cock or the bray of an ass or even the sneezing of a 
man. These superstitions show that these people behave as if possessed by the darkness 
and more slavishly “than all the slaves in the world.” Besides his exhortation to the 
Christians to scorn these things, he asks them to regard only one thing as terrible: sin, 
and offending God.89 At the same time, Chrysostom was aware that many Christians 
were equally susceptible to the very same superstitions, going as far as claiming that 
some deliberately avoided virgins for bringing bad luck whilst feeling joyous when 
meeting prostitutes on the streets.90 
iii. Apologetic battles: the nature of society  
Sometimes John uses a dialogue with a Greek as the setting for a debate about a 
particular issue. Wendy Mayer’s recent translation of the yet unedited homily On All the 
Martyrs provides us with one such example of John apparently engaging in an 
apologetic effort to convince a Greek about the truths of Christianity. Whether the 
dialogue (or the Greek) is real or imaginary will not be our concern here: our use of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 In Eph. hom. 12.3 (PG 62:92-3; NPNF 1-13:111-2). It is also the one thing that John advises his 
audience to be afraid of, since every other hardship can in fact have good outcomes, as per Job’s 
example: “Let us endure the other things with courage: loss of money, bodily sickness, business reverses, 
abuse, slander, and whatever other trouble may come upon us. It is not the nature of these things to harm 
us; in fact they can give us the greatest help.” De incompr. hom. 4 (SC 28bis:266; St. John Chrysostom, 
On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, trans. Paul W. Harkins, Washington, DC: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1984, 135-6). 
90 Cat. 1.39 (SC 50bis:128-129; trans. Harkins, Baptismal Instructions, 39): “I exhort both men and 
women to shun altogether omens and superstitions. These are foolish practices of the Greeks and of those 
who are still in the grip of error, this meddling of yours with the cawing of crows, the squeaking of mice, 
the creaking of beam; your joy on encountering those who are living disgraceful lives, while you avoid 
meeting with pious and devout persons, as if they were the cause of countless evils.” 
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word apologetic as a characterization for Chrysostom’s rhetoric at this point does not 
depend on him defending his beliefs to an actual audience who hold opposing views; 
rather, our use follows Amirav’s definition: “An exegete whose rhetoric is more 
apologetic in tone seeks to encourage a sense of belonging to a particular group by 
contrasting it with another.”91 This definition of apologetic is more useful for our 
purposes since it discards the notion that the apologist needs to defend his views to a 
real hostile audience with the hope of converting them. But it is not just simple 
preaching to the converted either, since it does not always presuppose that those 
“converted” are equipped with a proper understanding of their faith. According to this 
definition, John’s main purpose in this kind of text is to encourage a sense of belonging 
among Christians by contrasting them favourably with Greeks. Consequently, in this 
section of our analysis of Chrysostom’s criticism of the Greeks, we will examine texts 
which are broadly apologetic in nature (some using dialogue, others using other forms).	  
We will show, first, that Chrysostom contrasts Christian behaviour with that of the 
Greeks – particularly with regard to the kind of behaviour which characterises a good 
polis – and secondly, that Chrysostom exhorts Christians to exhibit good behaviour as a 
witness to their faith. 
In his homily On All the Martyrs John is emphatic that the Greek cannot be 
convinced from either events of the past or the eschatological expectations of 
Christianity.92 He therefore tries to argue from incidents of the present. It is worth 
quoting the passage in full before we proceed with our analysis: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Amirav, Rhetoric and Tradition, 224.  
92 Despite the fact that elsewhere Chrysostom has no problem admitting that certain Greek 
eschatological ideas could be considered as εἰκόνα τινά κρίσεως in tandem with the Christian idea of a 
final judgment. The full passage is from Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.10 (PG 47:347; trans. Hunter, A 
Comparison, 119): “Even if the pagans were unable to speak the truth about these things as they are, 
since they followed their own reasonings and certain teachings of ours which they misunderstood, 
nonetheless they have received a kind of image of the judgement. Among the poets, philosophers, orators, 
and all writers you will find speculations on these doctrines. You will hear about the Elysian Field, the 
Isles of the Blessed, the groves, the myrtle trees, the light air, the most pleasant odor, and the choruses 
who dwell there, garbed in white robes, dancing and singing hymns, and, in a word, the just desserts 
which await both the wicked and the good after death. How do you think both the good and the wicked 
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Tell me, what are you saying? He didn’t resurrect the dead when he was here? 
Nor did he cleanse the lepers, nor drive out demons nor did he effect the rest of 
the things I started out mentioning? Nor after that will he come [down] from 
heaven and demand of each person an account of their deeds, nor will he 
resurrect their bodies, nor grant us incorruptibility? Well, does it seem to you 
that these things are a fairy tale or heap of words or pure sound? Speak! Surely 
what is both present and visible doesn’t seem to be a fairy tale. For instance, the 
Churches everywhere in the world that multiply the sea of piety; the choruses of 
virgins; the ranks of monks; the diverse and perfected social group within the 
Church of people who conspicuously practice moderation in marriage, of people 
who practice patience in widowhood; the patronage focused on the poor; the 
ranks of priests; the obedience of the emperors; the philosophy of foreign 
people. Surely these things aren’t a fairy tale? Surely these things aren’t part of 
the future and the past?93 
 
In his willingness to convince the Greeks, if they were really the intended audience 
of this homily, Chrysostom is willing to put aside certain apologetic motifs that we can, 
by and large, consider as some of the central tenets of Christian doctrine: Jesus’ signs, 
which represent the past of Christianity, and his role in the eschatological times as both 
a judge and as the one who provides resurrection and incorruptibility to humans, which 
represent the future.94 His apologetic trope in this instance is consciously present-
oriented and pragmatic. What is essentially said is this: you can overlook the past and 
the future if you wish, but you can definitely not overlook what is happening right now. 
Churches are being built everywhere, virgins and monks are multiplying by the day, and 
the Christians are well known for their moderation in marriage and patient endurance of 
widowhood. He implies that Christians took the patronage system in the classical polis 
(which could provide for anything, from public events such as horseraces to war funds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
live after reflecting on these things? Are there not some persons who, even if they prosper in this life 
without pain and with great pleasure, upon reflection are struck, as it were, by the whip of conscience and 
by the expectation of the frightening things that await them? And, yet, good people, even if they should 
suffer a thousand misfortunes, have “a hope which nourishes” them, as Pindar says, and which does not 
allow them to feel the present misfortunes.” Besides an extensive knowledge of Greek eschatological 
ideas, this passage also shows that John was willing to admit that the weight of conscience and the hope 
for the future things was present in Christians and non-Christians alike, ideas that he could be very 
sympathetic with, even if disagreeing in the details about what the eschaton will look like.   
93 In mart. omn. 14 (John Chrysostom, The Cult of the Saints, trans. Wendy Mayer with Bronwen 
Neil, Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2006, 251). 
94 The resurrection of Christ was a very popular apologetic tool, especially among the early 
Apologists. However, Chrysostom’s reluctance to use it in this case could have much to do with M. 
Ludlow’s comment that “addressing queries about the possibility of resurrection seemed to miss the 
fundamental pagan concern: why should resurrection be a good thing to hope for?” Morwenna Ludlow, 
The Early Church (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 42, italics in the original. 
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and everything in between) and focused it on the poor, whether they were fellow 
citizens, foreigners, or slaves.95 The emperor’s Christian faith also gets an honorable 
mention, although Julian’s recent example could easily be used as a counterargument. 
The reality of all these things, Chrysostom believes, ultimately proves that Christianity 
is not a fairy tale, whether or not the Greeks are willing to engage with its past and/or 
future.   
It is notable that some of the things Chrysostom mentions are distinctively Christian 
(e.g. virgins and monks); others are examples of Christians using a social institution – 
like marriage, almsgiving or patronage – better than the Greeks. Therefore, I do not 
believe that he was against the institution of the polis in principle but rather had a 
different set of beliefs as to what made a polis great: “So Isaiah has instructed both the 
leaders and all his hearers quite a bit about philosophy in teaching them not to place 
confidence in the city’s greatness, its defence works or its military hardware, but in the 
virtue of their own people.”96  Here Chrysostom encourages a sense of belonging to a 
particular group – Christians – by contrasting their vision of the polis with that of earlier 
citizens – Greeks, even if many of these Christians were from a Greek background. 
These Christians are simply being asked to reconsider what constitutes virtue for their 
particular polis: its humans, and their way of life. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Liebeschuetz’s summary of the differences between Christian giving and traditional munificence is 
excellent and provides the necessary framework for us to understand John’s comment on the Christian 
patronage of the poor: “Christian charity was not directed towards fellow citizens or political supporters 
but towards the poor, whoever they might be. It was given to them precisely because they were poor or 
sick, and because God wants Christians to look after those in need… The idea that the poor and the sick 
and the old ought to be helped because they were there, and were God’s creatures, is not classical… 
Christian charity did not provide amenities like shows and baths and colonnades which were of benefit to 
rich and poor alike. It was focused on basic needs of food and shelter. Christian giving was quite 
independent of the secular institutions of the city.” J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops: 
Army, Church, and State in the Age of Arcadius and Chrysostom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 187. 
96 Comm. in Is. 3.2 (SC 304:152; trans. Garrett, An Analysis, 81). Cf. De stat. 17.4 (PG 49:179; trans. 
Mayer and Allen, John Chrysostom, 115): “When you wish to praise the city, don’t tell me about its 
suburb, Daphne, nor about the number and height of its cypress trees, nor its springs of water nor the 
numerous people who live in the city, not that its market-place is frequented with great freedom right 
until very late in the evening not of the abundance of market goods. All these things belong to the senses, 
and last for the duration of this present life. But if you can call on virtue, gentleness, almsgiving, vigils, 
prayers, common sense and wisdom of spirit- adorn the city with these qualities.” 
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Besides comparing the behaviour of Christians and Greeks, Chrysostom also 
analyses the difference Christianity could make to a Greek who converted. The example 
of a female prostitute and the changes that Christianity brings to her life after baptism 
serve as an example of the transformative and effective nature of the Christian faith. To 
contrast that with Hellenism Chrysostom brings up one of his favourite examples of 
Hellenic ineffectiveness: the case of Plato and his failed attempts to convert the tyrants 
of Syracuse into following his doctrine. Plato’s failure97 is directly in contrast to the 
power of the cross: “the philosopher … didn’t have the power to convert a single tyrant 
when he sailed so vast a sea … but the power of the cross convinced everyone: Romans, 
foreign people, fools, ordinary citizens.”98  
Hellenic ineffectiveness is one of his favourite themes, and in another apologetic 
work, Against the Jews, he contrasts a variety of things he regarded as failures with 
Christian successes. He mentions, for example, the failure of several philosophers 
(Zeno, Plato, Socrates, Pythagoras, Diagoras) who tried to introduce different politeiai 
among the Greeks but failed, with the subsequent result that many people hardly 
remember them.99 On the contrary, Christ’s politeia has been diffused to the whole 
oikoumene. In an abrupt turn of speech, Chrysostom asks about the number of miracles 
Apollonius of Tyana performed, before proclaiming that all his deeds were “a fraud, a 
vain show, and devoid of truth,”100 because they vanished and disappeared in an instant. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 The Greek philosophers’ failures are also contrasted with the success of the Christian project as 
was initiated by the Apostles, a project far more radical than Plato’s republic that involved “disturbing 
ancient customs, and removing their father's landmarks.” In 1 Cor. hom. 4.9 (PG 61:37; NPNF 1-12:20). 
After Chrysostom, other Christian authors continued stressing the failures of Plato and the other 
philosophers and exploiting their disagreements. In his study of Theodoret Papadogiannakis argued that 
“the failure –moral and otherwise- of Greek philosophers illustrates that the superiority of Christianity is 
based on the practice of virtue rather than cultural affiliation.” Papadogiannakis, Christianity and 
Hellenism, 103.  
98 In mart. omn. 15 (trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 252). 
99 Adv. Iud. or. 5.3 (PG 48:886). The following discussion is based on the same passage. 
100 Ibid. (trans. Harkins, Discourses Against Judaizing Christians,105). Apollonius of Tyana is 
mentioned again when John discusses the opinions of some who thought that Christ was a magician and 
mention him in the same context as Apollonius: ““But what about the man from Tyana?” someone says. 
“That man was a cheat and a charlatan and he was renowned.” Where, and when? In a tiny part of the 
world, and for a short time, then he was quickly snuffed out and perished, leaving behind neither a church 
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Anticipating that some from the audience might object to Christ being mentioned in the 
same sentence as Plato, Zeno, Pythagoras and Apollonius, John says that he does so out 
of consideration to the Jews, who think of Christ as a mere man, and uses the example 
of Paul who did not use the Scriptures when conversing with the Athenians but used 
their altar to the unknown God as the basis for his speech. 
Another theme in Chrysostom’s comparison of Greek and Christian public 
behaviour is pagan cult. For example, in his homily On all the Martyrs, the power of the 
cross, which was previously contrasted to Plato’s failure, also served to eliminate the 
pagan cults. These receive a very graphic description by Chrysostom:  
whereas before this there were altars and temples and burnt sacrifices 
everywhere, and cult statues and festivals full of shamelessness and dances of 
demons and the Devil reveling in the cities, and the tyranny of drunkenness and 
furnace of licentiousness and the flame of wickedness arose from all quarters, 
after the cross’s power all this was removed.101 
 
Chrysostom’s tirades against blood sacrifices have to be particularly seen in the 
light of Julian’s restoration of sacrifice as a central feature of Graeco-Roman religion 
and Libanius’ emphasis on it in many of his orations.102 Chrysostom’s claim that burnt 
sacrifices are being replaced by spiritual sacrifices and the wilderness has become more 
law-abiding than the cities,	  even resonates with Libanius’ claim that Christianity “has 
quenched the sacred flame: it has stopped the joyful sacrifices: it has set them on to 
spurn and overthrow your altars: your temples and sanctuaries it has closed, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nor a people, nor any other such thing.” De laud. Paul. hom. 4.8 (SC 300:198; trans. Mitchell, The 
Heavenly Trumpet, 461). The polemic against Apollonius might have its origins in Libanius’ reference to 
him as a pagan hero. See Cribiore, Libanius the Sophist, 56-8. For the survival of a cult devoted to 
Apollonius in Byzantium well into the seventh century and beyond see Helen Saradi-Mendelovici, 
“Christian Attitudes Toward Pagan Monuments in Late Antiquity,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 44 (1990), 
57. 
101 In mart. omn. 15 (trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 252). In De laud. Paul. hom. 4.8 (SC 300:198-
200) Chrysostom specifically mentions the silence of specific cult locations, such as the temple of Zeus in 
Dodona in Epirus and the sanctuary that contained a temple and oracle of Apollo in Claros, on the coast 
of Ionia. 
102 For the particular references in Libanius’ works see Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 
95. Libanius was willing to offer unqualified support to Julian’s religious restoration project. For the 
relevant texts see ibid., 217. 
107 
demolished, or profaned, or given to harlots to dwell in.”103 Chrysostom’s rhetoric is 
surely intended to encourage Christians’ sense of belonging to a distinct group which 
rejected blood sacrifice.  
The victory of the cross brings with it a great number of societal changes that John 
links in On All the Martyrs with monasticism: people are now subverting their 
stomachs, controlling their desires, consider money to be filth, and shape their souls on 
top of mountains. The focus here is certainly on desert asceticism and how it affected 
the society in general. The reason for the presentation of this idealized picture of the 
society of his time becomes more obvious when it is compared with the situation before 
the coming of Christianity: people married their mothers, men had sex among 
themselves, prostitution and adultery were all prevailing, and what was worse, 
according to Chrysostom, some of these things were considered law while others were 
considered religious observance.	  This obvious reference to the story of Oedipus is, as 
Wendy Mayer points out, an attempt by Chrysostom to promote “mythology as part of 
the Greek past.”104 It also aims to distance Christians from that past.  
Chrysostom’s caricature of Greek society is completed by an attack on one of his 
favourite targets, theatrical shows, and their role as “schools for immorality.”105 
Theatrical shows were a constant thorn in Chrysostom’s side, and we should elaborate a 
little on why he perceived them as something fundamentally incompatible with the 
Christian faith. In one of his very graphic descriptions about the state of humanity 
before the coming of Christ, John describes one of the reasons for his regular 
denunciations of the theatre: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Or. 17.7 (LCL 451:217). The polemic against sacrifice is further proof that it had played a major 
role in Christianity’s battle against Graeco-Roman religious practices. Before detailing exactly what 
Christianity inflicted on paganism, Libanius begins by declaring its victory (ibid.): “A creed which we 
had until then laughed to scorn, which had declared such violent, unceasing war against you, has won the 
day, after all.” 
104 Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 253. 
105 n. 17 in ibid.  
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In their indecent night-time gatherings, women were admitted to the 
performance. There you could see the obscene sight of a virgin sitting in the 
theatre during the night, amidst a drunken crowd of young men madly revelling. 
The festival was actually the darkness, and the abominable deeds practiced by 
them.106 
 
The first point that is observable is Chrysostom’s claim to be shocked regarding the 
presence of women in theatres, but, as A. Hartney has pointed out, the truthfulness of 
that claim does not really matter.107 What does matter is that one of his factors in 
explaining the decline of ancient society seems to be the “lapse in behavioural 
boundaries between the sexes.”108  
Secondly, the theatres and the behaviour of the spectators become a source of 
negative role models for his congregation, who were nonetheless very familiar with the 
great plays of the past. John takes this familiarity for granted when he attacks the plot of 
some of the greatest plays of the past without actually naming them, because he is sure 
that most of those attending know them already: 
One man loved his stepmother, and a woman her stepson, and as a result hung 
herself… And would you wish to see a son married to his mother? This too 
happened among them, and what is most horrible, although it was done in 
ignorance, the god whom they worshiped did not prevent it, but permitted this 
outrage against nature to be committed, even though she was a member of the 
nobility… The wife of a certain man fell in love with another man, and with the 
help of her adulterer, killed her husband on his return home. Most of you 
probably know the story. The son of the murdered man killed the adulterer, and 
after that his mother, and then he himself went mad, and was haunted by the 
furies. After this the madman himself murdered another man, and took his wife 
for himself.109 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 In Tit. hom. 5.4 (PG 62:693; trans. Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 
186). We will be citing Hartney’s translation of John’s criticisms against theatrical shows because 
although she used the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers series as the basis of her translations, her slight 
revisions make the text slightly more comprehensible to a modern audience. 
107 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 186. 
108 Ibid. B. Leyerle similarly interprets Chrysostom’s obsession with Plato’s “proposed marriage 
legislation, which pricked his ire every time he thought about it” as primarily taking issue with its 
“proposed reduction of social distinction between the sexes.” Leyerle, Theatrical Shows, 72.  
109 In Tit. hom. 5.4 (PG 62:693; trans. Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 
186). 
109 
This brief tour de force describing the plots of some of the greatest plays in ancient 
Greek literature110 and the dismissal of their subject matter do give the impression that 
he might have disparaged “Greek society as a whole, rather than merely the mythical 
heritage of this society.”111 John’s attack on the theatre was, as Blake Leyerle has 
argued, “part of a far larger cultural critique,” and particularly his culture’s “emphasis 
on display.”112  Ruth Webb theorizes that Chrysostom’s opposition was “informed by 
the fierce asceticism that had driven him to live as a hermit for several years.”113  Webb 
also sees this critique as a development of the Classical tradition of moralizing critiques, 
with the additional element of characterizing the theatre as non-Christian and demonic, 
and argues that what Chrysostom has in common with other Christian writers like 
Augustine and Tertullian is a “rejection of fiction, the refusal to grant an autonomous 
status to theatrical representation, and the denial of the boundaries between theatre and 
life.”114  However, other boundaries seem to be being blurred in this text: this seems to 
be another instance where the lines between the mythological and the historical past are 
unclear, and I would argue that this is exactly Chrysostom’s intention. Despite his 
acknowledgment of his audience’s familiarity with drama, and the understanding that 
these plays are all part of their common and inherited culture, Chrysostom wants them 
to realize that this behaviour belongs to their pre-Christian past. To drive his point even 
closer to home, he even argues that if this was the conduct of those who were supposed 
to be virtuous (even if it was for the sake of appearances), what was then the conduct of 
the hoi polloi who mostly lived in obscurity? If Chrysostom ignored “the more complex 
plot motivations behind each of the listed events” and instead presented them as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 The texts Chrysostom is referring to are Hippolytus, Oedipus Rex, and the trilogy of the Oresteia, 
as identified in Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 186. 
111 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 186. 
112 Leyerle, Theatrical Shows, ix. 
113 Ruth Webb, Demons and Dancers: Performance in Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), 7. 
114 Ibid., 200. 
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“heinous crimes prevalent in this decadent society,”115 it is because his intention was not 
to be a literary critic but a preacher. In order for him to emphasize the debauchery of the 
past, he picks a fair number of stories that most people of his time would know and 
treats them as history in order to prevent the Christians from participating in theatrical 
shows and thus being tempted to imitate the behaviour they saw in the plays. Even if 
Chrysostom was not seriously concerned that this was about to happen, he still did not 
want the audience to draw the wrong lessons. Finally, Chrysostom’s words are also an 
attack on theatrical shows as the traditional loci that “ensured the dissemination of the 
traditional canon even among those without formal schooling.”116 Someone might say 
that in an ideal Christian world Chrysostom would replace these dramatic performances 
with Christian sermons, which would ensure the dissemination of the Bible instead of 
the Greek classics, but he never claimed as much. 
Theatrical shows were not the only focus of attack related to the classical past. 
Homosexuality and its Greek origins was another. Chrysostom’s commentary on 
Romans 1:26-7 attempts to trace Paul’s charge of homosexuality back to the Greek past. 
John begins by mentioning a law of Solon as quoted by Plutarch: “He also wrote a law 
forbidding a slave to practise gymnastics or have a boy lover, thus putting the matter in 
the category of honourable and dignified practices, and in a way inciting the worthy to 
that which he forbade the unworthy.”117 However, homosexuality was not so much 
honourable but rather shameless, Chrysostom argues. He attributes the practice to the 
Athenians specifically, “and Solon who is so great among them.”118 He argues that the 
books of the philosophers are full of this disease, but interestingly does not mention 
certain criticisms against the practice from the philosophers themselves, as in Plato’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 187. 
116 Leyerle, Theatrical Shows, 4. 
117 Plutarch, Sol. 1.3 (LCL 46:407). 
118 In Rom. hom. 4.2 (PG 60:419; NPNF 1-10:357). 
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Laws 1.636, where both the Spartans and the Cretans are criticized for it. Chrysostom 
compares the youth who are involved in the practice to whores, whose plight is more 
miserable because at least whoredom is lawless, but at least not contrary to nature, 
whereas homosexuality is both. John considers them as worse than murderers, since 
death is a better option than living like this, and no other sin is equal to this. Whereas 
the murderers break the connection between the soul and the body, the homosexual man 
ruins both.119 Chrysostom’s words become harsher after this point, but for the purposes 
of our discussion it is interesting to note that his reference to Greek homosexuality is 
ostensibly only due to the fact that he wishes to trace the phenomenon back to its origin. 
But after mentioning Solon and his law, he transitions into the present tense and speaks 
about it as something that is still present and needs to be dealt with. This is not the only 
reference to this law. The second reference120 mentions the law on pederasty specifically 
and further claims that there were houses where pederasty was practiced openly. He 
even goes on to mention paidika, erotic songs addressed to young boys, for which 
certain lyric poets were famous, such as Ibycus, but without mentioning their actual 
subject matter, i.e. passion for boys.	  However, his condemnation of homosexuality has 
an apologetic function in both texts: it is a way of reinforcing the Christians’ identity 
rather than a real attempt to dissuade Greeks from such behaviour in the present. 
Nevertheless, dramatic performances and homosexuality would not be the worst 
aspect of a pagan’s past, according to Chrysostom. The epicentre of the problem, of 
which drama and homosexuality were just a part, was an entirely different way of life – 
a way of life which is connected to the Greeks’ past. In another apologetic text, his 
Demonstration against the Pagans that Christ is God, Chrysostom identified two 
factors as the most difficult aspects in the process of conversion from a non-Christian 
faith to Christianity: habit and pleasure (we will return to habit below). He does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 In Rom. hom. 4.2 (PG 60:419; NPNF 1-10:357). 
120 In Tit. hom. 5.4 (PG 62:693) 
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identify the former religion as paganism, but from the description of their past it is 
obvious that this is the religious system he has in mind. Part of this past are the people 
who taught the pagans their way of life: “their fathers, grandfathers, great grandfathers, 
their ancestors, their philosophers, and public speakers.”121 Despite the difficulty of 
rejecting one’s past, the people were persuaded to do so and accept a new and very 
difficult one. This new way of life also entailed some major changes: “from luxurious 
living … to fasting; from the love of money … to poverty; from wanton ways … to 
temperance; from anger … to mildness; from envy … to kindliness…” John insists that 
the people who converted to the Christian faith were not different kinds of human 
beings that lived outside of this world. They were very much part of this world and its 
ways until they were won over to the Christian way of life, which is defined, from 
among other things, by poverty. To the question as to who won them over, 
Chrysostom’s answer is typical: “eleven men [for some reason John does not include 
Matthias] … [who] were unlettered, ignorant, ineloquent, undistinguished, and poor. 
They could not rely on the fame of their homelands, or any abundance of wealth, or 
strength of body, or glorious reputation, or illustrious ancestry. They were neither 
forceful nor clever in speech; they could make no parade of knowledge.” The message 
is clear. It does not matter if they had none of these things, because they had the power 
of Christ and all the virtues John mentioned before, and thus were able to win people 
over. At the same time, they also had to define themselves against the licentious Greek 
way of life, which included dishonour, drunkenness, greed, luxury and pomp.122 John’s 
targets in this instance are twofold: on the one hand, a strong connection to a glorious 
past through ancestry that led people to arrogance; on the other, a way of life taught by 
these very same predecessors. Christians are able to reject both, because they belong to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 This and the quotes that follow are from C. Iud. et Gent. 12.6-9 (PG 47:830; trans. Harkins, 
Apologist, 240-1).  
122 See also De res. mort. 2 (SC 561:122). 
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a different community which, even if it lacks illustrious (from a worldly point of view) 
predecessors, teaches its members the exact opposites of the vices mentioned above. 
There are other examples of a similar appeal to the Greeks’ past. One of 
Chrysostom’s favourite phrases from the Platonic corpus are the words of the Egyptian 
priest who speaks to Solon in Timaeus 22b: “you Greeks are always children: there is 
not such a thing as an old Greek.” But in his interpretation of the sentence the 
Egyptian’s phrase is taken as a way to explain the behaviour of the Greeks of his time. 
Just like children who do not care when important things are discussed, so are the 
Greeks. When Christians talk to them about the Kingdom of God, they laugh. When 
you take away their wealth, just like when you take away things from a child, they cry. 
Finally, just as children have no shame and expose themselves, so the Greeks wallow 
“in whoredoms and adulteries.”123 This is not the only case where Chrysostom uses 
either an opinion or an event of the past and applies it to his own context. 
Another one of John’s arguments against the Greeks of his time stems from 
contemporary events and the attitude exhibited by the Christians: in this example, the 
monks during the statues riots.124 The parrhesia of the monks, as effective in front of 
humans as it is in front of God, is proof for John that the older stories of the Christians, 
those concerning Peter, Paul, and John, are true. On the contrary, the behavior exhibited 
by the philosophers at that time also proves that the older stories of the Greeks about 
their philosophers are false. In fact, even if the Scriptures did not exist this would not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 In 1 Cor. hom. 4.4 (PG 61:38; NPNF 1-12:22). For other uses of the same platonic passage see 
Pomeroy, “Reading Plato Through the Eyes of Eusebius.” In this case Pomeroy claims that Eusebius is 
not John’s source, particularly since John does not use it, as Eusebius did, to claim that the Greeks stole 
their philosophy from the Hebrews. Besides the portrayal of Greeks as immature children, they are also 
sometimes presented as the enemies of the Bible or of the Christians themselves, as in In 1 Cor. hom. 6.3 
(PG 61:52; NPNF 1-12:32): “for the books [of the Bible] are with their enemies, and through the zeal of 
certain Greeks they have been transferred into the Greek tongue.” 
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present a problem, since the actions of the monks exhibit the apostolic virtues without 
any need to resort to their writings.125  
The discussion of the Greeks’ past leads John to discuss the whole nature of kinship. 
Psalm 144:7 (“Stretch out your hand from on high; set me free and rescue me from the 
mighty waters, from the hands of aliens”) provides Chrysostom with the opportunity to 
discuss what he considers true kinship and who is kin and who an alien. To this extent, 
he provides a working definition, which he goes on to explain: “This person … is kin 
who is registered in the same country as I and shares the same table rather than the one 
related by race (γένει προσήκων).”126 This is followed by his oft-repeated statement that 
the earth is not our home, before bringing up the story of the Good Samaritan, where he 
claims that the gap between the Samaritans and Jews was not by nature and exhorts the 
Christians to consider everyone their neighbour when it comes to doing good. But when 
it comes to truth the distinction between kin and alien comes back again. Chrysostom 
argues that the law of truth takes precedence even before blood relations, and a brother 
from the same parents that does not share the law of truth is “more savage than the 
Scythian.”127 On the other hand, if one is a Scythian or a Samaritan and a believer of the 
truth at the same time, then he/she is more related to us than the one who was born from 
the same parents!128 Chrysostom concludes this section by providing an alternative 
definition as to who is really a barbarian: the Christians should think of barbarians “on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 De stat. 17.2 (PG 49:175; trans. Mayer and Allen, John Chrysostom, 110): “Because of the fact 
that they’ve become successors of the apostles as far as their piety is concerned, they have consequently 
received the apostles’ frankness of speech as well. Because of the fact that they were brought up in the 
same laws, they’ve consequently emulated the apostles’ virtue. The result is that we’ve no need of 
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pointing to their teachers. We’ve no need of words to demonstrate the nonsense of the pagans, and 
pusillanimity of their philosophers, while facts present and past are crying out that everything of theirs is 
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as an attack primarily on their prestige and as part of his attempt to re-define philosophy and ascribe the 
title to the monks instead, and their respective behavior during the riots provides him with the opportunity 
to do just that. For this point see Maxwell, Christianization, 32.  
126 Exp. in Ps. 144 3 (PG 55:461; trans. Hill, Commentary on the Psalms vol. 2, 327). 
127 Ibid. 
128 He says so explicitly again in In 1 Thess. hom. 2.3 (PG 62:404; NPNF 1-13:331): “Friends, that is, 
friends according to Christ, surpass fathers and sons.” 
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the basis not of language or race but of mindset and spirit (µὴ ἀπὸ τῆς γλώττης, µηδὲ 
ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς γνώµης καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς).” What marks a human being, after 
all is ὅταν δογµάτων ἀκρίβειαν ἔχῃ καὶ πολιτείαν φιλόσοφον.129 In this respect, the 
Christians are explicitly called an ἔθνος.130  
In these apologetic battles on the nature of society Chrysostom had a fairly 
consistent apologetic strategy, which encouraged a keen sense of Christian belonging, 
by stressing the contrast between Greeks and Christians. Christians are better in their 
morals (homosexuality, attendance of the theatre) and in their public contribution to the 
polis (alms, rejection of sacrifice); where Greek religion is a failure, Christianity is a 
success; although Greeks have a strong sense of attachment to their past through their 
ancestral lineage and through teaching, Christians reject that for the stronger and better 
kinship of the Gospel. Although there are points when he admits that Greeks show 
virtue and Christians fail, on the whole, the point of the comparisons is to show the 
superiority of Christianity. 
iv. Apologetic battles: the power of public Christian behaviour 
A second aspect of Chrysostom’s apologetic strategy is to exhort Christians to 
behaviour which will contrast favorably with that of the Greeks – or to avoid behaviour 
which is worse. In both cases the aim is similar to what we mentioned in the section 
above, i.e. to show that Christians could stand on a higher moral ground not only on the 
basis of doctrine but also through their public attitudes. 
Chrysostom was also not afraid to argue against national pride, primarily on the 
basis that humans are all strangers in this world. In his Homilies on Matthew, in order to 
back his claim that things such as national pride are utterly contemptible, he brings 
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63:501), he also provided, as we can see in the example above, alternative definitions. 
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nation) instituted?” 
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forward the support of the philosophers of the Greeks, who also call them external 
(ἐκτὸς) and rank them in the lowest place.131 At the same time, the source of Greek 
pride itself, which Paul took down, is the strength of sophistries and syllogisms.132 
Unfortunately, Chrysostom laments, the same cannot be said for some of the Christians 
of his day. They are utterly incapable of defending their faith and “it is this that prevents 
the pagans from quickly realizing the absurdity of their error.”133 It also allows the 
pagans to despise the Christian doctrine, consider the Christian teaching as deceitful and 
foolish, and blaspheme Christ as εἴρωνα καὶ ἀπατεῶνα “who makes use of the stupidity 
of the majority to advance His deceit.” Ultimately, Christians are responsible for this 
blasphemy due to their unwillingness to speak on behalf of the truth and do not think of 
these matters as important but concern themselves with the things of the earth instead.  
This is not the only instance where Chrysostom engages with the topic of the 
apologetic value of virtue and conduct. In his forty-third Homily on Matthew the 
Christians are reminded that, just like the apostles, their conduct will determine how 
they are perceived by the Greeks. As with their illustrious predecessors, they need to be 
“gentle, pure from wrath, from evil desire, from envy, from covetousness, rightly 
fulfilling all our other duties,” since not even the resurrection can appeal to the Greeks 
as much as a person practicing philosophy.134 In his Homily on Pelagia he is even more 
explicit about the kind of conduct that brings shame to the Christians and allows the 
Greeks to criticise them. Once the festival of the martyr is over, many Christians are 
“running off to drinking and pub-crawling”, thus disgracing the festival itself and losing 
their right to be frank. What John means by frankness (παῤῥησίαν) in this instance is the 
fact that Christians can shame the Greeks with an apologetic argument stemming from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 In Matt. hom. 9.5 (PG 57:181). 
132 In 2 Cor. hom. 21.2 (PG 61:543). 
133 In Ioh. hom. 17.4 (PG 59:112; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 170). The rest of the 
references in this paragraph are from the same work.  
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the example of Pelagia herself: the fact that so many years after her death, a single girl 
is able to attract such a large population in her memory, and that no passage of time has 
been able to interrupt this custom. This is what should ideally happen. But, as John 
indicates, “if they [the Greeks] were to catch sight of what happens in the festival, we 
would be stripped of the majority of praise.”135 
One of Chrysostom’s most commonly utilized arguments in his frequent 
exhortations to Christians to behave in a manner worthy of their name is the fact that 
their attitudes, particularly the ones in public, can be seen and judged by members of 
other communities, usually the Greeks and the Jews. It is often the case, Chrysostom 
claims, that even a minor scandal involving a few Christians can lead to a judgment 
against the whole community. To make this point visible to the Christian community, 
he is always providing plenty of examples of what he considers to be shameful 
behaviour, which provides ammo to those he calls unbelievers. Thus, a Christian 
frequenting a Church and turning up to horse races is a cause for Greeks and Jews to 
think that Christians are hypocrites. The same is the case when they see a Christian 
behaving with indifference.136 If a Greek enters a church and finds women adorned with 
gold and pearls he will say that the church of the Christians is a show and a myth, and 
that despite Paul’s teaching that “women should dress themselves modestly and 
decently in suitable clothing, not with their hair braided, or with gold, pearls, or 
expensive clothes” (1 Timothy 2:9) the opposite impression is given in practice.137 The 
reason that Greeks often disbelieve the things the Christians say is because their actions 
go contrary to their beliefs, and, Chrysostom claims, it is what the Christians do rather 
than what they say that the Greeks receive as a demonstration. Therefore, when they see 
Christians “building ourselves fine houses, and laying out gardens and baths, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 De Pelag. 3 (PG 50:582-583; trans. Mayer, ‘Let us Die That We May Live,’ 155). 
136 In Gen. hom. 7.1 (PG 53:62). 
137 Ne tim. hom. 1.5 (PG 55:507). 
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buying fields, they are not willing to believe that we are preparing for another sort of 
residence away from our city [on earth].”138  
To take Chrysostom’s condemnations of Christian hypocrisy as indications of the 
tensions between “the ideals of the Christians Church and the way that ordinary 
Christians were actually living their lives” is perfectly acceptable, since Chrysostom 
himself acknowledges that much. But some scholars have used these examples as 
proofs of the fact that in the fourth century, as Sandwell puts it, “large numbers of 
people were apathetic or indifferent to Christianity or… saw Christianity as something 
they only had to adopt in name.” This is an imaginative leap that becomes even larger 
when “the problematic nature of sermons as a source” is admitted.139 Later on, Sandwell 
makes the case that in Chrysostom’s audience we are not necessarily looking at people 
who were apathetic or indifferent towards religion but rather people who had a “a 
different idea from Chrysostom about the place religion should have in their lives and 
the extent to which being Christian should impact on them.”140 Similarly, Ruth Webb 
argues (regarding Christians who attended the theatre despite John’s condemnation) that 
“these ordinary Christians need not necessarily be considered as ‘semi-Christians’ (as 
Chrysostom himself termed them) or as ‘lukewarm converts’, but as Christians who had 
different ideas about where to draw the boundary between the acceptable and the 
unacceptable.”141 There is no possible way of knowing that though, even if Sandwell 
makes a good point that sometimes Chrysostom was presenting his audience “in starker 
terms than was really necessary and that the gap he presents between his ideals of 
religiosity for his audience and what they were actually doing might not have been as 
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140 Sandwell, “John Chrysostom’s Audiences,” 526-7. 
141 Webb, Demons and Dancers, 200. 
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wide as he suggests.”142 A further point that can be made in relation to both Sandwell’s 
and Webb’s arguments is that their claims not only cannot be empirically verified but 
also create a gap between the beliefs of an alleged clerical elite (“the Church”) and 
those of ordinary people, which, yet again, cannot be substantiated on the basis of 
Chrysostom’s claims only.143 To repeat something we have said before: Chrysostom had 
nothing to gain by presenting the Christians behaving like this. Thus, we are more often 
inclined to take him at his words than not. 
Another troubling issue was the irrational fear of death among some Christians. 
Chrysostom’s argument144 is against excessive wailing, lamenting and weeping; in order 
to convince his audience, he praises what he finds commendable in the Greeks’ way of 
mourning in order to correct Christian behavior. The first arguments he uses are 
unreservedly Christian: death is a sleep, and the proof we have of the resurrection 
should prevent anyone from excessive mourning.145 But not only do some Christians 
mourn excessively, but they go beyond that and add more to the crime: they hire female 
Greek mourners to sing dirges and rouse the passions during the funeral. He contrasts 
that attitude with the Greeks (παῖδες Ἑλλήνων), who, even without knowing anything 
about the resurrection, still find appropriate words of consolation such as ‘be brave, for 
you cannot change what happened or alter it with lamentations.’146 Chrysostom also 
refers to a custom of the Greeks to wear crowns and white garments when their children 
died, which they do, he claims, “that they might reap the present glory.” By contrast, the 
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120 
Christians cannot stop behaving like women despite the glory that lies ahead of them.147 
The Christians should be ashamed for their behaviour because the words they hear are 
better but their attitudes do not actually reflect it. They also impede the preacher’s work, 
since the Greeks do not pay attention to his words about the resurrection and instead 
look at what the Christians are doing.148  
Margaret Alexiou has pointed out that Chrysostom refers to Greek hired mourners 
in eight homilies and commentaries and the reason he regarded these practices as 
dangerous was not “only because of its insidious effects on others, but also because, as 
Chrysostom understood, in the initial stages before Christianity was firmly established, 
such pagan customs were ‘fatal to the Church’.”149 
The ultimate aim of commending appropriate Christian behaviour in apologetic 
contexts is to show the Greeks of what goods they have been deprived, even if he is 
addressing himself to Christians. But in order for this to happen, Chrysostom thinks that 
the Christians need to exhibit a certain set of behaviors: gentleness, purity from wrath, 
evil desire, envy, and covetousness.150 In other words, to practice what constitutes 
Christian philosophy, which is more effective in attracting the Greeks than the 
resurrection of a dead man; the latter only leads to amazement, but the former will profit 
them and abides forever.151 Chrysostom believes that what he asks from the Christians is 
nothing burdensome. He insists that he is not telling them not to marry or to disengage 
from the city and its public affairs, but rather that they show their virtue in its midst. He 
even goes as far as to say that he approves more of this than those who occupy the 
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mountains, i.e. the monks, due to the fact that the behavior of Christian laypeople in the 
cities was more beneficial to Christianity overall.152 After all, Chrysostom argues, “no 
one after lighting a lamp puts it under the bushel basket, but on the lampstand, and it 
gives light to all in the house” (Matthew 5:15). 
In the conclusion to one of Chrysostom’s Homilies on Romans he is arguing about 
the need for Christians to lead Christian lives in order to convince the Greeks in the 
form of a dialogue. The Greek very successfully criticizes the Christians’ actions that 
are in conflict with their beliefs. But in this case, Chrysostom’s focus is not simply on 
what the Christian says to the Greek, but on how he can correct him. The conversation 
takes place through a series of antithetical schemes: when the Greek sees the Christian 
philosophizing about the Kingdom of Heaven and disregarding the things of this life, he 
will wonder how is it possible to be afraid of hell and the calamities of this life at the 
same time. This will inevitably lead him to a series of questions: “If you are in love with 
the Kingdom, how is it you do not look down upon the things of this life? If you are 
expecting the awful judgment, why do you not despise the terrors of this world? If you 
hope for immortality, why do you not scorn death?”153 These are the things, Chrysostom 
claims, that scandalize the Greeks. If the Christians are to defend themselves from these 
accusations, they need to do it by actions, not words. Blasphemies against God come 
from bad lives, not from questions. Chrysostom insists that the only way the Greek 
would be convinced that the Christian commandments are feasible and achievable is by 
their practice, which some Christians never do. Indeed, when they are examined about 
this, they point to the monks in the desert as exemplars of the Christian way of life.  
Chrysostom argues that people who point to others whilst they are unable to display 
the Christian way themselves should be ashamed to call themselves Christians. He also 
points out the source of this shame: why does one need to go to the mountains and the 
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deserts in order to live like a Christian, the Greek would ask, and he would inquire 
instead to see a man who has a wife and children and is also able to pursue wisdom. 
Christ’s commandment to “let your light shine before others” (Matthew 5:16), means 
everywhere, not just mountains, deserts, and wildernesses. Chrysostom is explicitly 
clear that his comments do not mean to disparage the monks, but rather embarrass those 
who live in cities and have banished virtue from them. All he wants to do is to introduce 
the philosophy of the desert to the cities, which will release the Greek from being 
scandalized and allow the Christians to enjoy numerous rewards.154	  In other instances, 
such as in his Homilies on 1 Timothy, Chrysostom makes the same point, but rather than 
putting the arguments in the form of a dialogue, albeit an imaginary one, he is direct 
about what he thinks is wrong with Christians of his day.155 
v. Breaking the Habit 
We have already mentioned several instances where Chrysostom uses stories from 
the Greek past in the context of his homilies in order to support the point he is arguing 
in each particular situation. More specifically, Chrysostom uses the concept of συνηθεία 
(custom, habit) to explain Hellenic resistance to the power of the Gospel, both in his 
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interpreted as an indication that Chrysostom wanted to turn the whole world into a monastery. For this 
position see Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 136. 
155 In 1 Tim. hom. 10.3 (PG 62:551-2; NPNF 1-13:440): “We admire wealth equally with them, and 
even more. We have the same horror of death, the same dread of poverty, the same impatience of disease, 
we are equally fond of glory and of rule. We harass ourselves to death from our love of money, and serve 
the time. How then can they believe? From miracles? But these are no longer wrought. From our 
conversation? It has become corrupt. From charity? Not a trace of it is anywhere to be seen. Therefore, 
we shall have to give an account not only of our own sins, but of the injury done by them to others… 
There have been great men, it may be said, amongst us, but “how,” says the Greek, “shall I believe it? for 
I do not see anything like it in your conduct. If this is to be said, we too have had our philosophers, men 
admirable for their lives.” “But show me another Paul, or a John: you cannot.” Would he not then laugh 
at us for reasoning in this manner? Would he not continue to sit still in ignorance, seeing that the wisdom 
we profess is in words, not in works? For now, for a single halfpenny you are ready to slay or be slain! 
For a handful of earth you raise lawsuit after lawsuit! For the death of a child you turn all upside down: I 
omit other things that might make us weep; your auguries, your omens, your superstitious observances, 
your casting of nativities, your signs, your amulets, your divinations, your incantations, your magic arts. 
These are crying sins, enough to provoke the anger of God; that after He has sent His own Son, you 
should venture on such things as these.” 
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time as well as in the NT era. Among the Greeks, he claims, “great was the tyranny of 
the custom.”156 In their case, it starts as prejudice and a hardening of their attitudes that 
ultimately leads to their erroneous opinions. He wants to make it explicit that he is not 
just talking about one or two people. Those bound by custom include “sophists and 
orators, and fathers, and grandfathers, … all nations of Barbarians and all tribes of the 
Greeks, and wise men and ignorant, rulers and subjects, women and men, young and 
old, masters and slaves, artificers and husbandmen, dwellers in cities and in countries; 
all of them.”157 Later on, he repeats some of the categories, and mentions the 
Pythagoreans and the Platonists specifically, as he already expects the question: do you 
really think that all these people have been deceived and that twelve fishermen and 
tentmakers are wiser than all of them? To support his point on the tyranny of the custom 
he mentions two examples: the Jews and Plato. In regard to the Jews, he mentions their 
demand of garlic even though they had the manna, and their continual longing for 
Egypt, despite their status as slaves there. Similarly, the example from the ἔξωθεν is 
Plato, and his belief that everything about the gods is fallacious. Despite this belief, he 
condescended to popular feasts and rituals, both because of his inability to contend with 
custom and having learned this from Socrates. Even the suspicion that Plato was about 
to innovate led him to an unsuccessful attempt to implement what he really desired, his 
politeia, and he subsequently lost his life.158  
The discussion then moves to Chrysostom’s own time, and to the men he sees as 
prejudiced in their impiety, who, when charged with being Greek (ἐπειδὰν ἐγκαλοῖντο 
Ἕλληνες ὄντες), blame their fathers, grandfathers, and great grandfathers. The 
argument goes full circle again and closes with a saying from the ἔξωθεν: this is why 
they call habit second nature. As with many other cases, we cannot be sure of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 In 1 Cor. hom. 7.6 (PG 61:63; NPNF 1-12:40). 
157 In 1 Cor. hom. 7.7 (PG 61:63; NPNF 1-12:40). 
158 In 1 Cor. hom. 7.7 (PG 61:64). Chrysostom seems to believe that Plato’s involvement in the 
politics of Syracuse was what caused his death, although this is not confirmed in other sources.  
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origins of John’s phrase. The section concludes with a connection between doctrines 
and habit, and how much more rooted habit becomes when it is considered as part of a 
belief system, and this is why “a man would change all things more easily than those 
pertaining to religion.”159  
In various places Chrysostom is more specific about the kinds of habits he would 
like the Christians to move away from. One example he uses is that of marriage. He 
recognizes that marriage is an honourable thing for Christians and non-Christians alike. 
But he also recognizes that the strong appeal of custom has introduced Greek elements 
that he finds objectionable: “For dancing, and cymbals, and flutes, and shameful words, 
and songs, and drunkenness, and revellings, and all the Devil’s great heap of garbage is 
then introduced.”160 He understands that many people will find his objections ridiculous 
and will accuse him of disturbing ancient laws. As he has said before, the deceptive 
power of custom is great, and even if only a few listen to what he has to say then he will 
be content. In this case his argument is not against custom per se. If a custom is evil, it 
should not even be done once, but if it is good, then he allows for it to be done 
constantly, whatever its origins, Greek or Christian. His problem is not with marriage, 
but with the things that accompany it: painting the face, coloring the eyebrows, and so 
forth.  
This is followed by an attack on customs that come after the wedding, and are 
related to childbirth. He mentions nursemaids in the baths smearing a child’s forehead 
with mud in order to protect it from the evil eye and envy.161 In this case, he wonders 
why the adults practising this custom do not do it to themselves, when it is more likely 
that they will be envied. Indeed, why do they not cover their whole bodies with mud 
while they are at it? He is not surprised to find such practices among the Greeks, but he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 In 1 Cor. hom. 7.7 (PG 61:63-4; NPNF 1-12:40). 
160 In 1 Cor. hom. 12.5 (PG 61:103; NPNF 1-12:69). 
161 In 1 Cor. hom. 12.5 (PG 61:106; NPNF 1-12:71). 
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finds deplorable that Christians do the very same things. His solution is the application 
of the sign of the cross instead of this and an exhortation to understanding that even 
minor things can be a “source of great evils.”162 Throughout this attack on bad custom 
John is not willing to concede ground to those who make a joke out of him: “the 
derision I can bear, when any gain accrues from it. For I should indeed be worthy of 
derision, if while I was exhorting to contempt of the opinion of the many, I myself, of 
all men, were subdued by that feeling.”163 But as we saw, he can also be flexible. When 
he realized that an entire custom cannot be uprooted that easily, he could come up with 
solutions that would Christianize it until a time where it simply would not be necessary. 
vi. Interpreting Chrysostom’s criticism of the Greeks  
In section b of this chapter, we have analyzed some of the most common ways in 
which Chrysostom attacks the Greeks. His usual method of operation is utilizing 
examples from both Greeks of the classical past as well as his contemporaries and the 
ideas attacked range from philosophical propositions (like Plato’s politeia), religious 
concepts connected with philosophy (like reincarnation) to everyday customs that have 
been around for quite a long time and which he considered objectionable from a 
Christian point of view. Chrysostom’s constant attack on certain aspects of ancient 
Greek culture has been called “ironic”, considering that he shared many opinions with 
those he allegedly despised.164 For example, his sentiments towards ancient drama are 
very similar to those of Plato in the Republic, where he “disparaged Greek epic poetry 
on the account of its portrayal of men and gods performing immoral deeds.”165 As we 
will see in the chapter that examines his relationship to the Cynics, Chrysostom also 
shared a number of their views on issues of social justice. In light of this fact, why is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Ibid. 
163 In 1 Cor. hom. 12.5 (PG 61:103; NPNF 1-12:69-70).  
164 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 188. 
165 Ibid. 
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John so violently opposed to certain aspects of the Hellenic intellectual heritage?166 Is 
he opposed to ‘being Greek’ as a whole and in itself, or is he opposed to certain aspects 
and consequences of being Greek? This question is one of the driving forces behind this 
thesis, and our conclusion will be a preliminary attempt to answer that question based 
on the sources we examined.	  Before that, in what remains of this chapter, we will show 
that there are other places where Chrysostom appears to be more positively or neutrally 
disposed towards the Greeks. As we will see in these other references, we can 
tentatively argue that the correct response to the question above is that Chrysostom 
opposes certain aspects and consequences of ‘being Greek’ but in many other 
circumstances has no issue with giving credit where credit is due. There is nothing 
peculiar about the fact that the number of times he does that is smaller than his 
criticisms. He was, after all, a Christian.  
c. The praise of Hellenism 
While Chrysostom often uses the Greeks and their ancient society as negative 
examples that highlight the case he is trying to make, there are other instances where he 
compares them with other groups and either praises them or at least argues they are 
better than the other group/s he is discussing.167 One tactic is to use the example of a 
Greek or Greeks to shame his audience into better behaviour. Thus, when discussing the 
power that habits hold in our minds, and wanting to show that changing to another 
(good) habit is easy, he mentions two stories about Demosthenes: one regarding how he 
cured his lisping, and another on how he was able to stop his shoulders from shrugging 
up and constantly moving. The reason he uses these stories need not be guessed, as he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Hartney has framed the problem in two different ways, without attempting to provide a solution: 
“Is he [John] deliberately sabotaging the intellectual heritage of his audience in order to replace it with a 
Christianized version of ‘philosophy’? Or is he merely employing the rhetorical cliché of simplicity, 
which proved so effective and popular a weapon in the Christian armoury?” Ibid. 
167 Something that he also does in respect to other groups, like the Jews. For examples of positive 
comments on the Jews see Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 126 n.9. 
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immediately explains it afterwards: “for since you are not persuaded out of the 
Scriptures, I am compelled to shame you by them that are without.”168 
Elsewhere Chrysostom pursues the same tactic with a comparison between heretical 
virgins and “pagans”: 
Oh, you are more wretched than the pagans (Ὦ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ὑµεῖς ἀθλιώτεροι)! 
For even if the horrors of hell await them, nevertheless the pagans (Hellenes) 
here and now at least enjoy the pleasures of life; they marry, enjoy what money 
buys and indulge themselves in other ways. Yet for you there is torture and 
hardship in both worlds: in this one when you are willing, in the next when you 
are not. No one will reward the pagans (Hellenes) for fasting and practicing 
virginity, but neither is punishment in store for them. You, on the other hand, 
instead of receiving the multitude of praises you were expecting will pay the 
supreme penalty.169  
 
The discussion is obviously about fasting and virginity, and Chrysostom recognizes 
that these phenomena can be found outside Christianity, in both heretical and pagan 
communities. What is different in each case is the outcome, with the heretical virgins 
expected to receive a harsher punishment: 
For fasting and virginity are neither good nor evil in themselves (οὔτε καλὸν 
καθ’ ἑαυτὸ οὔτε κακόν) but from the purpose of those who practice them comes 
each of these qualities (ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν µετιόντων προαιρέσεως ἑκάτερον γίνεται). 
The practice of this virtue is unprofitable for the pagans (Hellenes); they earn no 
wage because they did not pursue it out of fear of God. As for you, because you 
fight with God and slander the objects of his creation, not only will you go 
unrewarded, you will even be punished. You will be ranked with the pagans for 
your opinions since you have denied as they do the true God and have 
introduced polytheism. Yet they will fare better than you because of their way of 
life. Their penalty will be limited to not receiving any good, but for you there 
will be the additional punishment of suffering evil. While it was possible for 
them to enjoy everything in the present life, you will be deprived both now and 
later.170  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 In Matt. hom. 17.5 (PG 57:263; NPNF 1-10:119). 
169 De virg. 4.1 (SC 125:102; trans. Shore, On Virginity, 5-6).  Bernard Grillet uses the term “Grecs” 
in the French translation of the Sources Chrétiennes edition, in contrast to the English translation that 
replaces it with the word pagans. This chapter’s title is telling: Ὅτι καὶ Ἑλλήνων ἀθλιώτεροι κατὰ τὴν 
παρθενίαν οἱ αἱρετικοί! The heretics in this case seem to be the Marcionites, Valentinians and the 
Manicheans, since Chrysostom mentions their founders in the previous chapter of the same work, 
although he could have others in mind as well. This is not the only instance of Chrysostom comparing the 
beliefs of Greeks and heretics. In his homilies On the Incomprehensible Nature of God he made the case 
that the iniquity of the Anomoeans regarding the divine nature was even more excessive than the one of 
the Greeks since the latter did not try to define the divine nature or give it a name. Even “in their 
speculations on the nature of incorporeal beings, the Greeks did not set down a complete definition of this 
nature but gave an obscure statement and description rather than a definition.” De incompr. hom. 5.37 
(SC 28bis:302; trans. Harkins, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, 153). 
170 De virg. 4.2 (SC 125:104; trans. Shore, On Virginity, 6). 
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When discussing the classification of the heretical virgin, and her contempt for 
marriage and married people, Chrysostom wonders about what group she can be 
associated with. He mentions the Jews first, but dismisses the idea since they honour 
marriage and do not allow the practice of virginity. The Christians are mentioned next, 
but this idea is dismissed as well, by citing Hebrews 13:4 (“Let marriage be kept 
honourable in every way…”), which John attributes to Paul. The pagans are the last 
group remaining, but even in that case the heretical virgin is found wanting. 
Chrysostom approvingly cites Plato’s dicta that “he was good who made all of this” and 
“no envy over anything is born in what is good” as evidence that the heretical virgin 
would even be rejected by the pagans.171 On the contrary, she is even more irreverent 
than the pagans; this is due to the fact that she calls God wicked and thinks of him as 
the creator of wicked works (αὐτὸν πονηρὸν καλεῖς καὶ πονηρῶν ἔργων δηµιουργόν). 
Since she cannot be associated with any of these groups, the only one that remains to 
share her opinion is the Devil himself, since even his angels recognize that God is 
good.172 
As part of this series of comparisons, John not only mentions Plato, but quotes him 
with approval. These positive references are not just mere indications of Chrysostom’s 
acquaintance with classical literature. They also challenge claims that, as A. Hartney 
puts it, “Chrysostom liked to ignore classical literature unless he was mocking its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Λείπεται δὴ µετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὑµᾶς στῆναι λοιπόν. Ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνοι παρώσονται πάλιν ὑµᾶς ὡς 
ἀσεβεστέρους. Πλάτων µὲν γάρ φησιν «ὅτι ἀγαθὸς ἦν ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν συστησάµενος», καὶ «ὅτι ἀγαθῷ 
οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς ἐγγίνεται φθόνος.»  De virg. 8.2 (SC 125:116; On Virginity, 10). The quotations are 
from Timaeus 29a and 29e. Samuel Pomeroy interprets this citation as Chrysostom’s attempt to show that 
“widespread agreement that the source of all things is good, and that the biblical narrative corroborates 
this notion.” Pomeroy, “Reading Plato Through the Eyes of Eusebius.” Pomeroy also mentions that 
despite the fact Chrysostom is citing a text that many would consider sacred to Greek culture, he does not 
bring up the issue of “its religious or ethnic ownership”, since his purpose was not to “construct” an 
identity at this point. Papadopoulos, John Chrysostom vol. 2, 15, sees the citation of these passages as a 
form of Pauline concession from John to his audience, considering that they are taken out of their original 
context, which is evident by the fact that Plato and Chrysostom would have very different understandings 
of the meaning of ἀγαθὸς.  
172 Ibid., providing Mark 2:24 and Acts 16:17 as evidence for the last claim. 
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baseness and immorality.”173  Chrysostom neither ignored nor just mocked classical 
literature, unless we only choose to read and cite passages that prove this point. Our 
references to his work will show that Chrysostom had a much more nuanced stance 
towards the classics, which certainly included mocking them, but did not do so 
exclusively. 
Indeed, this is not the only example of John citing Plato with measured approval. As 
we will see in the next chapter, there are plenty of examples where he criticizes him, 
especially when he compares him with Christians. Nevertheless, there is a striking 
passage in which John praises Plato, along with Socrates, Diogenes, Aristides and 
Epaminondas.174 We will be looking at the praise of Diogenes in more detail in our 
chapter on John and the Cynics. But it will be interesting to look at the other cases and 
see what exactly draws John’s admiration and praise. The passage begins with a 
comparison between Plato and Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily. It is a matter of fact, John 
argues, that Plato is more illustrious and praised than Dionysius. This despite the fact 
that “the tyrant ruled the entire world, lived in luxury, and spent his days amid great 
wealth, bodyguards, and other vanity, but Plato spent his time in the garden of the 
Academy, watering, sowing, eating olives, laying out a cheap table, and being free of all 
this vanity.”175 It is interesting to note that while in other passages John ruthlessly 
criticizes Plato for his alleged vanity, in this example he shows him completely free of it 
in comparison with the tyrant. Another interesting omission, intentional or not, is the 
lack of reference to Plato’s teaching in the Academy, among the other activities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 36. For another example of this 
point of view see Hill, Introduction to St. John Chrysostom: Commentary on the Psalms vol. 1, 22: 
“Despite his reputation in antiquity for classical scholarship, exemplified by his mentor Libanius’s vain 
hope to have him as his successor and by the odd reference in this commentary to Homer and Plato, his 
nod in the direction of “the scholars” seems at best deferential, probably disparaging, hardly 
sympathetic.” 
174 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.5 (PG 47:339-40). 
175 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.5 (PG 47:339-40; trans. Hunter, A Comparison, 106-8). All references below 
come from the same passage. This and other references from Chrysostom’s corpus only reinforce the 
point that sweeping judgments about his total negativity to classical scholarship are of little help when 
discussing the relations between early Christianity and Hellenism. 
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mentioned. John goes on to mention Plato’s sale as a slave, which “actually seemed 
admirable even to the tyrant himself. Such is virtue! Not only through its actions, but 
also through the misfortunes it suffers, it prevents itself and those who practice it from 
being forgotten or consigned to oblivion.” In this instance, Plato’s attitude is a prime 
example of virtue, which ultimately leads to the everlastingness of his name.  
This story is followed by a comparison between Socrates and king Archelaus of 
Macedon. Again, the king is living in great wealth whereas Socrates has only one 
garment and lives on bread, which he received from others, because he was so poor. 
The way these men lived is also a determining factor in the glory they possess during 
John’s time: “For the names of those men, Plato and Socrates, are known to many, 
whereas Dionysius and Archelaus are virtually unknown.” These philosophers’ claim to 
illustriousness is also attributed to the fact that they chose a “private life free of business 
and did not wish to get close to the government.”176 One cannot but notice the 
contradiction with Chrysostom’s claims elsewhere: in comparison to the apostles, the 
philosophers are virtually unknown. In this comparison, it is the kings who are 
unknown instead. In order to make his point here, John intentionally omits the fact that 
Plato eventually returned to Sicily to tutor Dionysius II (son of the tyrant mentioned 
before) in his attempt to become the archetypal philosopher-king.  
Chrysostom’s reference to government leads into a small diatribe about those 
involved with politics: “those who become famous are not the ones who live in wealth, 
luxury, and abundance, but rather those who live a life of poverty, simplicity and 
modesty.” To illustrate this point, he has two concrete examples in mind. The first is 
Aristides, to whom the Athenians gave a public funeral and who was much more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 However, elsewhere John does mention Plato’s wish “to strike out a new form of government … 
not by changing the customs relating to the gods, but merely by substituting one line of conduct for 
another” and then goes on to mention his exile from Sicily and his sale as a slave. In this case Plato is 
used as an example of how much easier it is to innovate in political rather than religious affairs, especially 
in the case for someone like Plato, whose proposals were in a book and did not create any obligation to 
the lawmakers to put them into practice. In 1 Cor. hom. 4.4 (PG 61:36; NPNF 1-12:20). 
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illustrious than Alcibiades, even though the latter was “outstanding in wealth, family, 
luxury, rhetorical power, bodily strength, nobility of birth and everything else.” The 
other example is Epaminondas, who only had one pair of clothes and was thus unable to 
attend the assembly of the Thebans when called there due to the fact that he had to wash 
them before he could go. Nevertheless, he was far more illustrious than the generals 
who did attend the assembly. This assessment of Epaminondas’ character is in accord 
with the opinion of other ancient historians who praised him for his simple and ascetic 
lifestyle and his disdain for material wealth.177 In John’s opinion both examples serve to 
prove that “fame and splendour do not reside in places or in clothes or in dignity or in 
power, but only in virtue of soul and philosophy.” Again, despite the fact that Aristides 
and Epaminondas had plenty of power during their lives, what John emphasizes is that 
their fame was not because of that but due to their spiritual attributes.  
Another instance of John agreeing with and appealing to the philosophers is in some 
of his polemics against rhetoric. His argument is that many “pagan” philosophers 
(ἔξωθεν φιλοσόφοις) cared little for education ὄντες ἀµαθεῖς.178 This is why they spent 
all of their lives concerned with the ethical part of philosophy, which is why they “lived 
a brilliant life and became famous.” The philosophers he mentions in that category are 
Anacharsis, Crates and Diogenes, who were either Cynics themselves (the latter two) or 
considered forerunners of Cynicism.  All these had no taste for letters, John claims, and 
some even say that Socrates did not either, a view that John does not completely 
advocate and thus mentions it with the disclaimer of “some say”. After citing part of 
Socrates’ speech in Plato’s Apology, John comes to the point he wanted to make all 
along: “rhetoric (εὐγλωττία) is not appropriate for philosophers, or even for grown men; 
rather, it is an ostentatious display of adolescents at play.” Chrysostom reinforces his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See Xenophon, Hellen. 7.5 (LCL 89:323-5); Diodorus, Hist. 9.11 (LCL 375:73); 15.88 (LCL 
389:199). 
178 For this and the other references in this paragraph see Adv. opp. vit. mon. 3.11 (PG 47:367-8; 
trans. Hunter, A Comparison, 148-50). 
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point by saying that this view is not only shared by all the other philosophers but even 
by the one who surpassed them all (Plato), since he believed that “such decoration was 
shameful for the philosopher.”179 At the same time, he recognizes that these arguments 
were more convincing to a pagan than a Christian, since the former chase after the glory 
of the crowd, but still think that eloquence is really nothing. The passage is concluded 
with John posing a hypothetical question: if even the “pagans” loathe eloquence, why 
are Christians willing to despise their spiritual needs in order to achieve it? As we have 
seen before, Chrysostom posed the same question in relation to the purposes of 
education in his day. 
Chrysostom’s praise of the philosophers sometimes takes a more general form that 
allows him to commend them without actually naming them. Thus, to support his 
argument that “no one cures evil by evil, but evil by good”180, he describes it as a 
conclusion reached by Greek philosophers (who remain nameless). The point he is 
trying to make yet again is that Christians should be ashamed that there is such virtue 
among the Greeks, even though their philosophy is inferior. What follows then is a 
catalogue of these virtues: “many of them have been wronged and have borne it; many 
have been falsely accused and have not taken revenge; they have been plotted against 
and have shown kindness.” In fact, Christians should be in awe because if some Greeks’ 
way of life is found to be superior to theirs, their punishment will be more severe. The 
Christians are then reminded about the benefits they have received because of their 
faith: “for, when we who have shared in the Spirit, we who are in expectation of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 However, elsewhere Chrysostom accuses Plato of betrayal of Socrates’ principles on that matter: 
“Yet see how very ridiculous [Plato] is. That which he has represented his master as avoiding, on the 
ground that it is disgraceful, and unworthy of philosophy, and the work of striplings, this he himself has 
practiced most of all.” In Ioh. hom. 2.3 (PG 59:32; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 19). A 
basic difference between this passage and the one mentioned in the main text is that in the former case 
Plato is compared to Paul, and, as with every case of a Christian being compared to a “pagan” in 
Chrysostom’s writings, there is always a need to downplay certain elements of the pagans’ personalities 
in order to make the Christians appear superior.  
180 In Ioh. hom. 51.3 (PG 59:286; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John vol. 2, 42). Every 
reference in this paragraph is from this passage.  
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kingdom, we who live virtuously for a heavenly reward, we who do not fear hell, we 
who are bidden to be angels, we who enjoy the benefit of the Mysteries, when, I repeat, 
we do not overtake them in practicing the same degree of virtue, what pardon shall we 
have?” The presumed answer is that there will be no pardon. Either way, Chrysostom 
concludes his praise by urging the Christians to leave aside all “bitterness and anger and 
passion.” This is yet another instance of John praising Greeks not for their own sake, 
but as a method of inspiring shame in his Christian audience. 
Chrysostom also sometimes appealed to some views of Greek philosophers to 
reinforce his arguments and show that his point is not only based on Jewish or Christian 
precedent but can also be found elsewhere, usually among the Greeks. Thus, when he 
wants to make the point that greed is the worst of all evils, he first appeals to the 
ἔξωθεν, who call it the citadel of all evils, and then to 1 Timothy 6:10. The reference 
here is probably to Diogenes the Cynic, who, according to Diogenes Laertius, called 
greed the metropolis of all evils.181 John also refers to anonymous philosophers when he 
wants to teach the Christians about the worthlessness of things in this life. Christians 
should be reproved and ashamed by the examples of those who exercise external 
wisdom, who were able to discern the shabbiness of this world and abstained from it. 
These philosophers have actually shown to the Christians that without any promise of 
future rewards (which the Christians aspired to), they were still able to keep away from 
vices.  
They did not expect any wealth, yet they subscribed to poverty, simply because they 
knew that poverty is better than wealth. They did not hope in any sort of future life 
when they abandoned luxury and followed a strict discipline, but they did so only 
because they learned the true nature of things as well as the fact that the strict training 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 In Matt. hom. 63.4 (PG 58:608); Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.50 (LCL 185:52). The difference 
in John’s quotation is that he claims they called it ἀκρόπολιν κακῶν, whereas Diogenes is said to have 
called it µητρόπολιν πάντων τῶν κακῶν.  
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of the soul goes together with the health of the body.182 Chrysostom is also willing to 
cite popular sayings in support of his arguments. When he wants to make a point that 
luxury and sobriety cannot coexist, he quotes from Arsenius’ Apophthegmata: “A fat 
belly does not produce a subtle mind.”183 
When Chrysostom wants to talk about conjugal relations between a husband and a 
wife, and the role of patience in case one marries a raucous wife, he uses the example of 
Socrates and his wife Xanthippe. In this example, she is presented as evil, loquacious, 
and a drunkard, and Socrates is cited as having said to some who asked how can he 
endure her, that she enables him to have his home as a school and training ground for 
philosophy, adding “for I shall be to all the rest meeker being here disciplined every 
day.” Chrysostom is profoundly sad to find that the Greeks can be so much more 
philosophical than the Christians, and advises them, in case they end up with unsuitable 
partners, to “try to be like this philosopher.”184 
Finally, Hellenism is also praised in the context of comparison between the attitudes 
of Hellenes (famous or not) and ordinary Christians in their everyday lives. One such 
example comes from Chrysostom’s lament regarding how Christian women mourn the 
deaths of their loved ones. He accuses them of putting on a show, some of them due to 
grief, others due to their vanity and still others to attract the male gaze. This is how he 
describes their lamentation: they are “baring their arms, tearing their hair, making 
scratches down their cheeks,”185 and other things he does not mention. John’s first 
problem with this attitude is how it appears to the Greeks, who might ridicule the 
Christians and think of their teachings as myths. The way the Christian women behave, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 In 1 Cor. hom. 8.5 (PG 61:74-75). 
183 In 1 Tim. hom. 13.4 (PG 62:569; Arsenius, Apophthegmata 5.22a, in Corpus Paroemiographorum 
Graecorum vol. 2, ed. Ernest Ludwig von Leutsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Schneidewin, Hildesheim: 
Georg Olms, 1958, 337).  
184 In 1 Cor. hom. 26.7 (PG 61:224; NPNF 1-12:156-7). 
185 In Ioh. hom. 62.4 (PG 59:346; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 174). Cf. De Laz. conc. 
4.2 (PG 48:1020). 
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John argues, resembles more the maenads than believers in God and will ultimately lead 
the Greeks to laugh and believe that there is no resurrection and that the Christian 
teachings are lies and jokes. The core of the problem appears to have been a lack of 
attention to the Biblical text, because if these Christian women believed that their 
beloveds’ lives have not ended but they have been transferred to a better life instead, 
they would not mourn them as if they no longer exist. If they believed in the 
resurrection they would never utter such words as “I will never see you again; I will 
never have you back again.”186 The result of this behaviour is that the Hellenes would 
come to believe that all Christian teachings are fables and if the Christians do not 
believe in their most important doctrine “how much more must this be true of the rest of 
their piety.” In his attempt to inspire shame in his audience, John contrasts this attitude 
to the Greeks, who do not behave like women (οὐχ οὕτως Ἕλληνες γυναικίζονται)187 
and “many among them have lived according to the precepts of true wisdom.”  
To prove his point, he goes on to cite three examples from Greek history that show 
true philosophical behaviour in the face of death, of which two have women as 
protagonists! The first is a reference to Plutarch’s Sayings of Spartan women, and the 
passage John cites is from a section on sayings of women whose names did not survive. 
In Plutarch’s version, upon hearing that all her five sons lost their lives in battle for 
Sparta, the woman simply says to the messenger “I did not inquire about that, you vile 
varlet, but how fares our country?”188 After learning that it was victorious, she gladly 
accepts the death of her sons. John’s reference to the incident is a little different: in his 
example, the woman has only one son, and her question is “but how are the fortunes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 In Ioh. hom. 62.4 (PG 59:347; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 174). 
187 Interestingly, one of Libanius’ stereotypes against Christianity was that it was a religion for 
women, and in Or. 16.47 (LCL 451:241) Christian males are accused of avoiding discussions of the 
doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras under the advice of their mothers, women and housekeepers: “So, 
whenever there is any mention of Plato and Pythagoras, you put forward the excuse of your mother, your 
wife, your housekeeper, your cook, and your lasting trust in doctrines like theirs, and you have no qualms 
about the qualms that such doctrines inspire, but you follow the lead of those you should command.” 
188 Plutarch, Sayings of Spartan Women 7 (LCL 245:463). 
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the city getting on”, which essentially has the same meaning as the question above, but 
might indicate a different source due to the difference in the number of sons. 
Chrysostom’s next example is a story about Xenophon (who is called a philosopher) 
from Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers. The story is about the participation 
of Xenophon’s sons, Diodorus and Gryllus, at the Battle of Mantinea in 362 and his 
reaction after he learnt that Gryllus was killed during the battle. This is how Plutarch 
describes it: “On this occasion Xenophon is said to have been sacrificing, with a chaplet 
on his head, which he removed when his son’s death was announced. But afterwards, 
upon learning that he had fallen gloriously, he replaced the chaplet on his head.”189 
Chrysostom omits the detail that Xenophon was sacrificing when he found out about his 
son’s death, but uses the rest of the story as an example of how a Hellene showed such 
exemplary behaviour upon learning about the death of his own child.190  
His final example comes from Sparta yet again,191 particularly the famous 
exhortation of Spartan women to their sons that they should return either carrying their 
shields (thus implying they would be alive and not have fled the field of battle) or 
carried on them (the implication being in this case that they would be dead). Although 
John refers to this story as an example of Greeks giving up their sons and daughters to 
be sacrificed in honour of demons, he still considers it as a true example of practising 
philosophy, which some Christians do not follow. The conclusion to these stories is yet 
another mention of the principle of the reverse practice of doctrine: those who do not 
subscribe to a specific doctrine act like those who believe in it, while those who do 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 2.54 (LCL 184:185). 
190 John, in stark contrast to Julian, believed that these writings could teach ἀνδρείαν, φρόνησιν, 
δικαιοσύνην to Christians, as we see in these examples. On the other hand, Julian could not possibly 
fathom that reading the Bible would ever make anyone φρονιµώτερος οὐδὲ ἀνδρειότερος οὐδ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ 
κρείττων, Contr. Gal. 229E (LCL 157:386). 
191 Could we possibly explain John’s inclination to use examples from Sparta as a reaction to 
Libanius’ dislike of its values as expressed in Or. 64.8 (trans. Johannes Haubold and Richard Miles, 
“Communality and Theatre in Libanius’ Oration LXIV In Defence of the Pantomimes,” in Culture and 
Society in Later Roman Antioch, ed. Isabella Sandwell and Janet Huskinson, Oxford: Oxbow, 2004, 28)? 
“Prosperity has furthered the growth of many cities and Hellenes and barbarians alike assign great value 
to being wealthy. The Spartans were convinced by their laws that poverty is stronger than riches.”  
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believe in that doctrine do not perform the actions they should due to their belief in said 
doctrine. Although the Greeks know nothing about the resurrection, they still perform 
the actions that “should be performed by those who know about it, while those who do 
know about it [the Christians] act like those who are ignorant of it.”192 Chrysostom was 
not afraid to call attention to the fact that in some instances the Greeks practised true 
philosophy in a more genuine way than some of the Christians, and did not hesitate to 
point that out, despite his alleged “anti-Hellenism.” 
It is interesting to note that all three examples Chrysostom invokes are related to 
deaths on the battlefield. This may be because these kinds of deaths can provide him 
with agonistic and heroic motifs. That would be true, except for the fact that his 
emphasis is not on the people that actually died, but rather the reaction of those related 
to them. The heroes in the stories as Chrysostom narrates them are the mother and the 
father who hear about the death of their sons and deal with it in the appropriate, 
Christian-like manner, not the sons who die in defence of their homeland. We saw that 
John could find some positive exemplars on how to face death among the Greeks. But 
how did he deal with one of the most famed deaths in antiquity? Could he make an 
example out of that? 
We are talking, of course, about the death of Socrates, which does not impress 
Chrysostom, who uses it as a negative example when comparing attitudes from Greeks 
and Christians in contempt of death. He indicates that he can bring forward ten 
thousand from within the Church that would drink the hemlock if it was lawful at the 
time of the persecutions. Socrates was not free to decide whether to drink the hemlock, 
John argues, whereas the Christian martyrs endured suffering on their own volition 
when they could choose not to. It is obvious that Socrates’ refusal to flee is not 
mentioned here, since it would not serve his argument. Socrates’ age is also mentioned, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 In Joh. hom. 62.4 (PG 59:347; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 175). 
138 
as Chrysostom finds it ironic that he decided to despise life when he was seventy, “if 
this can be called despising … For to die by hemlock is all as one with a sleeping man’s 
continuing in a state of sleep. Nay even sweeter than sleep is this sort of death, if reports 
say true.”193  
There are also other instances where John criticises all Christians and scorns them 
for their behaviour when compared to the Greeks. While his praise is often paired with a 
backhanded comment about the motive of the Greeks’ actions, he still finds it preferable 
to what the Christians are doing. Thus, the Greeks have practised an exemplary 
philosophy of life, but for the sake of δόξα.194 Equally, the Christians ought to practise 
every virtue more intensely and not for glory but to fulfill the will of God, a condition 
that John recognizes they often do not satisfy. The Christians should despise money for 
the sake of Christ but they do not; on the contrary, the Greeks make little account of 
their lives and during wars even give their children over to demons (an argument 
Chrysostom has already used when mentioning the Spartan women). At the end of his 
argument Chrysostom cannot but admit his shamefulness and astonishment (αἰσχύνοµαι 
καὶ ἐκπλήττοµαι) over the fact that he can obviously see some pagans despising money 
whereas all Christians get frenzied over it (παρὰ δὲ ἡµῖν µαινοµένους ἅπαντας). The 
hyperbolic nature of this statement leads Chrysostom to a quick qualification: even if 
there are Christians who scorn money, they are still enslaved by other passions, such as 
θυµῷ and βασκανίᾳ, which leads him to a very pessimistic closing: πρᾶγµα δύσκολον, 
καθαρὰν φιλοσοφίαν εὑρεῖν. 
In conclusion, it appears that John had no trouble using and citing examples from 
the classical world when he wanted to make certain points, and when he did so he was 
even willing to praise the philosophers or even anonymous Greeks for their attitudes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 In 1 Cor. hom. 4.4 (PG 61:35; NPNF 1-12:19). 
194 For the passage discussed in this paragraph see In Ioh. hom. 84.3 (PG 59:458-9; trans. Goggin, 
Commentary on Saint John vol. 2, 425-6). This is an example of combining both criticism and praise, 
which will be the focus of the next section. 
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and views. This by itself is not significant. But when seen in the context of modern 
arguments against John as the archetypal Christian anti-Hellene, it provides a useful 
counterexample that shows the one-sidedness of these points of view. The rest of this 
chapter (section d) will introduce some examples to show that Chrysostom’s attitude is 
even more complex. Having looked into examples of both praise and criticism towards 
Hellenism (sections b and c), we shall briefly look into three related attitudes: one that 
combines praise and criticism together, one that shows indifference and one that 
recommends how Greeks should be treated. Finally, we will examine concepts which 
Chrysostom inherits from Hellenism. 
d. Further complexity 
i. Praise and Critique of Hellenism combined 
We have already seen many instances where Chrysostom will criticize or praise the 
Greeks either as individuals or for their beliefs.195 In most of these cases he is doing one 
or the other. But there are instances where he can do both within the same homily, and 
it is with these that we will deal in this section. For example, John is prepared to admit 
that some of the Greek philosophers despised wealth and death,196 but with a caveat: 
they only did so in order to show off to others, and that is why their hopes were empty. 
Their paradigm is used in an exhortatory fashion: if the Christians are not even able to 
do what they did, how do they expect to be saved? The transgression of a Christian is 
much greater than that of a Greek, since the latter has lost all hope anyway.197  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 At one point (In 2 Tim. hom. 4.3, PG 62:622) he will also praise the Greek language as “admirable 
and beautiful.” 
196 In Tit. hom. 5.2 (PG 62:689) also mentions that while many of the ἔξωθεν philosophers despised 
money, virtually none of them was indifferent to women, which is proof enough for John that greed is 
worse than lust since the latter is implanted in our nature. Despite the fact the he was the one using the 
example of the philosophers, he quickly turns the discussion to Paul since he is addressing the Church 
and in this case, it is more appropriate to choose examples from the Scriptures rather than from those 
“outside.”  
197 In Matt. hom. 14.9 (PG 57:235). See In Matt. hom. 21.3 (PG 57:299-300; NPNF 1-10:147) for 
another reference to Greeks voluntarily stripping themselves of their possessions, “though not in a proper 
spirit,” and an exhortation to Christians to not appear inferior compared to Greek philosophers. 
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In his seventh Homily on Genesis he talks about the misuse of reason among the 
Greeks. The piece begins with an observation: the Greeks fell into error (ἐπλανήθησαν). 
The observation is followed by a procedural list: a) they entrusted everything to their 
own reasoning; b) refused to acknowledge the limitations of their nature; c) let their 
imagination run wild; d) exceeded the measure of their capabilities, and e) lost the 
status they laid claim to. And what exactly was that status? This is where Chrysostom’s 
praise, albeit brief, begins: they received the gift of reason and preeminence from the 
Creator himself, whilst they also outranked every other visible creature (λόγῳ 
τετιµηµένοι καὶ τοσαύτην προεδρίαν λαβόντες παρὰ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ, καὶ τῶν 
κτισµάτων ἁπάντων τῶν ὁρωµένων τιµιώτεροι). The praise of what one assumes to be 
intended for Greeks of the past is followed by an attack on the Greeks of both past and 
present: they fell into ἀλογίαν and ended up worshipping “dogs, monkeys, crocodiles … 
even onions and more worthless things than that.” But this was just the beginning: 
“following this extreme they went on to call sticks and stones gods, and divinized all the 
visible elements; once, you see, they strayed from the right path, they fell headlong and 
were cast into the very depth of wickedness.”198 Despite the negative conclusion, John’s 
praise is not minimal. His anthropology is defined by the concept of the λόγος being the 
distinctive mark that separates humans from all other animals. Simply put, a human is, 
above all, a logical (or rational) animal.199 In this sense, the Greeks were preeminent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 In Gen. hom. 7.6 (PG 53:68; trans. Hill, Homilies on Genesis 1-17, 102). 
199 Vid. dom. hom. 4.1 (SC 277:140; trans. Hill, Homilies on Isaiah and Jeremiah, 81): “What is it, 
rather, by which the human being is distinguished from the beasts? Language (Τῷ λόγῳ): on this score 
the human being is also a rational being (διὰ τοῦτο καὶ λογικὸν ζῶόν ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος).  Hill (ibid., 128) 
believes that Chrysostom is trying to flatter his audience for being attentive to his homilies by using a 
Stoic expression. Jean Dumortier identifies the origins of the phrase λογικὸν ζῶόν as Stoic (SC 177:141) 
as well, with references to Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus and Artemidorus. John uses a similar 
definition in In 1 Tim. hom. 13.4 (PG 62:569), which he attributes to the ἔξωθεν: Οἱ ἔξωθέν φασι ζῶον 
λογικὸν, θνητὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήµης δεκτικόν. The attributes of humanity in this definition, although not 
all at once, can be found in Aristotle, Trop. 112a and 128b. It appears verbatim in Sextus Empiricus, PH 
2.5 (LCL 273:168-9): Ἄλλοι ἔφασκον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήµης δεκτικόν. 
The Loeb editor attributes the definition to Peripatetics and Sceptics. Interestingly, it is one of the many 
definitions included by Sextus, the others belonging to Plato, Epicurus, Socrates, and Democritus. 
However, John chooses this one over the others, possibly because, as we also saw above, he could make 
it work from a Christian point of view. The sentence also appears verbatim in ps-Basil, Adversus 
Eunomium 4 (PG 29:688). Even when Chrysostom wants to escape the narrow definition of humans as 
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above everyone else, because they possessed the gift of logos to such an extent that it 
distinguished them from other humans.  
In this passage, the fact that John refers to onion worship among the Greeks might 
seem particularly strange. At the same time, in his Homilies on Matthew he calls ancient 
Egypt “her that was the slave of cats, that feared and dreaded onions.” This is yet 
another instance of Chrysostom being loose with the application of the word Hellenes 
and using it both as an ethnic and as a religious appellation.200 Similarly, in the context 
of Chrysostom admonishing Christian women not to paint their faces and bringing 
biblical figures in support of his argument, he mentions Leah, Jacob’s wife, who 
“although she was uncomely … continued to preserve the lineaments thereof 
undisfigured” and did this despite the fact that she was brought up by Greeks.201 This 
usage becomes clearer in John’s interpretation of Romans 2:10, where he talks about 
Greeks before Christ’s coming: “But by Greeks he here means not them that 
worshipped idols, but them that adored God, that obeyed the law of nature, that strictly 
kept all things, save the Jewish observances … such as were Melchizedek and those 
around him, such as was Job, such as were the Ninevites, such as was Cornelius.”202 
Furthermore, in the context of a comment on Romans 2:8-9, John mentions the 
countless evils that Greeks have suffered in this world, as recounted in both the histories 
written by the ἔξωθεν as well as the Scriptures. This is then followed by a question: 
“For who could recount the tragic calamities of the Babylonians, or those of the 
Egyptians?” This is yet another example of the name Hellenes used in a religious rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rational animals, since this is the primary definition provided by those outside the faith, he still makes the 
point that we are not just rational animals; we are, or at least we should be, more than that. Cf. Illum. cat. 
2.1 (PG 49:232; NPNF 1-9:165): “For a man [human in the original] is not merely whosoever has hands 
and feet of a man, nor whosoever is rational only, but whosoever practices piety and virtue with 
boldness.” 
200 In Matt. hom. 8.5 (PG 57:88; NPNF 1-10:51). 
201 In Matt. hom. 30.5 (PG 57:369-70; NPNF 1-10:199). 
202 In Rom. hom. 5.3 (PG 60:426; NPNF 1-10:363). 
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than an ethnic sense.203 Sometimes, what might appear as a criticism of Hellenism on 
the surface, ends up being something entirely different due to what we perceive as 
Chrysostom’s inconsistency. However, this might be an overly complex explanation of 
this problem. Chrysostom was no historian or classicist, and expecting him to abide by 
their rules as a pastor might just be us asking for too much.	   His comment is better 
understood within the context of early Christian critiques of Greek religion as coming 
from other cultures, including the Egyptians, which allows them to be homogenised in 
this way.204 
ii. Indifference to Hellenism 
Chrysostom’s references to classical authors or ideas were not always positive or 
negative. There were times when he mentions historical personages, events, and ideas 
without making any value judgments. Thus, in his Commentary on Isaiah Chrysostom 
briefly mentions Socrates and Demosthenes and notes that prior to the coming of Christ 
even philosophers and rhetoricians had to serve in the army and fight in the 
battlefield.205 Furthermore, in the same work Chrysostom cites a phrase from 
Demosthenes’ On the Embassy and calls him simply one of those outside the faith (τις 
καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν).206 This attitude of Chrysostom has been interpreted in different ways. 
For example, D. Garrett considers it as a standard feature of John’s attitude towards 
classical authors and contrasts it with the attitude of other fathers: “Overall, 
Chrysostom’s attitude towards the masters of antiquity is cool. Some other fathers 
cannot but admire them and wonder if they might have been Christians unaware, that is, 
men who by their wisdom and moral life proved themselves to be part of God’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 In Matt. hom. 36.4 (PG 57:417; NPNF 1-10:236). 
204 For a similar, and even more confusing history of the origins of “Hellenism,” see Epiphanius, 
Pan. 1.3. 
205 Comm. in Is. 2.5 (SC 304:122). 
206 Or. 19.314 (LCL 155:452), in Comm. in Is. 3.8 (SC 304:186). 
143 
elect.”207 The rhetorical scheme of those inside/outside the faith is very common in 
Chrysostom and in certain cases was applied as a description of the Christians and the 
Greeks.208 It is often utilised to demarcate the boundaries of one group (Christians) from 
another (Jews/Greeks). But sometimes, as in the examples mentioned above, the 
terminology of those outside the faith is a purely descriptive and not an evaluative term.  
When discussing Proverbs 15:1 (“Wrath undoes even the prudent”) he claims that 
even the ἔξωθεν admit so, a cryptic reference that Bady interprets as a signpost to 
Achilles’ wrath in the Iliad.209 In his Letter to a Young Widow he mentions a story about 
the “sophist who taught me”, one that exceeded everyone in his reverence towards the 
gods, and the admiration he expressed about John’s mother’s widowhood and the fact 
that women like these exist among the Christians. This reference, besides the fact that it 
is often used as proof of John’s tutelage under Libanius,210 is also another instance of 
Chrysostom talking about the ἔξωθεν without directing any praise or criticism towards 
them. Interestingly, in the beginning of this section Chrysostom indicates that the praise 
of widowhood is an honorable and admirable thing not only “for us believers, but for 
the unbelievers as well.”211 
Sometimes he would also cite from classical sources to support his views, which we 
classify as indifferent here because usually he does not make any value judgements 
regarding the source itself and often uses it as a way of showing either the antiquity of 
an idea or its existence in non-Christian circles. Thus, in his second Exhortation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Garrett, An Analysis, 243. 
208 In 1 Cor. hom. 16.2 (PG 61:130): τοὺς ἔσω καὶ τοὺς ἔξω, τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας… 
209 Com. in Prov. 15.1 (Guillaume Bady, Le commentaire inédit sur les proverbes attribué à Jean 
Chrysostome. Introduction, édition critique et traduction, 2 vols, doctoral dissertation, Université Lyon, 
2003, 330). 
210 For a discussion of the issue including assessments of previous scholarship see David G. Hunter, 
“Libanius and John Chrysostom: New Thoughts on an Old Problem,” Studia Patristica 22 (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1989), 129-35. 
211 Ad. vid. iun. 2 (SC 138:120). The unbelievers are not necessarily “pagans,” as Chrysostom applies 
the term to the Jews as well (De Sac. 4.1, SC 272:236) and, as Malingrey, Sur Le Sacerdoce, 236 n. 1, 
explains, it is applied to the Jews (and consequently to the “pagans”) due to their refusal to believe in the 
divinity of Christ. 
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Theodore John wants to make the point that nothing is more precious than the soul. To 
this effect, he cites Euripides’ Alcestis (which he does not mention as his source) and 
Homer’s Iliad.212 Elsewhere, he makes the poignant observation that the Christians, just 
like the ἔξωθεν, have developed an infatuation with oratory (λόγων ἔρως), an argument 
he uses to point out that the Christian preacher should be very well prepared for his 
sermons.213 When arguing against the divinization of humans in paganism, he prefaces 
his statement by citing the philosophers’ “comprehensive definition of the human race 
(for when asked what man was, they answered, he is an animal, rational and mortal),”214 
before attributing the very same divinization to hoi polloi. Finally, he will sometimes 
cite an opinion or a proverb attributed to those “outside” but we have no indication of 
whom he meant.215 
iii. How are the Christians supposed to treat the Greeks? 
Chrysostom’s multiple tirades against the Greeks would inevitably lead some to 
wonder how they should treat them as Christians. In treating this issue, Chrysostom 
makes a distinction between the person and their doctrine. A person should never be 
hated. Their doctrine however, is fair play, as is wicked conduct and a corrupted 
mindset. One is therefore not entitled to call a Greek “polluted” (µιαρὸν), at least 
without an excuse, or otherwise one will be considered an insulter. However, if one is 
asked regarding the Greeks’ doctrine, then one is entitled to respond that it is indeed 
polluted and impious. Chrysostom is carefully making clear that this should only be the 
case if someone asks the Christian or forces him/her to speak. Otherwise, if done on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Ad. Theod. 2 3.67 (SC 117:64): John’s οὐδὲν ψυχῆς τιµιώτερον is from Euripides’ Alc. 301 (LCL 
12:182); ψυχῆς γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀντάξιον, καὶ τῶν ἔξωθέν τις ποιητικὸς ἔφη is from Homer, Ill. 9.401 (LCL 
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213 De Sac. 5.8 (SC 272:302).  
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his/her own initiative, it can cause unnecessary hostilities.216 The analogy that can help 
clarify John’s point here is martyrdom. Chrysostom, like many other fathers before him, 
condemned the concept of voluntary martyrdom, because it could instigate a larger 
number of persecutions and was also seen as a form of intentional suicide.217 Similarly, 
a Christian giving his opinion about the Greeks and their doctrines without being asked 
might also be the instigator of persecution or at least of sowing division between the 
two groups.  The difference and distinction between the two categories we mentioned 
previously (humans/doctrine) is that whilst humans are God’s work, deceit is the 
Devil’s and one should not mix the two.  
As with many other issues, Chrysostom claims to follow the Pauline example here 
and particularly his relationship with the Jews.218 Paul’s treatment is also extended to 
debates with the Greeks. The aim of these is to “cure” the Greeks from their doctrines 
and to persuade them about the truth of Christianity. Chrysostom provided guidelines 
related to these debates and the topics that need to be discussed. The conversation 
should begin with the argument whether Christ is God, as well as the Son of God, and 
whether the gods of the Greeks are demons. After the establishment of these points, 
which Chrysostom calls first elements (τὰ πρῶτα στοιχεῖα), others can follow. Even if 
the Greek disbelieves things such as the last judgment, he will find that many of his 
philosophers have treated this subject, and although they separated the soul from the 
body, they still hold to the idea of a tribunal. John claims that almost everyone is aware 
of this, including the poets, and therefore the ideas of the tribunal and of the last 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 In Col. hom. 11.2 (PG 62:376). 
217 For a collection of numerous references from works before Chrysostom see Geoffrey E. M. De 
Ste. Croix, “Voluntary Martyrdom in the Early Church,” in Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and 
Orthodoxy, eds. Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, Michael Whitby, and Joseph Streeter (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 153-200. 
218 In 1 Cor. hom. 33.4 (PG 61:282). Similarly, in In Col. hom. 11.3 (PG 62:377), John’s advice to 
Christians not to call the Greeks µιαροὶ is based on Paul’s speech in Athens, which did not start with Ὦ 
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judgment are not really in dispute. Thus, it would be superfluous for the Christian to 
debase these issues, especially without setting the foundations of the first elements 
mentioned previously.219  
Chrysostom also envisages this conversation in the context of a personal 
relationship that might lead to a friendship. In this scenario, if a Christian becomes a 
friend with a Greek then the former should abstain from talking about religious matters 
until the point where they become really close friends, and even then, only to do so 
slowly.220 One would assume that this advice was provided because Chrysostom knew 
how contentious a subject religion is and therefore saw it as something that should be 
discussed only when the friendship is solidified. The Christians are also encouraged to 
pray for the Greeks, and it is God Himself who wills it.221 John’s response to the 
potential objection of some Christians that they cannot do that is that Christ died even 
for the Greeks, and the fact that they did not believe was irrelevant since Christ did his 
part.222  
Also irrelevant is a person’s religious convictions when it comes to the Christian 
practice of charity and almsgiving. Chrysostom explicitly says that the Christians ought 
to show kindness when they see a Greek in need, as well as every human that faces 
exceptional circumstances. What makes this point even more important is the fact that it 
precedes an accusation against a custom that seems to have prevailed among certain 
Christians: an overzealous search for monastics and a willingness to do good to them 
alone, followed by certain excuses when asked why they do not practise charity towards 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 In Col. hom. 2.5 (PG 62:316-7). Further below John contrasts the doctrine of judgment with the 
doctrine of the resurrection and their inherent relation to virtue and vice (ibid., NPNF 1-13:269): “This 
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220 In Col. hom. 11.2 (PG 62:377). 
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222 In 1 Tim. hom. 7.2 (PG 62:537). 
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others, such as “unless he be worthy, unless he be righteous, unless he work miracles, I 
stretch out no hand,” an attitude John criticizes for having “taken away the greater part 
of charity … and [which] in time will ... utterly destroy the very thing itself.”223 
Affliction is an issue that crosses the lines of any earthly division, be it racial, religious, 
or anything else, and that provides enough justification for Christian aid without the 
necessity of inquiring about anything related to the afflicted persons’ status.  
Despite the varied nature of John’s recommendations, he has been accused in the 
past for being not just a vocal but also a practical opponent of Hellenism. As we already 
indicated in the first chapter, the only actual proof we have, by his own admission but 
also independently verified by Theodoret, is the mission of the monks to Phoenicia 
where certain temples were destroyed and violent clashes ensued. However, he has also 
been accused of another, much greater crime, that is, the ultimate destruction of the 
Temple of Artemis in Ephesus. John refers to the Temple in his hypothesis to his 
Homilies on Ephesians. The initial claim seems to have been made by Clive Foss, who 
resolutely proclaims that “It [the Temple] was finally despoiled by Patriarch [sic] John 
Chrysostom during his visit to Ephesus in 401.”224 This claim later also found its way 
into works by Vasiliki Limberis, Hans Willer Laale and John Freely, who also present 
the destruction by Chrysostom as a fact.225 Foss, who is cited by Limberis but not by 
Laale or Freely, cites a text he claims was previously unnoticed: a forged encomium to 
the Virgin Mary ascribed to Cyril of Alexandria, where Chrysostom is presented as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 In Heb. hom. 10.4 (PG 63:88; NPNF 1-14:416). 
224 Clive Foss, Ephesus After Antiquity: A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 86. 
225 Vasiliki Limberis, “The Council of Ephesos: The Rise of the Cult of the Theotokos and the 
Demise of the See of Ephesos,” in Ephesos, Metropolis of Asia, ed. Helmut Koester (Valley Forge: 
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temple was then destroyed in 401 by a fanatical mob led by the patriarch [sic] John Chrysostom, who saw 
this as the final triumph of Christianity over paganism.”  
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“destroyer of the demons and overthrower of the Temple of Artemis.”226 Foss admits 
that “the Homily, however, appears to be a late forgery and thus presents no certain 
evidence for the destruction of the Temple.”227 Yet Foss contradicts himself elsewhere 
in the book when he refers to Isidore of Pelusium’s Epistle 55 To Hierax the 
Clarissimus228, which was certainly written after Chrysostom’s death and where the 
Temple of Artemis is mentioned in the context of a reference to Greeks digging up 
human remains from the Temple in order to revere them.229 As Frank Trombley 
indicated, Isidore’s epistle provides us with a terminus ante quem for the dismantling of 
the Temple and his reference to its existence in his time should have been enough to 
dispel that theory.230 Palladius’ Bk 14, concerned with John’s visit to Ephesus to deal 
with issues related to local bishops, makes no mention of this alleged destruction either. 
Another passage Foss uses to support Chrysostom’s involvement is a reference in 
Proclus’ Oration 20.3 where, among other achievements it is said that “in Ephesus, he 
despoiled the art of Midas (In Epheso, artem Midae nudavit).”231 This sentence could be 
interpreted in many different ways, but it cannot seriously sustain an argument that 
Chrysostom and his alleged mob destroyed the Temple. Proclus might have meant that 
he destroyed objects related to the local cult, or it could simply be a hyperbolic 
statement that contrasts the presence of a saintly bishop to an urban context that was 
famous for its devotion to Artemis and consequently, to paganism. This is just one 
example of certain persistent myths about Chrysostom, but one that through its spread 
on the internet is now often found cited as an undisputed fact. The question must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 PG 77:1032 (trans. Foss, Ephesus, 86). 
227 Foss, Ephesus, 86. 
228 PG 78:217. 
229 Foss, Ephesus, 32. 
230 Trombley, Hellenic Religion and Christianization v. 2, 242.  
231 PG 65:832, surviving text in Latin only. 
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asked again, even if it becomes repetitious: could examples like this be the reason for 
Chrysostom’s reputation as the archenemy of Hellenism? 
iv. The heritage of Hellenism 
A slightly different point is that Chrysostom sometimes shows that he inherits 
concepts from Hellenism, which he then adapts to a Christian frame. As we will argue 
in the chapter on Cynicism, there are certain ideas and concepts that John has directly 
inherited from Greek sources, with little trace of any biblical influence. While our focus 
in that chapter is the common basis between Cynic and Christian social ethics, there are 
other ideas that he seems to have received directly from his Greco-Roman educational 
background.  
One example of this is his belief in the evil eye, or βασκανία as it is called in ancient 
Greek. The belief in the evil or malevolent eye is shared among many different authors 
from Greco-Roman antiquity, and it seems that the core of the idea remained popular 
among the Christians. However, one feature that some Christians could certainly not 
accept (although this does not imply that it was not used) was the use of amulets and 
other apotropaic devices as sources of protection from the evil eye. We have already 
seen John forcefully arguing against these and it seems that their use was condemned in 
most patristic writings. However, this condemnation did not lead to a wholesale 
rejection of the concept. Thus, John’s references to βασκανία follow the path of 
previous Christian writers and the concept becomes synonymous with envy whilst also 
used to describe a series of societal evils: “because of this disease the law courts are 
thronged with cases. From it come vainglory and avarice. From it come ambition and 
pride. Because of it, the roads are beset by brutal robbers, and the sea is infested with 
pirates. Inspired by it, murders are committed throughout the world. By its influence our 
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race is torn apart.”232 Thus, in this specific case John adapts previous Christian and 
Greco-Roman tradition by extending the arguments against the evil eye to the society as 
a whole and the consequences it causes. Certain customs could not be Christianized, 
and John reserved his harshest judgment for them. 
e. A man of contradictions 
John’s ambivalent stance towards Hellenism should not be surprising to anyone who 
has read his works extensively. Contradictory opinions on the very same matter are 
present in many places within his corpus, and include examples of seeing him 
“vehemently condemn[ing] the swearing of any oaths or the use of cosmetics …” but 
elsewhere “we find him recommending certain types of oaths or suggesting ways in 
which beauty may be enhanced.”233	  However, this chapter has shown that one can move 
beyond a simple acknowledgment of his contradictory views on certain practices and try 
to contextualize these views properly, looking into the argument the views appear in 
and what he is trying to achieve in each case. If one were to summarize what Hellenism 
meant for Chrysostom, calling it a way of life would be the most apt description. At the 
same time, this way of life was certainly different from the Christian way, and in both 
cases John makes a connection between life and doctrine.234 In an analogy that brings 
both elements together, a good way of life is compared to a robe “woven together from 
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references to βασκανία before Chrysostom see G. W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), 293.  
233 Leyerle, Theatrical Shows, 183. 
234 A connection that is elsewhere ascribed to the Greeks as well, this time in the context of the 
behavior of a Christian slave: “But if they [the Greeks] see their slave, who has been taught the 
philosophy of displaying more self-command than their own philosophers, and serving with all meekness 
and good will, he will in every way admire the power of the Gospel. For the Greeks judge not of 
doctrines by the doctrine itself, but they make the life and conduct the test of the doctrines.” The servants 
(and the women) are then exhorted to be instructors of the Greek through conversation, and the former 
are also implored to show the untruthfulness of stereotypes about them, which Chrysostom hesitantly 
admits but, instead of explaining them as natural and inherent, lays the blame decidedly to their masters 
who care for nothing but to be served. See In Tit. hom. 4.4 (PG 62:685; NPNF 1-13:533). The same 
connection is made in a Chrysostomic definition of virtue: “[virtue is] the preciseness of true doctrines 
and correctness in life,” Quod nem. laed. 3 (SC 103:70). 
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good moral conduct and correct doctrine.”235 Hellenism did not uphold correct doctrine 
and was thus unable to procure examples of good moral conduct. Even when 
Chrysostom begrudgingly admits that certain Hellenes led admirable lives, he is quick 
to dismiss their motivation for doing so. Generally speaking, his polemic against 
Hellenism is not as frequent or as intense as it has been claimed in the past. Despite the 
fact that it was a popular subject that pleased his congregation (alongside his arguments 
against the Manicheans and the Marcionites), he recognized that sometimes “this sort of 
discourse is out of season”, and preferred to put his emphasis on teaching the Christian 
basic truths such as that being covetous is evil, since a lot of them were not 
intellectually mature enough to listen to polemic.236 This is stated unambiguously in two 
of his most direct statements on Hellenism: “when the life is corrupt, it engenders a 
doctrine congenial to it, and from this circumstance many are seen to fall into a depth of 
evil, and to turn aside into Hellenism.”237 But what exactly do these many do when they 
turn to Hellenism? According to Chrysostom, some, because of their fear of the last 
judgment, persuade themselves that what the Christians preach are lies. Others turn their 
faith aside because they try to understand everything through reasonings (logismoi). 
What they forget is that in this case, faith is a safe ship and reasonings a shipwreck. 
This is because, as we have shown, Chrysostom considers searching into the divine 
mysteries through reasonings to be blasphemy.238 Despite Hellenism’s many 
achievements and great ideals, this is where it ultimately fails. It is a rationalizing way 
of trying to understand God, and, precisely because of that, is to be rejected. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 De Christ. div. 12.5 (SC 396; trans. Harkins, On the Incomprehensible Nature of God, 305). 
236 In Heb. hom. 9.1 (PG 63:76; NPNF 1-14:409). 
237 In 1 Tim. hom. 5.1 (PG 62:527; NPNF 1-13:424, with minor changes): Ὅταν γὰρ ᾖ βίος 
ἀπεγνωσµένος, καὶ δόγµα τίκτεται τοιοῦτον· καὶ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν πολλοὺς ἐκ τούτου καταπεσόντας εἰς βυθὸν 
κακῶν, καὶ εἰς Ἑλληνισµὸν ἐκτραπέντας. The other reference is from John’s Commentary on Job 1.1 (SC 
346:86; St. John Chrysostom, Commentaries on the Sages vol. 1: Commentary on Job, trans. Robert 
Charles Hill, Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2006, 16): “A good life, you see, makes one 
recognize God, just as a bad one does the opposite; knowledge of God is arrived at through one’s life…. 
And so paganism (Hellenismos) comes from no other source than an impure life.” 
238 In 1 Tim. hom. 5.2 (PG 62:527). 
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3. Of what fatherland are you: The dialectics of identity through 
comparisons 
In the previous chapter we extensively analysed Chrysostom’s multifaceted 
approach to Hellenism. We primarily focused on positive, negative and even neutral 
engagements with Hellenism, primarily through analysing what Chrysostom said about 
Greek practices, ideas, and customs. These were often reflected in the sayings or 
attitudes of famous philosophers as well as common everyday people, and it is often the 
case that John will treat these sayings and attitudes in a paradigmatic and axiomatic 
way. A lot of the ideas we first encountered in the previous chapter will resurface again, 
albeit in a different context: in this chapter, we will be looking into John’s practice of 
synkrisis between Greeks and Christians. More specifically, the personifications of what 
John considers Christian and Greek ideals and virtues as they appear in numerous 
comparisons between Greeks and Christians in his work. Some of these comparisons 
have been the subject of scholarly scrutiny before, as in Margaret Mitchell’s masterful 
study of Pauline portraits within Chrysostom’s exegesis and Pak-Wah Lai’s doctoral 
dissertation on the hermeneutics of exemplar figures in Chrysostom’s works and how 
they were informed both by Greco-Roman traditions of paideia and virtue ethics as well 
as the Christian tradition. The difference between these works and the present study is 
that we will be working with more examples than Mitchell and Lai, who primarily 
focused on Paul (the former) and David (the latter). Our focus is also different, as we 
are primarily concerned with exemplar figures only in the context of comparisons 
between Greeks and Christians, and attempt to relate them to the framework of John’s 
reception of Hellenism as discussed in the previous chapter. The task here is to see 
John’s method and contents of comparison as we look into yet another aspect of his 
reception of Hellenism. First, we will examine how, in his rhetoric, John uses the 
category of martyrs to draw a sharp contrast between Christianity and Hellenism. Then 
we will look into specific comparisons he draws between Christians and Greeks, 
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starting from major ones between Peter, Paul and John on the one hand, and Plato, 
Socrates and Pythagoras, on the other. We will then proceed to look into some minor 
comparisons where we see some small variations on points of emphasis, and then 
conclude this chapter with a discussion of a seminal text for our purposes, the Discourse 
on Babylas. 
a. The martyrs in Chrysostom’s rhetoric 
In his panegyric to the martyr Lucian, John narrates a striking story from the 
martyr’s trial:  
 
he [the executioner] escorted him [Lucian] back into court and tortured him and 
applied incessant questions. But to each question he replied only: “I am a 
Christian.” And when the executioner said: “What country are you from?” said: 
“I am a Christian.” “What’s your occupation?” “I am a Christian.” “Who are 
your parents?” To everything he said: “I am a Christian.” … For the person who 
says, “I am a Christian” has revealed both their country and family history and 
occupation. Let me explain how. The Christian does not have a city on earth, but 
the Jerusalem in heaven… The Christian doesn’t have an earthly occupation, but 
arrives at the heavenly way of life… The Christian has as relatives and fellow 
citizens all the saints.1 
 
Regardless of the historicity of the trial, if Chrysostom’s account of the conversation 
were taken at face value it would imply and validate the suspicions of some scholars 
that one of the aims of Christianity was to create an exclusive religious identity that 
would make any other affiliation, be it ethnic or societal, irrelevant. Margaret Mitchell 
has argued against such an interpretation, calling the episode “a legend which dares to 
imagine an overturned social order through the enthusiastic vision of a single martyr.”2 
But Chrysostom made similar arguments elsewhere, without the need to use the 
martyr’s voice: “If you’re a Christian, you don’t have a city on earth. It’s God who’s the 
builder and maker (Hebrews 11:10) of our city. Even were we to gain possession of the 
whole world, we are strangers and pilgrims in it all. We’re enrolled in heaven; it’s there 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In. Lucian. 3 (PG 50:524-5; trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 71-2).  
2 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 234. 
154 
that we’re citizens.”3 Is Chrysostom’s rhetoric a call to arms for Christians to abandon 
their homelands? Or is it simply an exhortation to Christians that their religious identity 
trumps every other earthly one exactly because he thinks of it as not of this earth?  
This is a complicated passage that can easily be considered problematic. However, 
the danger of taking everything at face value is to neglect the paradigmatic function of 
sermons as building blocks in identity formation, and as such, prone to hyperbolic 
statements made in order to strengthen the sense of community. Returning to this 
passage again, we see that, despite the fact that Lucian had received education ἔξωθεν, 
he is portrayed as understanding perfectly that there is no need for rhetorical 
embellishments in this contest. On the surface Chrysostom’s statement against 
rhetorical superfluities seems peculiar: they are very much present in John’s rhetoric 
and there is also something rhetorical about Lucian’s statements. And yet even though 
Lucian was educated, he is portrayed as understanding that in contests such as these 
faith is more than enough.4 Chrysostom’s point about the lack of patris on Lucian’s 
behalf is thus perfectly complementary to his rhetorical use of an apparent lack of 
rhetoric: both are, in a way, superfluous elements that are already transcended in this 
present life if a Christian has his/her eye to the politeia above. 
As we will see, the martyrs and the saints play a prominent role in Chrysostom’s 
reception of Hellenism, serving both as role models and as living proofs of the emergent 
and victorious Christianity. A brief tour d’ horizon will enable us to see both cases in 
practice, and we will begin with the rhetoric of the power of the martyrs, which in 
Chrysostom’s words “catches in its net not just private persons, but those who wear the 
diadems” [i.e. the emperors].5 This same power is a “source of shame for the Greeks” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 De stat. 17.12 (PG 49:178; trans. Mayer and Allen, John Chrysostom, 114). Sandwell, “John 
Chrysostom’s Audiences,” 527, does not consider this passage to be “a simple rhetorical statement of 
loyalty to God” and thinks that it was intended “to transform every aspect of the life of the Christian.”  
4 In Lucian. 3 (PG 50:524). 
5 De Phoca 1 (PG 50:699; trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 78). 
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and “the censure of their error”.6 One might wonder why John thought the Greeks 
needed to feel shame for the persecutions that the Romans were responsible for. The 
answer to this is that John thinks of the Roman Emperors as Greeks, and actually calls 
them so. This can be explained as a statement reflective of the common background of 
Greco-Roman paganism, or more probably due to a Christian (and Chrysostomic) 
tendency to categorize anyone who was not a Jew or a Christian as Greek, regardless of 
their actual ethnicity. One of the texts where he does this is Demonstration against the 
Pagans That Christ is God: 
The emperors were pagans (Ἕλληνες). Augustus, Tiberius, Gaius, Nero, 
Vespasian, Titus and all his successors were pagans, down to the time of the 
blessed Emperor Constantine. All the pagan emperors waged war against the 
Church. Some were less harsh, others were more severe, but all waged their 
wars against it. Some emperors, it seemed, did leave the Church undisturbed. 
But they were emperors and obviously pagans and ungodly men. These very 
facts caused a constant threat of war since other men would ingratiate 
themselves with the emperors and prove their loyalty by a war against the 
Church. Yes, men did plot against the Church … Still, these plots did produce 
many martyrs. But they left the Church treasures that will never perish, columns 
that will always stand, towers that no force can take by storm. In death as in life, 
these martyrs have become a source of strength and assistance to those of a later 
age.7 
 
John’s insistence that “yes, men did plot against the church” implies that some 
members of his audience would find it difficult to believe that something like that could 
ever have happened. It seems that a series of Christian emperors (whether they were 
orthodox or not) made the persecutions a long distant memory, and part of 
Chrysostom’s efforts both as a priest and bishop would have been to remind people 
about the constant possibility of martyrdom. 
Such examples show that in the rhetoric of Chrysostom, martyrdom becomes a very 
significant point of divergence from Hellenism, precisely because, according to John, 
the Hellenes cannot claim any martyrs for their religion. In another instance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
7 C. Iud. et. gent. 15.1-2 (PG 47:833; trans. Harkins, Apologist, 249). John himself uses the word 
Ἕλληνες only once, even though Harkins mentions “pagans” three times in his translation, which is 
completely unnecessary in the third sentence. 
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Chrysostom compares the martyrs to the disciples of Socrates and their attitude after his 
death. It is clearly implied that their exile was self-imposed, and that “they appeared 
more cowardly than frogs” while the martyrs “didn’t just despise death but also 
countless tortures which were crueller than any death.” W. Mayer argues that John’s 
allusion might be in reference to Critias, Charmides and Alcibiades, who were all exiled 
after Socrates’ death. However, as we shall see later, when Chrysostom mentions the 
flight of Socrates’ disciples in other writings he has different people in mind.8 
Regardless of their identity though, the important point is the contrast between 
Socrates’ disciples and Christian martyrs and the lack of the former’s philosophical 
convictions whilst facing the prospect of death.9 Yet John’s effort might have been in 
vain if his aim was to appeal to pagans since people like Libanius would claim that 
Hellenism did not really need martyrs.10  
However, we can argue that this was not his intended audience. The martyrs 
primarily serve as role models for the Christian community, and one thing John always 
seems to emphasize is their humanity. This is for two reasons: partly because he does 
not want the believers to consider them as something extraordinary that they could 
never be, which would mark a departure from many representations of martyrs, and 
partly because he wants to emphasize their common bond with his audience and the 
potential they have to emulate them. Chrysostom wanted to avoid giving the impression 
that the apostles or the saints were of a different nature than that shared by all humans, 
even when he wanted to make a point about them transcending this very nature, as in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In mart. omn. 7 (trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 245). 
9 Chrysostom extended the concept of exhibiting philosophy through martyrdom to Jewish martyrs as 
well. Thus, the Maccabean martyrs also provide evidence of their philosophy through their martyrdom 
and Chrysostom urges the believers to give “evidence of the same philosophical virtue in the battle 
against the irrational passions, in particular rage, the longing for money, (physical) love, and vainglory.” 
Gerard Rouwhorst, “The Emergence of the Cult of the Maccabean Martyrs in Late Antique Christianity,” 
in More than a Memory: The Discourse of Martyrdom and the Construction of Christian Identity in the 
History of Christianity, ed. Johan Leemans (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 91. It is also important to note that 
Chrysostom’s exhortation is extended to all Christians, “whether they live in the cities or in the desert, 
whether they are virgins or whether they conduct a holy married life” (ibid., 92). 
10 Cribiore, Libanius the Sophist, 160. 
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the second homily In Praise of St Paul: “Paul did not obtain another nature, nor share a 
different soul, nor inhabit another world, but, having been reared on the same earth, and 
land, and laws, and customs, he exceeded all human beings who have existed from the 
time there have been human beings.”11 Nevertheless, not all persecutions are equal to 
Paul’s.  
In addition to his emphasis on the humanity of martyrs, another interesting aspect of 
John’s homilies is his constant effort to avoid the phenomenon of divinizing natural 
elements. In some cases, he would use the occasion of speaking about a saintly 
Christian figure in order to argue against such phenomena. Thus, in his Homily on St 
Phocas John argues that “God made the heavens so that we might see the work and 
adore the Creator, but the Greeks made the work a god,”12 obviously referring to Uranus 
in Greek mythology. In another example, he describes Apollo’s temple in Daphne as a 
battleground between Apollo and the martyr Babylas. Here John is evidently celebrating 
the victory of the martyr after the burning of the temple and teases those who 
worshipped the sun as a God: ποῦ νῦν εἰσιν οἱ τὸ καλὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ δηµιούργηµα καὶ 
πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν ἡµετέραν γεγονὸς τὸν ἥλιον ἐνυβρίζοντες καὶ τῷ δαίµονι τὸ ἄστρον 
ἐπιφηµίζοντες καὶ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον εἶναι λέγοντες;13 What is also evident from this 
passage, as has already been observed by Schatkin and Mitchell, is the implicit criticism 
of Julian, who was a self-confessed devotee of Helios.14 As we can already see, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 De Laud. Paul. hom. 2.1 (SC 30:144; trans. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 448). 
12 De Phoca 3 (PG 50:703; trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 84). 
13 De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 83 (SC 362:204). For a similar sentiment cf. In Gen. serm. 1.1 (SC 433:144; 
St. John Chrysostom: Eight Sermons on the Book of Genesis, trans. Robert Charles Hill, Brookline, MA: 
Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2004, 24): “If Greeks knew how to exercise their mind properly about 
creation, they would not have strayed from the truth … The sky is beautiful, but the reason it was made 
was for you to adore its maker; the sun is brilliant, but it is for you to worship its creator. If, on the 
contrary, you are bent on stopping at the wonder of creation, and becoming attached to the beauty of the 
works, light has become darkness for you- or, rather, you have turned light into darkness.” 
14 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 239, citing Schatkin’s introduction to the critical edition of the 
Panegyric on Babylas. In other works, John was not afraid to criticize Julian directly and refer to him by 
name, as he does e.g. when discussing his plan to rebuild the temple in Jerusalem in his homilies Against 
the Jews, where Julian’s brief tenure is described as a period where τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ ἤνθει and Julian himself 
is described as ἀνδρὸς ἀσεβοῦς καὶ Ἕλληνος, Adv. Iud. or. 5.11 (PG 48:901). 
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martyrs can be used for multiple purposes in John’s battle against Hellenism: they, like 
the apostles, had no earthly homeland and their family and compatriots were the saints, 
not their earthly family or fellow citizens. They were not afraid of death and the fact 
that they shared a common human nature with us is proof enough that they can be 
emulated. And yet, unlike the Greeks who were keen to personify and divinize natural 
elements like the sun and the sky, the martyrs were not to be divinized. Certain 
attributes of the martyrs were therefore points of contention, which were only enlarged 
when they were compared to personalities from the Greek world, as we will see in the 
next section. 
b. Major Comparisons 
The comparison method was by no means systematic, and can be found scattered 
throughout many of Chrysostom’s works. As we already mentioned, Margaret Mitchell 
has firmly established the importance of Chrysostom’s use of exemplar portraits 
(particularly those of Paul) and their central position in his exegetical practice.15 Pak-
Wah Lai has brought attention to the fact that Chrysostom’s portrayals are often of an 
ad hoc nature and thus it would be difficult to attempt an ideological interpretation.16 
Mitchell has also made a similar argument: “although several emphases do emerge, 
both by volume and extent- such as Paul the prisoner for the gospel, Paul the teacher of 
the world, or Paul the man of sufferings… Chrysostom’s portraits of Paul do not 
constitute a single composite portrait, nor a search for the single most accurate portrait, 
but rather an extensive portrait series.”17 As we have already seen, a similar case can be 
made for many of Chrysostom’s portraits, even those of non-Christians. In the previous 
chapter we saw instances where Plato is described as a humble ascetic content with a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 69-377. 
16 Pak-Wah Lai, “Exemplar Portraits and the Interpretation of John Chrysostom’s Doctrine of 
Recapitulation,” in (Re)Visioning John Chrysostom: New Theories and Approaches, ed. Wendy Mayer 
and Chris de Wet (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). 
17 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 383. 
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simple life, while in another he is the arrogant philosopher who failed to establish his 
ideal republic on earth. Keeping these caveats in mind, what we are aiming to do here is 
to collect and analyse this material, while at the same time trying to contextualize it 
within the broader context of John’s reception of Hellenism. There will be some 
recurrent themes that we will note as we go through the different comparisons, which 
we will also summarise in the conclusion to this chapter. 
i. Plato, Socrates, Peter, and Paul 
The technique that John usually uses to elevate the Christian saints and martyrs over 
and against pagan personalities is called synkrisis. In ancient literature synkrisis (or 
comparison) “refers to the comparative juxtaposition of people and things”, and when 
used in a rhetorical context also includes praise or blame.18 Time and again Chrysostom 
compares figures such as Paul, John or Babylas with pagan figures and uses those 
comparisons to extract different lessons for his audience.19 We will begin our analysis 
of these comparisons with a rather long passage that contains a dialogue between a 
Christian and a Hellene as reported by John, which compares the eloquence of Paul and 
Plato: 
So, prove to me this - that Peter and Paul were eloquent. But you cannot. For 
they were “unskilled” and “unlettered” (Acts 4:13) … Therefore, when the 
Greeks accuse the disciples of being unskilled, we should accuse them [i.e. the 
apostles] of it even more. Don’t let anyone say that Paul was wise, but instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 H. A. Gärtner, “Synkrisis”, Brill’s New Pauly. Antiquity volumes edited by Hubert Cancik and 
Helmuth Schneider, English Edition by: Christine F. Salazar, Classical Tradition volumes edited by: 
Manfred Landfester, English Edition by: Francis G. Gentry. Accessed on 21 November 2017, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1127330. Plutarch’s Parallel Lives are a classic example of 
the genre.  Definitions and discussions of the technique were a standard staple in the surviving 
progymnasmata handbooks of Aelius Theon, ps-Hermogenes, Aphthonius, Nicolaus the Sophist, and 
Libanius, which also included practical exercises showcasing each of the rhetorical methods mentioned, 
including synkrisis.  
19 Pak-Wah Lai, John Chrysostom and the Hermeneutics of Exemplar Portraits (PhD diss., Durham 
University, 2010), 257, points out that sometimes martyrs can also be compared to other saints, as in the 
synkrisis between Bernike, Prosdoke and Domnina who are presented as greater than Moses and the 
Patriarchs. Some of the comparisons we will be discussing go beyond Lai’s assertion that in “synkrisis … 
the exemplar concerned is compared with another similar exemplar or even a villainous figure, in order to 
highlight the aretai and superiority of the exemplar concerned.” Sometimes the exemplar is compared to 
a figure that is neither saintly nor villainous, at least in the sense Lai uses the term (e.g. Antiochus 
Epiphanes’ persecution of the Maccabees). 
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let’s exalt for wisdom the famous men among the Greeks, and marvel at their 
facility in speech, but let’s say that all the Christian figures were unskilled. For 
in this respect we shall overthrow them in no small way; for thus the victories 
will be magnificent! Now the reason I have said these things is that I once heard 
a Christian debating in a ridiculous fashion with a Greek, and both of them were 
demolishing their own case in the battle against the other. For the Greek was 
saying the things the Christian should have said; and the Christian was 
proposing the things the Greek customarily should have said. For the dispute 
was about Paul and Plato, with the Greek trying to prove that Paul was 
uneducated and unskilled, while the Christian, due to simplicity, was zealously 
making the case that Paul was more eloquent than Plato. Thus, the victory 
belonged to the Greek, as this argument prevailed. For if Paul were more 
eloquent than Plato, likely many would argue back that it was not by grace, but 
by persuasive speech that he prevailed. Therefore, what the Christian said 
worked to the advantage of the Greek; and what the Greek was saying to that of 
the Christian. For if Paul were uneducated, but he prevailed over Plato, as I was 
saying, the victory was magnificent. For the uneducated man [Paul], taking 
Plato’s disciples, persuaded them all and led them to himself. Whence it is clear 
that it was not by human wisdom that the gospel prevailed, but by the grace of 
God. Therefore, so that we might not suffer these things, nor be ridiculed when 
we are debating with Greeks, since Paul was the one who led them to us, let’s 
accuse the Apostles of being uneducated. For this accusation is an encomium.20 
 
In what M. Mitchell calls “a deliberate rhetorical strategy,”21 John argues that it is 
wrong for a Christian to claim that Paul was more eloquent than Plato. In fact, when a 
Greek accuses the apostles of being illiterate, the Christian should not only admit to that 
accusation but push it even further! Mitchell has called this argument “illiteracy by 
association”, and sees it as an effort to harmonize Paul with the other apostles, although 
Chrysostom usually tries to set him apart in other matters.22  On the other hand, those on 
the Greeks’ side who were wise and eloquent should be admired by the Christians for 
their wisdom and eloquence, a statement that is definitely semi-ironic considering the 
value John sometimes attributed to secular wisdom and eloquence.23 But exactly the 
absence of these virtues in connection to the apostles proclaims their victory.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In 1 Cor. hom. 3.8 (PG 61:27; trans. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 243-4). 
21 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 243, emphasis in the original. 
22 Ibid., 278, n. 372. 
23 But see his In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:413-4; NPNF 1-11:353): “And this is why they stood against 
one another and Aristotle rose up against Plato, and the Stoics blustered against him, and one has become 
hostile to one, another to another. So that one should not so much marvel at them for their wisdom, as 
turn away from them indignant and hate them, because through this very thing they have become fools. 
For had they not trusted what they have to reasonings, and syllogisms, and sophistries, they would not 
have suffered what they did suffer.” The admiration towards the philosophers turns into hatred in this 
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John’s remarks arise out of a dialogue he observed once between a Christian and a 
Greek. Whether the dialogue was real or imaginary will not concern us here. What does 
matter is the conclusion he draws from that dialogue, namely that the fact that Paul was 
uneducated should be a matter of praise. Although Plato was wise and eloquent (in an 
ironic kind of way), and therefore more illustrious than Paul in regard to these qualities, 
his followers ended up on Paul’s side. The reason John makes this point is very 
specific- and obvious: the success of the Gospel is not to be attributed to human wisdom 
or persuasive rhetoric, but to the grace of God. In other words, John’s purpose was to 
“diminish the rhetorical competence of Paul” and by doing that reverses “the 
encomiastic topoi	  by insisting that Paul was ἀπαίδευτος.”24  
Before there were ever monks, there was Paul, and Paul was stronger than all of the 
philosophers, and more effective at that.25 According to Chrysostom, Paul was even 
stronger than Plato, “who is thought more reverend than the rest of them”26 and was 
also considered “the chief of their philosophers”; but Chrysostom also describes him as 
a pimp, in relation to his view that in the ideal Republic women will be shared in 
common (Republic V).27 But why is Plato singled out among the many Greek 
philosophers, not only in John’s Homilies on Titus, but in many of his other works as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
passage, and instead of wise they are called fools. However, one cannot avoid thinking that one of the 
reasons John emphasized the divisions of the philosophical schools must have been the underlying 
implication that the Church is not divided and her members do not fight each other like the followers of 
the different schools.  
24 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 244. Wah, “Exemplar Portraits”: “I would argue that 
Chrysostom’s rhetorical strategy is both theologically and pastorally motivated. Theologically speaking, 
by drawing attention to the lowliness of Paul’s origins and upbringing, Chrysostom would be able to 
demonstrate anew the transforming power of the Spirit. From a pastoral perspective, the same rhetoric 
also becomes, for Chrysostom, a means of encouraging his listeners to pursue their calling more 
fervently.” 
25 In Tit. hom. 2.2 (PG 62:273; NPNF 1-13:525): “Do you not see that Paul put to flight the whole 
world, that he was more powerful than Plato and all the rest?” M. Mitchell translates the first part of the 
sentence as “don’t you see that Paul turned around the whole world” (ibid., 274), which I think is closer 
to the meaning of the Greek original. 
26 In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:414; NPNF 1-12:353). 
27“Another, the chief of their philosophers, approves of their going out to the war, and of their being 
common, as if he were a pimp and pander to their lusts,” In Tit. hom. 5.4 (PG 62:694; NPNF 1-13:538). 
Plato’s views on the ideal state were already criticized by Aristotle in the second book of his Politics. 
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well? For Margaret Mitchell, it is because Plato “often serves as a metonym for all of 
Greek philosophy and learning.”28 One could also argue that this was because of the 
enduring influence of Platonism in many Christian authors and the status of Plato for 
educated elites more generally. By focusing on Paul’s victory over Plato, John can 
claim a complete victory of Christianity over philosophy,	   or, as Mitchell puts it, “the 
dissolution of the entire enterprise.”29 A. Hartney has also pointed out that in 
Chrysostom’s homilies on the Pauline epistles “it is Plato who appears most often as a 
figure of comparison”, with Aristotle being the second, and speculates that the reason 
for this choice was because Chrysostom might have felt that “his audience’s familiarity 
with Plato was a direct threat to the status of his beloved Paul.”30 While a direct threat is 
difficult to establish, John’s multiple references to Plato indicate that at a minimum 
certain Platonic ideas had to be combatted.  
The comparison between Plato and Paul has been aptly summarized and analysed by 
Margaret Mitchell, and we will only make a brief note of it here. The main points are: a) 
that Plato was incapable of even converting the tyrant of Sicily, while Paul managed to 
convert the whole world, b) Paul’s victory becomes more significant by the fact that he 
lacked Plato’s advanced education, and c) that even without formal training, it was 
Paul’s letters and rhetoric that won the victory over philosophy.31 Mitchell’s third point 
demands a bit of elaboration. Mitchell herself claims that Paul’s lack of paideia ensures 
that he could not have technically been a rhetorician.32 She also claims that Paul’s lack 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The Heavenly Trumpet, 274. In contrast, Paul’s persona is often “an apostolic metonym of the 
morally superior and victorious philosophy” (ibid., 380). 
29 Ibid., 274. 
30 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 82. Hartney also mentions that in 
the whole of John’s corpus, Josephus is the second most frequently mentioned writer, after Plato of 
course (ibid.).   
31 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 275, with appropriate references to Chrysostom’s works. 
32 Ibid., 278. John also interprets Paul’s dictum in 1 Corinthians 1:22 (“For Jews demand signs and 
Greeks desire wisdom”) as the Greeks demanding “a rhetorical style, and the acuteness of sophistry” 
(ῥητορείαν λόγων καὶ δεινότητα σοφισµάτων), In 1 Cor. hom. 4.3 (PG 61:33; NPNF 1-12:18). The 
Christians’ preaching of the Cross is actually the exact opposite of this demand, which nevertheless still 
163 
of any formal rhetorical training enabled Christianity to appropriate the classical debate 
between rhetoric and philosophy and to place Paul on the side of philosophy.33 Mitchell 
is correct to point out that this portrait of Paul would be hard to sustain however, 
considering Chrysostom’s constant references to his persuasive abilities, which would 
be considered the hallmark of any good rhetorician. To solve this apparent 
inconsistency, Mitchell argues, Chrysostom specifies that Paul’s rhetoric “defies the 
elitism of ancient paideia (as did its proponents), for it is accessible to all manner of 
people because it bases its appeal, not on deductive arguments [συλλογισµοί], but on 
faith [πίστις].”34  
In that sense, Paul deserves even more praise because his natural aptitudes (and 
divine grace) were so great that he had no need for formal or technical training. Paul’s 
persuasive abilities were not a result of any special training, and for this reason he was 
more eloquent than any of the Greek rhetoricians. Compared to them, his speech 
qualities might have been poorer, but much more powerful and effective, even 
compared to the rest of the Apostles.35 We will demonstrate that	   the argument for the 
simplicity of the evangelical message and the contrast between faith and reasonings (or 
syllogisms) reappears in other comparisons as well, which we examine further below. 
John rejects the sophists and their clever syllogisms for the same reasons.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
persuades those who would rather hear otherwise. The Cross becomes σοφίας ἀπόδειξις, and, instead of 
being considered a scandal and an offence, manages to attract people. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 279, citing Chrysostom’s In Rom. hom. 2.5 (PG 60:407): “For this reason, the Athenians 
themselves now laugh at those philosophers of old, whereas even the barbarians and ignorant and 
untrained attend to Paul. For his preaching is laid out common to all. He recognizes no difference in 
status, nor superiority of any nation, or any other such thing. For it requires faith alone, not syllogisms. 
Hence this proclamation is especially worthy of admiration, not only because of its utility and salvific 
power, but because it is simple and easy, and readily grasped by all, which is especially a work of God’s 
providence, for he lays out all his gifts in common to all.”  
35 “Now if I were demanding the polish of Isocrates and the grandeur of Demosthenes and the dignity 
of Thucydides and the sublimity of Plato, it would be right to confront me with the testimony of Paul. But 
in fact, I pass over all those qualities and the superfluous embellishments of pagan (ἔξωθεν) writers. I 
take no account of diction or style. Let a man’s diction be beggarly and his verbal composition simple and 
artless, but do not let him be inexpert in the knowledge and careful statement of doctrine.” De Sac. 4.6 
(SC 272:268-70; St John Chrysostom, Six Books on the Priesthood, trans. Graham Neville, Crestwood, 
NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1977, 121-2).  
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One factor which Mitchell does not pay attention to is the way in which Plato was 
singled out for comparison because of the perception (on John’s part) that he was “the 
most important —and the most dangerous— of the ancient rebels against the God-given 
sexual hierarchy.”36 Elizabeth Clark usefully points out John’s many references to Bk 5 
of the Republic and his relevant criticisms against it: women being shared in common, 
performing activities appropriate to men only, and, most shockingly, the “requirement 
of physical training for girls.”37 As far as Chrysostom’s direct references to the classics 
go, this is one of the most frequent engagements with one of them, and the most 
common one outside of work of anti-Christian polemic. Another criticism Chrysostom 
directs against Plato is his plan for women to receive military instruction, which he 
deemed as unnatural and linked it with other practices he considered as such, namely 
homosexuality and infanticide.38 Finally, the last critical point in connection to John’s 
criticisms against Plato’s views on female sexuality was his objection against Plato’s 
advocacy not only of a community of women but also of communal childbearing. 
Again, these practices are considered as being against the natural order of things, while 
at the same time he accuses Plato of hypocrisy as he did not practise what he preached 
regarding the community of women and sarcastically admits that no legislator decided 
to implement Plato’s ideal republic.39  
Clark argues that John was not against the community of goods in principle. On the 
contrary, he espoused it and very often praised the early members of the Christian 
community for practising it. She also believes that it was Plato’s position on the 
community of women in particular and not communal living in general that offended 
John and enabled him to attack Plato’s politeia. The textual evidence is very much in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Elizabeth Clark, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Friends: Essays and Translations (Lewiston, NY: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1979), 11. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Clark, Jerome, Chrysostom, and Friends, 12. 
39 Ibid., 13, where Clark provides ample documentation of John’s views from many different texts.  
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support of Clark’s argument, as we shall also see later in this chapter (section C, i), and 
it seems that one more reason for Chrysostom’s choice of Plato as the archetypal villain 
is his utopian plan to eradicate sexual differences from human society, something that 
Chrysostom believed would only be achieved in the afterlife, as with every distinction 
on earth (ethnic, racial, social, etc.).40  
Finally, we cannot exclude the possibility that the major focus of John’s criticisms 
was to undermine a philosopher whose works were still so highly regarded. This is why 
John claims that Plato lost not by means of another philosopher but through an 
unlearned fisherman.41	  In this example, Plato is the ultimate expression of the wisdom 
shown to be foolish, just as Paul is the epitome of true wisdom despite his lack of 
learning. 
Besides Paul, Plato is also compared to Peter, and, as with Paul, the apostle emerges 
victorious. The relevant passage begins with a triumphalist statement: 
Where now is Greece with her big pretentions? Where the name of Athens? 
Where the ravings of the philosophers? He of Galilee, he of Bethsaida, he, the 
uncouth rustic, has overcome them all. Are you not ashamed —confess it— at 
the very name of the country of him who has defeated you? But if you hear his 
own name too, and learn that he was called Cephas, much more will you hide 
your faces.42  
 
This passage from Chrysostom’s Homilies on the Acts bears striking similarities 
with Tertullian’s famous contrast between Athens and Jerusalem, and we can even say 
that it is even more triumphant than Tertullian’s. At first sight, we might easily dismiss 
it as a poor effort at bragging on Chrysostom’s part. Nevertheless, the rest of the homily 
contains some very interesting criticisms of Plato’s philosophy, and Chrysostom’s 
boasts should not prevent us from analysing it. If, however, one needs to justify the 
boasting, s/he would have to look no further that Julian’s use of Galileans as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid., 14. 
41 In 1 Cor. hom. 4.2 (PG 61:33). 
42 In Act. apost. hom. 4.3 (PG 60:47; NPNF 11:29). 
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derogatory term. If seen through this lens, what Chrysostom does here is simply re-
appropriation. He reclaims the term Galilean, and embraces it to prove his point. 
Moving on from this, John attempts to answer the question as to why Christ did not 
influence Plato and Pythagoras but chose Peter instead. His response is that this 
happened because his mind (or soul) was more philosophical than theirs (πολλῷ 
φιλοσοφωτέρα ἦν ἡ Πέτρου ψυχὴ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐκείνων)!43 It would definitely be 
problematic if John made this assertion and ended it there. But this is just a prelude to a 
full-frontal attack that comes out as a result of his comparison between Plato and Peter. 
The intent of the comparison initially is to describe the habits and pursuits of each. In 
this description, Plato is someone who wasted his time with foolish and useless 
doctrines.44 Chrysostom very much doubts the usefulness (ὄφελος) of Plato’s doctrines, 
particularly his doctrine of metempsychosis, which he ridicules by mentioning Plato’s 
reference to the soul as a fly and saying that since he believed that, his soul might just 
be a fly! Plato’s character also receives a harsh treatment: the man was “full of irony, 
and of jealous feelings against everyone else,”45 and exactly because of these character 
traits it seemed as if he did not want to introduce anything useful to humanity, either 
when he borrowed ideas from others, as was the case with reincarnation, or when he 
introduced ideas of his own. Plato’s own idea is, of course, his suggestion in the 
Republic that the women will be shared by everyone in his ideal state. But in his 
Homilies on Acts John criticizes other ideas suggested by Plato for his model republic.46 
These include the idea that virgins should be naked, that they should take part in 
wrestling competitions, and that the children will be common just like the women. John 
justifies his preference for Plato over examining the doctrines of the Greek poets, lest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:47; NPNF 1-11:30). Paul was also called “more philosophical than 
philosophers, more eloquent than rhetoricians (ὁ φιλοσόφων φιλοσοφώτερος, ὁ ῥητόρων 
εὐγλωττότερος)”, De Laz. conc. 6.9 (PG 48:1041).  
44 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:48). 
45 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:47; NPNF 1-11:30).  
46 Ibid. 
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someone accuse him of “ripping up fables”, the implication being that the works of the 
poets are hardly worthy of attention because of the myths they contain, whereas John 
takes the Republic as a kind of constitution for the society Plato wanted to establish. 
Another factor might be the disregard shown to the poets by none other than Plato 
himself.47  
Plato is not the only philosopher who is compared with Paul, Peter, or any of the 
other apostles: John also uses Socrates for this purpose. John’s choice of Socrates is not 
random. Besides the fact that, as Mitchell notes, Libanius uses Socrates as the “zenith 
and metonym of Greek culture against Christians,”48 Socrates was also the one 
philosophical figure that all philosophical schools admired, and thus, by attacking him, 
the implication is that all those who admire him might be considered guilty by 
association.49 References to Socrates from both Christians and pagans were almost 
always meant to be ideologically charged. For example, in Libanius’ works Socrates 
represents “the intellectual tradition of Hellenism, specifically in opposition to 
Christianity”, and thus works such as the Comparison between a King and a Monk can 
be seen under the lens of John’s response to Libanius’ polemic against Christianity. 
John applies Libanius’ depictions of Socrates and Julian as ascetics to the monks, and, 
instead of presenting their virtues as “an argument on behalf of Greek paideia,” claims 
them for the Christian monks, who are the true philosophers.50  
Chrysostom presents Peter and Paul as victors, but who did the apostles fight 
against? The answer John provides is against very many people and without the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Yet another reason could be the fact that “prose and poetry were inescapably filled with allusions 
to polytheism, and many of its aspects were far from edifying.” Laistner, Christianity and Pagan Culture, 
49. For Chrysostom’s references to Greek poets see P. R. Coleman Norton, “St. Chrysostom’s Use of the 
Greek Poets,” Classical Philology 28:3 (1932), 213-21. As we saw in the previous chapter Chrysostom 
had no trouble calling the works of the poets’ nonsense.  
48 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 274. 
49 For a positive reference to Socrates see In 1 Cor. hom. 4.5 (PG 61:37; NPNF 1-12:20): “the great 
Socrates … who surpassed in philosophy all among them...” 
50 For the previous references above and further discussion of the figure of Socrates in John’s 
Comparatio see Hunter, A Comparison, 28-9. 
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supposedly necessary weapons too: “without experience, without skill of the tongue, 
and in the condition of quite ordinary men, matched against juggling conjurors, against 
impostors, against the whole throng of sophists, of rhetoricians, of philosophers grown 
mouldy in the Academy and the walks of the Peripatetics, against all these they fought 
the battle out.”51 If we could group together under one term all the apostolic attributes 
that Chrysostom included in his different comparisons, that term would be simplicity, 
and despite the fact that it is used in contrast to the rhetoricians and the philosophers, it 
has been recognized as a rhetorical tool itself.52 Hartney argues that John’s praise of 
Paul and Peter “as simple and untutored men, who nevertheless won a huge following” 
served as “part of the ongoing ‘Christianisation’ of discourse, whereby traditional 
heroes of pagan culture are replaced by their simpler, and by extension more sincere, 
Christian counterparts.”53 Hartney also considers John’s Christianization of discourse as 
a project that entails a demonstration of Plato’s achievements as insignificant failures, 
thereby establishing Paul’s message in their place, and thus “rewriting the cultural 
heritage of his new Christian citizens.”54  
My objection to this thesis is primarily due to the fact that we know John did not 
object to the standards of education of his day, which included the literature and 
philosophy associated with the Greco-Roman cultural heritage. Since that is the case, 
the role of Paul’s texts would not be part of a rewriting of the cultural heritage but 
rather expanding it to include Christian texts, which would be primarily taught at home 
and in the church. The connection between simplicity of thought and expression as 
marks of sincerity on the one hand, and complexity of thought and expression as marks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In Act. apost. hom. 4.4 (PG 60:47; NPNF 1-11:29). 
52 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 81. Cf. Amirav, Rhetoric and 
Tradition, 25: “There is nothing surprising in the fact that the propagation of ideals which centre around 
rusticity, simplicity, and even idealistic illiteracy depends on the literary skills of their authors. In this 
sense, Christianity is like any other culture, immortalising the mute and illiterate by means of its urbanity 
and literacy.”  
53 Hartney, John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City, 81.  
54 Ibid., 82. 
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of insincerity, on the other, is one that John makes in various texts and it can also be 
considered a rhetorical tool. In fact, it has long been recognized as such, and 
Chrysostom was not unique in employing it.55  
And yet, despite his apparent lack of education, Paul was also singlehandedly 
responsible for the demolition of paganism, according to Chrysostom. In the second 
Homily on Eutropius John describes the religious and social status quo under paganism: 
Formerly there was lamentation, there were altars everywhere, everywhere the 
smoke and fumes of sacrifice, everywhere unclean rites and mysteries, and 
sacrifices, everywhere demons holding their orgies, everywhere a citadel of the 
devil, everywhere fornication decked with wreaths of honour; and Paul stood 
alone. How did he escape being overwhelmed or torn in pieces? How could he 
open his mouth?56       
 
M. Mitchell has analysed the similarity of the terminology and concepts in the 
second Homily on Eutropius with Libanius’ Oration 18, where John’s teacher is 
describing in very similar terms the restoration of pagan worship that took place under 
Julian, and argues that what Chrysostom achieves here is an antithesis between Paul and 
Julian.57 In this antithetical scheme, and keeping in mind that Chrysostom’s implicit 
target is probably Julian, Paul represents a solitary figure that stands against what the 
Emperor tried to resurrect in Chrysostom’s time. Many a time in Chrysostom’s rhetoric 
Paul represents the archetypal Christian hero, while Julian and Plato often serve as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 “At times it was useful to emphasize the difference, to stress the “simplicity” of Christian literature 
over the conceit and trickery of rhetoric, or to insist on the irrational, the leap of faith, contrasted with the 
implied rationality of worldly learning.” Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 85. Even 
more explicitly, although Cameron refers to Jerome: “Sometimes the claim to simplicity was obviously 
bogus, juxtaposed as it was with full utilization of the rhetorical repertoire.” Ibid., 112. Or, in general on 
the Fathers: “It is impossible to make any seasoned system out of the utterances of the Fathers. All 
denounce the folly of contemporary orators and all on occasion avail themselves of their tools.” Hubbell, 
“Chrysostom and Rhetoric,” 266. 
56 De capt. Eutr. 14 (PG 52.409; NPNF 1-9:261). Referring to pre-Christian times, in his first Homily 
on the Cross and the Thief John explains that the concentration of Jewish worship and sacrifices in 
Jerusalem was a necessary response to the uncleanliness of the rest of the earth, brought upon it by 
Hellenic sacrifices: De cruc. et latr. hom. 1 1 (PG 49:400). Cf. De cruc. et latr. hom. 2 1 (PG 49:409) for 
the same argument and the additional point that it was Christ who cleansed the earth. 
57 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 271. Cf. Libanius, Or. 18.126 (LCL 451:361). “First of all then, 
as I have said, he restored piety, as it were, from exile. Some temples he built, others he restored, while 
he furnished others with statues…Everywhere there were altars, fire, blood offerings, fat and smoke: the 
mystic ritual was performed, seers were freed from fear, and on the mountain tops were pipings and 
processions, and the same ox served as worship for the gods and a feast for men.” 
170 
archetypal pagan villains.  It is because of this that Hubbell describes the seven homilies 
in praise of St. Paul as “not an encomium on Paul but an apology for Christianity, and a 
proof of its divine origin, using the greatness of Paul as one of the proofs.”58   
As we discussed more extensively in the previous chapter, for Chrysostom pagan 
worship did not exist in a vacuum. This is particularly important since both Libanius 
and Julian, as representatives of the Hellenic tradition in Chrysostom’s time, are being 
attacked for their religious views. However, “the particular mode of Chrysostom's 
argument involves an ethical dimension: the pagans are criticized for maintaining 
beliefs and forms of worship that contribute to moral decadence.” It is an apologetic 
argument that fits within Chrysostom’s efforts to prove the moral superiority of 
Christianity.59 Time and again he explicitly connects religion with Greek philosophy, 
which he considers the element that “provided the logic and justification for the worship 
of idols.”60 To support this argument Mitchell mentions the Homilies on Romans, where 
John refers to Socrates’ command to his followers to sacrifice a rooster to Asclepius.61 
What John is doing is effectively creating a chain of philosophers who are treated as 
enablers of paganism, starting from Socrates through Plato and down to Julian and 
Libanius in his own day. Despite his lack of learning, and in contrast to all these men 
considered wise, Paul is the epitome of true faith because unlike them, he teaches the 
correct doctrine. 
ii. The beloved disciple, Plato and Pythagoras 
The argument about the effectiveness of the apostolic teaching reappears in John’s 
Homilies on John, in a detailed comparison between the Apostle John, Plato and 
Pythagoras. John was of no native land, but of an inglorious village of a place little 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Hubbell, “Chrysostom and Rhetoric,” 271. 
59 For further discussion and the aforementioned quotation see Hunter, A Comparison, 54. 
60 Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 274. 
61 In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:414) 
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esteemed,62 a topos that John has already used in connection to the trial of the martyr 
Lucian. As for παιδείας τῆς ἔξωθεν, “he had none whatsoever.”63 To put it succinctly, 
John was not just ἰδιώτης, but also ἀγράµµατος. Chrysostom insists that this remained 
the case both before and after he met and accompanied Christ, but this fact did not 
affect John’s works. Now John being the fisherman that he was, one would expect to 
hear things about fishing or rivers from him. But, Chrysostom says, “we shall hear none 
of these, but heavenly things, which no one ever before has learned … sublime 
teachings, and a virtuous way and philosophy of life.”64 This statement is followed by a 
Chrysostomic tirade of rhetorical questions on who is entitled to speak about things like 
these: “Tell me, are these the words of a fisherman? Of an accomplished orator? Of a 
sophist or a philosopher? Of someone educated in profane learning? Not at all.” 
Humans cannot philosophize about “that incorrupt and blessed Nature; about the 
powers closely associated with It; about immortality and everlasting life; about the 
nature of mortal bodies and of the immortal beings they will afterwards become; about 
punishment, about the future judgment, and about the accounts to be rendered; for 
words, for deeds, for thoughts, and for intentions. And to know why man (ἄνθρωπος) 
exists … what vice is, and what virtue.”65 
This is the point where Plato and Pythagoras enter the discussion, precisely because 
they inquired into these matters. Chrysostom’s reference to these two only is because 
“we ought not to recall the others at all, so ridiculous have they all become on this 
subject through their exaggeration.”66 Plato is the first to be accused, starting, as per 
usual, with the charge that he spent his life trying to make women common to all. His 
aim was to disturb the lives of people, by corrupting their marriages and to cause a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In Ioh. hom. 2.1 (PG 59:30; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 12). 
63 Ibid. 2.1 (PG 59:30; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 13). 
64 Ibid. (trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 13-4). 
65 Ibid. (PG 59:30; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 14).  
66 In Ioh. hom. 2.2 (PG 59:30; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 14). 
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general upheaval. The second accusation is about the fate of the soul after death, which 
is an issue we have noted before in relation to comparisons with Plato, with the 
difference that Chrysostom’s reference here is based on a quote by Empedocles: “And 
with regard to their teachings about the soul, they have omitted nothing at all that is 
excessively shameful, saying that the souls of men become flies and gnats, and shrubs, 
declaring that God Himself is a soul…”67 However, he asserts that the main difference 
between them and the apostle is this: while they “make all their statements from obscure 
and undependable reasoning [logismoi being the preferred word again here]”, John 
“speaks all things with assurance and, as one founded on a rock, he never wavers.”68  
John’s rock-steadiness is contrasted to the Greeks’ ever-changing opinion (“always 
changing their minds about the same matters”), and his lack of education and humility 
of origin, at which the Greeks poke fun, becomes a source of pride for the Christians. 
Chrysostom goes as far as to say that no matter how barbarous	   and distant from 
Hellenic paideia John’s “nation” seems to the Greeks, “so much the brighter do our 
claims appear.”69 Essentially the barbarian and ἀµαθὴς apostle teaches things that no 
one before him ever knew. There is no need of greater proof of the claim that his 
sayings are “God-inspired” than the fact that “all his hearers through all time believe.”70 
In other words, the argument from conviction reappears in John’s case, as it already did 
with Paul and Peter.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., 2.2 (PG 59:31; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 15). The passage is from 
Empedocles 9.569 (ed. Beckby, Anthologia Graeca 3.346): ῎Ηδη γάρ ποτ̓ ἐγὼ γενόµην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε 
θάµνος τ̓ οἵωνός τε καὶ ἐξ ἁλὸς ἔµπυρος ἰχθύς.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid: ὅσῳ γὰρ ἂν τὸ ἔθνος αὐτοῖς βάρβαρον φαίνηται καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ἀπέχον παιδεύσεως, 
τοσούτῳ λαµπρότερα τὰ ἡµέτερα φανεῖται! When we see Chrysostom attacking Greek paideia, we should 
never forget the fact that he is primarily arguing against views like Julian’s, who saw it as “a gift of the 
gods to mankind” which leads humans to achievements such as the advancement of scientific knowledge 
or the establishment of different types of political constitutions. See Contr. Gal. 229C (LCL 157:387). As 
Vasiliki Limberis, ““Religion” as the Cipher for Identity: The Cases of Emperor Julian, Libanius, and 
Gregory Nazianzus,” Harvard Theological Review 93:4 (2000), 387 points out, “paideia becomes 
something of a religion itself.”  
70 In Ioh. hom. 2.2 (PG 59:30; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 16). 
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The strongest proof of John’s divine inspiration, according to Chrysostom, is that he 
laid no laws of his own, since he was a disciple of Christ’s law,71 and by writing his 
Gospel he occupies the whole world, in a spiritual sense. But even in the bodily sense, 
Chrysostom argues, John lived in “the middle of Asia, where of old all those of Greek 
persuasion used to teach philosophy, and there he is fearful to the demons; shining in 
the midst of his enemies, dispersing their darkness...”72 This is obviously a reference to 
the tradition that John resided in Ephesus for a period of his life, but this is not the most 
significant part of this passage. The first element that stands out is Chrysostom’s 
reference to the Ionian school of philosophers, whom he calls οἱ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς 
συµµορίας ἅπαντες, literally “those of the Greek gang!” The other significant element is 
the mention of John as dispersing the philosophers’ darkness, which serves as a rather 
subtle allusion to the obscurity of some of the Ionians’ writings (e.g. Heraclitus).73 This 
is not the only time John refers to the Ionian philosophers.  
These comments can be further contextualized by reference to Chrysostom’s 
hypothesis on his Homilies on the Ephesians: here he dedicates about half of his space 
to talk about the cult of Artemis in Ephesus and the philosophers who were known as 
residents in the city in the past. He begins with the cult of the goddess, observing that 
she was honored as a great god and that the superstition of those who worshipped her 
was so great that they refused to reveal the name of the one who burnt her temple. This 
is in reference to the second temple, which was destroyed by Herostratus, and John 
correctly refers to the fact that the Ephesians forbade anyone from mentioning his name. 
After indicating that Ephesus was also the place where John the Evangelist died, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Unlike Plato. John’s frequent references to Plato’s failure in establishing his ideal republic is also 
better understood within this context.  
72 Ibid. 
73 See Diogenes Laertius Vit. phil. 9.1 (LCL 185:408-25). This is not the only instance where John 
points to the obscurity of the Greeks’ writings. In De Laz. conc. 3.3 (PG 48:994) he makes the case that 
the philosophers, orators, and writers of those “outside” not only did not strive for the common good, but 
even when they had something useful to say they hid it in obscurity, as in a cloud. 
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goes on to mention the philosophers based there: Pythagoras was said to come from 
there, perhaps because Samos was also traditionally thought of as part of Ionia, as well 
as disciples of Parmenides, Zeno and Democritus. The reference to philosophers closes 
with the observation that one can see a number of them even in Chrysostom’s day.74 
Ephesus is then a double apostolic battleground: John (with his presence) and Paul 
(with his letter) are able to fight and prevail against both a strong philosophical current 
that goes all the way back to the pre-Socratics and a powerful local cult that could not 
have easily been uprooted. 
Nonetheless, the end result of this battle between John and the philosophers should 
be obvious by now: “the teachings of Pythagoras have fallen silent, as well as those of 
Plato, which at one time seemed authoritative - and many do not even know them by 
name.”75 This reference to the two philosophers is followed by a direct criticism of 
Pythagoras and a very vague reference to Plato’s trip to Sicily. The interesting part in 
the critique of Pythagoras is the reference to his apparent dialogue with oxen, which 
Chrysostom sees as something that “in no way helped the human race, but even has 
done it the greatest harm.”76 It seems that the theme of usefulness is a standard trope 
every time Greek philosophy is mentioned.77 But John’s tirade against Pythagoras does 
not stop there:  
He did not cause irrational nature to exercise the power of reason (since this is 
impossible for a man to do), but he deceived the ignorant by tricks. Refraining 
from teaching man anything useful, he taught that to eat beans was the same as 
to eat the heads of one’s ancestors, and persuaded his followers that the soul of 
their teacher once was a shrub, then a maiden, then a fish.78 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In Eph. hom. Arg. (PG:62.9-10). 
75 In Ioh. hom. 2.2 (PG 59:31; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 16). 
76 Ibid. (trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 16-7). 
77 When receiving the Gospel, the wise do not profit at all by their wisdom and the unlearned are not 
hurt by their ignorance. In this respect, ignorance is even preferable since it represses “all doubting 
thoughts” and thus proves wisdom to be useful for nothing. In the end, faith and simplicity are always 
prioritized over the wisdom from without, which they destroyed. See In 1 Cor. hom. 4.1 (PG 61:33; 
NPNF 1-12:18). 
78 In Ioh. hom. 2.2 (PG 59:31; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 17).  
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The main criticisms against Pythagoras can be summed up as follows: a) he 
deceived the foolish with his magic tricks, b) he did not teach anything useful to 
humans, c) he convinced those who followed him (in this case, Empedocles) to believe 
in reincarnation. Au contraire, John did not bother with the “foolishness about the 
nature of brute beasts”, and “he strove for one single object: that the whole world might 
learn something that would be both useful to it and capable of conducting it from earth 
to heaven.”79 It is because John wanted his teachings to be useful that he decided to 
avoid the Pythagoreans’ obscurity and teaching practices, such as the five years of 
silence and the motionless sitting. Chrysostom commends John’s rejection of what he 
calls the “mythology” that the universe consisted of numbers; he also praises the 
simplicity of his teaching, which was understood not only by men, but also by women 
and youths. Chrysostom anticipates the question as to why John would want to be 
understood by all, to which he provides the following response: “he believed that they 
[his teachings] were both true and useful for all his hearers.”80 Consequently, true 
philosophy is primarily practical. 
After the contrast between Pythagoras and John, Chrysostom returns to the 
comparison between Plato and John. His focus now is the excessive rhetorical 
embellishment of Plato, along with a brief criticism of his doctrine of the soul. What we 
observe in the evangelist’s writings are “not … noise of words or pomposity of style, or 
careful ordering and artificial, foolish arrangement of nouns and verbs (for these things 
are far removed from all philosophy), but invincible and divine strength, irresistible 
power of authentic doctrines, and a wealth of good things without number.…”81 This 
passage has some similarities to the aforementioned comparison between Plato and 
Paul, whose eloquence was not a result of technical training, but of divine grace and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In Ioh. hom. 2.3 (PG 59:32; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 17). 
80 Ibid. (trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 18). 
81 Ibid. (trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 18).  
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Paul’s natural aptitude for learning. What John assumes here is that Plato did have the 
writing style he is criticized for, but the difference between this comparison and the one 
we mentioned earlier between Paul and Plato is that John’s focus here is the style of 
writing whereas earlier it was rhetoric. Even in his writing Paul was much simpler than 
Plato: but at the same time, his thought (just like his speech) had the strength of true 
doctrine behind it, and was thus more convincing. 
Excessiveness on matters of expression, Chrysostom argues, is not even worthy of 
the sophists: at this point he introduces the beginning of Plato’s Apology, where 
Socrates claims that he is ashamed of this art and tells the judges that “they will hear 
from him utterances made simply and extemporaneously, not adorned with elaborate 
expressions or decked out with artificially chosen nouns and verbs. 'It would not, of 
course, be befitting my age, gentlemen,' he says, 'for me to come in to you like a lad 
inventing speeches’.”82 Chrysostom uses the example of Socrates in order to accuse 
Plato of betraying the exact principles that his teacher promoted.  
His final attack, which concludes the comparison between John and the 
philosophers, is an analogy between whitened graves that are filled with stench and 
rotten bones and Plato’s doctrines, especially his doctrine of the soul, “since he both 
honors it and desecrates it immoderately.”83 On the one hand, Plato is 
disproportionately honouring the soul when he says that it is of the divine substance. On 
the other hand, he dishonours and insults it even more when he is “bringing it into 
swine, asses, and animals even less esteemed than these.”84 John ends his comparison 
abruptly, since he feels that “if it were possible to learn something useful from this 
review, it would be necessary to spend even more time on it. But, if the object is only to 
observe how great unseemliness and absurdity these things possess, then we have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 In Ioh. hom. 2.3 (PG 59.32-3; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 18-19). Cf. Plato, Apol. 
Soc. 1b-c (LCL 36:106-8). 
83 Ibid., 2.3 (PG 59.33; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 19). 
84 Ibid. 
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carried on the discussion further than necessary.”85 It is a fitting end that brings the 
issue of usefulness full circle, and dismisses Greek philosophy as a collection of absurd 
fables, precisely because Chrysostom finds no use in it. 
c. Minor comparisons 
i. The Evangelists and the Philosophers 
Chrysostom’s very first homily on Matthew, before his actual commentary on the 
Gospel, serves as an introduction to the work and deals with various issues, such as the 
occasion of the writing of the gospels as well as their harmony. He makes a point that 
he will be trying to prove their fundamental agreement with each other throughout the 
work and says that those who think they disagree only say so because they expected 
them to use the “same words and forms of speech.”86 This point provides an opportunity 
for Chrysostom to compare the evangelists with the Greek philosophers. The latter are 
the ones who “glory greatly in rhetoric and philosophy.” Now despite the fact that these 
(as yet unnamed) men have written many books about the same things, they not only 
“expressed themselves differently, but have even spoken in opposition to another (οὐ 
µόνον ἁπλῶς διεφώνησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίως ἀλλήλοις εἶπον).” The disagreements of 
the philosophers are a common Chrysostomic trope. Sometimes he is even more 
specific about it, as in his Homilies on Romans where Aristotle rebels against Plato and 
the Stoics rebel against Aristotle.87 But in his Commentary on Galatians he also 
recognizes that the Christians are also suffering from their own divisions (probably a 
reference to the schisms in Antioch), and they thus become a laughing stock for Jews 
and Greeks.88 This is yet another instance of Chrysostom using disagreements among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In Ioh. hom. 2.3 (PG 59.33; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 19). 
86 In Matt. hom. 1.4-5 (PG 57:18-20; NPNF 1-10:4-6). The following analysis and all of 
Chrysostom’s passages within are from this passage. 
87 In Rom. hom. 2.3 (PG 60:414). 
88 In Gal. comm. 1.6 (PG 61:623). 
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philosophers and turning them against them, even if he does not provide concrete 
examples.  
After describing the success of the gospel writings Chrysostom makes another 
point: what the evangelists wrote was “concerning the things in heaven”, all the while 
introducing a unique way of life where things like wealth and poverty or freedom and 
slavery all radically acquire a new meaning. He then compares the heavenly philosophy 
to the earthly philosophy of the Greeks, specifically Plato and Zeno (who are both 
targeted for having written works entitled Politeia), as well as anyone who has written a 
similarly titled work (Diogenes the Cynic allegedly wrote one, and one would think that 
Aristotle is also included here) or any laws. Chrysostom targets them elsewhere, for the 
exact same reasons, and many of the arguments are repeated.89 These writings, 
Chrysostom argues, manifest an evil spirit that has set its eyes to turning everything 
upside down. His proof for this claim? The fact that the philosophers want to make the 
women common to all and to establish illegal marriages, and that virgins are to fight 
naked in the wrestling school where anyone can gaze at them.  
The philosophers also failed in other respects: they did not even know the word 
virginity, or the concepts of voluntary poverty and fasting. On the contrary, the 
evangelists, among other things, have “filled the whole earth with the plant of 
virginity.” The knowledge that the evangelists spread with their writings had not even 
been mentally conceived before them, Chrysostom claims, and how could it be 
conceived by those “who made for gods images of beasts.” The inevitable conclusion, 
and one that has also been repeated elsewhere, is that the evangelical writings were not 
only accepted and believed but are still flourishing to this day, whilst the philosophical 
writings have perished and disappeared.  
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But Chrysostom is not done with Plato’s Politeia. The next comparison is between 
respective writing circumstances: the philosophers were able to write “not amidst 
persecutions, nor dangers, nor fightings, but in all security and freedom.” On the 
contrary, the “doctrines of the fishermen” are of men who were themselves chased, men 
who were “scourged and in jeopardy.” His next point regards the length of the work. 
After the accusation that the philosopher has spent a vast number of lines just to show 
what justice is (τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον), he is also accused of being obtuse; even if his 
writing did contain something profitable, this would be useless for human life. 
Chrysostom assumes that people like smiths, builders and farmers, indeed manual 
laborers in general, would not be able to leave behind their art and honest toil for years 
just to learn what justice is. Before they even get a chance to learn, hunger will destroy 
them and they will perish without even learning anything useful! This is then contrasted 
not with the Apostles but with Christ, whose whole teaching is contained in a few 
simple words: here Chrysostom quotes Matthew 22:40 (“On these two commandments 
hang all the law and the prophets”) and 7:12 (“In everything do to others as you would 
have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets”). Everyone, whether a laborer, 
a servant, a widow, and even a child can comprehend and easily learn these things. But 
for Chrysostom it is not only just about how easily these respective teachings can be 
understood. It is also about how easily they can be emulated in all manner of 
circumstances, regardless of one’s location or social status, and in this respect Christ’s 
teaching is yet again victorious. 
Chrysostom’s initial targeting of the authors comes full circle when he makes his 
point clear. The fishermen also wrote a politeia. But unlike the philosophical politeia, 
with its rules that it has to be taught from childhood or the “law that the virtuous man 
must be so many years old,” the evangelical one is addressed to everyone of any age; 
where the former resembles children’s toys, the latter manifests the truth of things. The 
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place of the Christian politeia is in Heaven, and God is its lawgiver. The rewards of this 
heavenly politeia are also different: instead of bay leaves or olives, or eating in public, 
it provides us with life everlasting with Christ. The guides of the heavenly politeia are 
publicans, fishermen and tent-makers, a point that Chrysostom brings up to show that 
they were doing good not only whilst they were alive but also now after their death. 
Finally, this politeia is at war not with other humans but with the devil and other 
incorporeal powers. Its general is God Himself and its armor is not made of steel or 
skins but of “righteousness, and faith, and all true love of wisdom (philosophia).” 
Chrysostom’s conclusion to this introductory homily is that this politeia is indeed the 
subject of Matthew’s Gospel and the topic he will be speaking of throughout, and his 
aim is to enroll those who have yet not become its citizens.  
As with other comparisons, certain themes seem to reappear, while others are new. 
As an example of the latter, Chrysostom here takes the argument regarding the number 
of the Gospels and turns it against Greek philosophy by emphasizing philosophical 
disagreements- the implication being that the variety of the Gospels did not have the 
same outcome. He repeats the claim that the evangelical writings are primarily 
concerned with the heavenly politeia but at the same time emphasizes that the 
application of their teaching also led to a radical departure from old ways of thinking 
that have caused a virtuous revolution in society. In contrast, the writings of the 
philosophers promoted perverse teachings, were ignorant of important things, and have 
subsequently vanished- even if John’s reference to them could be taken to indicate 
otherwise. Also new is the point about the respective writing conditions of each, but 
also the brevity of their writings. Chrysostom happily points out that the average 
philosophical writing could probably never be read by the common man (we use the 
masculine intentionally here due to Chrysostom referring to male handymen), due to its 
length, and, one would also assume, complexity. His solution to that is to not even point 
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to the evangelical writings, presumably because one could still claim that these need 
sufficient time and dedication to be read. Instead, he deflects the issue by bringing up 
Jesus and the Golden Rule, which he considers sufficient and easy enough for everyone 
to learn and apply to his/her life. 
ii. The Apostles and the Great Men of Greece 
Comparisons between the Apostles and of certain famous men among the Greeks 
abound in Chrysostom’s works. Usually the Apostles are treated as a single entity, with 
the exceptions being Paul, Peter, and John, whereas the Greeks are often criticized 
individually. In his thirty-third Homily on Matthew the targets of the attack initially 
seem to be Plato, Pythagoras and the Stoics.90 However, after mentioning Plato’s sale as 
a slave and failure to convert even one tyrant, despite the great honor he enjoyed 
beforehand,91 he turns his attention to the Cynics, who, besides their usual 
characterization as scum, are also said to have passed by “like a dream and a shadow.”92 
These men were considered glorious for their philosophy, spent their time at leisure, 
and profited handsomely. Chrysostom then proceeds to give more examples. The first is 
Aristippus of Cyrene, who is accused of purchasing costly whores, something that John 
could have easily known from certain anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius.93 The next two 
targets are anonymous: one is a philosopher who made his will without leaving any 
inheritance and the other is one who used his disciples as a bridge and walked on them. 
The final target is Diogenes the Cynic, and his public exhibitions in the market place. 
These examples are used in order to draw a clear line (in his terms) between ‘them’ (the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 In Matt. hom. 33.4 (PG 57:393; NPNF 1-10:217-8). 
91 This is a very common trope in Chrysostom’s works. It usually appears in comparisons between 
Paul and Plato and its aim is to show the success of the former against the failure of the latter. For other 
references see In Rom. hom. 2.5 (PG 60:407); In Tit. hom. 2.2 (PG 62:673): Paul more powerful than 
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Greek philosophers) and ‘us’ (the Christians). These are the things they do, John claims. 
On the contrary, there are no such things on the Christian side, and what is there is 
σωφροσύνη καὶ κοσµιότης and a war against the entire world in defense of truth and 
piety.94 But the Greeks did not just have philosophers. They also had men exceedingly 
skilled in warfare, and the examples used here are Pericles and Themistocles. Compared 
to the achievements of the fishermen, their achievements look like children’s toys. 
Chrysostom is not particularly impressed with Themistocles’ persuasive abilities when 
he convinced the Athenians to lure Xerxes’ fleet into the straits of Salamis. In the 
Apostles’ case, it is not just Xerxes marching onto Greece but the devil and his 
innumerable demons fighting against the Apostles not just once, but throughout their 
lives. Even the method of their prevalence was exemplary, since they did not have to 
slay their adversaries, and converted them instead.95 In this example we have two 
significant diversions from previous comparisons. Besides the usual suspects (Plato, 
Pythagoras), John is willing to widen the net and include people like Aristippus of 
Cyrene and even anecdotes about anonymous philosophers in order to demarcate the 
boundaries between the philosophers and the Christians. Furthermore, the repertoire is 
also expanded with the addition of personalities famous for their involvement with 
Greek politics and warfare. In this case John downplays their achievement by saying 
that the apostles exceeded them since their opponent was not human but the devil 
himself, whilst also bringing back the conviction argument and comparing it to the 
slaughters any warfare inevitably brings with it. 
iii. The flight of the philosophers, the fight over science, and faith against reasonings 
In John’s Homilies on Colossians Paul’s bonds are compared to those of Socrates, 
and while the similarity of their imprisonment is mentioned, the emphasis is on the 
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reaction of their respective disciples. Socrates’ students fled to Megara, while Paul’s 
became more confident because they saw that even though Paul was in chains the 
preaching could not be hindered.96 The theme of the flight of Socrates’ students 
reappears in Chrysostom’s fourth homily In praise of St. Paul, but this time in order to 
make a contrast between present day Greeks (who are called εὐτελεῖς and 
εὐκαταφρόνητοι) and the legendary Greeks of the past (who are called θαυµαστοί and 
ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ βεβοηµένοι).97 John mentions Plato, Diagoras, Anaxagoras and Zeno and 
talks about their flight to Megara after Socrates’ death and their subsequent deprivations 
of their native lands as well as their failures to win any converts. It is also recalled that 
although these philosophers lacked nothing, and that they were in fact proficient 
speakers as well as wealthy and citizens of a celebrated land, they in fact had no power 
at all. Chrysostom ends this passage triumphantly, by observing that “such is the case 
with deception, that even when no one troubles it, it falls in ruins; such with the truth 
that, even when many battle against it, it is promoted.”98 
We call this theme “the flight of the philosophers”, since the disciples of Socrates 
are not the only ones it is applied to. It also appears when John contrasts the attitude of 
the monks with the attitude of the philosophers during the statues riots in Antioch.99 In 
this case the ascetics manifest themselves as the real lovers of wisdom through their 
actions and their life in virtue, and are contrasted with a caricature of the contemporary 
philosophers in Antioch. In F. G. Downing’s opinion Chrysostom is “showing that it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In Col. hom. 10.4 (PG 62:370). 
97 See n. 98 below for the full reference to John’s text. 
98 De Laud. Paul. hom. 4.19 (SC 300:224-6; trans. Mitchell, The Heavenly Trumpet, 466):  Καὶ τί 
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κίνδυνος, οὐκ ἰδιωτεία, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεινοὶ λέγειν ἦσαν, καὶ χρηµάτων εὐπόρουν, καὶ τῆς παρὰ πᾶσι 
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ἐνοχλοῦντος, καταρρεῖ· τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ πολλῶν πολεµούντων, διεγείρεται. 
99 De stat. 17.2 (PG 49:173-4). 
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the penniless Christian monks … who in reality display the Cynic virtues, live up to the 
Cynic ideals.”100 The manifestation of the philosophical ideal by the monks is 
something that Chrysostom would do time and time again and was another weapon used 
as a proof of concept in his use of the theme of usefulness and how each side benefits 
humanity either in critical events such as the riots or in their everyday lives.101 
In the final analysis, according to Chrysostom, faith is what really makes people 
philosophers and allows the Christians to differentiate from the Greeks, who base their 
beliefs on their reasonings (logismoi) rather than faith. The distinction between 
logismoi/syllogismoi and pistis, which were already mentioned in connection to Paul’s 
eloquence and his superiority over Plato, become metonyms that come to represent the 
mind-sets of the Greeks and the Christians respectively, as well as their respective 
writings: “secular writings … are full of questions and sophistry (syllogisms).”102 
Additionally, Chrysostom argues in regard to his own time, “not even now persuade we 
by argumentation (συλλογισµῶν); but from the Divine Scriptures, and from the miracles 
done at that time, we produce the proof of what we say.” At the same time, he admits 
that even the Apostles didn’t persuade just by signs, but also through discourse 
(διαλεγόµενοι), even though their words were powerful not due to their shrewdness 
(δεινότης) but primarily because of the signs and the witness of the OT.103 The dialectic 
relationship between faith and reasonings is a constant feature in Chrysostom’s works 
but here we will limit ourselves only to the extent that it relates to the concepts being 
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considered as representative of Christianity and Hellenism. In this respect, John 
contrasts the two attitudes through the prism of education and knowledge: 
Let us, then, have faith, and let us not entrust our own affairs altogether to 
reason. Why is it, may I ask, that the Greeks were able to discover nothing of 
God? Did they not know all the pagan wisdom? How is it, then, that they were 
unable to get the better of fishermen and tent-makers, and unlettered men? Was 
it not because the Greeks trusted everything to reason, while the latter placed all 
their confidence in faith? That is why these prevailed over Plato and Pythagoras 
and, in a word, over all who were in error: those familiar with astrology, and 
mathematics, and geometry, and arithmetic. They surpassed all who had had a 
thorough and complete education, and became as far superior to them as true 
philosophers to those who are actually dull and witless by nature. Notice that 
[those of the Christian faith] assert that the soul is immortal, or, rather, they have 
not only asserted this, but have even argued in favour of this fact. The others, on 
the contrary, at first did not even know what in the world a soul is. But when 
they did discover it and had distinguished it from the body, they once more fell 
into error, some maintaining that it is incorporeal, others that it is a material 
body and fused with the body itself. Once more, regarding heaven, some said it 
was animated by a soul and was a god, while the fishermen both taught and 
argued that it is a work of God and part of His creation. However, it is not at all 
strange that the Greeks make use of reason, but it is a lamentable thing when 
those who seem to be of the faith are discovered to be concerned only with this 
life.104 
 
In the passage above, John is prepared to admit that the Greeks were well educated 
in all of the ἔξωθεν wisdom. With that being the case, how could they not prevail 
against the fishermen and the tent-makers? In Chrysostom’s mind, it was because the 
Greeks chose to trust their λογισµοί and not faith, as the apostles did. It is precisely 
because of their faith that the apostles were able to prevail over Plato and Pythagoras, 
and everyone whose life was devoted to astrology, mathematics, arithmetic, geometry 
and every other branch of learning. Chrysostom’s choice of the sciences is interesting. 
If we rule out mathematics as a science that encompasses both arithmetic and geometry, 
what he refers to here are three out of the four sciences that comprised the ancient 
Greek quadrivium, except for music. It should be noted that the medieval quadrivium 
had significant differences to Plato’s version, including the intensity and seriousness of 
mathematical studies. Chrysostom’s diatribe against these sciences is exactly because 
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“Plato emphasized the sovereign importance of mathematics for all higher study” and 
“firmly believed that mathematics was the true and proper propaedeutic to 
philosophy.”105 If for Plato mathematics were τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον … µάθηµα, ἐπειδὴ 
φαίνεταί γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν,106 this was definitely not the case for Chrysostom and it seems that his choice 
of sciences is related to Plato’s very high estimation of them.  
This is not the only instance of John detailing Plato’s preoccupation with geometry 
and numbers in general: “What great labours did Plato endure, and his followers, 
discoursing to us about a line, and an angle, and a point, and about numbers even and 
odd, and equal unto one another and unequal, and such-like spiderwebs; … and without 
doing good to any one great or small by their means…” Even Plato’s endeavour to 
prove that the soul is immortal failed to persuade people, whereas the Cross was able to 
persuade even through unlearned men, “and of all men it made philosophers: the very 
rustics, the utterly unlearned.”107 Chrysostom’s comments here are clearly targeting one 
of the fundamental principles of Platonism, as expressed above the door of the 
Academy: ἀγεωµέτρητος µηδεὶς εἰσίτω expresses an elitism that John strongly argues 
against, and counters it with an assertion that all humans are philosophers, regardless of 
profession or knowledge. 
Another reason why John focuses on maths and the sciences in general might have 
been because these were technical subjects that had to be taught. Again, John seems to 
be responding to Hellenic criticisms that the fishermen were illiterate with the 
counterpoint that there is a kind of wisdom that does not need tuition. He would also 
employ a similar analogy when comparing rural Christians, whose wisdom was not 
based on their education but on their simplicity and were thus superior to both urban 
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Christians as well as educated Greeks.108 On the contrary, he believes that these views 
did not lead to the truth in other matters of importance, such as the immortality of the 
soul or the nature of the sky.109 Whereas in these matters the apostles held firm views, 
arguing for the immortality of the soul and that the sun was God’s creation, and 
managed to convince others about their views as well, the Greeks cannot come to an 
agreement and hold divided opinions. John did not hesitate to make much of Greek 
disagreements, as we have already seen.  
Besides faith, the other crucial element that proves the apostolic victory over Plato 
and Pythagoras is the fact that the apostles did not just say and teach things, but were 
also able to convince others and convert them to their beliefs, and this is proven by the 
use of ἔπεισαν twice in the passage above. When it comes down to the effectiveness of 
teaching, the apostles convinced humans with their faith (and teachings), whereas the 
reasonings of the Greeks did not.110 This is a recurring motif in Chrysostom’s works. In 
his Homilies on Romans he uses it to compare the effectiveness of Paul versus Plato: 
“All Greece and all barbarian lands has the tentmaker converted. But Plato, who is so 
cried up and carried about among them (Ὁ δὲ παρ’ αὐτοῖς ἀγόµενος καὶ περιφερόµενος 
Πλάτων), coming a third time to Sicily with the bombast of those words of his, with his 
brilliant reputation (ὑπολήψεως), did not even get the better of a single king, but came 
off so wretchedly, as even to have lost his liberty. But this tentmaker ran over not Sicily 
alone or Italy, but the whole world.”111 The success of the Christian preaching is also 
attributed to the power of faith against reasonings: “For his preaching is set forth to all 
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alike, it knows no distinction of rank, no preeminence of nation, no other thing of the 
sort; for faith alone does it require, and not reasonings.”112   
Could it be that Chrysostom’s aversion to the idea of the pre-eminence of any nation 
led some to call him “the champion of anti-Hellenism?” It is certainly possible. His 
insistence on faith over against reasonings, which he believes allows the Christian 
preaching to be comprehensible to all, is a very flexible apologetic trope that 
Chrysostom can apply to any number of situations. From the apostolic times to his own 
day, it can be used to explain such a variety of themes like why Paul was victorious 
against Plato and Pythagoras to why knowledge of geometry or any other science is 
irrelevant to salvation.  These ideas are not necessarily linked. His aversion to the pre-
eminence of any nation would include all nations of his time, not just the Greeks. But 
the faith versus reasonings debate is a core idea explicitly connected with Hellenism 
and is related to the production of knowledge. Chrysostom does not doubt that 
philosophy can produce knowledge from a strictly secular point of view. Nevertheless, 
he very much doubts its usefulness- another core theme that appears repeatedly in the 
process of synkrisis. Finally, the proof that faith is stronger than reasonings and that the 
apostolic teaching is more useful to humans than the philosophic one is related to the 
third core theme we have seen so far: the success of the apostles versus the failure of the 
philosophers. Even though during his time Chrysostom could still not claim that the 
Empire has been wholeheartedly Christianised, the signs were obvious that this would 
soon be the reality. 
d. Babylas and the Greeks 
As we demonstrated in chapter 2, some scholars have argued that Chrysostom was 
an impassioned enemy of Hellenism. Before we turn to a detailed analysis of the 
Discourse on Blessed Babylas and Against the Greeks, we must begin with an example 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In Rom. hom. 2.5 (PG 60:407; NPNF 1-11:348). 
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that shows how certain myths have managed to prevail in scholarship despite evidence 
to the contrary, just like the alleged destruction of the Temple of Artemis by 
Chrysostom. We will contrast an extract from Babylas with one of the letters of Julian 
the Emperor.  
In an interesting turn of phrase, the Emperor Julian asks Ecdicius, the Prefect of 
Egypt, to seek out and acquire the personal library of George of Cappadocia, Arian 
Bishop of Alexandria during Athanasius’ third exile, who was now dead.  
For there were in his house many [books] on philosophy, and many on rhetoric; 
many also on the teachings of the impious Galileans. These latter I should wish 
to be utterly annihilated, but for fear that along with them more useful works 
may be destroyed by mistake, let all these also be sought for with the greatest 
care.113  
 
Julian would wish that the Christian books were annihilated, but in this case, he 
cannot order their immediate destruction because other more useful works might be 
destroyed as well, whilst he could also use them in his anti-Christian polemic.114 
Another implication of that statement is that Julian thinks he could distinguish between 
the “useful” and the Christian books, but he is clearly not confident that those he sent to 
seek out the books would be able to. We can compare this attitude to Chrysostom’s 
reference to Christians preserving pagan books in his Discourse on Blessed Babylas and 
against the Greeks: 
The philosophers and talented orators had a great reputation with the public on 
account of their dignity and ability to speak. After the battle against us they 
became ridiculous and seemed no different from foolish children. From so many 
nations and peoples, they were not able to change anyone, wise, ignorant, male, 
female, or even a small child. The estimation of what they wrote is so low that 
their books dissapeared a long time ago, and mostly perished when they first 
appeared. If anything at all is found preserved, one finds it being preserved by 
Christians.115  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Julian, Letter 23 (LCL 157:73-5). 
114 David Hunt, “The Christian context of Julian’s Against the Galileans,” in Emperor and Author: 
The Writings of Julian the Apostate, ed. Nicholas Baker-Brian and Shaun Tougher (Swansea: Classical 
Press of Wales, 2012), 255. 
115 De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 11 (SC 362:106; trans. Schatkin, Apologist, 82). 
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Chrysostom thinks these books are of little value, since they could not even 
convince a child, and were usually a cause of laughter, which presumably led to the 
demise of a lot of them. However, the ones that are still extant, he claims, are to be 
found among the Christians. If we limit ourselves to Chrysostom’s time, his claim is 
most probably true, considering that even one of Libanius’ texts (the Monody on the 
Shrine at Daphne) survives in its refutation by Chrysostom.  
The attitudes of both Julian and John in these examples are indicative of the 
ineffectiveness of certain stereotypes that are by and large standard in scholarship: that 
of Julian as the enlightened Emperor that tried vainly to restore the ancient glory of the 
Empire,116 and that of John as a pathological enemy of the Hellenic cultural heritage. In 
Julian’s letter, his attitude towards Christian books is far from open-minded, although 
both he and John share the idea that one can distinguish between useful and non-useful 
books. On the other hand, John’s attitude towards Greek literature, even if motivated by 
apologetic reasons, is far more tolerant, despite its scornful assessment regarding its 
value. It seems then that for Julian Christian books are either useless or dangerous, 
while for John there are both useful and useless books within classical literature.  
Therefore, by examining a small treatise of Chrysostom (which, as we shall see, 
might or might have not been written as a partial response to some of Julian’s writings), 
we have identified two contrasting attitudes which help us to grasp the basic tenets that 
characterize Chrysostom’s understanding of Hellenism and its legacy.  
The text we are going to analyze in some detail is the small apologetic treatise 
Discourse on Blessed Babylas and against the Greeks.117 It was written between 363 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See e.g. Athanassiadi-Fowden, Julian and Hellenism. 
117 The text we will be citing from is published in Saint John Chrysostom: Apologist. Along with this 
translation we will be citing the Sources chrétiennes critical edition of the text, edited by Schatkin as well 
and used as the basis for her English translation. To avoid repetition, the numbers in parentheses at the 
end of or within sentences are to the translation. It should be noted that this treatise is different from a 
Homily on Babylas, delivered on the feast of the martyr and published together with it in the 
aforementioned critical edition. Schatkin also eliminates the reference to Julian in the title of the work as 
it is not frequently attested in the manuscript tradition of the text.  
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and 379-380, most probably in 378.118 M. Schatkin argues that specific issues and 
tensions between pagans and Christians provided the occasion of the writing of the 
Discourse (16-17). The first of them is probably the writings of Porphyry, a 
Neoplatonic philosopher and one of the most energetic opponents of Christianity in late 
antiquity. The fact that Chrysostom was aware of Porphyry (and Celsus) is indicated 
when he refers to both as witnesses to the antiquity of the books of the NT.119 In another 
possible reference to the same two authors he mentions “the book of a certain foul 
pagan philosopher written against us, and also that of that other old one”, with the 
express intention, as he says to the Christians, “to arouse you and draw you out of your 
excessive apathy.”120 
The context in the latter case is the Christians’ unwillingness to put forward a 
defence of their faith in response to legitimate questions that might come from the 
Greeks, such as how the doctrine of the Trinity differs from polytheism. Schatkin 
argues that the Discourse is a general response to Porphyry’s Philosophy from 
Oracles121 (17) and perhaps another of Porphyry’s works, his fifteen books Against 
Christians.122 In this respect, Chrysostom follows a long line of previous Christian 
writers who wrote against Porphyry, including Methodius, Apollinarius of Laodicea, 
Gregory of Nazianzus and even his own teacher, Diodore of Tarsus (18-19). Schatkin 
also argues that Chrysostom was probably in possession of a copy of Against 
Christians, as he claims that Christians were the ones responsible for the preservation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Schatkin, Apologist, 16. Christine Shepardson has narrowed the date between spring 379 and 
spring 380, arguing that there is a possibility the text was written for St. Babylas’s feast day on January 
24, 380: Christine Shepardson, “Rewriting Julian’s Legacy: John Chrysostom’s On Babylas and 
Libanius’ Oration 24,” Journal of Late Antiquity 2.1 (2009), 99-115. 
119 In 1 Cor. hom. 6.3 (PG 61:52). 
120 In Ioh. hom. 17.4 (PG 59:113; trans. Goggin, Commentary on Saint John, 171-2). 
121 Written before the persecutions of Christians under Diocletian and Galerius. 
122 Written during Porphyry’s retirement in Sicily from 268 AD onwards. For John’s knowledge of 
Contra Christianos and the inclusion of fragments from the work in his homilies see Michael Bland 
Simmons, Universal Salvation in Late Antiquity: Porphyry of Tyre and the Pagan-Christian Debate 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 68-9. 
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anti-Christian writings (23). It is also possible that certain of the arguments Chrysostom 
used were directed against Hierocles and his anti-Christian Philalethes, but most of 
them can also be found in Eusebius’ Against Hierocles (27), in which case Chrysostom 
is probably repeating Eusebius’ arguments and does not deal directly with Hierocles’ 
text.  
The second important focus of tension between pagans and Christians is possibly 
the Emperor Julian and his three books Against Christians (or Galileans).123 In this 
work we meet some arguments against Christianity that have already been used by 
Porphyry and Hierocles, but some new ones as well, particularly the charge that 
Christians have resorted to violence against pagans and heretics, something that is 
directly opposed to Jesus’ teachings. Julian also attacked the practice of almsgiving, and 
accused the Christians of worshipping a corpse (29). Chrysostom’s responses to these 
charges can be considered an indication that he was acquainted with Julian’s work (29).  
The writings of Gregory of Nazianzus and Ephraim the Syrian, composed after the 
death of Julian, are characterized by “exultation at the defeat of one of God’s enemies.” 
In stark contrast, John’s discourse on Babylas “does not have the same bitter tone”, 
according to Schatkin (36). In fact, Schatkin argues that “Chrysostom uses the 
principles of Greek ethical theory to demonstrate that the Hellenic ideal of virtue is 
realized only among Christians.”124 Paul Harkins offers a different view, calling the 
Discourse on Babylas “an encomium on the triumph of Christianity and the downfall of 
paganism” (p. 181), while according to J.N.D. Kelly, “its theme, developed with 
bravura and sometimes tedious repetitiveness, is the assertion that the source of 
Christianity's victory over paganism is the power of Christ, which is just as visible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Dated 362-3.  
124 In different parts of the treatise: De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 34-36, 45ff, 47, 49 (Apologist, 42). 
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today as when he was alive on earth.”125 Wilken’s assessment echoes both Harkins and 
Kelly: “Here he presents the strife between Christianity and Hellenism as a conflict over 
the role of divine power in history. Whose power is greatest-that of the gods of the 
Greeks and Romans, reflected in the fortunes of the empire, or that of Christ, reflected 
in the fortunes of the Church?”126	  It is clear, then, that while Kelly, Harkins and Wilken 
emphasize the apologetic and triumphant nature of the work, and therefore make it 
sound strikingly similar to Gregory’s and Ephraim’s writings against Julian, Schatkin 
resists that effort and emphasizes John’s appropriation of the Hellenic ideal of virtue. 
Other scholars have emphasised a more contextual understanding, stressing the 
particular setting, rather than the general contrast between Christian and Greek. 
Shepardson, for example, has suggested that On Babylas might have been written after 
encouragement by Meletius of Antioch and was thus “one more propaganda effort by 
Meletius to appropriate the authority of Babylas for his Antiochene community.”127 
Sandwell stresses the literary context, arguing that both the Demonstration and the 
Discourse can be something more than merely apologetic texts: they could also be “a 
form of edification for Christian audiences, or as education in how to argue against 
Greeks.”128 
Hunter makes the valid point that “Chrysostom does not simply attack an abstract 
“Hellenism” as it was represented in the figures of the ancient philosophers or in the 
myth of Daphne and Apollo [but] also attacks specific contemporary pagans, the 
emperor Julian and the sophist Libanius.”129 These attacks are related to specific 
incidents of his time: on the one hand, in Julian’s case what provoked John was his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 J. N. D. Kelly, Golden Mouth: The Story of John Chrysostom, Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop (London: 
Duckworth, 1995), 41. Cf. Liebeschuetz, Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 148: “the treatise De sancto 
Babyla is Chrysostom’s fullest statement of the Christian case against the pagans.” 
126 Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 131.  
127 Shepardson, “Rewriting Julian’s Legacy,” 113. 
128 Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 76. 
129 Hunter, A Comparison, 52. 
194 
decision for the removal of St. Babylas' relics from Daphne and his failed attempt to 
rebuild the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem.130 On the other hand, Libanius is specifically 
attacked “for his oratorical efforts on behalf of Julian and the cult of Apollo.”131 This is 
the reason the Discourse includes passages from Libanius’ Oration 60 (Monody on the 
Shrine at Daphne), where Libanius laments the burning of the shrine of Apollo.132  
However, Hunter continues his argument about Libanius and Julian by claiming that 
they both fulfilled the archetypal pair of philosophers and orators in John’s work: “It is 
significant that Chrysostom portrays the evil which must be overcome in terms of the 
inherited values of a culture, passed down by previous generations and confirmed by 
pagan education; philosophers and orators.”133 References to the philosophers and 
orators abound both in the Demonstration and the Discourse on Babylas. It is very 
likely that Chrysostom had Julian and Libanius in mind. The former was well-known as 
a philosopher, the latter famed as an orator. The argument of the Demonstration, 
therefore, is not simply that the spread of the Christian movement has fulfilled 
prophecy. Chrysostom also argues that the teachings of Christ and the apostles provide 
superior moral pedagogy. The apostles replaced the old familial and cultural values with 
a “new habit” (καινὴ συνήθεια): fasting instead of luxury, poverty instead of love of 
money, temperance instead of immorality, meekness instead of anger, kindness instead 
of envy. Moreover, unlike the “philosophers and orators,” who merely confirmed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 For an analysis of the relationship between John’s apologetics against Hellenism and Julian’s 
effort to rebuild the temple see Wilken, John Chrysostom and the Jews, 148-60. 
131 Ibid. Simon Swain provides another interpretation regarding the attack on Libanius, which he 
originally found incomprehensible since John seems to go out of his way to do it. He speculates that this 
might be due to Libanius’ Or. 24 On Avenging Julian, which was addressed to the new emperor, 
Theodosius, and called on him to follow and avenge Julian. See Simon Swain, “Sophists and Emperors: 
The Case of Libanius,” in Approaching Late Antiquity: The Transformation from Early to Late Empire, 
eds. Simon Swain and Mark Edwards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 400. On the other hand, 
Ameringer relates the attack to Chrysostom’s abhorrence of pagan worship, “of which the sophists were 
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132 One of the only two direct references to Libanius (although in both cases he calls him the sophist), 
the other being his reference to the latter’s tribute to Chrysostom’s mother, included in his letter To a 
Young Widow 2 (SC 138:120). 
133 Hunter, A Comparison, 49. 
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accepted values, the apostles achieved their notable moral results without the supposed 
benefits of Greek culture. 
John’s text certainly seems to take its starting point from the continuing power 
associated with the remains of Babylas, bishop of Antioch and martyr c. 250. When 
translated from the old city cemetery to the suburb of Daphne, they had first caused 
mischiefs to stop there. They then reduced the nearby oracle of Apollo to silence,134 and 
finally, when returned by the outraged emperor Julian to their former resting place, had 
struck back by making Apollo’s famous temple go up in flames.135 In what folllows, our 
aim will be twofold: on the one hand, we are going to analyse the text briefly and see if 
it fits the competing claims about its nature that we mentioned earlier. On the other 
hand, we will also attempt to assess John’s attitude towards Hellenism through that text 
and as part of the larger picture that will emerge through the study of his corpus, of 
which this work is particularly important for our evaluation of Chrysostom’s reception 
of Hellenism. 
John begins the treatise by admitting that there have been many teachers before 
Christ, who also had disciples and were able to perform wonders. He attributes that 
claim to the Greeks (par. 1; p. 75; pp. 90-2).136 He is willing to admit that although 
Jesus is admired as a wonderworker, everyone should worship him as God not only 
based on his miracles but also on his precepts. Indeed, Chrysostom is generally prone to 
emphasise faith over signs. Elsewhere he mentions a hypothetical scenario regarding the 
second coming of Christ and the effects it would produce on the Greeks, which would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 An argument that Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins, 294, claims comes from Oenomaus of 
Gadara. Shepardson, Controlling Contested Places, 73: “In Chrysostom’s view, not only the Christian 
God, Christianity itself, and Christians, but even the relics of Christian saints have the ability to 
overwhelm the gods and their clients.” 
135 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 41. 
136 Καίτοι πολλοὶ ἕτεροι διδάσκαλοί τε ἐγένοντο καὶ µαθητὰς ἔσχον καὶ θαύµατα ἐπεδείξαντο καθὼς 
Ἑλλήνων παῖδες κοµπάζουσι, ἀλλ’ ὅµως οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε ἐκείνων τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὔτε εἰς νοῦν ἐβάλετο 
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sentences. The first reference will be to the paragraph and page of Schatkin’s translation and the second 
to the pages in the critical edition. 
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presumably include their confession of His divinity and worship. But in Chrysostom’s 
eyes this would not be faith (ὅτι τοῦτο πίστις οὐκ ἔστιν), but a result of necessity and of 
things seen, as it would be not a result of prohairesis but of the “vastness of the 
spectacle.” He concludes by claiming that the more overpowering an event like this is, 
the more the faith is abridged, and this is why signs are not happening anymore (διὰ 
τοῦτο σηµεῖα νῦν οὐ γίνεται).137  
In the Discourse on Babylas John sees the Incarnation as the final blow to the 
sacrificial system, and amazingly Jesus does not only rescue Christians, but also the 
Greeks who blaspheme (βλασφηµοῦντας) against him, particularly from their position 
of being tyrannised by sacrifices to demons (as John thinks; 6; p. 78; p. 98). Chrysostom 
spends quite some time describing sacrifices as an integral part of Greek religion, 
something that might initially seem odd since in other texts he presents Greek religion 
as something that is practically dead. It seems that this conflicting attitude can be 
explained by the difference between the ultimate aim of each reference: when 
addressing Greeks, Chrysostom is not very eager to present Greek religion as something 
alive since he does not want it to appear as an option for them. But when he compares 
Christianity to Greek religion and its practices, his emphasis on blood sacrifice 
functions on a deeper symbolic level: that of a distinguishing feature that defines and 
separates the two religions.138 The emphasis on sacrifice is also an indirect attack on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 In 1 Cor. hom. 6.2 (PG 61:51; NPNF 1-12:31). The Library of the Fathers translated the last 
sentence as miracles instead of signs, which I think is incorrect because elsewhere Chrysostom clearly 
mentions the miracles of the saints in his own time, thus reserving the signs as manifestations of Christ’s 
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138 For this tension in Chrysostom’s thought see Sandwell, Religious Identity in Late Antiquity, 77. C. 
Shepardson also notes Chrysostom’s “emphasis … on bloody sacrifice, the relation of which to the 
violent murder of the saint himself would not have been lost on Chrysostom’s audience.” See 
Shepardson, Controlling Contested Places, 76. 
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Julian and “the grotesqueness of ritual practices that Chrysostom associates with 
Julian.”139 
Chrysostom then goes on to make the accusation that the pagans’ doctrine has never 
been persecuted, because it is not in the character of Christians to “eradicate error by 
constraint and force, but to save humanity by persuasion and reason and gentleness 
(πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ προσηνείᾳ)” (13; p. 83; pp. 106-8). Therefore, no Christian 
emperor has persecuted them, unlike pagan emperors who were constantly contriving 
against the Christians. These references might seem strange to a modern reader, 
considering that John’s career largely coincided with that of Theodosius, but if we 
consider the date of the work then we see that Theodosius has not enacted his ban on 
paganism just yet.140 More important is the fact that Chrysostom uses the Socratic king-
tyrant distinction to make his point: it is a striking example of the practice of Christians 
using techniques they acquired in “pagan” schools against paganism itself.141 
Chrysostom next attributes the collapse of the ancient Greek religion not to external 
factors, but to causes coming from within. It might not have been obliterated yet, but it 
is easy to see that it will be in the near future (13; p. 83; p. 108). Despite the universal 
character of the ancient religion, it was destroyed by Christ’s power, a statement that 
seems to be at odds with what John mentioned before as the reason for its collapse (15; 
p. 84; p. 110).142 Christ’s power (dynamis) here (15) is to be associated with the means 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Shepardson, ibid. 
140 The most comprehensive law of Theodosius against paganism was CTh 16.10.12, which was 
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on anti-pagan legislation under Theodosius and after his death, and the distinction between ritual 
paganism (which was prohibited) and cultural paganism (which was widely tolerated) see Liebeschuetz, 
Barbarians and Bishops, 150. Nevertheless, even the issuing of this law was not enough for Chrysostom 
to use in his arguments against paganism: “His recriminations against pagan idolatry and sacrifice are, for 
example, never backed up by reference to imperial laws against these.” Isabella Sandwell, “Christian 
Self-Definition in the Fourth Century AD: John Chrysostom on Christianity, Imperial Rule and the City,” 
in Culture and Society in Later Roman Antioch, ed. Sandwell and Huskinson, 42. 
141 See Robert E. Carter, “Saint John Chrysostom’s Rhetorical Use of the Socratic Distinction 
between Kingship and Tyranny,” Tradition 14 (1958), 367-71. 
142 “The religion of the Greeks [Hellenism] had been spread all over the earth and controlled the 
souls of all humanity; only later, after gaining so much strength, was it destroyed by Christ’s power.” 
Schatkin (84) situates this argument within a tradition of apologetics that goes back to Eusebius. In Vid. 
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that he used to save humanity (persuasion, reason, gentleness), and not physical might. 
Either way, in the first case John seems to attribute the demise of the ancient religion to 
internal factors, while in the second it seems that Christianity (or divine will) becomes 
the reason for its collapse. 
Using an image that was meant to showcase the impossible, John compares the 
Greeks who attempt to contradict the Christians with those who try to drain the ocean 
by emptying it with their bare hands. He believes that the proper response to that is to 
laugh and weep for the Greeks, because what they are attempting is more difficult than 
trying to drain the ocean (21; p. 87; p. 116)! John uses here the poetic device of the 
adynaton, or impossibility, to emphasize his point and make sure that his audience 
understands the improbability of such an enterprise.  
John’s subject, the bishop and martyr Babylas, becomes an example of someone 
who “was instructed by the divine teaching that all worldly activities are a shadow, and 
a dream …” (34; p. 95; p. 134).143 Then, the unbelievers realize, to their amazement, 
that Christ has imbued his disciples with great courage, and upon this finding “they 
derided their own servility, bondage, and humiliation, and saw the great distance 
between the nobility of the Christians and the degradation of the Greeks” (40-41; p. 98; 
pp. 140-2).  
John also accuses the pagan priests of performing the rituals due to fear of the 
emperors (ibid.). He contrasts this attitude with the situation of a Christian ascending 
the imperial throne and makes the interesting observation that when this happens 
Christianity deteriorates (42; p. 99; pp. 142-4). What he probably has in mind here is the 
series of Arian Emperors that succeeded Constantine to the throne. Chrysostom seems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dom. hom. 4.3 (SC 277:152; trans. Hill, St. John Chrysostom Old Testament Homilies vol. 2, 85) it is 
Peter who is undoing Greek religion like a spider’s web: “What of Peter … unskilled in the word and 
overwhelming orator, unlettered yet stopping the mouths of the philosophers, undoing the pagan religion 
like a spider web…” 
143 A common topos in the Hellenic tradition: cf. Pindar, Pyth. 8.99f., Aeschylus, Ag. 1327f., 
Sophocles, Aj. 125f., Euripides, Med. 1224. 
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to appreciate more the situation when an “impious man” is ruling and persecutes the 
Christians, because this allows the Christian message to spread and provides the 
Christians with the opportunity to win a martyr’s crown (ibid.).144  
To summarize what we have been discussing so far: a number of themes seem to 
emerge from our examination of Chrysostom’s text. First, John is systematically 
disparaging the Greeks for a number of different reasons: especially the fact that they 
have not been persecuted, their own persecution of the Christians, and the decline of 
their religion. The emphasis is usually on their immorality and inexperience of 
humiliation in the past. At the same time, John uses these arguments to emphasize the 
moral superiority and power of Christianity, which seems to be on a mission to convert 
the former followers of paganism. The apologetic nature of the text justifies this latter 
statement, especially in light of its alleged status as a response to a number of pagan 
texts.   
Despite the fact that Chrysostom is anxious to downplay the continued presence of 
paganism in the cities of the Empire, as it stands “the treatise provides indirect evidence 
of the strength of the pagan minority in Antioch in the late 370s.”145 His description of 
idol-worship might show an awareness of certain pagan rituals that were taking place in 
Antioch at the time: “daily and nocturnal feasts, the flutes and kettle-drums, the licence 
to use obscene language and to act even more obscenely, gluttony to the point of 
bursting, delirium from intoxication, degeneration into most shameful madness” (43; p. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Cf.: “Our cause is not the same as the cause of the Greeks; it is not dependent upon the disposition 
of a ruler, but it rests on its own internal strength, and shines forth with greater luster, the more 
vehemently it is assailed,” Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.9 (PG 47:344; trans. Schatkin, Apologist, 99). “For now 
indeed that we are in the enjoyment of peace, we are become supine and lax, and have filled the Church 
with countless evils; but when we were persecuted, we were more sober-minded, and kinder, and more 
earnest, and readier as to these assemblies and as to hearing. For what fire is to gold, that is affliction unto 
souls; wiping away filth, rendering men clean, making them bright and shining,” In 2 Cor. hom. 26.4 (PG 
61:580; NPNF 1-12:401). Another theme that can be inferred from the passage is the danger that exists 
when times of peace are combined with luxury. For Chrysostom’s idea of imperial rule in contrast to the 
Eusebeian model, which is often assumed to have been universally accepted by all Christian writers after 
Constantine, see Sandwell, “Christian Self-Definition,” passim and especially 42. 
145 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 41. 
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99; p. 144). However, we must not exclude the possibility that these might be just 
generic descriptions of what a Christian of the time thought the pagan rituals consisted 
of.  
But John does not limit himself to criticism of non-Christian religious rituals. He 
also criticizes the phenomenon and the abuses of parasitism and contrasts it with the 
Christian attitude towards idle individuals, who are encouraged to find a job and to 
contribute to the wellbeing of themselves and the community at large (43-4; p. 100; pp. 
144-6). Parasitism is also explicitly connected with both the debauchery that follows the 
pagan rituals and the system of patronage and its implications for society (ibid.). To 
further advance the contrast, John uses the figure of Babylas again. This time Babylas is 
contrasted with the philosophers, who are characterized by “vainglory, impudence, and 
puerility” (45; pp. 100-1; p. 146). He is also explicitly compared with Diogenes of 
Sinope, although Babylas did not live in a wine cask and did not go to the market 
wearing rags. Though John does admire Diogenes’ actions since they seem to “involve 
much labor and extreme pain, [they] nevertheless are deprived of all praise … [because] 
useless labor is deprived of every encomium” (ibid.).146 The point John is trying to 
make here is a contrast between Greek parasitism and Christian usefulness. This 
statement demands an elaboration: for society at large, an individual’s contributions to 
it are measured by the usefulness of his/her actions. In this case, Chrysostom’s thesis 
appears to be that all philosophers are ultimately useless. Even Diogenes, who at least 
expended labour in his efforts to teach, was useless, because he was expending useless 
labour. Thus, although Diogenes was not a parasite, he still was not labouring for a 
purpose. If John can prove that even Diogenes, a figure admired by many of the 
philosophical schools, was useless, the implication would be that all philosophers are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 And not just actions either. John was an ardent believer of the principle that “however much a 
person may say, if it does not issue in something advantageous, he speaks to no purpose.” In Act. apost. 
hom. 6.2 (PG 60:59; NPNF 1-11:40). 
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useless. He will therefore attempt to prove just that and we will try to systematically 
examine his thoughts as we proceed.  
In an imaginary dialogue with an admirer of Diogenes, John brings forth the 
admirer’s argument that Diogenes addressed Alexander with great παῤῥησία. He goes 
on to recount the story of their meeting, when Alexander asked Diogenes what he 
needed and his reply was that he needed nothing except for the king not to cast his 
shadow upon him. John is of the opinion that Diogenes’ reply should not be a matter of 
pride for his admirers but should bring them to shame, since he could have asked for 
something useful instead of sunbathing like an infant (46; pp. 101-2; pp. 148-50). It is 
not παρρησία that characterized Diogenes, John says, but pure eccentricity. The ἀγαθὸς 
ἀνήρ is called as such only when all his actions aim for the common welfare and strive 
to improve the lot of humanity (πρὸς τὸ κοινωφελὲς ἅπαντα πράττειν χρὴ καὶ τὸν τῶν 
ἄλλων βίον κατορθοῦν). Diogenes’ request to not be put in the shade was of no benefit 
(διέσωσεν) to any city, household, man or woman. “Tell the fruit of his liberty (or 
freedom of speech)” (εἰπὲ τῆς παῤῥησίας τὸ κέρδος), John concludes, with a certain hint 
towards Diogenes’ useless’ existence (47; p. 102; p. 150). It is now clear that for 
Chrysostom freedom of speech and frankness are not virtues unless they bear fruits, an 
idea that he will expand in other works, when he calls things such as chastity and 
fasting as neither good nor evil in and of themselves, but characterizes them as such 
only according to the purpose they serve.   
The example of Diogenes is used in this case as a prelude to, and a comparison with, 
Babylas’ attitude towards the emperor (Decius) and the different scope of his actions. 
John refers to an incident when Babylas chased the emperor out of the church, a fact 
that proves that John “was not boasting when I said that he [Babylas] demonstrated the 
childishness (παιδικῆς ἔργα διανοίας) of your philosopher’s marvellous deeds” (48; p. 
102; p. 152). Babylas’ attitude towards the emperor is used here as an example to show 
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that Diogenes is childish because he a) asks for something useless, and b) because the 
very act of making a request proves his servility towards the emperor. In contrast, 
Babylas not only does not ask for anything, but also shows that he has power over the 
emperor. The imaginary dialogue with Diogenes’ fan continues. This time he 
supposedly argues that Diogenes was temperate and lived in abstinence, even refusing 
to get married. John’s response to that is that his opponent is partially concealing the 
truth by not mentioning Diogenes’ foul and shameful sexual actions in public (48; pp. 
102-103; p. 152).147 Chrysostom’s comment on Diogenes’ sexuality concludes his 
diatribe against him, and is immediately followed by a frontal attack on Aristotle, 
Epicurus, Plato and Socrates.  
The accusations are different, but they are all related to sexual matters and opinions. 
He censures Aristotle about his alleged habit of eating human semen.  He wonders if 
there is any profit (ὄφελος) if someone has intercourse with mothers and sisters, as 
promulgated by Epicurus.148 He closes this section by mentioning the founders of the 
Platonic Academy, Socrates and Plato, whom he reproaches of hiding their preference 
for pederasty under a veil of allegory and thereby considering it as something 
respectable and a part of philosophy.149 John seems to imply here that their alleged 
preference for pederasty is not only contrary to Christian morals, but also useless, 
because they bear no physical progeny. But since he does not make a concrete reference 
to a Platonic source, due to the already lengthy nature of his work (as he himself points 
out) our assumption about the text he is referring to must be speculative.  I would argue 
that the most probable text that underlies John’s response is Symposium 209a-e, of 
which we will cite just a selection:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.69. 
148 Cf. SVF 3:185. See also Schatkin’s comment on this last accusation: “a retortion of the slander of 
“Oedipodean intercourse,” i.e., incest, made against the early church,” 104, n. 98. 
149 “…one suspects that rhetorical excess has colored Chrysostom's attack on pederasty. Furthermore, 
pederasty in Chrysostom's mind was a vice intimately associated with Greek paideia and, therefore, this 
polemic is part of his more general attack on Greek culture.” Hunter, A Comparison, 140, n. 45. 
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Now those who are teeming in body betake them rather to women, and are 
amorous on this wise: by getting children they acquire an immortality, a 
memorial, and a state of bliss, which in their imagining they “for all succeeding 
time procure.” But pregnancy of soul—for there are persons,’ she declared,’ 
who in their souls still more than in their bodies conceive those things which are 
proper for soul to conceive and bring forth; and what are those things? Prudence, 
and virtue in general … when a man’s soul is so far divine that it is made 
pregnant with these from his youth, and on attaining manhood immediately 
desires to bring forth and beget, he too, I imagine, goes about seeking the 
beautiful object whereon he may do his begetting since he will never beget upon 
the ugly. Hence it is the beautiful rather than the ugly bodies that he welcomes 
in his pregnancy, and if he chances also on a soul that is fair and noble and well-
endowed, he gladly cherishes the two combined in one …Equally too with him 
he shares the nurturing of what is begotten, so that men in this condition enjoy a 
far fuller community with each other than that which comes with children, and a 
far surer friendship, since the children of their union are fairer and more 
deathless. Everyone would choose to have got children such as these rather than 
the human sort…150 
 
John seems to be justified in his criticism, at least concerning the distinction 
between physical/spiritual offspring. Plato (via Diotima) certainly considers the second 
as significantly more important than the first, an argument he supports by mentioning 
the works of Homer, Hesiod, Lycurgus and Solon, which he characterizes as their very 
own immortal offspring. We can also see how John could infer an endorsement of 
pederasty and homosexuality from Plato, an interpretation that is also in line with 
modern exegesis of the same text. To summarize our argument regarding the platonic 
text: although at first sight Plato seems to imply that philosophy (or poetry, or law 
making) lead to better progeny than sexual intercourse, it is not something that he 
leaves outside his field of vision. He just includes it within the context of a lover 
instilling his wisdom in a young boy, a relationship that involves a carnal and spiritual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Plato, Symp. 209a-e (LCL 166:198-201). If our speculation about the platonic text that John is 
responding to is correct, then he would not be the only one that sees pederasty as one of the underlying 
themes of this passage. Modern commentators of Plato have interpreted it along the same lines. See for 
example C. D. C. Reeve, Introduction to Plato on Love: Lysis, Symposium, Phaedrus, Alcibiades, with 
Selections from Republic and Laws (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2006), xxv: “…like spermatozoa the 
embryology that the Symposium implicitly embraces when it portrays forth the lover (italics in the 
original) as pregnant and as seeking a beautiful boy in which to beget an offspring– need only be 
ejaculated into the right receptacle in order to grow into their mature forms. Sex can lead to virtue, in 
other words, without the need for hard work. As soon as the illusion is enjoyed, therefore, it gives birth 
not to a realistic attempt to acquire virtue but to the sexual seduction fantasy mentioned earlier. The 
origins of this fantasy -though, no doubt, partly personal- are predominantly social. It is the complex 
ideology of Athenian paiderasteia…” 
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paideusis and can only lead to spiritual offspring. If our hypothesis is correct, it is in 
line with both modern exegesis as well as Chrysostom’s interpretation of the same 
passage. 
John concludes and brings his argument full circle by mentioning the example of 
Diogenes again: if he, “who prevails in courage and temperance, according to the 
seemingly more austere branch of philosophy, appears so disgraceful, eccentric and 
unbalanced –he even said it is indifferent to eat human beings151 –what argument 
against the others is left us, if one who eclipsed the rest at the acme of the profession is 
convicted of absurdity, puerility, and stupidity in the eyes of all” (49; p. 103; p. 154).    
Chrysostom’s next targets are the Olympian gods themselves. He accuses Apollo of 
using excuses to escape from difficulties when the people consulted his oracles, as in 
Delphi, and mocks him for his weakness and inability to perform by claiming that it was 
the presence of a corpse (i.e. Babylas’s relics) that prevented him from doing so (84; pp. 
204-6). Chrysostom further claims that Apollo’s oracles are purposefully obscure in 
order to make people visit again, looking for a solution (88; p. 126-7; p. 210). His next 
object of ridicule is none other than Zeus himself. But in the process of ridiculing the 
father of the gods, John also attacks his former teacher Libanius “and	  derisively tears to 
pieces the lament which Libanius (a sincere pagan who felt genuinely shattered by the 
event) had composed for the destruction of the temple [of Apollo].”152 The way 
Chrysostom does that is by selecting certain passages from Libanius’ lament, echoing 
them but reversing their meaning, and mocking him for feeling sadness over the 
destruction of Apollo’s temple. Kelly believes that only the tension between the pagans 
and the Christians in Antioch can explain John's intemperate onslaught on Libanius, 
who was still alive and in the city. This is a reasonable assumption, but we cannot 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.73. See Schatkin’s comment: “In effect, a retortion of the slander of 
“Thyestean feasts” (cannibalism) made against the early Christians,” 104, n. 104. 
152 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 41. 
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exclude the personal aspect of the attack, considering that, for John, Libanius must have 
personified many of the evils he saw in the surviving remnants of paganism. It is fair to 
say, though, that paganism was far from dead, especially after Julian’s brief tenure, and 
that that must have been a cause of anxiety for John, no matter how much he tried to 
downplay it.153 John’s references to Julian’s sacrifices at the shrine of Apollo at Daphne 
further validate this point (80, 100, 103; pp. 200, 228-30, 232). 
However, although we often mention Julian and Libanius together, we must not 
overlook their differences as personalities and the ideas they espoused. For example, as 
D. Hunter argues, Libanius, unlike Julian, had no interest in philosophy per se, and his 
writings and orations show no trace of Neoplatonic influence.154 Their attitudes towards 
traditional religion and piety were also significant – and disputed by scholars. On the 
one hand, Athanassiadi argues that Libanius, “unlike Julian, worshipped Culture and 
stopped there.”155 On the other hand, Hunter would very much disagree with this 
statement, considering the strong connection between λόγοι and ἱερά, or education and 
religion, in Libanius’s works: Libanius would also agree with Julian that paideia was a 
pagan possession and utilized Julian’s conversion to prove just that. The second way 
Libanius utilized Julian as a symbol of Hellenism was by promoting him as a figure of a 
higher moral status, and an ascetic who abstained from many of life’s vices. Hunter 
further argues that “the crucial difference in Libanius' presentation is that the formation 
of Julian's virtue and nobility of character is credited to Greek paideia. Homer, the 
orators, historians, and especially the philosophers are held responsible for Julian's 
humanity (φιλανθρωπία) and clemency (ἡµερότης).”156 These together with the fact that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 42.  
154 Hunter, A Comparison, 54. 
155 Athanassiadi-Fowden, Julian and Hellenism, 207. 
156 Hunter, A Comparison, 54. 
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they shared an antipathy towards Christianity were the main reasons John often argued 
against them as a duo.  
One might think that Chrysostom’s treatise should have ended by now, since he has 
described Babylas’ life up until his death. But for Chrysostom this is a Greek way of 
thinking, “since Greeks … have limited their hope to the present life.” However, for the 
Christians the end of this life is just the beginning of another, brighter existence (64; p. 
111; p. 172). However, John only finishes his treatise after referring to the things 
Babylas achieved after his death: “he put an end to the strength of the demon; utterly 
refuted the deceit of the Greeks; exposed the nonsense of divination, shattered its mask, 
and displayed all its hypocrisy laid bare, having silenced and defeated by main force the 
one who seemed to be its master [Apollo].”157 The power (ἰσχύς) of the saints is great 
and fearsome, not only for the demons or the devil, but even for the emperor himself 
(127; p. 152; p. 274)!	   In the words of J.N.D. Kelly, “the message hammered home is 
that pagans should be persuaded, by the contrast between the laughable ineffectiveness 
of the old gods and the extraordinary miracles which Christ continues to work through 
his saints, to transfer their allegiance to him.”158  
Two key themes emerge from our reading of the text. First, Chrysostom personifies 
his arguments against paganism by comparing the lives of individuals from both the 
Christian and the pagan sides. In this small treatise, the bishop Babylas exemplifies the 
ideal Christian. His life and attitude are compared with the lives and ideas of a number 
of Greek philosophers, mainly Diogenes, but also Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and even 
the Olympian gods, who are all found wanting. He is also powerful after his death, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 In his Homily on Martyr Babylas, delivered in Antioch on the martyr’s feast day on January 24, 
John observes that “where there is recollection of martyrs, the shaming of the Greeks occurs there too” 
(SC 362:302; trans. Wendy Mayer, ‘Let us Die That We May Live,’ 145) before moving to an outburst 
against Apollo and his request for Babylas’ body to be moved. 
158 Kelly, Golden Mouth, 41. 
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particularly through the translation of his relics from Daphne, where the narrative 
functions as a way of “shaping a new collective Christian identity.”159  
Secondly, the theme of usefulness plays a prominent role in his criticism, and one of 
his major arguments against the most eminent philosophers of Hellenism is that their 
lives (in some cases) and theories (in other cases) were ultimately worthless, because 
they either served no purpose at all or plainly failed. In the Discourse on Babylas his 
main focus of criticism are the lives of the philosophers, although this is just one aspect 
of his critique of Hellenism.  
With regard to the debate on the nature of the text, we think that a combination of 
the different interpretations as outlined above is applicable. As per Schatkin’s comment, 
the text does talk about Greek ethical theory and tries to prove that Babylas was a much 
better practitioner than those who initially conceived this theory, so that he is a prime 
example of the vindication of Christian philosophy. But the Discourse on Babylas is 
also a triumphal witness to an emergent and victorious Christianity and its subversion of 
paganism, as per Harkins’ and Kelly’s views. There are strong references to power, 
victory and domination that John emphasizes against the weakness and subservience of 
the Greeks.  
Both sides of the debate seem to assume a certain mode of discourse to the 
exclusion of others: thus, Kelly and Harkins tend to highlight the rhetorical nature of the 
text as the dominant mode and see it as a primary example of the psogos genre, in 
which a speaker tries to insult and/or degrade someone or something. On the other hand, 
Schatkin seems to assume that the dominant mode is philosophical, primarily through 
an emphasis on ethical theory. Our analysis above, however, has shown that both modes 
are to be found in the text, especially given what Chrysostom has to say about 
Christianity’s victory being won through both power and persuasion. Babylas is a better 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Shepardson, Controlling Contested Places, 73. 
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philosopher than the Greeks because his actions are actually useful, whilst his power 
remains strong even after death, when his relics make the false gods leave their abodes.  
This is what he claims Babylas (and all the saints) did, and John’s best homage to the 
former bishop of Antioch is a homily that is powerfully persuasive through rhetoric and 
philosophy.  
e. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have highlighted the following themes as they appear in many 
comparisons between Christians and Greeks: first, simplicity versus paideia, where 
paideia is sometimes construed in terms of philosophy and sometimes in terms of 
rhetoric. In the Christians’ case, it was persuasive even when not taught, and despite the 
simplicity of its message. Second, faith versus reasonings/logismoi. Whilst the latter 
does not originally have a negative connotation, since it is a God-given gift to humanity, 
excessive dependence on reason is a characteristic of the Greeks and one of the original 
reasons for their downfall. Third, unity versus division. Although this theme appears a 
few times, John does not press it as hard as he could, especially considering that there 
were precedents within Hellenic tradition that emphasized philosophical disagreements. 
However, it seems that the fragile situation of Nicene Christianity and the divisions in 
Antioch did not enable him to make as much use of it as he could. Fourth, the theme of 
useful versus useless philosophy, particularly as a way of transmission of a way of life. 
Even when Chrysostom gives in and admits that there could be some admirable 
elements to a pagan philosopher, he ultimately denies them on the basis that they would 
be useless for the other humans. On the other hand, the Christians’ lives are not just 
paradigmatic and useful, but can also be emulated. Finally, the theme of success versus 
failure. This was more obvious in John’s later career rather than earlier, but even during 
his time in Antioch he could point to a future that looked decidedly Christian in a lot of 
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ways. Where the philosophers failed, the Apostles succeeded, and with them they 
converted what John understood as the whole world. 
Moreover, John sometimes employs the contrast in a philosophical mode (e.g. 
Christian virtue is identifiable by Greeks as virtue, but Christians do it better) and 
sometimes in a rhetorical mode, as when he triumphantly proclaims the victory of 
Christianity over Hellenism. The works of Mitchell and Lai we mentioned in the 
beginning already made the point that these comparisons are not very systematic and 
are often of an ad hoc manner. I would argue that the two exceptions to this rule are the 
Discourse on Babylas and the introduction to the Homilies on Matthew. They are too 
well crafted to not have been prepared in advance and they respond to specific texts, 
sometimes verbatim in the Discourse’s case. Therefore, the comparisons might not be 
very systematic but there is a certain consistency in John’s strategy. By using synkrisis, 
Chrysostom grapples with the similarities and differences in such a way that certain 
themes emerge (such as the ones listed previously), and these themes are addressed 
sometimes in a philosophical and sometimes in a rhetorical mode. 
Many of these themes are Pauline in nature, but often John extends Paul’s thought 
to its logical conclusion by framing it in the context of his own time. For example, when 
discussing 1 Corinthians 1:17 (“For Christ did not send me to baptize but to proclaim 
the gospel, and not with eloquent wisdom, so that the cross of Christ might not be 
emptied of its power”) Chrysostom argues that this wisdom is explicitly at war with the 
Cross and the Gospel, and therefore one “should not boast about it, but … retire with 
shame.”160 It is precisely because of this that the Apostles were unwise. It was not any 
weakness on their part, but a preventative measure so that the Gospel wouldn’t suffer 
any harm. While in the hands of the unwise Apostles the Word is established, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 In 1 Cor. hom. 3.3 (PG 61:26; NPNF 1-12:13). 
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hands of the wise it is defamed.161 This cosmic battle is always described as a case of 
the weak overcoming the strong, or the twelve versus the world.162 Chrysostom’s 
polemic against Hellenism is then an extension of this mission. Peter, Paul, and the 
others might have set the stage for the initial battle, but Chrysostom sees it continued 
through martyrs of later times, such as Babylas, and the responsibility he must have felt 
to continue in this tradition.  
If we refer our conclusion to the title of this chapter and the issue of identity, we 
would argue that Chrysostom expresses a collective Christian identity through these 
synkriseis by establishing the apostles and the saints as protagonists in a cosmic 
battleground where the trophies are the souls of men and women. John would argue that 
the philosophers cannot offer any kind of salvation and to prove his point he would 
constantly refer back to their failures, which were then compared implicitly or explicitly 
with the successes of Christianity. In this respect, both the philosophers and the 
apostles, the generals and the saints, are carriers of identity. Despite the fact that, as we 
saw in chapter 2, Chrysostom could sometimes praise certain famous or anonymous 
Greeks, one would not expect him to do so when comparing them to Christians. Yet he 
would sometimes do that, but always on the level of discourse about everyday attitudes 
exhibited by anonymous Greeks and Christians. On the level of each group’s heroic 
figures, Plato could never hope to beat Paul. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In 1 Cor. hom. 3.3 (PG 61:26; NPNF 1-12:13). 
162 Ibid., 3.4 (PG 61:28). 
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4. “Dogs priced at three obols”1: The reception of Cynicism in John 
Chrysostom2 
Christianity and its doctrines have often been analysed or compared with the 
philosophical schools of antiquity, primarily Platonism and Stoicism. However, despite 
a renaissance of studies on Cynicism as a legitimate philosophical school, the number of 
studies on Christianity and Cynicism is still limited.	  As we shall show, Cynicism is a 
particularly interesting focal point for a comparison between Christianity and Hellenism 
because both Christians and their enemies saw certain similarities between them. If we 
were to sum up the interaction between philosophical schools and Christianity in the 
view of modern scholarship, it has been construed as a relationship of 
opposition/appropriation,3 synthesis,4 transformation,5 and symbiosis.6 If we take the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This phrase was used by Chrysostom to characterize the Cynics, their philosophy, and Greek 
philosophy overall, in his In Eph. hom. 21.2 (PG 62:153): Εἰ γὰρ Ἕλληνες ἄνδρες τριωβολιµαῖοί τινες 
καὶ κύνες, φιλοσοφίαν τοιαύτην ἀναδεξάµενοι τριωβολιµαῖον (τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ) … The 
application of the term to the Cynics is obviously an ironic use of ps-Crates’ exhortation in Epistle 22 To 
Metrocles (trans. Ronald F. Hock in The Cynic Epistles: A Study Edition, ed. Abraham J. Malherbe, 
Missoula, MT: Scholars Press,1977, 73): “Do not take from everyone but only from the worthy, and do 
not take the same amount from everyone, but accept three obols from the prudent and a mina from 
spendthrifts.” Cf. Epistle 27 To the Athenians (ibid., 77): “Diogenes the Cynic used to say that all things 
belong to God and that friends have things in common, so that all things belong to the wise man… do not 
be angry whenever you are asked for three obols by wise men. For you are giving back not what is yours 
but what is theirs.” 
2 A version of this chapter will appear in (Re)visioning John Chrysostom: New Perspectives, 
Theories and Approaches, eds. Chris L. de Wet and Wendy Mayer (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). I would 
like to thank the editors for their careful reading of the text and their insightful comments on it. 
3 As in Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret. S. Lilla refers to three distinct positions among Christian 
authors between the first and fifth centuries: “(1) a rejection and total condemnation, (2) a moderate 
openness, (3) and an enthusiasm, leading even to an impassioned defense of Hellenic thought.” S. Lilla, 
“Hellenism and Christianity,” in Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity vol. 2, ed. Angelo di Berardino 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2014), 205. While John Chrysostom has often been presented as an 
advocate of the first position, a more nuanced study of his work will show that he often displays the 
second attitude as well, but certainly not the third. 
4 As in Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia. Jaeger’s classic examples of this synthesis are 
Origen and the Cappadocians. 
5 As in Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture. 
6 The symbiotic position appears to be the most popular in contemporary scholarship, especially 
since the symbiosis of two organizations can encompass a wide range of relationships within it, including, 
but not limited to, antagonism, correlation, parallel influences, and negotiation. This can sometimes lead 
to overly minimalistic positions, such as the claim that “when Constantine made Christianity legal, very 
little differentiated Christian intellectuals from their non-Christian intellectual neighbours; what separated 
them were nuances.” At the same time, I am sympathetic towards the proposition that “Greek Christians 
thus did not conquer, adopt, or appropriate logoi and paideia (that is, Hellenism or pagan culture) because 
one does not adopt, conquer, or appropriate what one possesses by birth, education, and divine design.” 
Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church, 11.  
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aforementioned positions as applicable to many, if not most, patristic writers, where 
does Chrysostom stand? A superficial reading will reveal a deep hostility to philosophy, 
an “anti-intellectual posturing,”7 an impression further reinforced in the most detailed 
collection of his references to Greek philosophers, where it is argued that “to their 
writings he probably seldom recurred for recreation”, and that his opinion of Greek 
philosophy was “low”.8 As we have seen in chapter 1, more recent works have 
discarded this position and provided certain nuances, not only in relation to 
Chrysostom’s references to the philosophers, but also to the influence of philosophy in 
his own thought.9 It has also been shown that more often than not Chrysostom’s 
arguments on different subjects can be placed within “existing intellectual traditions” 
that were part of Hellenistic secular paideia.”10  Modern scholarship on Chrysostom 
recognizes “predominantly Stoic and Cynic frameworks, but also … Platonic, 
Aristotelian, and Epicurean elements, in the main little different from those of his pagan 
counterparts who had been educated in the same philosophical schools.”11  
Chrysostom then, as most church Fathers, is representative of a philosophical 
eclecticism. In terms of his reception of Cynic ideas, there have been studies that 
examined the influence of Cynic and Stoic ethic as well as elements from other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Which is defined as “not the total rejection of philosophy and contemporary oratory that it seems, 
but a rejection of what misleadingly he represents as the sum total of Greek paideia and secular 
rhetorical-philosophical pedagogy, namely, epideictic rhetoric or oratory that is showy and aimed at 
applause and self-promotion.” Wendy Mayer, “Shaping the Sick Soul: Reshaping the Identity of John 
Chrysostom,” in Christians Shaping Identity from the Roman Empire to Byzantium: Studies inspired by 
Pauline Allen, eds. Geoffrey D. Dunn and Wendy Mayer (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 150. 
8 P.R. Coleman-Norton, “St. Chrysostom and the Greek Philosophers,” 305. The article collects 
Chrysostom’s references to Greek philosophers and his assessment of some of their ideas. Although it 
often lacks analysis and context, it continues to be a useful resource. Coleman-Norton’s opinion is still 
cited uncritically in modern scholarly works, even though a large number of studies have put 
Chrysostom’s opinion into perspective. 
9 Margaret Mitchell, “John Chrysostom on the Sermon on the Mount: φιλοσοφία as the basis for the 
Christian πολιτεία,” in The Sermon on the Mount through the Centuries: From the Early Church to John 
Paul II, ed. J.P. Greenman, T. Larsen and S.R. Spender (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2007), 19-42. 
10 Wendy Mayer, “A Son of Hellenism.”  
11 Pauline Allen and Silke Sitzler, Introduction to Preaching Poverty in Late Antiquity: Perceptions 
and Realities, eds. Pauline Allen, Bronwen Neil, Wendy Mayer (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 
2009), 24. 
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philosophical schools, in his teachings on wealth, poverty, and almsgiving.12 The 
question of philosophical influences in Chrysostom’s thought as well as his reception of 
philosophical ideas are issues that also touch on religious identity in late antiquity.  
Isabella Sandwell’s work in this area has pioneered a variety of approaches in the 
subject and our chapter can be considered as a complement to Sandwell who focuses on 
praxis rather than theoria. In sum: for a full picture of Chrysostom’s understanding of 
Hellenism and its ideas there needs to be a balance between assessing his opinions of 
individual philosophers and their ideas and his reception and incorporation of the very 
same ideas into his own teachings, where we can confidently say that his approach is 
much subtler and engaged.  
Our chapter is also part of a larger discussion on the nature, transformation, and 
reception of Cynicism in late antiquity.13 The school curriculum during that period 
preserves a number of Diogenes traditions, and even from earlier times, such as the first 
and second century AD, Diogenes had become a stock character and a cultural 
archetype in a number of literary writings. His sayings (chreiai) formed a large part of 
the common rhetorical education and he figures prominently in rhetorical handbooks, 
possibly more than any other philosopher. This, more than any other factor, helps to 
explain the continued relevance of Cynicism not only during late antiquity but also in 
Byzantium. Other factors include polemical writings and references against them, such 
as those of Julian the Emperor (who tended to disregard his contemporary Cynics but 
praise Diogenes, even though a number of them were present at his court) and 
Christians who self-identified as Cynics (such as Maximus, the archbishop of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Giovanni Viansino, “Aspetti dell’ opera di Giovanni Crisostomo”, Koinonia 25 (2001), 137-205, 
cited in Wendy Mayer, “John Chrysostom on Poverty,” in Pauline Allen, Bronwen Neil, Wendy Mayer, 
ibid., 81. 
13 The following paragraph draws substantially on Derek Krueger, “Diogenes in Late Antiquity,” in 
his Symeon the Holy Fool: Leontius’ Life and the Late Antique City (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 74-8. In his “Diogenes the Cynic Among the Fourth Century Fathers,” 29-30, Krueger 
observed that Cynicism in Late Antiquity has not yet received serious attention but argued that the 
reception of Cynic philosophical ideals in Christian philosophy was through the absorption of Cynic ideas 
in the Stoic tradition of the late-first and second centuries. 
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Constantinople). Augustine, for instance, indicated their continued existence into the 
fifth century. It is a historical paradox that sometimes the Cynics would even appear in 
Christian writings as the representatives of Greek philosophy par excellence. 
Regardless of how the Cynics themselves were presented, or even how late we might 
think that people who self-identified as Cynics in reality existed, however, it remains a 
fact that a considerable number of Cynic themes persisted in Christian writings 
throughout the centuries.14 
a. Early Christianity and Cynicism: Views Past and Present  
Previous scholarship on early Christianity and Cynicism has a tendency to examine 
a large number of diachronic sources, which is not very helpful for understanding the 
dynamics of the reception of Cynicism in different historical periods.15 While useful for 
the large number of writings of the Church Fathers subject to Cynic influence they have 
identified, these studies often lack the type of analysis that would facilitate 
understanding how the two movements differed or resembled each other and the precise 
influence of Cynicism on Christian writers. This is in stark contrast to studies on 
Cynicism and Christianity during the New Testament era, where studies abound, despite 
the controversial conclusions of this particular line of research.16 In discussing 
Cynicism and some of its main concepts, we will face an inevitable question: how did 
certain philosophical concepts, such as autarkeia (autarchy or self-sufficiency), 
contribute to the development of Christian discourse in late antiquity? In other words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For the legacies of Cynicism see the studies of William Desmond, Cynics (Ancient Philosophies; 
Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008); The Greek Praise of Poverty: Origins of Ancient Cynicism (Notre Dame, 
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). 
15 The definitive study on the subject is still Downing’s Cynics and Christian Origins. Studies on 
Cynicism as a philosophical and cultural movement are on the increase but it is still understudied in terms 
of the reception of its ideals in the Patristic era. 
16 Besides Downing’s works, other noteworthy studies include John Dominic Crossan, The Historical 
Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), the 
main proponent (along with Burton Mack and Downing) of the Cynic Jesus hypothesis. See Gregory 
Boyd, Cynic Sage or Son of God? Recovering the Real Jesus in an Age of Revisionist Replies (Wheaton, 
IL: Victor Books, 1995) for a critique of this thesis. 
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did autarkeia mean the same thing for John Chrysostom as it did for Diogenes and the 
Cynics in general?	  By focusing on one specific concept as a case-study, we will be able 
to focus the question of Chrysostom’s attitude to Hellenism as sharply as possible. 
Early Christians and Cynics were sometimes grouped together in literary references, 
as we will see. There are further similarities in the ascetic practices and rhetorical 
methods of the Christians and Cynics.17 The two groups were also intertwined in 
instances of Christians becoming Cynics, such as Peregrinus, or Christian bishops being 
called Cynics, such as the Bishop Maximus of Constantinople in the fourth century.18 
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish whether someone like Maximus was called 
Cynic due to his beliefs, ascetic lifestyle, or even way of dressing. Nevertheless, these 
similarities, such as the fondness that some Christian authors and the Cynics had for 
poverty,19 as well as the differences, such as the reception of Cynic shamelessness, lead 
us to the topic of this chapter. Besides the obvious common elements between 
Christianity and Cynicism, can we talk of a deeper ideological alliance that they shared 
in terms of social ethics? Does the fact that they employed many common terms in 
similar kinds of ways mean anything more than the assumption that they were often part 
of the same intellectual climate? We will also examine the reception of Cynics as 
personalities themselves, both in the writings of John Chrysostom and other Church 
Fathers, in an attempt to delineate whether their opinion about them is reflective of a 
consensus on certain themes or not. The most important interaction, and central for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The most common of the latter being the diatribe, “the instrument of the Cynic, preaching virtue on 
the street corner…” Hubbell, “Chrysostom and Rhetoric,” 263. 
18 Although this fact should not be overstated: “Despite partial similarities between ascetic Cynicism 
and ascetic strains of Christianity, in antiquity the two seem to have occupied very different cultural 
spaces, too separate for a single person to bridge. The record at least seems to indicate very few who were 
both Cynics and Christians. By one reckoning. we know of only three such persons, at the most, and they 
span three centuries: Peregrinus Proteus, Heraclas, and Maximus Hero.” Desmond, Cynics, 219. Rowland 
Smith, Julian’s Gods: Religion and Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the Apostate 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 87, points out that the designation of Maximus as a Cynic might have 
denoted a Nicene Christian “who dresses in peculiar costume in illustration of virtues that remain the 
monopoly of Christians.” 
19 For example, both Chrysostom and the Cynics consider poverty to be praiseworthy, which the 
former allies “to the Christian idea of heavenly wealth.” Mayer, “John Chrysostom on Poverty,” 101. 
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argument of this chapter, occurs when the two groups were lumped together by 
outsiders based on a number of similar characteristics. For example, in the second 
century AD Aelius Aristides accuses the Cynics of twisting the meaning of words, when 
they believe  
[t]hat shamelessness is freedom, being hated means they have been speaking 
frankly, and taking is being generous… They deceive like flatterers, but they are 
as insolent as if they were of higher rank… behaving like those impious men of 
Palestine. For the proof of the impiety of those people is that they do not believe 
in the higher power. And these men in a certain fashion have defected from the 
Greek race, or rather from all that is higher.20 
 
A number of common behavioural traits leads Aristides to the conclusion that the 
Cynics resemble the Christians, at least in terms of public appearance.21  
During Chrysostom’s time, Julian’s To the Cynic Herakleios provides a vivid 
description of contemporary Cynics and makes an interesting comparison with another 
group, the Christian monks. He wonders what Herakleios has done to earn the staff of 
Diogenes and his παῤῥησία and what kind of askesis he has practiced. This is followed 
by a description of the lifestyle of Cynics in the fourth century A.D.: “Do you really 
think it so great an achievement to carry a staff and let your hair grow, and haunt cities 
and camps uttering calumnies against the noblest men and flattering the vilest?”22 Julian 
aligns these Cynics with the Christian monks (ἀποτακτιστάς, renunciators), as he says 
the δυσσεβεῖς Γαλιλαῖοι (impious Galileans) call them, because just like them, “by 
making small sacrifices they gain much or rather everything from all sources.”23  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Aelius Aristides, Or. 3 To Plato: In Defence of the Four (ed. Lenz and Behr, 666-671; trans. Behr, 
274-5). 
21 For other ancient to late-ancient texts that identify similarities between Christianity and Cynicism 
see F. Gerald Downing, “Cynics and Early Christianity,” in Le Cynisme Ancien et ses Prolongements, 
eds. Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé and Richard Goulet (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), 281-
304. 
22 Julian, Or. 7.223 (LCL 29:121). 
23 Julian, Or. 7.224 (LCL 29: 122-3). It has also been argued that Julian’s attack on the Cynics of his 
time is due to the fact that he viewed them as social revolutionaries who threatened social cohesion as 
much as the Christians. See Nikolaos M. Skouteropoulos, Οι Αρχαίοι Κυνικοί: Αποσπάσµατα και 
Μαρτυρίες [The Ancient Cynics: Fragments and Testimonies] (Athens: Gnosi, 2006), 189; and Elm, Sons 
of Hellenism, 110: “False Cynics and Christian renunciators were guilty of a similar mistake, indeed 
crime: their rejections of the gods and of the laws of society was a willful innovation. It posed a grave 
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many respects they are the same, except for money-making: the Christian monks collect 
money and call it ἐλεηµοσύνην (almsgiving). As for the rest, “in all other respects your 
habits and theirs are very much alike”, and more importantly, “like them you have 
abandoned your country”.24 Abandoning one’s homeland (or city) is a major accusation 
Julian raises against both the monks and the Cynics, or, rather, those who falsely claim 
the name of “Cynics.” The latter are also held responsible for making philosophy 
εὐκαταφρόνητος (lightly esteemed) and for equating Cynicism with the stereotypical 
attributes Julian never fails to mention: βακτηρία (staff), τρίβων (cloak), κόµη (long 
hair) … ἀµαθία, θράσος, ἰταµότης καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα (impudence, insolence, 
and in a word everything of the sort).25 The examples of Aristides and Julian allow us to 
identify some common accusations that will also be employed later by some Christians: 
the Cynics (of their time) are shameless, hated for their tendencies to insult people 
(particularly the rich and prominent), and depend on others for their living. They are 
also defectors from the Greek race, atheists, and pay more attention to external 
characteristics than to philosophy.26 In sum, Julian’s strong dislike toward the Cynics of 
his day can be attributed to their rootlessness, and their ἀπαιδευσία.27 Others have also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
danger to the politeia, threatening its very foundations, and could not, for that reason, be considered 
philosophical in the least ... Such excessive rejection marked false Cynics and certain Christians (by using 
“Galileans,” a label denoting a small ethnic group, Julian accused all Christians of marginal status, which 
the renunciators then pushed to extreme).” G.W. Bowersock’s interpretation of Julian’s attack on the 
Cynics of his time includes a claim that Julian’s ideal Cynic was the description of a person “remarkably 
like himself” and his attack on other forms of paganism showed that his character was “of a bigot, and a 
puritanical one at that.” Bowersock, Julian the Apostate, 82. 
24 In his Deipnosophistae 13.611c (LCL 345:91) Athenaeus also accuses the Cynics of retaining the 
worst of the dogs’ characteristics: “But the creature also has an abusive mouth and is willing to eat 
anything, and in addition it leads an impoverished existence, stripped of all possessions—and you devote 
yourselves to both qualities, since you are foul-mouthed gluttons, and on top of that you live without a 
hearth or a home!” 
25 Julian, Or. 7.225 (LCL 29:124-5). Chrysostom uses fairly similar phraseology in one of his 
criticisms of the philosophers, without making it specific to Cynicism: Hab. eund. spir. hom. 1.3 (PG 
51:274). 
26 Christian critiques of Cynicism often resembled similar Graeco-Roman arguments against the 
movement, including an emphasis on certain exterior features that different authors considered 
problematic, such as appearance (cloak, staff, long beard) and lifestyle (sleeping rough, begging, verbal 
abuse of others).   
27 Athanassiadi, Julian and Hellenism, 128-31. 
218 
seen his opposition to them as part of his effort to “forge an Hellenic orthodoxy” which 
presupposed the “fundamental unity of all Greek philosophy,” with the exception of 
these pseudo-Cynics.28 
Similarities between Cynics and Christians have also been the subject of study in 
modern scholarship. F. Gerald Downing, for example, has argued that some early 
Christians “were at least content to be seen as and even understood as a kind of Cynic” 
and for that reason they did little to distinguish themselves from genuine Cynics. He 
refers to some Christians looking at points of similarity, even though other aspects of 
Cynicism horrified them, and he draws an analogy with the Christian reception of Plato 
and the Stoics.29 In reference to the specific case of Diogenes, Derek Krueger has 
pointed out that we cannot claim a unified Christian stance towards him, and even 
among individual Christian writers their opinion was not always consistent.30 Both of 
these arguments will be exemplified in our discussion on the patristic reception of 
Cynicism. On the other hand, Rowland Smith has argued that the appeal of the 
movements might have been comparable on the social level but rejects the possibility of 
a positive ideological rapport.31 
In section b, we will argue that early Christian authors found some Cynic ideas 
easier to accept and others much less acceptable. This caused an interesting tension 
which runs throughout Christian discourse about the Cynics. The main aim of this 
section will be to describe and analyse this tension in a selection of general Christian 
accounts of Cynicism. This necessarily brief account will serve primarily to illuminate 
both the context in which John Chrysostom discusses Cynicism and his reaction to it. 
This will be followed by a closer examination of Chrysostom’s reception of Cynicism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Arnaldo Marcone, “The forging of an Hellenic orthodoxy: Julian’s speeches against the Cynics,” 
in Emperor and Author, ed. Baker-Brian and Tougher, 241. 
29 Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins, 23. Other studies on the topic will be referenced 
throughout the chapter. 
30 Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 43. 
31 Smith, Julian’s Gods, 88. 
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divided into his opinion of individual Cynics and Cynics in general (section c) and his 
appropriation of Cynic ideas (section d). As we will argue, some of the concepts in his 
thought, and particularly the one which will be analysed in section d (autarkeia), were 
very much influenced by Cynicism. Autarkeia -and parrhesia [outspokenness], tuphos 
[in the sense of vanity], etc.- are not concepts found exclusively in Cynicism, but are 
nonetheless popularly employed in combination with a number of other catchwords that 
represent the spirit of Cynicism. As Downing explains, “the attitudes and commitments 
that are expressed in witty sayings, in lively metaphors and parables, and in striking 
actions, all together articulate the life-style that is lived.”32 What we would identify as 
the main common theme is an understanding of philosophy primarily as a way of life, 
an emphasis that can be found in Christianity’s appropriation of the word philosophia 
itself as well as Cynicism’s exemplification of philosophy through actions narrated in 
popular anecdotes and witty sayings.  
b. Patristic Reception of Cynic Philosophers: Criticism, Praise and Distortion 
It has often been noted in scholarship on Cynicism and Christianity that there was a 
degree of sympathy between them, with different scholars citing various reasons for 
this.33  The resemblance of the two movements was already commented upon in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins, 49. For a full list of these words see ibid., 47. 
33 Thus, Donald Dudley, A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the Sixth Century A.D. (2nd ed.; 
Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1998), 174, proposes that “the Jews, the Cynics, and the Christians were 
alike hostile to the general standards of Graeco-Roman civilization.” Downing, Cynics and Christian 
Origins, 170, posits the following as points of alignment between the two groups: “concentration on 
practice rather than rational discussion, severe self-discipline, rejection of wealth, fame, pleasure, family, 
social distinction and even respectable clothing.” Earlier, Pierre de Labriolle emphasized attitudes toward 
traditional religion, social ethics and modes of rhetoric as things that made some Christians sympathetic 
towards the Cynics: “Cynicism made fun of the established religion and its traditional legends, and 
declared them immoral, absurd, quite unacceptable. It did not even spare the most hallowed of the 
mysteries. It stood out forcefully against customs and immoralities which the Christians also condemned 
– for example, exposing infants, homosexuality, and war, too. Add to this the fact that the Cynic 
preachers didn’t shut themselves away in little rooms on their own with a small select audience-they 
spoke to the masses, putting their teaching across openly in public…this communication in the open air 
and this freedom of speech were far from displeasing to the Christians.”  La réaction païenne : Étude sur 
la polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe siècle (Paris: L‘ artisan du Livre, 1934), 84 (trans. Downing, 
Cynics and Christian Origins, 192). Gilles Dorival, “L'image des Cyniques chez les Pères grecs”, in Le 
Cynisme Ancien, ed. Goulet-Cazé and Goulet, 442-3, identifies three different attitudes in terms of the 
reception of Cynicism in the Greek Fathers: a) an identification of Cynicism with Hellenism, which 
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antiquity. We have already seen the examples of Aelius Aristides and Julian, and it 
seems that certain attitudes and appearances created the impression that Cynics and 
Christians shared a number of similar attitudes.34 We will start our brief analysis of 
Christian responses to Cynicism with Diogenes, since most scholars today consider 
him, and not Antisthenes, as the founder of Cynicism, but also because the stories about 
his life provided more opportunities for commentary, from both Christians and non-
Christians alike. 
i. Diogenes35 
The first major feature of the patristic interpretation of Cynicism is that criticism of 
the Cynics is often paired with praise; this is hardly unique, since, as we have shown in 
chapter 2, other personalities and philosophical schools from the Greek world could be 
praised and criticized at the same time.36 What is surprising about Cynicism is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
corresponds to a desire to mark the radical novelty of Christianity; b) a more sensitive approach to the 
continuity between Hellenism and Christianity, where some Fathers present a positive image of 
Cynicism, that they see as either an ally in the battle against paganism or even as a preparatory stage for 
the Christian life; c) an attitude of hesitation and embarrassment, especially towards the more radical 
aspects of Cynicism. Finally, William Desmond, Cynics, 218-9, refers to admiration by Christian writers 
who saw the Cynics as predecessors of the Gospel: “Their overall criticisms notwithstanding, Christian 
writers could also express admiration for some aspects of Cynicism, and often in the very treatises that 
condemned the Cynics as shameless vainglorious atheists. For although the Cynics were “atheists”, at 
least they did not believe in the pagan gods and with their criticism of pagan customs they helped prepare 
the way for the Gospel … Perhaps most enduring here is the admiration of Cynic asceticism as quasi-
Christian, as if their renunciation of worldly goods such as wealth and power foreshadowed the holy 
poverty of Jesus and the Apostles.” 
34 Hans Dieter-Betz, Antike und Christentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze IV (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1998), 40, comments that “Pagan attacks against Christianity, however, make use of similarities between 
Christian and Cynic preachers” and that this type of comparison became “a stereotypical anti-Christian 
propaganda tool, used then also by the Christians themselves against “heretics” like Marcion, the 
Encratites, and the so-called Apotactites in fourth-century Asia Minor.” Cf. Downing, “Cynics and Early 
Christianity,” 285: “Cynicism as a sect seems to have been for the early Christians both a model and an 
ally, while also a most important rival, having too much in common with the newer movement to be other 
than disturbing.” 
35 The following references provide a small but representative sample of the contours of Diogenes’ 
image in the Church Fathers. For a more detailed discussion, see Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool, 72-89. 
36 For example, John Chrysostom could as easily mock Plato for his failure to establish his republic, 
as in In mart. omn. 15 (trans. Mayer, Cult of the Saints, 252), but at the same time praise him when he 
compares him with Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, as in Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.5 (PG 47:339-40). Cf. 
Derek Krueger, “The Bawdy and Society: The Shamelessness of Diogenes in Roman Imperial Culture,” 
in The Cynics: The Cynic movement in Antiquity and its Legacy, eds. Robert Bracht Branham and Marie-
Odile Goulet-Cazé (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 225: “Pagans and Christians 
alike praised Diogenes for his life of voluntary poverty and condemned him for obscenity.” Downing, 
“Cynics and Early Christianity,” 302: “[Greek Christian writers] criticise aspects of Cynicism and in 
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extent of its influence, particularly in the Eastern Church, with both positive and 
negative attitudes appearing in many different authors and writings. The reason we 
called it surprising is because one might have thought Cynicism would be long dead by 
the time the Cappadocians or Chrysostom engaged with its ideas. However, as we saw 
earlier, this was hardly true, and Cynicism continued to fascinate Christians and non-
Christians alike for many centuries. Their commentary proves that even though the 
Cynics lacked personalities like Diogenes or Crates by that time, their ideas were as 
strong and influential as ever, and the polemic from both pagans and Christians shows 
that Cynic ideas must have had quite an influence in at least some segments of the 
population. One of the main drivers behind the negative attitudes of the Christians is 
primarily the fact that non-Christian Cynicism could be (and was) a competitor to late 
antique Christianity in the same way that all other philosophical schools were. In its 
attempt at self-definition Christianity had to clarify elements that might have seemed all 
too common to a third-party observer, such as the emphasis on asceticism and freedom, 
the frankness of speech, the similarities between Cynic street preachers and Paul’s 
preaching in the agorai of ancient cities, etc. While certain anecdotes and opinions from 
the radical Cynic tradition were clearly hard to swallow, at the same time much of the 
Cynic ethos had “become indigenous” and Cynic attitudes and sayings are still 
discussed and analysed in the fifth century and beyond, and for as long as Diogenes’ 
sayings formed a large part of the curriculum in late antiquity and Byzantium.37  
Thus, Gregory of Nazianzus mixes his criticism of Diogenes with praise. The “dog 
from Sinope” was “simple and moderate in life … not observing laws from God, and 
not on account of any hope.” He only had one thing in his possession, his stick, and 
lived in a tub to protect himself from the winds, which for him was much more valuable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
particular Cynics, while still making full use of chreiai, maxims, examples and above all the ascetic ethic 
drawn from Cynic tradition.”  
37 Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins, 295. 
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than rooms with golden ceilings. His food was casual, but made without labour (τροφή 
τε σχέδιος, οὐ πονουµένη).38   
The influence of the Cynics is also evident in references on the Latin side. Thus, 
Lactantius eagerly approves of Diogenes’ “strict and superior brand of virtue that 
subjects everything to scorn”, but at the same time criticizes him for making a living out 
of begging instead of engaging in honest trade.39 He wonders what kind of society there 
would be if everyone adopted this lifestyle and proceeds to criticize the Cynic custom of 
performing sexual acts in public. His conclusion is that there is no real virtue in 
Cynicism since it lacks a sense of shame.40   
Augustine repeats the criticism of the alleged Cynic support for sexual acts in public 
view, an idea he attributes to Diogenes.41  He proudly declares that our “innate sense of 
decency triumphed over this wild fancy” and is glad that the Cynic successors to 
Diogenes did not follow his example. Augustine is of the opinion that Diogenes did not 
really perform the act, but only pretended to do so, and finishes with the remark that the 
Cynics of his day refuse to do this in case the mob stones them.42 Augustine’s view of 
the Cynics of his day is in contrast to the opinion of others, such as Julian the Emperor, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Gregory Nazianzus, Carm. mor. 1.2.10, II. 218-27 (PG 37:696; trans. Krueger, Symeon the Holy 
Fool, 86). For a discussion of Gregory’s Cynicism see Claudio Moreschini, “Gregory Nazianzen and 
Philosophy, with Remarks on Gregory’s Cynicism”, trans. Carol Chiodo, in Re-Reading Gregory of 
Nazianzus: Essays on History, Theology and Culture, ed. Christopher Beeley (Washington, D.C: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2012), 103-24. 
39  Lactantius, Epit. 34.4-6 (ed. Heck and Wlosok, 48; trans. R. Dobbin, The Cynic Philosophers: 
From Diogenes to Julian, London: Penguin Books, 2012, 54). 
40 Lactantius was not the first to indicate that Cynicism has no sense of shame. It seems that his 
source in this case is Cicero, De off. 1.41.148 (LCL 30:151): “But the Cynics’ whole system of 
philosophy must be rejected, for it is inimical to moral sensibility, and without moral sensibility nothing 
can be upright, nothing morally good.” 
41 Augustine’s reference is better explained in Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.69 (LCL 185:71), where 
the following story is told about Diogenes: “It was his habit to do everything in public, the works of 
Demeter and of Aphrodite alike. He used to draw out the following arguments. “If to breakfast be not 
absurd, neither is it absurd in the market-place; but to breakfast is not absurd, therefore it is not absurd to 
breakfast in the marketplace.” Behaving indecently in public, he wished “it were as easy to banish hunger 
by rubbing the belly’.” Diogenes’ attitude in this incident is also indirectly criticized by Plutarch, whose 
original target is Chrysippus and his praise of Diogenes for rejecting pleasure in principle but behaving 
shamelessly in public for the sake of pleasure: Stoic. rep. 1044b (LCL 470:501). The accusation is 
repeated by John Chrysostom, In Matt. hom. 33.5 (PG 57:392). 
42 Augustine, Civ. 14.20 (LCL 414:368; trans. Dobbin, The Cynic Philosophers, 54-55). 
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that the Cynics of this period were actually significantly worse than the founders of the 
movement.  
In the context of his discussion of Greek philosophers who subjected themselves to 
voluntary poverty, Origen mentions Diogenes’ life in a tub as an example of extreme 
poverty and claims that no sane person would say that Diogenes was subjected to evils 
(due to the fact that he lived in a tub).43  This is one of the passages that shows a neutral 
stance towards the famous Cynic, with no evident hints of praise or hostility. 
Epiphanius also displays a neutral attitude towards Diogenes, claiming that he agreed 
with Antisthenes on everything and approvingly cites his saying that “the good is 
natural to every wise man but everything else is simply foolishness.”44    
On the other hand, Jerome’s stance is overwhelmingly positive. He believes 
Diogenes to be stronger than Alexander the Great and to have been a “victor over 
human nature” (naturae victor humanae).  Diogenes is also the standard of comparison 
for Christian ascetics and his example is used in an attempt to shame some of them with 
an example of a “pagan” philosopher famous for his austerity: “I have cited the example 
of only one philosopher, so that our fine, erect, muscular athletes … who either know 
nothing of apostolic poverty and the hardness of the cross, or despise it, may at least 
imitate Gentile moderation.”45 Jerome seems to be a unique case when he uses the 
example of Diogenes as a measuring stick for the conduct of Christian ascetics. While 
other Christian writers were not hesitant to point out certain weaknesses in the 
personalities or attitudes of Christian ascetics, using a “pagan” to embarrass them would 
require a level of boldness that not many were ready to exhibit. The use of a pagan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Origen, Cels. 2.41 (SC 132:380; trans. Chadwick, Contra Celsum, 98-9). Other philosophers 
mentioned in the same passage are Democritus, “who allowed his estate to become a pasture for sheep, 
and about Crates who set himself free by giving to the Thebans the money which he realized by selling all 
his possessions.” 
44 Epiphanius, De Fide (=Pan.) 3.2.9 (trans. Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of Salamis, 
Books II and III. De Fide, Leiden: Brill, 2012, 666). 
45 Jerome, Jov. 2.14 (PL 23:318; NPNF 2-6:398). 
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philosopher to shame the Christian ascetics so directly is something very different 
compared to appropriating or using the example of an OT prophet, who would 
presumably have been a figure of reverence or authority for most Christian ascetics. 
There are instances of writers such as John Chrysostom using examples from classical 
literature in order to shame their audience, but in this case most, if not almost all, of the 
recipients of the message would be regular church members, not ascetics.46 Finally, 
even Diogenes’ manner of death meets with approval by Jerome, who praises his virtue 
(virtutem) and continence (continentiam) and highlights his ultimate battle with fever, 
which is resolved by his voluntary death.47 
Basil of Caesarea also offers a more positive appraisal of Diogenes’ personality, 
particularly his simplicity.48 The story comes from Diogenes Laertius, as per usual: 
“One day, observing a child drinking out of his hands, he cast away the cup from his 
wallet with the words, ‘A child has beaten me in plainness of living.’” He also threw 
away his bowl when in like manner he saw a child who had broken his plate taking up 
his lentils with the hollow part of a morsel of bread.”49 For Basil, the significant part 
here is that Diogenes is being taught simplicity from a child, which is a positive 
example in and of itself. This incident leads to Basil’s praise for him through the 
personification of poverty in his Letter 4: “As for Diogenes, Basil never ceased 
admiring him, the philosopher who was so set upon being content with nothing but the 
gifts of nature that he even threw away his drinking-cup, after he had learned from a 
boy how to bend over and drink from the hollow of his hands.”50  Furthermore, Basil 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For an example, as we saw in chapter 2, when discussing certain wrong (in his view) Christian 
attitudes to death Chrysostom uses three different examples from Greek history in order to highlight true 
philosophical behaviour in the face of death and the fact that the Greeks do not behave like women: In 
Joh. hom. 62.4 (PG 59:347). 
47 Jerome, Jov. 2.14 (PL 23:318). 
48 Cf. Crates’ hymn to simplicity in Anth. Pal. 10.104 (LCL 85:55): “Hail! divine lady Simplicity, 
child of glorious Temperance, beloved by good men. All who practise righteousness venerate thy virtue.” 
49 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.37 (LCL 185:39). 
50 Basil, Ep. 4 To Olympius (LCL 190:31). 
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approvingly cites Diogenes’ opinion that “the care of the hair or of dress, is … the mark 
of men who are either unfortunate or doing wrong.”51   
Interestingly, some of the most famous stories and anecdotes about Diogenes were 
distorted by Christian (and sometimes pagan) authors and were given an entirely 
different meaning from that which the original tale may have had. Thus, the story of 
Diogenes and the lamp in the daytime, where he says he is looking for an honest man,52  
becomes for Theodoret of Cyrus a story of Diogenes having sex in public. In this story, 
Diogenes is presented as an advocate of philosophy in words but becomes enslaved to 
pleasure and has sex with prostitutes in public, providing a bad example to the 
onlookers. When someone scorns him, and asks what he’s doing, Diogenes responds by 
saying “you scum, I am looking for a man.”53 This is not the first or the last Christian 
effort to deconstruct the austere and ascetic image of Diogenes, which was even proving 
alluring for writers like Jerome. Its uniqueness, if one can call it that, is that it bases its 
negative assessment on a story that was clearly invented, whereas other writers, like 
Chrysostom, tended to criticize Diogenes based on traditions about Diogenes that were 
commonly accepted as genuine by both Christians and non-Christians. 
To summarize the general patristic consensus on Diogenes: while admired by many 
for certain aspects of his lifestyle as well as his parrhesia, his behaviour is also 
evaluated negatively, specifically his alleged lewd sexual acts. Interestingly, some 
aspects of the Diogenes tradition have clearly been altered, intentionally or 
unintentionally, which leads to certain new interpretations (or, perhaps, 
misinterpretations), such as the aforementioned example from Theodoret. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Basil, Address to Young Men on Greek Literature 9.4 (LCL 270:417). Cf.  Dudley, A History of 
Cynicism, 207: “St. Basil expressed admiration for Diogenes, whose way of life he regarded as a heathen 
exemplar of the poor monk.” Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 35-6: “With Basil, Diogenes became firmly 
rooted in a Christian intellectual tradition… Diogenes was good for the care of the soul because it was 
possible to illustrate appropriate Christian behaviour from the example of Diogenes.” 
52 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.2.41 (LCL 185:42). 
53 Theodoret, Aff. 12.48-9 (SC 57:434). 
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considerable number of stories about Diogenes’ personality and actions enabled 
patristic writers to strategically reconstruct his image and utilize it according to their 
purposes. For example, Jerome lavishly praises him but his aim was to use his example 
as a way of shaming Christian ascetics that failed to emulate even the example of a 
pagan, whereas Theodoret -even though he praises Crates on one occasion- and others 
tend to downplay the significance of Diogenes’ actions and add that often he was acting 
as a pervert or that his motives were just an extension of his vainglorious personality. 
Others -John Chrysostom among them, as we will see- could be critical or positive in 
different circumstances. As a result, we cannot speak of a clear consensus among 
patristic authors in regard to how Diogenes was received. The patristic Diogenes, rather, 
acts as a “mixed” exemplum, supporting at one moment values of poverty and self-
renunciation, at another, going against the virtue of modesty.54  
ii. Antisthenes 
Like Diogenes, Antisthenes,55 who was considered by many as the founder of 
Cynicism in antiquity, is praised by Jerome in his Adversus Jovinianum. He is credited 
as a teacher of rhetoric and student of Socrates and commended for selling and 
dispensing with all his belongings except for a small cloak.56  Antisthenes is also 
praised by Gregory of Nazianzus who calls him µέγας (great) because of a story where 
someone thrashed Antisthenes’ face. His response was solely to write the beater’s name 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 31: “Christians’ manipulation of Diogenes’ meaning was part of 
their synthesis of the cultural legacy of the pagan past.” 
55 I am aware that many scholars of Cynicism do not consider Antisthenes as the founder of the 
movement, crediting Diogenes instead. For the purposes of this chapter I will include Antisthenes among 
the Cynics because most of the ancient sources I refer to do so as well, including some early Christian 
sources. 
56 Jerome, Jov. 2.14 (PL 23:318). Jerome has clearly mistaken Crates’ dispersal of his wealth with 
Antisthenes. See Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.87 (LCL 185:90). Among other things, Downing (Cynics 
and Christian Origins, 237) lists the following points as instances of Jerome advocating ideals which 
were also central in Cynicism: objection to reliance on high birth and desire for fame, the fact that wealth 
might be ill-gotten, and the fact that “men and women are equally fallible, and we should judge people’s 
virtue not by their sex but by their character.” 
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on his forehead, in order to make plain who was responsible for beating him.57  Clement 
of Alexandria58 and Theodoret of Cyrus59  both approvingly cite Antisthenes’ view that 
humility is the ultimate end in life.  
Origen names Antisthenes together with Crates and Diogenes as part of a Cynic trio 
in a passage from Contra Celsum where he discusses the gift of prophecy among the 
Prophets of the Old Testament. The Cynics’ lives are said to have been “of unexampled 
courage and freedom … And reason demands that the prophets of the supreme God 
should be such people. They make the courage of Antisthenes, Crates, and Diogenes 
appear as child’s play.”60  Again, this is a comment that mixes praise with criticism and 
it is important that it appears in an apologetic text. Origen does admit that the Cynics 
were courageous; but when compared to the Prophets, their courage is simply a childish 
version of the prophetic one. 
Theodoret uses the example of the same Cynic trio, but instead of comparing them 
with the prophets, like Origen, he compares them to the Stoics. Theodoret accuses the 
Cynics of κενοδοξία and contrasts Antisthenes, Diogenes and Crates’ vainglory to the 
mindset of the Stoics, who do the good for its own sake and not for the sake of their 
δόξα.61  This is a rare occurrence where a Christian writer explicitly states his 
preference for one “pagan” philosophical school over another. The Christian 
preoccupation with the Cynics’ vainglory might be explained by the fact that it also 
appears as a criticism in non-Christian sources. Thus, Diogenes Laertius tells the story 
of a crowd where some were giving Diogenes a “thorough drenching” while others took 
pity on him. Plato was also there, and told those who pitied him that if they really felt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 4.72 (PG 35:596). 
58 Clement, Strom. 2.21.130 (GCS 52:184). 
59 Theodoret, Aff. 11.8 (SC 57:393–94).  
60 Origen, Cels. 7.7 (SC 150:30; trans. Chadwick, Contra Celsum, 400). 
61 Theodoret, Aff. 12.32 (SC 57:429). 
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pity for him they should move away, “alluding to his vanity” (ἐνδεικνύµενος 
φιλοδοξίαν αὐτοῦ). 62 
iii. Crates 
We will conclude our section on the Christian reception of the founders of Cynicism 
with Crates of Thebes, a student of Diogenes and teacher of Zeno of Citium. Crates was 
famous for dispersing his wealth and being one of the few (to our knowledge) married 
Cynics. His wife was Ipparchia, daughter of his student Metrocles and a follower of 
Cynicism in her own right. As we will see, this marriage became the subject of criticism 
from Christian writers. Yet Crates is particularly praised by Gregory of Nazianzus, who 
says the following in Oration 4: “Crates is a great man with you [the Greeks]; and 
certainly it was philosophic conduct for a sheep-farmer to have cast away his fortune - 
conduct quite like that of our own philosophers.”63  Gregory believes that the reason 
Crates cast away his fortune was because he considered it a maidservant to vice and to 
bodily needs (κακίας ὑπηρέτιν καὶ σωµάτων).64 His description of the famous story of 
Crates giving away his wealth is fascinating and has led some scholars to consider 
certain parts of Crates’ poem as it appears in Gregory’s work to be passages from 
Crates’ lost works.65  Here is how he narrates it: Crates is in Olympia, in a place above 
the shrine. He stands there and shouts: “Crates from Thebes is freeing Crates 
(Ἐλευθεροῖ Κράτητα Θηβαῖον Κράτης).” Gregory’s interpretation of this action is that 
Crates did it because he knew well that to be bound by material things is a form of 
slavery.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.41 (LCL 185:42-3). 
63 Gregory Nazianzen, Or. 4.72 (PG 35:596; Julian the Emperor, trans. Charles William King, 
London, 1888, 42). 
64 Gregory Nazianzen, Carm. mor. 1.2.10, II. 230 (PG 37:697). 
65 For further information, see Skouteropoulos, Οι Αρχαίοι Κυνικοί, 501. 
66 Gregory Nazianzen, Carm. mor. 1.2.10, II. 228-243 (PG 37:697). As with other Christian writers, 
Gregory was not hesitant to condemn other aspects of Cynicism he found unacceptable. See Moreschini, 
“Gregory Nazianzen and Philosophy,” 106-107. Furthermore, and in agreement with Julian, he rejected 
229 
We should note that although Crates was famous for dispensing with his property, 
there are different accounts of how he did it. In Gregory’s account, he is in a shrine in 
Olympia while according to Chrysostom, as we will see later, he dumps it in the sea, a 
difference that can be explained by the use of different literary sources. Either way, our 
focus in both cases should be the action itself and not the manner in which it happened. 
Origen praised Crates, similarly to Gregory. Epiphanius also cites with approval Crates’ 
chreia that “poverty is liberty.”67  
Crates’ abandonment of his wealth was not always seen in a positive light. In the 
context of his interpretation of Jesus’ admonition to the rich young man to sell his 
possessions, Clement of Alexandria argues that “the renunciation of wealth and the 
bestowment of it on the poor or needy” was nothing new. On the contrary, “many did so 
before the Saviour’s advent, —some because of the leisure (thereby obtained) for 
learning, and on account of a dead wisdom; and others for empty fame and vainglory, as 
the Anaxagorases, the Democriti, and the Crateses.”68  The accusation again seems to be 
that these were the right actions but performed for the wrong reasons and motives, 
namely fame and vainglory, and all in service of a dead wisdom. 
Moreover, it was Crates’ marriage to Ipparchia that seemed to annoy many 
Christians, particularly because they believed the stories about the couple’s public 
intercourse. Thus, Theodoret accuses Crates of “surrendering to passion” and 
performing “the Cynic wedding in public” (κυνογάµια, literally a dog’s wedding, is 
probably a euphemism for the Cynics’ alleged tendencies for public sex).69 
Nevertheless, Theodoret’s attitude towards Crates, as is usually the case with other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his contemporary Cynics for not living up to the ideals of the great founders of the movement. See 
Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 41-2. 
67 ἔλεγεν ἐλευθερίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀκτηµοσύνην. Epiphanius, De Fide 3.2.9 (GCS 37:507). 
68 Clement, Quis div. 11.3-4 (GCS 17:166-7; ANF 2:594). 
69 Theodoret, Aff. 12.49 (SC 57:434). Cf. a similar reference to Ipparchia in an extensive catalogue of 
ancient Greek women philosophers and poets in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.19.121 (GCS 17:302). 
This is yet another example of Theodoret using a real event (the marriage of Crates and Ipparchia) and 
interpreting it in a way that would appear shameful for the Cynics.  
230 
Christian writers and their attitude towards the Cynics, is an ambivalent one. In another 
instance, he wholeheartedly approves Crates’ love for virtue and quotes his dictum 
“Those, unenslaved and unbended by servile pleasure, love the immortal kingdom and 
freedom.”70   
iv. Ambivalence and Assimilation 
The common fight for the ideals of freedom, poverty, asceticism, as well as a radical 
critique of traditional religious practices often united Cynics and Christians in an 
ideological alliance that might have been unthinkable otherwise, considering the 
different roots of each movement. The fact that the Christians often held an ambivalent 
position towards the figures of Cynicism and their ideas is significant, not only for 
understanding the reception (and eclecticism) of Greek moral philosophy in early 
Christian thought, but also for highlighting the complexity of Christian utilisations of 
“pagan” exempla. Although this ambivalence to the Cynics is not very different to the 
attitude shown to other philosophical schools, significantly less scholarship has been 
devoted to this issue. This is not to suggest that one could be a Cynic and a Christian at 
the same time, just as one could not strictly be a Stoic or Platonist Christian.71 Despite 
Christianity’s animosity towards split allegiances, one could easily assimilate ideals 
from the Greek philosophical schools without having to claim to be a disciple of Plato 
or Diogenes, and, as we have already seen, philosophical eclecticism was the norm 
among patristic authors.  
Modern scholars have also criticized the Cynics for being overly negative 
reactionaries who principally criticized people for their vices and constantly attacked 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Theodoret, Aff. 12.49 (SC 57:434.13–14). It seems that Theodoret’s source for this saying is 
Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 2.20.121, and we cite this translation because the Greek text is identical 
(GCS 17:179; ANF 2:373). 
71 Downing, Cynics and Christian Origins, 177: “One could not ‘be’ a Stoic, maintaining a Stoic 
pantheism and be a Christian, or a Platonist, holding to a doctrine of the transmigration of souls, and be a 
Christian. And, similarly- strictly analogously- one could not be a Cynic in the most rigorous and 
‘shameless’ tradition of Diogenes, and also a Christian.” 
231 
various political and social institutions.72  The issue at heart in this appraisal is not the 
practice of criticising others itself but rather the Cynics’ failure to offer positive role 
models. Even when they did offer positive examples, it was their own exclusive model 
that was recommended and their way of life that others were directed to follow and 
nothing else. Diogenes was their hero not because he was their founder but because he 
was the most radical exponent of their principles. The Christians often shared the 
sentiment that their way of life was the only one considered worthy. But they also 
offered a variety of positive role models in their criticisms of people or political 
institutions -Christ himself, the Apostles, martyrs and saints- as well as models of social 
experimentation, such as the first Christian community in Jerusalem as described in 
Acts. 
c. John Chrysostom on the Cynics 
A substantial number of references to Cynicism occur in Chrysostom’s works, and 
in this section both his criticisms against and his occasional praises of Cynic 
philosophers will be investigated. Chrysostom does not usually refer to the Cynics by 
name except for Diogenes. When he mentions Cynics without a reference to Diogenes 
he is usually referring to contemporary Cynics. In both cases, it is the vainglory of the 
Cynics that becomes the main subject of criticism.73  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Margarethe Billerbeck, “Greek Cynicism in Imperial Rome,” in Die Kyniker in der modernen 
Forschung: Aufsätze mit Einführung und Bibliographie, ed. Margarethe Billerbeck (Amsterdam: B.R. 
Grüner, 1991), 150. Others have focused on the fact that later Cynics seemed to adapt the name in order 
to justify certain behaviours. For this view see Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek 
Philosophy, 13th ed., rev. Wilhem Nestle, trans. L.R. Palmer (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1963), 273: 
“Even in the best of its representatives Cynicism was not free from many excesses and it served not a few 
as a mere pretext for a life of idleness and parasitism, immorality and the gratification of vanity by an 
attitude of boastful ostentation.” Many of these criticisms have already been pronounced by Chrysostom, 
as we will see below. 
73 John also included Crates and Diogenes in another list of Greek philosophers that were in his 
opinion “obsessed (ἐµµανεῖς)” with glory, i.e. attention seekers. The other philosophers named are 
Epaminondas, Aristides and Socrates: Ad vid. iun. 6 (SC 138:146-8).  In her translation of De Bab. c. Iul. 
et gent. (Apologist, 100), Margaret Schatkin notes: “Chrysostom frequently states that the passion for 
glory was the motive for all the amazing deeds of the philosophers.” 
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 i.  Criticism against Diogenes (and Crates): Vainglory, perversion, and uselessness  
In Chrysostom’s Homilies on 1 Corinthians, we find the Cynics contrasted to the 
Apostles, whose “motive of all they did” was “not vainglory but benevolence” (οὐ διὰ 
κενοδοξίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν ἅπαντα ἔπραττον).74 The Cynics are called enemies 
of our common nature, and certain of their actions are severely criticized. Crates (whom 
he calls a madman, but does not mention by name) is the first example John adduces, 
mentioning Crates’ act of throwing all of his property in the sea, not for any good 
reason but because of his φιλοτιµία.75 This is in contrast to the apostolic attitude of 
receiving everything that was given to them and then giving it for free to the poor. The 
key criticism seems to be about why things are done, and not what these things/actions 
are. Crates squanders his property to no benefit and is thus of no profit to others.  
The second example is Diogenes who, clothed in rags and living in a barrel, 
“astonished many, but profited none (ἐξέπληξε µὲν πολλούς, ὠφέλησε δὲ οὐδένα).”76  
There is nothing to admire in Diogenes, John says, since the way of life he modelled 
failed to engender virtue in others. This is in contrast to Paul’s behaviour, who did not 
wish for anyone’s φιλοτιµία but wore proper, decent clothes and lived in a house like 
most people. What John stresses here is Paul’s conventionality, in contrast to Diogenes’ 
unconventional lifestyle, which did not prevent Paul from living a perfectly virtuous 
life. Diogenes sneered at such behaviour while at the same time he shamed himself in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 In 1 Cor. hom. 35.4 (PG 61:301; NPNF 1-12:212). Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 39: “For 
Chrysostom, the notion that Diogenes had been motivated by δόξα was sufficient grounds to condemn 
him.” Chrysostom could have possibly inferred this as fact by looking at the pseudonymous Cynic 
epistles where ps-Crates (Epistle 8 To Diogenes, trans. Ronald F. Hock, The Cynic Epistles, 59) admits as 
much: “We are indeed free from wealth, but fame (δόξα) has up to this point not yet released us from 
bondage to her…” According to Malherbe, The Cynic Epistles, 10, the “Crates letters are to be dated at 
the earliest in the first or second century A.D.” However, in the letters of Ps-Diogenes, which are earlier 
than the Crates letters, Diogenes proclaims himself “free from popular opinion (δόξα)” and “living not in 
conformity with popular opinion but according to nature…”, Epistle 7 To Hicetas (trans. Benjamin Fiore, 
The Cynic Epistles, 99). 
75 In Act. apost. hom. 7.1 (PG 60:64) is another reference to the same story, but again without 
referring to Crates by name. John also mentions other philosophers who gave up their land, and in this 
case attributes their actions not to real contempt of wealth, but to folly and madness (µωρία καὶ ἄνοια)! 
76 In 1 Cor. hom. 35.4 (PG 61:302; NPNF 1-12:212). 
233 
public -probably another reference to his public sexual performances- “dragged away by 
his mad passion for glory” (ὑπὸ τῆς περὶ τὴν δόξαν µανίας συρόµενος). John concludes 
by saying that the only reason Diogenes lived in a barrel was his κενοδοξία.77 It appears 
that the main difference between Christians, such as Paul or the monks, and the Cynics 
is in this case their relationality to other humans and the outcome of their actions. John 
is obviously of the opinion that the former’s actions had a positive impact on those 
around them, whereas the Cynics’ outrageous actions, even if they initially appear pure 
and genuine, profited none other than themselves. 
Just like Augustine, John also accuses Diogenes of acts of public indecency and of 
behaviour contrary to nature. In his thirty-third Homily on Matthew John refers to the 
Cynics as mere outcasts (Κυνικὰ καθάρµατα) who “have all passed by like a dream and 
a shadow.”78 This part of the text is preceded by a series of rhetorical questions about 
Plato, Pythagoras, and the Stoics, indicating how they have ultimately failed in their 
enterprises. This is followed by an ironic declaration about how these philosophers 
became glorious. Among the examples mentioned, he refers to the Athenians making a 
public monument to the epistles of Plato, and to philosophers passing all their time at 
ease and being wealthy (the example of this being Aristippus who used to purchase 
costly harlots). Chrysostom saves the final mention for the philosopher “of Sinope” who 
… “even behaved himself unseemly in the market place.”79 As is usually the case with 
Chrysostom’s references to Greeks, the reason he mentions all these is to contrast them 
to opposite Christian attitudes: “but there is no such thing here, but a strict temperance 
(σωφροσύνη), and a perfect decency (κοσµιότης), and a war against the whole world on 
behalf of truth and godliness.”80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Ibid. (PG 61:301-2; NPNF 1-12:212). 
78 In Matt. hom. 33.4 (PG 57:392; NPNF 1-10:217). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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Besides Paul, Diogenes is also compared, in John’s Discourse on Blessed Babylas, 
to the bishop and martyr Babylas.81 What Babylas demonstrated with his life was that 
“the philosophers, of whom they boast, are characterized by vainglory, impudence, and 
puerility.”82 The argumentation is very similar to the synkrisis between Diogenes and 
Paul: Babylas did not live in a wine cask, nor was he clothed in rags. John realizes that 
for some people Diogenes’ actions might seem astounding, involving much labor and 
pain, which he is willing to admit. But what he also admits is that whatever Diogenes 
did was without praise, since “useless labor is deprived of any encomium.”83 Diogenes, 
just like Crates, did not benefit the poor through his actions, or anyone else for that 
matter. The feats of Diogenes are further downplayed when Chrysostom refers to men 
(i.e. circus performers) who eat pointed and sharpened nails or chew up and devour 
sandals and says that these phenomena are much more impressive than the wine cask 
and rags.84  
We have already mentioned the comparison between Babylas and Diogenes in the 
previous chapter, and we would argue again that what the examples of Paul and Babylas 
demonstrate, and the point we believe John is trying to make with this synkrisis, is a 
contrast between Greek parasitism and Christian usefulness. In addition, Diogenes 
serves rhetorically to condemn all Greek philosophy by the use of an a fortiori 
argument.85 If Diogenes, who was generally admired by all philosophical schools, was 
found wanting, then all other philosophers were as well. Whilst Chrysostom calls Plato 
“the chief of their philosophers”, his frequent references to Diogenes show that he was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Which Dorival, “L’ Image,” 423, called “the most vigorous denunciation of Cynicism” in John’s 
corpus. 
82 De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 45.1-3 (SC 362:146; trans. Schatkin, Apologist, 100). 
83 De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 45.11 (SC 362:148; trans. Schatkin, Apologist, 101). 
84 De Bab. c. Iul. et gent. 45.12-18 (SC 362:148). 
85 Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 37: “the value of Diogenes as a model of moral behavior was part 
of the larger debate between pagans and Christians in the second half of the fourth century over which 
community was the legitimate heir of Greco-Roman educational and philosophical traditions.” 
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as equally, and even possibly more, admired as Plato, although for different reasons. 
We also saw the conclusions Chrysostom draws from the story of Diogenes meeting 
Alexander: Diogenes’ request was useless and selfish and his frankness was of benefit 
to no one. 
If we were to summarize John’s critique of Cynicism as personified in Diogenes, we 
could say that it fits all four main categories of patristic Christian criticisms against the 
Cynics as established by Gilles Dorival: Cynic “indifference, uselessness, hypocrisy and 
perversion, and vainglory.”86 As we have already seen, similar criticism has already 
been used by pagan opponents of the Cynics, and thus far Chrysostom is conforming to 
a common trope. Nevertheless, the fact that, along with Plato, Diogenes was the one 
philosopher whom Chrysostom repeatedly attempted to discredit by reinterpreting the 
motivations behind his behaviour might have another explanation: “Chrysostom is 
specifically interested in discrediting this pagan exemplar who most seems to embody 
Christian ideals.”87 
ii. Praising Diogenes: A re-evaluation of kingship 
However, John praises Diogenes elsewhere as a philosopher who is wealthier than 
all the kings, despite being clothed with rags, and as someone so important that King 
Alexander of Macedon abandoned his expedition against the Persians when he saw him 
and went to ask him if he needed anything, to which Diogenes gave no response.88 
There are two closely connected ideas at play here: wealth and power. Cynics and 
Christians shared a re-evaluation of the idea of kingship in their various comparisons 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Dorival, “L'image,” 431-2. However, I do not agree with Dorival that Cynicism was the primary 
Greek adversary for Christians and that when they attack Greek philosophy they primarily attack the 
Cynics. In John Chrysostom’s case, at least, Plato is attacked much more frequently than Diogenes when 
it comes to philosophers from the Classical period.  
87 Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 39. 
88 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.5 (PG 47:339). 
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between the king and the ascetic philosopher/monk respectively.89 The Cynic idea 
basically comes down to the point that “only the ascetic philosopher is really a king, 
since only he is independent and capable of guiding other people.”90 John claims with 
approval that Alexander the Great was also eager to provide Diogenes with everything 
in order to be able to touch his (spiritual) wealth. 91 It seems that the reception of 
Diogenes in John’s writings is more faithful to the Diogenes literary tradition than 
Julian’s or Epictetus’, who tended to refer to the previous literary tradition and expand 
it with ideas that could hardly be applicable to the historical Diogenes, and were also 
keen to emphasize certain features that are not particularly highlighted in literary 
references to Diogenes as they survive today.92 It may, of course, be the case that Julian, 
Epictetus, or even John Chrysostom, had access to a greater range of sources than we 
have today at our disposal. Without being able to verify this, what appears to be original 
in John’s image of Diogenes is his interpretation of Diogenes’ attitudes, particularly his 
discussion of the usefulness of Diogenes’ actions. His reconstruction of Diogenes can 
be either positive or negative, based on the requirements of his argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Modern scholarship has identified other similarities as well: “The Cynic ascetic was a predecessor 
of the monk in more than one way, but particularly in his role as a moral educator of humankind, whose 
moral instruction presupposes a) knowledge of virtue, b) following his moral principles, c) self-education 
and self-discipline.” Billerbeck, “Greek Cynicism,” 162.  
90 Billerbeck, “Greek Cynicism,” 152. It is not the only idea that has been identified as pronounced 
by the Cynics and later emphasized in Christian thought. Another example is the total renunciation of 
material possessions, “and in advancing as a prime motive for doing so the opportunity which it provided 
for the contemplation of real and lasting values,” which could be achieved primarily through the practice 
of autarkeia. See A.R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1968), 76. 
91 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 2.4 (PG 47:335; trans. Hunter, A Comparison, 103): “How much money do you 
think Alexander would have given to Diogenes, if Diogenes had wished to accept it? But he did not wish 
to. But Alexander tried hard and did everything so as to be able to approach the wealth of Diogenes.” 
John used the example of Diogenes here to show that there was a precedent for the monks’ contempt of 
wealth. Cf. Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynic,” 38: “Chrysostom’s invocation of Diogenes in defence of 
monasticism needs to be considered in light of the considerable suspicion against asceticism among 
Christian elites.” 
92 For the biases Julian brought to his assessment of the Cynics, see Abraham Malherbe, “Self-
Definition among Epicureans and Cynics,” in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition vol. 3: Self-Definition 
in the Greco-Roman World, eds. Ben F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1983), 
58: “His own austerity, susceptibility to religious mysticism, constant seeking for divine guidance, and 
the polemical nature of his addresses on the Cynics colour his views to an inordinate degree.” 
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iii. Criticism of contemporary Cynics 
While Diogenes seems to have been the only Cynic who was singled out 
individually, there are other references to the Cynics in John’s writings where they are 
criticized as a group. Thus, when talking about the riots in 387 in Antioch, he draws an 
unfavourable contrast between the attitudes of what appears to be Cynic philosophers 
and the monks during the crisis:  
Now where are those wearing threadbare cloaks, sporting a long beard, and 
carrying a staff in their right hands- the pagan philosophers, canine outcasts who 
are more miserable than dogs under the table and do everything for the sake of 
their stomachs? At that time, they all left the city, they all leapt away, and hid in 
caves. It was only the ones who by their actions had truly demonstrated wisdom 
who appeared so fearlessly in the market-place, as if no adversity had overtaken 
the city. While the inhabitants of the cities fled to the mountains and the deserts, 
the citizens of the desert rushed to the city, showing by their actions what on 
previous days I haven’t stopped talking about, namely that not even a furnace 
will be able to harm in any way the person who lives a virtuous life.93 
 
Here the phrase Κυνικά καθάρµατα appears for a second time, but, in this instance, 
instead of the old Cynics passing as a dream and a shadow, their contemporaries also 
prove themselves worthless of their title as philosophers.  Only the monks manifested 
themselves as real lovers of wisdom, proper philosophers, who were not afraid to show 
their virtue with their deeds, when they showed up in the city at the moment when 
everyone else, including the pagan philosophers, was leaving. The courage the monks 
displayed, in contradistinction to the cowardice of the so-called philosophers, shows 
that they are the truly manly philosophers who manifest their love of wisdom in direct 
correlation with their actions. We cannot be absolutely certain that many or most 
contemporary philosophers in Antioch John refers to were Cynics. But even if that was 
not the case, we can hypothesize that he chose to mention them over others due to 
Cynicism’s alleged bravery when confronting rulers -as in the example of Diogenes 
with Alexander- and the contemporary Cynics’ failure to emulate that attitude. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 De stat. 17.5 (PG 49:173; trans. Mayer and Allen, John Chrysostom, 108). John explicitly 
mentions the Cynics, but this is not obvious from the translation. 
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Another reference to the Cynics occurs in Chrysostom’s Homilies on Matthew, 
where all Greek philosophers are accused of wanting to emulate the shamelessness of 
the Cynics, without understanding that there is no point living in a tub if one is 
profligate at the same time. This is both an indirect reference to popular stories about 
Diogenes and also a point against him when compared to John the Baptist, who is the 
main character of this homily. John’s life represents the exact opposite of the Greek 
philosophers’ lifestyle: “showing forth all strictness of self-restraint” (πᾶσαν ἀκριβῆ 
φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιδεικνύµενος), “being a champion of godliness” (ἀθλητὴς εὐσεβείας ὤν), 
“and a philosopher of that philosophy which is worthy of the heavens” (καὶ φιλόσοφος 
τῆς τῶν οὐρανῶν ἀξίας φιλοσοφίας).94 Chrysostom’s point should be clear by now: 
despite the fact that some might hesitate to call the monks or John the Baptist 
“philosophers” in the usual sense of the word, their life and deeds prove them to be the 
only ones worthy of the name -  and in fact they demonstrate a more precise example of 
philosophy. 
iv. Summing up Chrysostom on the Cynics 
These are not the only references to Cynics in John’s writings. However, they are 
representative of John’s overall view. What we should keep in mind is that, besides the 
obvious references, there are also instances where Chrysostom introduces Cynicism (or 
apparent allusions to Cynicism) in a context which seemingly refers to something else. 
Thus, Chrysostom’s interpretation of the story of the Syro-Phoenician woman (Matthew 
15:21-28), particularly in his fifty second Homily on Matthew, is filled with a number of 
common Cynic topoi, including anaideia, parrhesia, and karteria, and presents the 
woman as a (Cynic?) philosopher in her own right, which in this case is a title of 
praise.95 In many respects, then, John’s critique of Cynicism has two aspects. The first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 In Matt. hom. 10.4 (PG 57:188; NPNF 1-10:62). 
95 In Matt. hom. 52 (PG 58:518-521). For a fuller discussion of the patristic interpretation of the story 
and the image of the woman as a Cynic philosopher see Downing, “Cynics and Early Christianity,” 302. 
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is his criticism of the older Cynics, which resembles critiques from the earlier Christian 
literary tradition. Here his main contribution is a series of comparative portraits where 
individual Christians such as Paul, Babylas, and John the Baptist are compared to 
Diogenes. The second is his criticism of contemporary Cynics, which resembles 
Julian’s critique minus the idolizing of Diogenes, and focuses on the Cynics’ attitude in 
the aftermath of the riots. Finally, in terms of his praise of Diogenes, although it was 
limited compared to Basil or Jerome, it is still an indication that he could find positive 
attributes in individuals from the pagan world, even if he is harsh in his condemnation 
of them on other occasions.96 
d. Autarkeia in the Thought of John Chrysostom 
From consideration of Chrysostom’s reception of the Cynics, we now turn to his 
reception of Cynic ideas. Before it became one of the most important ideas in the 
history of Greek philosophy, autarkeia (self-sufficiency) was primarily a political ideal 
related to the life of the polis in antiquity.97 But the concept rose to particular 
prominence when applied “to the individual life, to the divine and to the cosmos as a 
whole.”98  Glenn Most has shown that there is a certain degree of continuity from the 
self-sufficient oikos of the Homeric poems to the Aristotelian conception of the self-
sufficient polis as the ideal society, which concludes with Aristotle’s claim that humans, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Krueger’s explanation of what some might consider as lack of consistency is still unparalleled: 
“We can make the general observation that Late Ancient Christians cited Diogenes positively to support 
their arguments in favor of the life of poverty and self-control, and negatively to argue against 
surrendering to passion and lust. However, Christian lack of consistency with regard to Diogenes should 
not be surprising. Christians presented a varied picture of Diogenes because they had received a varied 
picture. The πρόσωπον of Diogenes was a composite of asceticism and shamelessness. The variety of 
ways in which Christians employed the chreiai attributed to Diogenes reflected the diversity within the 
figure of Diogenes which the chreiai preserved.” “Diogenes the Cynic,” 44. 
97 Thus, “a state [polis] comes into being since each of us is not independent, but actually needs the 
support of many people,” Plato, Rep. 2.369b (LCL 237:161). See also Marcus Wheeler, “Self-Sufficiency 
and the Greek City,” Journal of the History of Ideas 16.3 (1955), 416-20. 
98 Desmond, Cynics, 172. Glenn Most has defined it as “independence of external needs and freedom 
from external compulsion.” Glenn Most, “The Stranger’s Stratagem: Self-Disclosure and Self-Sufficiency 
in Greek Culture,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 109 (1989), 127. 
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unlike the gods and the animals, cannot be entirely self-sufficient.99 On the level of the 
individual person, autarkeia is an ethical ideal, something that one strives for, and its 
personification in Greek philosophy is the divine itself. Thus, for Diogenes, the richest 
man is the one who is self-sufficient. Starting with Diogenes,100 then, self-sufficiency 
became one of the fundamental principles of Cynicism and an ideal that would later be 
favourably received in the Christian tradition.  
i. Cynic autarkeia  
There are three characteristics of autarkeia that are of particular significance to the 
comparison between Cynic and Christian virtues. First, autarkeia functions on two 
levels in Cynicism: one is its physical aspect, where someone is content with “the bare 
necessities of life.” There is also a spiritual aspect: “complete detachment from the 
world and worldly values.”101  On the physical level, getting rid of superfluous things 
and reducing needs to an absolute minimum was the proper path to autarkeia, while on 
the spiritual level the possession of virtue was all that was required for happiness. The 
most rigid form of autarkeia recognized no value in the things that the majority seem to 
value the most, including wealth, pleasure, knowledge, and friendship, which a Cynic 
sometimes regarded as unnecessary luxuries. In other words, “nothing…that was to be 
derived from any source external to himself had any value for him or could affect him 
in any way.”102 Diogenes even gave up sexual intercourse to emulate Pan, thus 
renouncing what others thought of as most necessary.103  While the Cynic conception of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Most, “The Stranger’s Stratagem,” 128 with references to numerous ancient texts on autarkeia. 
100 Although there are already references to Antisthenes in Xenophon, Symp. 4.35-44 (LCL 168.610-
14).  
101 Audrey N. M. Rich, “The Cynic Conception of ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ,” in Die Kyniker in der modernen 
Forschung: Aufsätze mit Einführung und Bibliographie, ed. Margarethe Billerbeck (Amsterdam: B.R. 
Grüner, 1991), 233. The description of autarkeia in the next two paragraphs is indebted to this article. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Dio Chrysostom, Tyr. 17-20 (LCL 257:259-61). 
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autarkeia would soften over time, the original version was the one considered to be 
characteristically and genuinely Cynic.  
While the phrase “less is more” is first found in Robert Browning’s poem “Andrea 
del Sarto (called ‘The Faultless Painter’)”, the idea behind it has definitive Cynic roots. 
If you have little, you have little to lose, and if you desire nothing, you cannot be 
disappointed by anything. Cynicism is by and large a philosophy of zero expectations 
and just enough possessions to avoid death. Being self-sufficient allows the Cynic to 
operate on two levels: on the one hand his life resembles that of an animal and its very 
limited needs, or, in the words of Epictetus, every animal “is sufficient to himself, and 
lacks neither its own proper food nor that way of life which is appropriate to it and in 
harmony with nature.”104  However, the Cynic also operates on another, higher level: 
that of the divinity, who is entirely self-sufficient or as Diogenes put it, “it was the 
privilege of the gods to need nothing and of god-like men to want but little.”105  This 
paradox, the fact that the “αὐτάρκης is sub-human in so far as he descends to the animal 
level, super-human in so far as he approximates to the divine,”106  was simultaneously a 
point of pride for the Cynics and a weapon in the hands of their opponents, who would 
often equate them with irrational animals. Even Diogenes’ legendary meeting with 
Alexander is a paradigmatic case of autarkeia: Diogenes needs nothing, even from 
someone like Alexander.  
Secondly, the original idea of solitary autarkeia would later be crucial in the 
development of Christian monasticism, and it was exactly the ascetic tendencies of 
Cynicism expressed in ideas such as autarkeia that were influential in Christian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Epictetus, Diss. 1.9.9 (LCL 131:65). Cf. Dio Chrysostom, Serv. 10.16 (LCL 257:429): “Consider 
the beasts yonder and the birds, how much freer from trouble they live than men, and how much more 
happily also, this much healthier and stronger they are, and how each of them lives the longest life 
possible, although they have neither hands nor human intelligence. And yet, to counter-balance these and 
their other limitations, they have one very great blessing — they own no property." 
105 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 6.104 (LCL 185:109). 
106 Rich, “The Cynic Conception,” 234. 
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rhetoric. However, the reason we have chosen to use autarkeia instead of “self-
sufficiency” throughout this brief exposition is because “self-sufficiency” is inadequate 
for signifying all the nuances of the Greek term and, additionally, has negative 
connotations. As Doyne Dawson has argued, autarkeia also signifies "spontaneity" and 
a sense of freedom that comes both from helping others and through askesis.107 It can 
therefore be a communal, as well as an individual, concept. As it relates to the life of the 
individual, autarkeia often serves as a defence mechanism “against the vicissitudes of 
life and the fickleness of fate.”108 
Thirdly, while autarkeia was not the central Cynic value, it was essential for 
proceeding to the two essential virtues, freedom and parrhesia.109 The Cynic ideal of 
autarkeia would later influence other philosophical schools and their related concepts, 
such as the Stoic and Sceptic apatheia or the Epicurean ataraxia.110 It also influenced a 
number of Christian authors, John Chrysostom among them, and it is this influence we 
will attempt to trace in what follows. 
ii. Chrysostom on Christian autarkeia  
Chrysostom’s definition of autarkeia is very close to that of the Cynics: he defines it 
as “the using [of] those things which it is impossible to live without. I say food, not 
feasting; raiment, not ornament.”111 If humans simply asked just for food and shelter, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Doyne Dawson, Cities of God: Communist Utopias in Greek Thought (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 145-46. 
108 Philip Bosman, “Ancient debates on autarkeia and our global impasse,” Phronimon 16.1 (2015), 
13. 
109 Robert Bracht Branham, “Defacing the Currency: Diogenes’ Rhetoric and the Invention of 
Cynicism,” in The Cynics, ed. Branham and Goulet-Caze, 97: “[For the Cynics] Autarkeia (“self-
sufficiency”) is a desideratum, but freedom is imperative.” Different scholars have made various 
propositions as to what was the core idea that best sums up Cynicism. Autarkeia has been one of them, 
along with negative freedom, askesis, and critique of wealth. For the scholars representing each of these 
views see Desmond, Cynics, 245. 
110 Desmond, The Greek Praise of Poverty, 171. 
111 τροφὴν, οὐ τρυφὴν λέγω· σκεπάσµατα, οὐ καλλωπίσµατα. The wordplay is somewhat lost in the 
translation. In 2 Cor. hom. 19.3 (PG 61:534). 
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then they would be able to obtain much more than that.112 The one who does not desire 
what others possess, but is satisfied with what they have, is the wealthiest of all.113 
However, this limitation of desire only applies to earthly things. “In heavenly things let 
our desire of more never be satiated, but let each be ever coveting more. But upon earth 
let everyone desire only what is needful and sufficient, and seek nothing more.”114 At 
the same time, being autarkēs does not mean that one cannot enjoy things but rather that 
one should enjoy everything in moderation.115 Autarkeia is thus connected with certain 
practices that allow it to flourish. They include disregarding fancy clothing and 
excessive care of the body, focusing instead on caring for the soul and dressing it with 
virtue. As for the Cynics, primary examples of autarkeia are the animals, which do not 
exceed their limits whether they eat or drink. Chrysostom regrets that some humans 
have become worse than dogs and asses and always overcome the boundaries of 
moderation.116 But autarkeia is not an end in itself. On the contrary, it leads to all things 
that make human life better: pleasure, health, ease of mind, freedom, vigour of body, 
sobriety and alertness of mind.117 In fact, autarkeia is both nourishment and pleasure, 
health and acuteness of the senses, and nothing prevents disease better than that.118 
Autarkeia is then part of what Chrysostom sees as the health of the soul, and the best 
preventative medicines against sicknesses such as vainglory and anger.119 It also offers 
security and honor to one’s self and prevents us from seeking glory and approval from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In 1 Cor. hom. 16.3 (PG 61:138). 
113 De Laz. conc. 2.1 (PG 48:982). 
114 In 1 Thess. hom. 10.4 (PG 62:462; NPNF 1-13:370). 
115 Pasch. (long recension) 4.4 (SC 561:286-87). According to the editor, Nathalie Rambault, 
Introduction to SC 561:235-40, the homily belongs among the ps.-Chrysostomica that are mosaic in 
composition, but contains substantial portions of authentic Chrysostomian material. 
116 In Matt. hom. 57.6 (PG 58:565). 
117 In Act. apost. hom. 27.3 (PG 60:207). 
118 In Heb. hom. 29.7 (PG 63:207). 
119 For a discussion of John as a “therapist of the soul” see Mayer, “The Persistence.” 
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others when we have self-respect.120 Christian autarkeia thus automatically “corrects” 
one of the errors that John Chrysostom condemns in the Cynics: kenodoxia.121 
Chrysostom further adduces the idea of autarkeia in his various comments on social 
issues. For example, in the fourth Homily on 1 Timothy he describes the diverse ways 
we can glorify God through body and soul. He mentions specifically how women can 
do so: when they do not use perfumes, or paint themselves, but are satisfied with the 
way God made them, without any additional embellishments. When they do use such 
enhancements, it is as if they are thinking God’s craftsmanship is insufficient and 
consider themselves as better artists than Him. When the women adorn themselves, it is 
only so that they can attract crowds of lovers and insult their Creator. Instead, they 
should be autarkeis with their natural appearance and adorn it with modesty and 
chastity instead of paints and jewellery.122   
Chrysostom’s connection between divine craftsmanship and autarkeia is not the 
only instance of establishing a link with the concept of creating something out of 
nothing. Chrysostom also uses the concept of autarkeia to construct a hierarchy of arts 
and their usefulness for human life. These arts are housebuilding, weaving, shoemaking, 
and agriculture. Chrysostom claims that the latter is the most useful one, since “without 
shoes and clothes it is possible to live; but without agriculture it is impossible.”123 He 
then brings up the examples of the Nomads and the Gymnosophists,124 who utilized 
only agriculture from among these arts, and uses this argument to shame those in his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 In Matt. hom. 87.4 (PG 58:774). 
121 Kenodoxia stands as an obstacle to our journey towards the glory of God, the only true doxa. For 
the importance of kenodoxia in Chrysostom’s thought see A.M. Malingrey, Introduction to SC 13:13: 
“Toute la vie morale de l'antiquité s'appuie … sur la gloire qu'une bonne action rapporte à celui qui l'a 
faite. Si le mot doxa est un des plus usuels du vocabulaire grec, celui de kenodoxia prend, dans la langue 
des Peres, une importance qu'il n'avait jamais eue. Autant la doxa forme, pour un païen, l'atmosphère où il 
aime vivre, autant la kenodoxia est, pour un chrétien, la tentation qu'il faut fuir avant tout.”  
122 In 1 Tim. hom. 4.3 (PG 62:524). 
123 In 2 Cor. hom. 15.3 (PG 61:506; NPNF 1-12.352).  
124 Interestingly, certain aspects of the Gymnosophists’ lifestyle served as models in Cynic writings 
of the Imperial period. For a discussion of similarities and differences, see Claire Muckensturm, “Les 
Gymnosophistes étaient-ils des Cyniques modèles?” in Le Cynisme Ancien, 225-239. 
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audience who have introduced “vain refinements into life,” such as “cooks, 
confectioners, embroiders.” He claims that the reasons he mentions this is not to lay 
down a law so that they would live that way but to provide them with a proper hierarchy 
of the arts, which is the following: “First then comes agriculture; second, weaving; and 
third after it, building; and shoemaking last of all; for amongst us at any rate there are 
many both servants and laborers (οἰκέται καὶ γεωργοί) who live without shoes.”125 Both 
this example as well as the one mentioned in the previous paragraph are connected 
through a single theme: initially, God creates the woman in her natural beauty, and the 
humans create the art that is sufficient for them to survive. But in both cases, the 
humans exceed their limit and stop being self-sufficient: the woman insults her Maker 
by adding things that are unnecessary and not intended by Him, while humanity creates 
arts that are not fit for their survival, in order to satisfy their various pleasures, such as 
gluttony. 
Unlike Cynicism’s version of solitary autarkeia, Chrysostom’s paradigm envisions 
a community of self-sufficient people who serve as lights to each other.126 However, 
utter self-sufficiency is not in our nature, he argues; for this reason, marriage was 
instituted.127 Through marriage humans supply what they lack as individuals to one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 All of the references in this paragraph derive from In 2 Cor. hom. 15.3-4 (PG 61:506-7; NPNF 1-
12:352-53). In one of his Baptismal Instructions Chrysostom claimed that the simple rustic who spends 
his time farming and tilling the earth “has exact knowledge of things which the philosophers who take 
pride in their beard and staff have never even been able to imagine.” In his eyes, these simple folks hold a 
“deep philosophy of virtue” whilst not paying attention to visible things but have faith and hope in the 
invisible and unseen things. See Cat. 8.6 (SC 50bis:250-51; trans. Harkins, Baptismal Instructions, 121). 
For a similar comparison between a theologically-knowledgeable widow and an idle talking philosopher, 
see Mut. nom. hom. 4.5 (PG 51:152-53). The tradition of placing common people in a higher sphere of 
knowledge than philosophers precisely because they focus on invisible things goes back to Origen, who 
in Contra Celsum 7.46 (trans. Chadwick, Contra Celsum, 434) responds to Celsus’ accusation that 
common Christians do not understand Plato’s metaphysics because they are ἀπαίδευτοι: “They look, as 
they have learnt, not at the things which are becoming, which are seen and on that account temporal, but 
at the higher things, whether one wishes to call them 'being', or things 'invisible' because they are 
intelligible, or 'things which are not seen' because their nature lies outside the realm of sense-perception.” 
126 Adv. opp. vit. mon. 3.2 (PG 47:351). 
127 In 1 Cor. hom. 40.6 (PG 61:354) Chrysostom discusses the possession of slaves and claims that 
even though human beings were created to be self-sufficient, if someone cannot be without slaves, then 
one or two should be enough. For further discussion on slavery and self-sufficiency, see Chris L. De Wet, 
Preaching Bondage: John Chrysostom and the Discourse of Slavery in Early Christianity (Oakland: 
University of California Press, 2015), 56. Both marriage and slave possession then can be considered as 
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another and their incomplete nature becomes self-sufficient, which leads to its 
immortality through the succession of descendants.128 It is interesting that when 
Chrysostom talks about the institution of marriage he chooses to emphasize the fact that 
humans are not self-sufficient on their own. Elsewhere, he declares that God did indeed 
create humanity to be self-sufficient in order to choose virtue and avoid vice.129 Virtue 
is sufficient in itself and has no need for wealth, nobility, or anything else external to 
accompany it.130 As with other cases in Chrysostom’s writings, we cannot be certain 
whether one view is dominant over the other. It seems that, just as we noted earlier, here 
too he picks and chooses how he employs this concept, depending on the requirements 
of his argument, leading to the simultaneous exercise in his thought of different, but not 
incompatible, modes. On the one hand, he promotes autarkeia as communal, when he 
justifies marriage as an institution that provides the other half of autarkeia we lack as 
human beings. On the other, he promotes solitary autarkeia when he argues that our 
self-sufficiency only genuinely comes into play when we choose virtue over vice. At the 
same time, he had to make a convincing case for his claim that a solitary man/woman 
could indeed be autarkēs on his/her own, since otherwise he could not justify the choice 
of asceticism and the solitary life, which he had experienced himself.131 In a sense, John 
Chrysostom’s version of autarkeia is both solitary and communal, but even if solitary it 
would be useless without helping others, as the monks did at the time of the riots, and as 
Diogenes and the Cynics did not, because they were too preoccupied with their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
outcomes of Adam’s original disobedience that stripped humanity of the autarkeia with which it was 
originally created. 
128 In Ioh. hom. 19.1 (PG 59:120). 
129 In Rom. hom. 5.6 (PG 60:429). 
130 John expressed this view in one of his rhetorical outbursts against Greek philosophy, where he 
also argues against philosophers who denied the idea of providence or the origin of the world from God: 
De stat. 19.4 (PG 49:189). 
131 But see Wendy Mayer, “What Does It Mean to Say that John Chrysostom Was a Monk?” Studia 
Patristica 41 (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 451-5, for a reconsideration of the ancient biographies of 
Chrysostom and their descriptions of his ascetic regime. 
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vainglory. As always, Chrysostom considers the criterion of usefulness behind the 
motivation of every action.  
Our study of Chrysostom’s conception of autarkeia would not be complete if we did 
not refer to his commentary on the three NT occurrences of the word, two in the form of 
autarkeia and one as autarkēs, all three in Pauline writings.132 It is particularly in these 
commentaries that Chrysostom connects the concept with other virtues and develops a 
fuller theory of what it entails when it comes to its application in human life. First of all, 
John argues on the basis of Paul’s use of ἔµαθον, that autarkeia is something that we 
learn. It is therefore “a matter of teaching and exercise and care” which at the same time 
involves a great deal of difficulty and pain. Paul is autarkēs because he knows how to 
use little, to bear hunger and want, and his self-sufficiency is contrasted to abundance, 
which is without virtue.133 Paul’s prayer in 2 Corinthians 9:8 (“And God is able to 
provide you with every blessing in abundance, so that by always having enough of 
everything, you may share abundantly in every good work”) is called an example of 
great philosophy, because Paul wishes neither wealth nor abundance for the 
Corinthians. Instead, he condescends to their weakness by not compelling them to give 
from their want and asks them to be sufficient with what they have.  
In terms of his commentary on Paul, John connects his exhortation to autarkeia with 
the virtue of philanthropy. In his own exhortation to his audience, he utilizes Paul’s 
condescension yet again to argue that he is not asking them to reach the heights of 
indigence, but rather to cut off the superfluous things and learn how to be self-
sufficient.134  Finally, John also uses 1 Timothy 6:6 (“there is great gain in godliness 
combined with contentment”) as a lead in to a practical discussion of the value of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Philippians 4:11, 2 Corinthians 9:8 and 1 Timothy 6:6. For the possible sources behind Paul’s 
references to autarkeia, see Hans Dieter Betz, Studies in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians (Tubingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 91-112. 
133 In Phil. hom. 16.1 (PG 62:289; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 
trans. Pauline Allen, Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2013, 301). 
134 In 2 Cor. hom. 29.3 (PG 61:532-33; NPNF 1-12:369). 
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money and possessions. Εὐσέβεια and αὐτάρκεια are only great gains when we do not 
have wealth, not when we do. Possessions are worthless, Chrysostom argues, because 
when we leave this world they stay behind and do not follow us: “if we brought nothing 
with us, [then we] shall take nothing away with us.”135 In essence, God created 
humanity to be self-sufficient “so as to be able to choose virtue and avoid vice.”136  
e. Conclusion 
Numerous other Cynic themes appear in Chrysostom’s work, such as anaideia, 
hēdonē, typhos (atyphia), and others. A comprehensive study in which his and the 
Cynics’ interpretation of these themes are compared would be beneficial of future 
research, if we are to shed some much-needed light on the complicated subject of 
Cynicism and its reception in patristic writings. Indeed, the frequency of a number of 
key Cynic terms in Chrysostom’s writings leads one to suspect that his corpus in 
particular will prove in future to be a rich field for investigating in a more nuanced way 
how these ideas were assimilated and transformed.137 Our suspicion, even on the basis 
of the preliminary exploration undertaken in this chapter, is that the outcome will 
reinforce our finding that John would hesitantly approve of certain Cynic ideas, but 
would certainly not accept them without reservation. But as W. Mayer pointed out, even 
these ideas would need to be filtered through their interplay with similar Scriptural 
concepts before becoming normative in Christian discourse.138 Chrysostom’s 
engagement with the Cynics as individuals and with their ideas in any case shows the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 In 1 Tim. hom. 17.1 (PG 62:592; NPNF 1-13:468). 
136 In Rom. hom. 5.5 (PG 60:429; NPNF 1-10:365). 
137 A simple TLG search of the word παῤῥησία brings up more than a thousand references to 
Chrysostom’s works. We also know how important that concept was to the Cynics and the construction of 
Diogenes as the epitome of virtue.  
138 Mayer, “John Chrysostom on Poverty,” 81: “The point to be made here is that in assessing the 
discourse of John and other eastern bishops on the topics of poverty, wealth, virtue, and evergetism one 
should not expect it to be either novel or uniquely Christian, but rather deeply rooted in the Greek 
philosophical tradition. Their distinction lies rather in the way that they filter long-existing philosophical 
tropes through the Christian Scriptures, transforming them in the process into a specifically Christian 
ethic.” 
249 
continuing relevance of Cynicism in late antiquity even though its greatest 
representatives were long gone. Diogenes’ presence in the rhetorical handbooks and his 
popularity was something that many Christians (as well as non-Christians) felt they 
should be responding to, particularly as the establishment of Christianity as the state 
religion highlighted the need for Christians to showcase their own philosophers, even if 
they could not have their texts taught in schools. Chrysostom rose to that challenge with 
his comparison of Paul and Babylas to Diogenes but did not limit himself to just that. 
He expanded the meaning of autarkeia and interpreted it as both an exercise of the self 
as well as a communal event. Furthermore, he describes it as a gift from God, although 
humanity could not hold onto it after its fall. He also agreed with Cynic critiques of 
Greek culture and civilization and the effect it had on virtue, critiques which argued that 
the Greeks had by no means a monopoly on wisdom, if in fact one could call their 
philosophy proper wisdom-at least by Chrysostom’s standards.139 
The “tension” in Christian attitudes to the Cynics means that some Cynic values 
came under suspicion, while others were assimilated, and, in order to showcase that, we 
examined an example of the particular assimilation/critique of the Cynics by John 
Chrysostom. Here we saw that Chrysostom criticizes Cynics for typical reasons: love of 
praise, indecency and indifference, uselessness, and not being “real” philosophers. At 
the same time, his criticism is mostly directed towards contemporary pagan assessments 
of Diogenes (particularly Julian’s) and his refutation serves as another instrument in 
proving the superiority of Christianity over Cynicism.140 Thus, in terms of the reception 
of Cynics in his writings, he exhibits little difference from Christian and non-Christian 
critics alike and like others before him, such as Julian, he does not consider someone 
who wears a cloak and carries a staff and has long hair and a beard to be necessarily a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Cf. Ps-Anacharsis, Epistle 2 To Solon (trans. Anne McGuire, The Cynic Epistles, 39): “The 
Greeks are wise men, yet in no way are they wiser than non-Greeks. For the gods did not withhold from 
non-Greeks the ability to know the good.” 
140 Krueger, “Diogenes the Cynics,” 39. 
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philosopher. His expectations extend well beyond appearance to address the interior 
person instead. In terms of the nuances of his critique, he does praise Diogenes for re-
evaluating the ideas of kingship and wealth and, if we were to apply Diogenes’ 
parrhesia to Chrysostom’s life, we could claim that the latter’s tendency to “speak truth 
to power” was personally costlier. He does not, like Theodoret, distort the stories he 
refers to when talking about the life of Diogenes or Crates, but he does characterize 
their actions differently. Whereas Gregory of Nazianzus praises Crates for dispersing 
his wealth and becoming free from its bondage, Chrysostom applies the criterion of 
utility to the act, seeing instead a madman who could have put his money to better use.  
Finally, we also explored how John nuances and modulates one particular Cynic 
virtue, autarkeia. Chrysostom was quite careful to define the parameters, similarities 
and differences of Christian autarkeia. His main agreement with the Cynics was on the 
core definition of the concept. Aristotle describes controversies on the subject, with two 
sides involved: “about this question there are many controversies, owing to those that 
draw us towards either extreme of life, the one school towards parsimony and the other 
towards luxury.”141  At one extreme were those “who understood self-sufficiency as 
being able to cater for any personal need that might arise;” at the other, those “who 
believed that self-sufficiency is about restricting need to what is truly necessary.”142 
Both the Cynics and Chrysostom (with many others from the Christian tradition) 
strongly opposed the first definition, while promoting the second. It is in the 
implications of this within a specifically Christian empire and how autarkeia of this 
kind should be expressed in a person’s way of life that the two movements differed. 
Even so: why did Chrysostom and other Christians need to get involved in this debate, 
although indirectly? I believe that the response to this is related to the development of 
Christian discourse in the fourth century and the appropriation of the two constituents of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Aristotle, Pol. 7.1326b (LCL 264:561). 
142 Bosman, “Ancient debates on autarkeia,” 7. 
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classical rhetoric: rhetoric as a technique (“a form of specialized knowledge”) and “a 
means of institutional power.”143 From the later fourth century onwards there is a 
realization among Christian writers that they need to move beyond the sermo 
piscatorius, whilst maintaining their previous arguments in favor of simplicity and 
inclusivity144 and their argument that a Christian did not necessarily need learning in 
order to philosophize. One way of doing this was through the appropriation of concepts 
that their audience would be aware of (such as autarkeia) combined with a 
transformation, sometimes radical but often not, of what they entailed and how they 
could fit into their lives as citizens of a Christian empire. But this appropriation does not 
necessarily imply usurpation as has previously been argued, and the argument that “the 
purpose was to change consciousness by changing language” falls flat when we see that 
the reception of autarkeia was within the previous philosophical tradition and not 
outside of it.145 
For Chrysostom, this difference between Christianity and Cynicism became defined 
by the criterion of usefulness or utility. In this respect, our investigation into 
Chrysostom’s response against Cynic philosophy has also contributed to a discussion on 
the use of exemplars. The use of non-Christian or “pagan” exemplars, such as Diogenes, 
in Chrysostom is more complex than it appears at face value. Chrysostom uses the 
Cynics—both Diogenes and Cynic contemporaries of Chrysostom—as negative 
examples to highlight the nature and uses of voluntary poverty and charity, and the 
dangers of vainglory and neglecting modesty. At face value, Christians and Cynics may 
appear similar to one another, as Julian thought. Many may have held similar opinions 
about the commonalities between Christians and Cynics. But the renunciation of wealth 
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145 Herbert Hunger, “The Classical Tradition in Byzantine Literature: The Importance of Rhetoric,” 
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252 
without caring for the poor is akin to madness and vainglory. For Chrysostom, this is 
the main difference between Christians and Cynics. The Cynic exemplars in this way 
become convenient to illustrate the importance of, on the one hand, the act of wealth 
renunciation and, on the other, the motivation for it. And it is the motivations for one’s 
actions that receive priority in Chrysostom’s moral philosophy. 
In chapter 2 we described three primary modes of interaction in John’s reception of 
Hellenism: positive, negative, and neutral. As we relate these modes to our discussion in 
this chapter, we see him praising Diogenes, especially when he compares him to secular 
rulers, but otherwise disparaging him for his vanity and his uselessness when compared 
to Christian saints like Babylas. Yet despite his negative predisposition towards 
Diogenes and even Crates, we do not see him fabricating stories about them. Therefore, 
in terms of his reception of individual Cynics his attitude is mostly negative, sprinkled 
with a few positive references. What is more interesting is John’s reception of a concept 
particularly associated with Cynicism, that of autarkeia. Although we do not find any 
direct quotations from Cynics in his corpus, we can confidently assert that he was aware 
of the discussion related to the concept and a participant in it throughout his works. As 
we have shown, he would be willing to tentatively accept the Cynic conception of 
autarkeia with a few caveats, and would also include, as he did with many other 
concepts elsewhere, Paul and the monks as the most illustrious examples of someone 
who is perfectly autarkēs. In essence, his reception of the philosophic ideal behind 
autarkeia is generally positive, even if filtered through Christian discourse. What 
distinguishes him from other Christian writers is his particular reconfiguration and 
application of Cynic philosophical concepts such as the one we have been discussing 
and the way he integrates them in Christian popular discourse. 
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5. Conclusion 
John Chrysostom’s understanding of Christianity as a way of life is part of the 
patristic legacy that sought to present the Christian faith in practical as well as 
intellectual terms. It largely shares that feature with what we conventionally call 
“schools of ancient philosophy”, that is, different forms of life “defined by an ideal of 
wisdom.”1 In the introduction to this thesis we indicated that Chrysostom’s reception of 
Greek philosophy is sometimes used by scholars to fit grand master narratives on the 
relationship between Christianity and Hellenism, and, depending on the author’s 
position on the matter (peaceful co-existence, hostility, symbiosis), one can find 
statements to support any of these narratives. At other times, John’s name is 
conspicuous by its absence, even if he is sometimes classified alongside others either 
for his contribution to the project of “Christian Hellenism,” or for the influence that his 
hostility toward philosophy had in Byzantium and its attitudes towards the classical 
tradition.2 One has to wonder about this absence. Is it because the essentializing of two 
large concepts such as Christianity and Hellenism requires the formation of a canonical 
set of writers who can be considered representatives of each? And if Chrysostom was so 
influential in Byzantium and beyond, why is he not part of this set?  
In our literature review (chapter 1) we identified two scholarly focal points in the 
Christian reception of Hellenism: one that focuses on the time from the Apologists to 
Origen, and another on the Cappadocians. Both have previously been treated as 
paradigmatic, which is not a problem in itself except for the fact that it leaves out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 59. 
2 For example, we do not find a single reference to him in De Vogel’s article on Platonism and 
Christianity and he is not classified under the five main types of attitudes of early Christian writers 
towards philosophy. De Vogel, “Platonism and Christianity,” 19: “(a) total rejection and hostility, (b) a 
great open-mindedness and assimilation of philosophical thinking forms, (c) an extremely critical 
attitude, yet reception of certain elements, (d) far-going acceptance of philosophical thinking forms, 
sometimes in a spirit of syncretism, (e) far-going acceptance joined with transformation.” Many of the 
scholars we analysed in the literature review would include Chrysostom under type a, while a few might 
have opted for b. We believe we have sufficiently demonstrated that type c would be the most appropriate 
option, a type that according to Vogel also includes the Apologists, Origen, the Cappadocians, and 
Augustine (ibid., 20). 
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authors that would not fit either of these receptions, even if one can always find points 
of agreement. The study of the interaction between Christianity and Hellenism in Late 
Antiquity has been advanced on many fronts lately, yet Chrysostom’s role in it seems to 
be severely limited. This study is an attempt to overcome that limitation by bringing 
together a wide variety of texts from John’s corpus and reading them in the context in 
which they appear. In this respect, we look at several modes of interaction. We started 
in chapter 2 with John’s stark critique of the philosophers and their ideas, because this 
has often been the reason for sweeping scholarly judgments that dismiss his reception, 
thus allowing very little room for discussion of the actual subject matter. We have 
identified several reasons for this critique, including the fame of certain philosophers, 
the popularity of some of their ideas, and their role (as John understood it) as the 
intellectual masterminds behind paganism. We showed that in his polemic against 
Hellenism Chrysostom utilizes a method similar to that in his polemic against the Jews. 
He creates an anchor concept which is then used as a measuring stick against each 
group, although there is a major difference, as we shall explain below. The Jewish 
anchor concept is the Mosaic Law. In his attempt to argue against what he considers 
Jewish national pride, Chrysostom is not afraid to admit that he will use the prophets as 
weapons against them.3 In the case of the Greeks, the problem is their intellectual pride 
and the anchor concept is, obviously, philosophy. This is not just speculation on our 
part. John himself brings the two groups together and attributes their respective 
practices to the Law and philosophy.4 In fact, he assigns the first polemic against them 
to Paul. 
The major difference we indicated before needs to be explained. In using the Law 
against the Jews, Chrysostom treats it as a sacred text which now belongs to the 
Christians since the Jews failed to live up to its ideals and despite the fact that they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Adv. Iud. or. 8.1 (PG 48:927). 
4 In Col. hom. 6.1 (PG 62:339). 
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obstinately clinging to it.5 On the contrary, Greek philosophy is not treated as sacred 
anywhere in John’s corpus. In fact, it is usually considered as the main reason behind 
what he considers the downfall of the Greeks from their place as the most rational of all 
humans. It was because of the philosophers, their disagreements, and the perverted use 
of logismoi that the “Greeks” fell into irrationality and ended up worshipping sticks and 
stones. In this scheme, Hellenic religion often equals worship of creatures, either 
animate or inanimate. Chrysostom is never in doubt as to whether the Greeks were wise, 
at least from a secular point of view. In some issues, the Greeks are actually to be 
admired for their philosophical stance, because they did not have any expectations for 
any sort of future life. But an essential difference is related to the teachers each side 
could claim. Chrysostom had no issue with admitting that the Christians were first 
taught by a tentmaker, a publican, a fisherman, alongside exemplars such as the thief on 
the cross, the prostitutes, and even the Magi. For him, the insignificance of these 
individuals, at least according to worldly perceptions, was a cause célèbre and pointed 
to the divine origins of the Gospel. In this battle, he is willing to admit every argument 
the Greeks would use. Yes, Plato, Pythagoras and the others were philosophers, 
eloquent men of stature amongst their countrymen, glorious in their predecessors and 
honoured by everyone. Yet the hustlers beat the philosophers, the illiterate beat the 
rhetoricians and to prove this he would always ask, “Where is Plato now?” One has to 
wonder whether anyone in Chrysostom’s audience ever pointed out to him that Plato 
seems to be right here, as you keep mentioning him again and again. But we digress.  
Chrysostom’s doubts are mainly focused on the outcomes of Greek wisdom, one of 
which was the prevalence of idolatry. The question remains: why does he often feel the 
need to demarcate Greek philosophy and Hellenism from Christianity? I would argue 
that the answer to this is Chrysostom’s audience, regardless of his method of delivery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 De Sac. 4.4 (SC 272:256). 
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(oral/written or treatise/sermon).6 When Chrysostom speaks (or writes) he has in front 
of him (or envisions) a Christian audience which needs to be educated. Part of this 
education is the argument that philosophy is not necessary for salvation. If we see the 
problem through this lens, his argument is not against philosophy per se but rather its 
soteriological role.7 Chrysostom’s most important argument against Greek philosophy is 
that, unlike faith, it has no salvific value. Someone who is well versed in philosophy has 
no advantage over someone who is illiterate in regard to their salvation as individuals, 
and Chrysostom could point to numerous examples to the effect of the illiterate 
prevailing over the educated, from Paul’s victory over Plato and other Greek 
philosophers to the monks exhibiting real philosophy during the statues riots, unlike the 
allegedly brave Cynics.8 John is also willing to exploit the Greek intellectual tradition 
from within, as when he refers to the animosity between philosophers and sophists or 
when he uses the disagreements of the philosophers as an argument against the unity of 
philosophy. His polemic against philosophy must also be related to the specific context 
of Greek philosophy in the fourth century, and particularly the role of the philosophers 
as theurgists.9 One might offer the counterargument that this was not the aim of 
philosophy in general, and even more so before the Neoplatonists. But Chrysostom has 
intertwined it with religion to such a degree that for him their separation would be 
unthinkable.	  One avenue of further research which has emerged from our study is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For the debate on the composition of Chrysostom’s audience, particularly in terms of issues such as 
social class and gender divisions, see Wendy Mayer, “Who Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach? 
Recovering a Late Fourth-Century Preacher's Audience,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 76:1 
(2000),73-87. Cf. Maxwell, Christianization and Communication, 65-87 for the actual composition of the 
audience. 
7 Papadopoulos, John Chrysostom vol. 2, 9 (my translation): “He does not deal with the problem of 
the value, beauty, or power of philosophy in itself, elements that he silently accepts, since he uses its 
structures and shapes.”  
8 For an example of Paul being victorious against Plato see In Rom. hom. 3.3 (PG 60:414). For the 
monks’ exhibition of true philosophy in Antioch see De stat. 17.2 (PG 49:173-4). 
9 Limberis, ““Religion” as the Cipher for Identity,” 380: “For most of the fourth century, 
philosophers at the best schools gained their reputations much less from their dialectic skill than from 
their daemonic powers that manifested their greatness through supernatural signs. The philosopher’s 
authority resided in his ability to manifest holiness, and his ability to prove that holiness is genuine, rather 
than in his skill at rational disputation.” 
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desirability of a more detailed examination of this theme. It is exactly because of this 
that he also traces the influence of philosophy to Christian heresies of his own time and 
thus sometimes treats Hellenism (in the sense of paganism) as the originator of 
Marcionism, Manicheanism, Sabellianism, and Arianism.10 The common basis is not at 
the level of ideas, however, but rather in that in all these cases the mistake he attributes 
to them is an excessive reliance on their own reasonings (logismoi) that can only lead to 
wrong belief. In terms of his own contribution to the anti-philosophical discourse, 
Chrysostom has been credited as the first author who used the term “Christian 
philosophy” (or simply “our philosophy”) in contrast to Greek philosophy, as a concept 
by which he just meant a Christian way of life.11  
Chrysostom’s attacks on philosophy and pagan religious practices have also been 
interpreted as markers of identity, primarily by I. Sandwell and J. Maxwell. The 
assumption is that Chrysostom was chiefly interested in erecting boundaries between 
his group of Christians and every other religious group, and that he tried to do so by 
establishing clear-cut definitions and constructing an exclusive religious identity. 
Sandwell particularly emphasises that at that time Christianity was not something that 
was absolutely defined, and that its boundaries could still be very fluid. This is all well 
and good, minus the fact that the Christian community in Antioch had a history of more 
than 300 years before Chrysostom was born and one would assume that in the meantime 
it would have formed some sort of identity, even if it was not as “clear-cut” as 
Chrysostom’s; this point of view also leaves aside the fact that Chrysostom is neither 
the first nor the last Christian attacking philosophy and paganism, and that in fact he 
provides no concrete systematic definitions for them other than that they were practices 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 E.g. In Gen. hom. 2.3 (PG 53:30).  
11 Hubertus R. Drobner, “Christian Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Studies, 
eds. Ashbrook Harvey and Hunter, 678. The reference is to Chrysostom, Homily on the Kalends (PG 
48:953-62). Malingrey’s definition is still unrivalled: “L'incarnation de la foi chrétienne avec toutes les 
exigences qu'elle comporte, indépendamment d'une forme de vie particulière.” Anne Marie Malingrey, 
Philosophia: Étude d'un groupe de mots dans la littérature grecque, des présocratiques au IVe siècle 
après J.-C. (Paris: Klincksieck, 1961), 288. 
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involved with a different way of life. If we take his polemic against paganism as a fight 
against a clear-cut concept, we disregard the varieties of Hellenism and paganism 
present in his very own works, unless one thinks that references to onion worship 
among the Egyptians or to the cult of Helios are part of one and the same thing. 
Chrysostom’s constant attack on isolated elements from paganism was not just a part of 
his strategy to use it as a contrast to Christianity and thus as part of his “construction” of 
Christian identity. It was literally what Paul and tens of other Christian writers before 
Chrysostom did as well. When Chrysostom attacks blood sacrifices, he is not 
constructing an identity. He just follows Paul’s thought in 1 Corinthians 10:20 to its 
logical conclusion.   
This point of view is also overlooking the fact that, just like “pagans” such as 
Porphyry, Chrysostom had both praise and blame for the Greeks, and just like Porphyry 
he could be extremely critical of both the gods and pagan religious practices. Do we 
imply that their intentions were the same then? Absolutely not. What we are arguing is 
that not every attack on certain religious practices is due to a hypothetical construction 
of an identity and/or the erection of boundaries. If Chrysostom was interested in 
erecting boundaries, which we think he was not, then Hellenic philosophical schools did 
as well. After all, they too relied on assimilation and memorization of the dogmas and 
way of life of the school, which was presumably John’s aim for the Christians as well.12 
In his case he did not even have to argue that he was following tradition. In his mind, as 
we have shown, the first and ultimate demolisher of the philosophers and of paganism 
was Paul. Despite this, scholarly discussions	   of identity have not particularly paid 
attention to John’s dependence on the New Testament and Pauline examples, at the 
expense of losing sight of his biblical influences. In essence, the argument comes down 
to the purpose of Chrysostom’s preaching: was it primarily an exercise in identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 59. 
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formation? Or simply the exercise of a priest’s (and later bishop’s) duty to interpret the 
Bible in order to bring salvation to those whom he is preaching? And why could it not 
be both? We would argue that a combination of these is the only solution to this 
problem and the tendency to read Chrysostomic material as a constant positioning on a 
battleground between different groups. Familiarity with the whole of Chrysostom’s 
corpus would show that there never was a sense of any great conflict. 
One of Chrysostom’s points of contention was what he perceived as the Greek 
philosophers’ support of the ancient religion. The chain of philosophers who acted as 
enablers of paganism is a long one and goes back all the way to the pre-Socratics. But to 
these he would add quite a few from his own time, particularly Libanius, and the one he 
calls the most impious of all: Julian the Emperor. Julian should be always kept in mind, 
and not just because Chrysostom wrote a treatise against him. Although he is writing 
long after Julian’s death, the latter’s memory, along with the possibility that someone 
like him might reach the imperial throne again, is very much alive in his mind. This is 
important not only because Julian made the strongest case for uniting Greek learning 
and religion in an unbreakable bond, but also because of his claims that Christianity is 
“antithetical to the civilized life.”13 In terms of Chrysostom’s description of pagan cultic 
practices, at points they seem to resemble similar descriptions from Libanius’ Julianic 
orations,14 and can thus be contextualized more as a description of late antique 
paganism than an actual knowledge of classical or even Hellenistic religious practices. 
Likewise, we cannot dismiss the possibility that John was superimposing the attitude of 
contemporary philosophers towards religion back to the philosophers of the classical 
era. Nonetheless, John’s understanding of paganism was not the most refined: idolatry 
is often reduced to the worship of sticks and stones, an inability to distinguish between 
the Creator and his creation, and the divinization of mortals and natural elements.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Limberis, ““Religion” as the Cipher for Identity,” 385. 
14 Cf. Libanius, Or. 18.126 (LCL 451:361) with De capt. Eutr. 14 (PG 52:409; NPNF 1-9:261). 
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But to focus on depictions of the philosophers as mere enablers of paganism is 
missing the point: their image throughout Chrysostom’s corpus shows a multivalence of 
approaches15 that help Chrysostom make specific arguments. At one end of the 
spectrum, as we saw in Chapter 2, Plato is a shameless pimp who wants women to be 
common to all and to fight naked in public: he is also an advocate for pederasty and the 
epitome of a failed philosopher. At the other end, Plato is a quiet ascetic who spends his 
days tending to his garden and sustains himself with olives and herbs. One might 
wonder: how could both images be written (or spoken about) by the same person? The 
answer goes back to a point we made in Chapter 1. All too often scholars look for 
consistency where none is to be found; but one wonders why it was expected in the first 
place. Chrysostom is able to use both images of Plato in different places because he is 
trying to make two different and unrelated points. By focusing on the negative images, 
scholars have misinterpreted Chrysostom as a pathological enemy of Hellenism. The 
same misinterpretation applies to a number of other issues. For example, his opinion on 
the value of rhetorical education has been interpreted as an all-out attack on paideia.16  
And yet, as we have shown, it was no such thing. The opposite interpretation can 
also be applied, with certain passages treated in isolation in order to show that 
Chrysostom had no issues with education in his day and that he could easily recommend 
a reading of the classics without feeling that it would threaten Christian beliefs in any 
way. This interpretation would also miss the point. Chrysostom definitely had issues 
with the educational system of his day, specifically with its outcomes and the danger of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 It would be amiss if we did not point out that the same multivalence applies to Chrysostom 
himself: in his time, he was accused of being too friendly with the Greeks and of being too forgiving 
towards sinners (Socrates, Hist. Eccl. 6.21, GCS NF 4:345, for the first accusation; Photius, Bibl. 59, ed. 
Henry, 56, for a report of the charges brought against him by the monk Isaac at the Council of the Oak). 
Today, he is called the archenemy of Hellenism and his expectations from Christians are considered to 
have been too demanding. 
16 A similar interpretation has been proposed in relation to his attacks against “paganism.” But these, 
as Liebeschuetz pointed out previously, were only occasional and sporadic because he realised that 
without public support it would inevitably fade away: Ambrose and John Chrysostom, 152. For this view 
see Athanassiadi, Julian and Hellenism, 19. 
261 
someone mastering rhetorical training without sufficient spiritual preparation. 
Essentially, this was a fear that an exclusive focus on the classics could lead one to 
disregard the Bible.17 This acknowledgment, however, should not be taken as indicative 
that he was on a mission to take the whole system down or that this was even his secret 
aim. When he recommends reading the books of those “outside,” he does this as a 
concession to his audience. He knows that some of them find pleasure in reading 
philosophy, and thus exhorts them to read it in a paradigmatic fashion. One should not 
be surprised to not find Chrysostom recommending a program of studies based on the 
classics.18 Besides the fact that he was a priest, not a school teacher, he did not do that 
with Christian books either. In fact, the only book he ever recommended to an audience, 
other than the Bible, was Athanasius’ Life of Anthony, and we would argue that this was 
not accidental.19 Chrysostom’s links to Egypt, both through his connections with 
individuals with first-hand experience of Egyptian asceticism like Palladius and John 
Cassian, and through some of the concepts he shares with ascetic writings (such as 
νῆψις), need to be further examined, and we believe this is another fruitful avenue for 
research emerging from our study. The classic distinction between the Antiochene and 
Alexandrian schools and their assumed opposition might be the reason this research has 
not yet been undertaken, but, as with his biblical exegesis, Chrysostom was no standard 
Antiochene, even if he is treated as such. 
What about his actual engagement with philosophy itself? As we have seen, in a few 
instances he engages with cosmological ideas. At the same time, there is not much focus 
on metaphysical concepts. In general, we should be cautious when reading texts 
referring to the philosophy of those “outside,” since, as we saw in chapter 2, John could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Papadopoulos, John Chrysostom vol. 2, 13. See n. 60 in Chapter 1 for analysis of a complete 
misinterpretation of a passage from Against the Opponents of Monastic Life. 
18 Even if other Christian bishops and intellectuals, like Basil of Caesarea, did. The point needs to be 
repeated. The Christian response to Hellenism was neither uniform nor identical, and sometimes the local 
context could make all the difference. 
19 In Matt. hom. 8.7 (PG 58:88). 
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be quite flexible with the application of the term Hellenes to all pre-Christian non-Jews 
and the attribution of their religious practices to “paganism.” His acquaintance with 
certain ancient texts cannot be doubted, even if sometimes his knowledge of them came 
through Eusebius, as in the case of Timaeus. In other cases, as we have demonstrated, 
his reception of different texts (such as Plato’s Republic) or individuals (such as Plato or 
Pythagoras), shows a monomania with certain concepts to which he repeatedly returns. 
Severe criticism of a number of recommended practices from the Symposium and of 
Pythagorean and Platonic eschatological ideas is abundant. This engagement can tell us 
a few things, not only about the popularity of some texts and certain ideas, but also 
about one of the issues we questioned in the beginning of this thesis. Often, Christianity 
and Hellenism have been treated as entities that are either compatible or incompatible.  
In Chapter 1 we asked why this question is asked in the first place. This is a false 
dilemma, because it assumes that the only interaction Christianity could have with 
Hellenism would be to either absorb it or discard with it. If this premise is accepted, it 
also creates a dead end: if it was absorbed, then Christianity was Hellenized—which for 
certain strands of scholarship would mean that it was corrupted. If it was discarded, then 
Hellenism died, or at least was in limbo. In light of Christianity’s interaction with 
various other cultures in antiquity, why did it particularly have to be compatible or 
incompatible with Hellenism? Chrysostom would opt for a model of symbiosis, with 
certain caveats. On issues like faith and salvation, compatibility is not even a question. 
On other issues, he could be more flexible and allow for inquiry outside the Christian 
modes of discourse. This application to religious ideas is very important and it should 
be kept in mind because we will return to it later.  
An exclusive focus on Chrysostom’s negativity towards the Greeks and their 
philosophy also does a disservice to the fact that neither the Greeks nor the Jews were 
the constant target of his ire. He would often reproach some Christians about the way 
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they behaved in public: for example, their reaction to losing a loved one, or their pub 
crawls after martyr festivals or their dressing in church. Let us briefly consider just one 
of those, which we examined in more detail in Chapter 2: Chrysostom’s issue with 
some Christians’ mourning customs because they resembled the mourning of those 
"without hope," i.e. the Greeks. Their long cries showed disbelief in the resurrection, 
something that was harmful to both themselves as well as to the person that was dead, 
or rather, asleep. One of his concerns was that the Christians would be mercilessly 
mocked by other groups for their behaviour, especially when they behaved like Greeks. 
This trope is always accompanied by a number of examples, the most common being 
women (pagan or Christian) chanting incantations or Christians attending the theatre or 
horse races.20 John was a strong believer in the power of public behaviour, and to this 
extent he found many examples of Christians behaving shamelessly, which he was not 
hesitant to criticise, and many examples of Greeks (both past and present) behaving 
philosophically, which he commends. The dynamic of this kind of social behaviour is 
hard to imagine in a culture where religion is essentially a private matter that is 
considered too rude to be discussed in public.   
At the same time, and as we saw in Chapter 2, Chrysostom often finds common 
ground on specific religious ideas, such as a last judgment and a retribution for our 
human deeds on earth. On this, he would claim, everyone agrees: poets and 
philosophers, Greeks and barbarians, and of course, the Christians. We cannot 
confidently say why he felt the need to refer to this common ground. One might 
speculate that this was because many from his audience would be familiar with these 
ideas. Others might say that at times he was prone to showcase his extensive classical 
education by evoking images from his student days. He is also willing to praise certain 
philosophers who rejected what both he and they considered as false values: wealth, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See e.g. Illum. Cat. 2.5 (PG 49:240). 
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excessive pleasures, and fame. Yet this was no uncritical acceptance. In most cases, the 
praise was concluded with a critique of the philosophers’ motive, principally vainglory.	  
We should also consider John’s pastoral considerations. He could very well have been 
trying to address concerns from his audience. Perhaps they were the ones who 
questioned how much ‘Hellenism’ they could have in their lives while yet remaining 
Christians, and he could have been trying to show them how they could properly 
integrate the two. His first concerns, as others have mentioned before, were always 
pastoral.   
Vainglory is connected with the other major theme of Chrysostom’s critique of 
philosophy: its usefulness and the way it is connected to the title of the philosopher. 
According to Chrysostom, Christian philosophy is based on a different premise, one that 
is more inclusive about who is eligible for the title of philosopher. Oftentimes, the 
philosopher is someone who knows a trade and is employed to do manual labour, 
contrary to those “who are brought up to nothing and are idle, who employ many 
attendants, and are served by an immense retinue,”21 an image that brings to mind the 
philosopher as an idle aristocrat who spends his days thinking while others take care of 
his needs. By contrast, for John hard work is definitely “a kind of philosophy” that 
keeps the soul pure and the mind sharper.22 The man that has nothing to do is by 
definition lethargic and spends his days doing either nothing or useless things. On the 
contrary, the manual worker is busy with useful enterprises, whether in deeds, words or 
thoughts and so is not to be despised. Chrysostom’s argumentation is not just about the 
distinction between idlers and workers, however: it extends to the right use of one’s 
leisure, and the subsequent rewards or punishments one will receive based on one’s use 
of it; that is, whether you are living your life as you should, or if you are wasting it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 In 1 Cor. hom. 5.6 (PG 61:47; NPNF 1-12:28).  
22 Ibid. 
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away.23 With this discussion in mind, we can gain a much better understanding of 
Chrysostom’s comment that Peter was more philosophical than Plato and his emphasis 
on the exhibition of philosophical attitudes by anonymous individuals. John even refers 
to the example of a crippled widow begging outside the Church.24 If she is examined on 
things such as the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of bodies, divine providence, 
the last judgment, punishment of sinners, etc., she will respond with precision. This is 
not the case with the philosophers who thinks that their hairstyle and staff make them 
great, and whose long speeches are garrulous and meaningless. This type of criticism is 
not unknown to Hellenic tradition, as we saw in the example of Julian and the Cynics or 
Diogenes’ comment that Plato’s lectures were “a waste of time.”25	   But, as we have 
shown, Chrysostom employs it to particular effect in contrasting Christians and Greek 
philosophers, both famous and anonymous. 
In order to highlight the virtues of what he considered Christian philosophy, 
Chrysostom was keen to use exemplars representing each side. As we have shown in a 
series of comparisons studied in detail in Chapter 3, his aim was to show the superiority 
of Christians through the use of specific themes, especially the visible success of 
Christianity and the fact that the philosophers failed in all their enterprises. John is also 
involved in re-appropriating derogatory terms directed against Christians, such as 
Galileans, and turning them on their head by emphasizing that in the end it was the 
Galileans who won. The ad hoc nature of these comparisons should also be mentioned 
again. The repetitive nature of certain accusations shows that John had a number of 
stock paradigms in mind, which he could flexibly apply to the individual he was talking 
about, whether he was referring to a pagan or a Christian. We also argued (although 
cannot conclusively prove) that the exception to the use of these stock paradigms are the 
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24 Mut. nom. hom. 4.5 (PG 51:152-3). 
25 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 2.6 (LCL 185:27). 
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first in his series of homilies on Matthew, where he discusses the various politeiai 
written by Greek philosophers and points to their failure by establishing the success of 
Christ’s politeia, and the Discourse on Babylas, which we analysed extensively in 
chapter 3. The reason these two texts seem exceptional is due to their carefully crafted 
arguments, literary references and direct quotations from Libanius’ corpus. The 
reasoning behind these synkriseis is best explained by John himself. Firstly, if someone 
wants to adopt the greatest way of life, then the emulation of one’s example acts as an 
education. Secondly, when the soul is sick from belief in false doctrine, then the 
application of words becomes an emergency treatment, in order both to safeguard the 
Christians and to respond to attacks from those “outside.”26 By comparing Greeks and 
Christians then, John achieves both aims: he showcases examples that can be emulated, 
but also points out the effects false doctrines had on the lives of the Greeks in order 
both to prevent the Christians from emulating them and also to counterattack the ἔξωθεν 
for their high regard of these individuals.  
Our study concluded in Chapter 4 with an example of how Chrysostomic 
scholarship can move forward when examining his reception of Hellenism and 
philosophy. First, we looked into Chrysostom’s reception of Cynicism by situating it 
within the context of previous Christian assessments of the Cynics. We showed the 
extent to which his reception was similar to other Christian writers and we analysed the 
differences in his assessments of individuals like Diogenes and Crates. We then looked 
into a philosophical concept related to ethics and closely associated with Cynicism: 
autarkeia. There is a characterization of Chrysostom repeated ad nauseam in 
scholarship: that he was a moralist preacher/minister, but not a theologian or 
philosopher. Even if the terms are not exactly clarified, it is true that Chrysostom was 
very much concerned with practical ethics. As we saw, John commended certain 
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philosophers (Diogenes, Crates, Anacharsis) for spending their lives concerned with the 
ethical part of philosophy, which was the reason they lived brilliant lives and also 
became very famous. This rare endorsement led us into looking at various ethical 
concepts within Cynicism. We chose autarkeia because the three references to the word 
in the New Testament would surely not provide enough material for Chrysostom’s 
points, even though his primary example of autarkēs is, to no-one’s surprise, Paul. We 
then compared the exegesis of the term in both the Cynics and John. What we found 
were two competing modes of discourse that shared enough similarities to be 
considered part of a discussion within the same intellectual tradition. We argued that in 
his use of the term autarkeia Chrysostom is exhibiting a method of reception which is 
complex and subtle and which falls outside the models of either outright hostility or 
complete approbation. To some extent, this conclusion coheres with the work of 
scholars such as Wendy Mayer, who have been working with a similar model for some 
time. Nevertheless, through our in-depth examination of the term autarkeia, we have 
shown that Chrysostom’s use of other key Cynic concepts such as parrhesia or tuphos 
would be worth examining. Our detailed study of the Cynics also shows that the fact 
that John did not engage with Platonic metaphysics as much as others did does not 
mean that his engagement with Greek philosophy was limited.  
All too often Chrysostom’s comments towards philosophy have been interpreted as 
casual disparagement and deliberate mocking, without sufficient consideration of the 
precise content of the comments. Let us examine one example of John criticizing 
specific philosophical doctrines for being wrong: “that the things existing was destitute 
of a providence, and that the creation had not its origin from God; that virtue was not 
sufficient for itself, but stood in need of wealth, and nobility, and external splendour, 
and other things still more ridiculous.”27 Are these legitimate philosophical opinions or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 De Stat. 19.1 (PG 49:189; NPNF 1-9:465). Our citation of this passage deliberately omits its 
context. John’s critique in this case, as in many others, does not appear out of nowhere. The context is a 
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just plain straw men that John introduces as such? And do they constitute what someone 
might consider an unthinking disparaging of all Greek philosophy?  
Yet this sort of commentary sometimes comes from unrealistic expectations. How 
could someone possibly expect John to praise philosophy when comparing it to 
Christianity? Is there even one example of a Christian ever doing that? On the contrary, 
as we have shown, John’s is an engagement with a complex set of ideas in mind. The 
variety of themes and concepts in ancient philosophy enabled not only a diversity of 
thought but also a plurality of modes of interaction by those traditionally thought of as 
its opponents. Some of these interactions have been well documented,	  but this study has 
aimed to demonstrate the complexity of the interaction in more detail. Still more 
remains to be done and one hopes that this will indeed be part of the future of 
Chrysostom studies.  
Chrysostom’s contribution to the patristic relation between Hellenism and 
Christianity was to bring certain ethical concerns that have been part of the 
philosophical tradition for a very long time to the forefront of Christian discourse. By 
virtue of that he reclaimed a Hellenic tradition of social justice which not only went on 
to have an enormous influence in Byzantine homiletic literature and practice, but which 
also, through his writings, became synonymous with authoritative orthodox biblical 
exegesis. In the end, his overall reception of Hellenism is not so different to that of 
many of his Christian counterparts. He is, at times, very critical; at other times, neutral; 
and, occasionally, he can praise the Greeks and their philosophy too. What is different, 
as we hope to have shown, are the specific aspects of Hellenism he chooses when 
utilising any of these three modes of interaction. Aaron Johnson described Hellenism in 
late antiquity as a sort of rhetorical and conceptual toolbox from which the educated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
comparison between these philosophers and the monks and the opinions each group holds over these 
issues. However, this is not the important issue. Chrysostom uses it as a lead to the real point he wants to 
make: what good was all this schooling to these pagan philosophers since when the crisis hit the city (the 
statues riots) all they did was vanish into thin air? And how were the illiterate monks harmed by their lack 
of knowledge since they were the only ones to brave the elements and face the situation headstrong?  
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drew in order to articulate their own identity as well as that of others.28 Anthony 
Kaldellis then posits Hellenism as existing in limbo for about 600 years (400-1000 
AD).29 I think the most appropriate metaphor for the way Chrysostom and other 
Christian intellectuals in late antiquity saw Hellenism is that it resembles Schrödinger's 
cat. Is Hellenism alive or dead? Or is Hellenism both alive and dead? From John’s point 
of view, it was the latter, for he was always willing to embrace a paradox. In one of 
John’s most brilliant paradoxical statements, the apostles overcome the Greeks’ wisdom 
by becoming wiser than those considered wise. Hellenism may or may not have been 
dead. Either way, Chrysostom had to deal with it.30 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Johnson, “Hellenism and Its Discontents,” 439.  
29 Kaldellis, Hellenism in Byzantium, 173-88. 
30 In our case the metaphor works like this: people who look at individual bits of Chrysostom’s 
corpus and even overlook the context of some of these bits remind us of the observers of the cat, giving a 
status to Hellenism that is only fixed at an individual moment of observation. I would like to thank Dr. 
Richard Flower for this excellent point.  
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